Created: 4/21/1960

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last week continued to criticize the Western powers for their alleged failure to undertake specific steps tothe success of the summit conference. Commenting on the meeting of the Western foreign ministers ln Washington, Soviet propaganda adopted the general line that the West has limited itself to words and has failed to realize that "originality of views" is the primary for success at the summit.

Pravda againpril speech


as the basis for dotailedof the Western position on disarmament and Germany, and Izvestla onprilim-ilar approach byalter Llppmann article as indicative of the official Westernto avoid definitiveat the heads*of-govero-ment meeting.


separate German states, both Pravda and Izvestia sharply re-jected the plebiscite concept in either Berlin or Germany. Both papers also repeated the USSR's threat to sign atreaty if it falls to find understanding from the Western leaders on the Soviet proposalreaty vith both Germa-hys- Izvestia added that "no one should entertain anythat when such action is taken, "all rights arising from the defeat of Germany will lapse in all territory over which East Germany has sovereignty.**


Pravda onpril rovived the proposal for an interimto Berlin's status. In response to Sorter's statement tying Berlin to GermanPravda claimed that tho possibility "for agreement on ,if provisional andpossible at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference, but only after the West had discarded itsproposals. Posing theas to why the "positive experience" achieved at Geneva should be written off, Pravda asserted that these negotiations "came quite close" to framing individual provisions for an interim agreement.

Moscow's renewed emphasis on the interim agreementthe signal for an East German initiative onpril in the formetter from Ulbrlcht to West Oerman workers. Ulbrlcht Indicated thateasure to establish confidence, East Germany could agree to an Interim solution which wouldestriction onpropaganda activity in Westan onatomic weapons in the city, the gradual reduction of


troops, and the step-by-step Abolition of the occupation status. The Ulbrlcht proposal corresponds closely to the terms for an interim agreement advanced by Gromyko at the Geneva meeting.

The East German letter makes no specific link between an interim solution and theof an all-German commission, butpeech on the same day, and ln a interview onpril,referred to theof summit agreement to formommission based on parity of representation.

Although the bloc hasover the past several months on the original Soviet proposals to convertree city, theof an Interim solution was never droppod completely. The memorandum delivered inby Soviet Ambassador Smlrnov to the West German Socialmentioned the developmentree city by stages, and the Moscow Declaration of the Warsaw Pact countries on 4criticized Western attempts to "cancel" the achievements of the Geneva negotiations. Again, in late March, Smlrnov publicly assumed that the summitwould begin at the point where the Geneva discussions ended.

East German politburoVerner onarch asserted that an Interim solution was"on the road to afreedding thatolution should Include guarantees against the use of West Berlinenter for propaganda against thestates." As the summitthis proposal will probablyore prominent place in Soviet comments on the Berlin issue.




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