CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY0
er definition of the consequenceseparate treaty is tothe incentive for the West to negotiate an Interim Berlin agreement as anunilateral Soviet ac^ tion.
[Foreign Minister Gromyko mtecnhatolution was still negotiable, afterthe standard demandeace treaty with both German states and the creationree city in Berlin.
Timed for maximum impact on the talks between Presidents Eisenhower and De Gaulle,speech was probably intendedeply 'to De Gaulle's statement that no solution could be reached on Berlin or Germany. The Soviet premier sharply criticized "some statesmen" who Intend tooncommittal exchango of opinions at tho summit and avoid reaching "concrete"
Khrushchev adhered closely to tho position taken by the Soviet delegation in thenegotiations Anthe West for insisting on substituting control for Gromyko's private)re-marks that Khrushchev^will beconcrete" decision on disarmament provide further evidence that Moscow.will pressoint statement endorsing the main principlesreaty for complete and generalwhich the Sovietcould represent as ato proceed with the Soviet plan.
Tho Soviet leader also made it clear that he anticipates hard bargaining at the summit on the
Khrushchev,peech onpril at Baku,review of his negotiating position on the major summit issues. Predicting that the favorable trend ln International affairs would continue after the summit, he assigned top priority to disarmament, to be followediscussion of Germany and Berlin. Nuclear test ban negotiations and the general category of East-West relations were also Included as subjects for summit
The speech was anotherof tbe Soviet strategy of combining pressure andto extract concessions from the West. After Moscowravda,article in mid-April to oncourage speculation on theof an interim solution on Berlin, Khrushchev sought to sharpen the alternatives open to the West by spoiling out in some detail the consequences of the conclusioneparate peace treaty with East Germany. He elaborated on the standard claim that such action would end all Western rights of occupation, specifically including tbe right of access to Berlin by land, water, and air.
By discussing the question in the general context of the May moeting, Khrushchev again Implied, without, however, specifically committing the USSR to such timing, thatwould take prompt unilateral action If the Western leaders reject the Soviet peace treaty proposal. He reinforced tbe separate treaty threatarning that if "hotheads" should invoke the use of force, they would be met with force.
Khrushchev's apparentective ln revertingtrong-1 _
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questionuclear test ban treaty.ong silence on the Elsenhower-lfacmlllan communique'oluntary moratorium on small underground tests, Khrushchev portrayed this as accepting in principle the Soviet proposal and thereby raising hopes for conclusionreaty "in the neare singled out the duration of the moratorium as the key issue, and claimed that tho Sovietof four or five years was based on American estimates of the period necessary to work out improved detectionHe implied, however, that this duration could be shortened.
Gromyko privately also struck, an optimistic noteest ban treaty, contrasting it with the "disappointing" Western position in the disarmament negotiations.
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KHRUSHCHEV'S ROAD TO THE SUMMIT
weeks after agreement was reached last December on the date and place for the '. forthcoming summit meeting, Khrushchev proudly Informed the Supreme Soviethat his campaign for top-level East-West talks launched ln7 had been crowned with success.
peech ath anniversary celebration of the Bolshevikhrushchev had calledhigh-level meeting ofof capitalist and socialist countries" to reach agreement to exclude wareans of settling international disputes, to end the cold war and the armaments race, tocoexlstencs as the basis of internationaland to settleIssues by peacefulnot by force. This speech was followed by formal notes to the Western powers proposing an early conference of heads of government tomeasures for easingand ending the cold war.
With these pronouncements Moscow Initiated what hasinto its most ambitious and far-reaching foreignoperation since the death of Stalin. The ultimateare to extract from the Western powers arecognition of tbeand territorial gains scored by the USSR during and after World War II and to bring about the most favorableconditions forthe USSR's domestic goals as set forth in the Seven-Year Plan.
This diplomatic offensive was conceived against aof the military andachievements ln the
SEC late summer ofICBM test and the launching of the firstthe Soviet leaders hailed asa major shift in the world balance of power. Theygreat confidence that the trend of world events washeavily in their favor and that they could translate these technological advances intogains.
While Soviet tactics over the past two and one-half years have fluctuated widely, theobjectives of the summit campaign have remainedconstant. Khrushchev's overriding aim is to overcome tbe West's unwillingness tothe permanence of the So-vlotlzation of Eastern Europe and the partition of Germany.
In an interviewe spelled out theof the only kind of accommodation with the West he would find acceptable: "One thing only is needed (to ensurerecognize what has historically takenhe existence of the satellite regimes. "There must be noln their affairs. We, for our part, proceed from the realistic conditions of the existence of such capitalist states as the United States, Britain, France, and others, and that the social structure of these countries is the,affair of their peoples."
The Soviet leadershad little expectation that the Western governments could be stampeded into accepting their Initial bidummitin the springhey apparently envisaged this as only the opening moverolonged period oflasting possibly several years, In which the USSR, by a
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combination of pressures and inducements, would gradually bring tbe Western powers tohain of concessions whose cumulative effect would be recognition of theand legitimacy of the status quo in Eastern Europe and East Germany.
By the time the USSRaccepted the West'sfor preparatoryin Moscow between Foreign Minister Gromyko and the three Western ambassadors beginning lnhrushchev and his colleagues evidently had lost much of their optimism about get'ummit meeting on their terms.
'reflected Moscow's unwillingness to engage inummit.
The USSR, ln effect,these talks in June by publishing the documentsby the twoof the agreed secrecy. This marked the end, for the time being, of the summit drive'. Khrushchev concluded tbat he could not force the Westummit meeting on Soviet terms without greater pressure.
Background ofrlin Crisis
Khrushchev's determination to bring mattersead with the Western powers wasby the resolution passed by the West German Bundestag on8 authorizing nuclear weapons and missiles for the West German armed forces, la. view"of the* Soviet-leaders' almost pathological suspicion and foar of resurgent German military power, Itln retrospect that this developmentajor role in Khrushchev's decision toa new Berlin crisis. From Moscow's viewpoint, the prospoct of strong West Gorman forces, armed with modernunderscored the urgency of consolidating Soviet hegemony ln Eastern Europe, especially
in East Germany, before thepower of West Germany could confront the USSRerious challenge.
The USSR responded quicklyove designed primarily to check the Implementation of NATO plans totrong nuclear-deterrent capacityIn West Germany, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet onromyko announced the unilateral cessation ofnuclear weapons tests. out half of his speechevoro lndictmont of the Adenauer government's "It would be sheorbe warned, "to underrate the gravity of this step" by the Bonn government.
Moscow's preoccupation with erecting an impregnable barrier against future West Germanand military pressure on the satellites was evident in Gromy-ko's conclusion that Bonn'sto arm its forces with nuclear weapons "cannot beotherwise thanhallenge to the European nations and, abovo all, to thoseon Germany." To emphasize his point, Gromyko charged that West Germany "is the onlystate whose government is seeking to redraw the present frontiers in Europe."
First Deputy Premierarrived in Bonn at the end ofstensibly tooutine trade agreement, but actually to Impress on Chancellor Adenauer thewith which the USSR viewed Bonn's decision onweapons. Mlkoyan repeateaxy ooject this decision and expressed Soviot fears that Nationaltendencies wouldin the new Germanestablishment and would ultimately affect the conduct of the government itself.
against nucloar attack In the event of war, provided West Germany renounced nuclearBe also warned thatof measures to equip West German forces with such weapons wouldnew obstacle to German
Pressure for Summit Mooting
eport to his colloagues ln Moscowharp increase ln Soviet pressure on the West, particularly on the United tv States. Moscow seized on the Middle East crisis sparked by the Iraqi revolution in mid-July8 to call for ansummit meeting tospecifically, theof American troops in Lebanon and British forces ln Jordan. But the Sovietdropped this project whon they failed to break Western insistenceorum which they considereda special session of the UN Security Council attended by the heads of memberut bound by Security Council rules and voting procedures.
Khrushchev certainlythe crisis precipitated by the Chinese Communists'of the offshore Que-moy Islands onnd8 as an excellent to test American readiness to respondloc challenge and to discredit and isolate the United States on an issue where its policy was the subject of widespread disagreement ln the free world. He probably considered that if Washington could either be forced toj treat from its.position on the offshore islands issue or to act ln defiance of worldtho upshot would be apolitical defeat for the united States.
Soviet complicity ln this operation seems probable, for Khrushchev and Mao must have discussed strategy on this issue
at their meeting ln Peiping fromuly The most striking feature of the USSR's role was the unprecedented-ly strong and unequivocalto provide military support forsharp contrast to the cautious Soviet behavior ln the strait crisis. In letters toEisonhowerhrushchev cited the USSR's obligations under0 Slno-Soviet Treaty, pledged that Moscow would come to the aid of China in the event ofnd intimated that there would be retaliation in kind to any nuclear.
The mood and calculations that governed Khrushchev'scourse in the Taiwan Strait affair were reflectedemark he maderemlin reception onovemberthe day he Invoked an Indirect threatew and moreBerlin blockade bythe USSR's intention to turn over its remainingin Berlin to the East Ger-mana. Khrushchev told,"up" to that time*he had beenfor peace, but that now he was demanding it wLth an atomic bomb in hie hand.
o tcchurch to pray for peace, they throw bombs at mo, butome there bomb in hand to ask for peace, they will listen."
The frustrationf-forts since7 to bring the Westummitunder favorable conditions had convinced Khrushchev that he had to have a sharp crisis,hreat of one, toummit urgent and compel the Western governments totheir previous conditions.
Khrushchev's aim inthe Berlin question was to confront the Western powers with
what appeared tohoice between risking war to maintain their rights in Berlin orconcessions which would erode their position not only ln Berlin but on thequestion of German
During visit to Prance
In addition to using the Berlin threateverummit meeting,Khrushchev saw the Berlin Issueeans of wringing concessions from the West which would leadto some form of recognition of the East German regime and to acceptance of the permanence and legitimacy of the status quo in Eastern Europe. Berlin, therefore, was not an end inbuteans of drawing the West toward anwith long-standing Soviet demands regarding the future shape of Europe.
quootion. What matters to us Is the recognition of the two German states. It ls ln regard to this that wo must have an understanding, If we are to make progress on any otherwhatever."
Khrushchev's line of action ln developing the Berlin threat was aimed at making the danger of an Imminent military clash appear credible to Westernopinion. He showedhowever, that ho could control the situation and ex- tract heavy political gainsany serious risk of provok-"Yestern military reaction
"Khrushchev saia it was "un-thtifkable" that the Western powors would fight over Berlin,
Mlkoyan's visit to the United States in9 was intended not only to sound out American official and public opinion on Berlin, but to create
an impression that the twowere taking tho first steps toward an accommodation. Soviet agents In Europereports designed tofearsrivate Soviet-American doal at the expense of the United States' allies.
Mlkoyan's report on his visit att party congress at the end of January sought to convey an Impression that the situation was ripe for serious negotiations. He said he found that American leaders were"to recognize theof peaceful coexistence" and noted that "In contrast to earlier times, the American statesmen had expressed ato negotiate" and that they no longer talkedpolicy of containing or liberating."
Soviet Negotiating Tactics
Khrushchev's fundamental goal In tbe period ofwhich opened with the Geneva foreign ministers'ln9 was not to drive Western forces out of Berlin ln some brief period of time, but to bringhange in the legal status of the West-em presenoe ln the city. This change of status, In Moscow's view, would seriously undermine the Western powers'insistence that their rights in Berlin, based on thesurrender of Naziobtain until Germany is reunified by four-powerThe Western presence In Berlin under the "occupationchallenges the permanence of tho partition of Germany, on which Moscow's claim to theof the status quo in Eastern Europe is based.
From the beginning of the Berlin threat lnoscow has stated that while it is willing to considerto its free-city plan, these must be directed at ending the "occupation regime" in West Berlin. The Soviet notes ofovember setting forth the
city plan took the position that the West has "lost the right for preserving theregime"'by violating the Potsdam Agreement. Mlkoyan took pains to clarifyctual objective In Berlii
Ilkoyan declared that tl USSPTwas not demanding that the Western forces should befrom West Berlin, but only that the "occupation" be terminated.
The three main objectives that guided Gromyko's tactics at the foreign ministers'ln Oeneva9o Induce the Westhange in the status of West Berlin which the USSR could interpret as acceptance of the principle that theregime should be ended and that Western forces,onsequence, should be reduced and ultimatelyo curtail existing political and economic links between West Berlin and West Germany;o enhance thestature and acceptability of the East German regime.
The Soviet delegationin getting the twodelegations seated attables, although onlyto the main conference table. Khrushchev, speaking onune, declared that their participation showed "not only de facto but also de Jureof the existence of the two German states."
Gromyko lost no time in moving the negotiations toward tho question of an interimon Berlin. He made hints in this direction ln the second week of the conference, andndune heroposal which would havethe West to "retainoccupation rights" for oneextended toonths. However, Gromykorefused to endorse tho "perpetuation" of these rights. Bis basic objection to allproposals for an Interim solution was that they were based on an Indefiniteof tho occupation regime.
The Western ministersattempted to elicit an unequivocal response as to whether the USSR would agree that Western rights would be maintained after the proposed time limit on an Interimexpired, but Gromyko would not be pinned down. Khrushchev vigorously supported his foreign minister on this pointtatementune that the USSR "cannot under any pressure accept an agreement which tho occupationhis statementeply to President Elsenhower's callunelear Sovietreaffirming Western rights ln Berlin.
In forcing the deadlock on this key issue of Western rights the Soviet leaders werethat the West would have no alternative but to proceedummit meeting without any of the previous progressolution on which it hadInsisted. On the day the foreign ministers' conference opened, Khrushchev publiclyconfidenceummit would be held regardless of the outcome of the Geneva meeting and hinted that heeries of summit meetings. When tbe first half of the conference ended in stalemate, he predicted onuneummit"will take place, if notthen at some later date, because the people of the world demand it."
Khrushchev's Visit to US
The Soviet leaders cloarly regarded President Elsenhower's Invitation to Khrushchevirect result of their powerlav on Berlin. Soviet officials
^asserted that from the
oviot standpoint, the foreign
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY0
conference hadreatince lt bad led to the long-soughtfor Khrushchev to visit the United States.and bold talks with the President. Theythe belief thatasic cnn change in American policy and greater receptivity, to anbased on the "global status quo."
Apart from thereached with the President that future negotiations onshould not have any time limit but should not beIndefinitely,did not introducechanges ln hison Berlin and Germany. His goal of bringing the West to recognize'.the status quo in Europe-and the "existence of two systems" throughout the world was implicit In hiscalls for "peacefuland an "end to the old war."
Khrushchev made thisarticularly clearalk with members of the SenateRelations Committee. In words that closely parallel his statement lne said recognition of the status quo ls "the mainThere is no other problem, and if that ls recognized, we should be able toirm and lasting peace."
Khrushchev's visit usheredew phase in Soviet policy. In contrast to the assertlveness and pressure tactics thatSoviet behavior from the fall7 through the first halfonciliatory posturethe West. Soviethailed the "Camp Davidasew era in East-West relations.
Khrushchev's appraisal of the visit, however, made it clear that peaceful coexistence
is neither an end in itself nor ft signasic turn ln Soviet policyenuine long-term accommodation with the West. Peaceful coexistence, inview, is primarilyto inhibit and limit Western reaction to growing bloc military power and toramework for obtainingWestern concessions through negotiations ln the face of this power.
In his speech in Moscow oneptember summing up his trip, Khrushchev repeated the standard Soviet contention that bloc strength was the mainln the present trend toward "peace." In Peiping oneptember he assessedpolicyeaction tobloc strength. "The leaders of many capitaliste said, "are being forced more and more to take account of realities and recast their international relations."
Khrushchev has deeplyhis personal prestige and authorityifficult anddelicate diplomaticwhich he clearly believes has already yielded substantial results. He assured the Chinese Communists that lt "will gain new victories in the future, too."
If be ls to attain thegoals he has set himself, Khrushchev mustree hand to maneuver and temporize. He must avoid applying excessive pressure on the West which could upset his whole design, and to this endheneedsthe understanding and support of his satellites, his Chinese allies,rand his own subordinates. It would seem that much will turn on his success or failure in winning Peiping's agreoment to refrain from any premature testing by forceof the stability of the capitalist system.
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