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Office of the Director
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster SUBJECT: Statistics Relating torogram
Total holdings of processed filmeet ofm "tracker"trip approximatelyiles long, andinear feet ofide basic intelligence film,iles long.
From theseeparate photo-analytical reports have been prepared and diaaeminated to appropriately cleared officials.
Ofquare miles that comprise the USSR, the project has covered one or more ttmeaquare mile*f the gross area.
The following table gives the aggregate coverage including
LinearMiles
m 9mm nch
USSR andandissions) 8 1
Total (including)
Intelligence Community'srogram which formed the basis for part of myCongressional Committees last May is attached to showcontribution to our knowledge of the USSR made by
(Signed) ALLEN W. DULLES Director
0 ACCOMPLISHMENTS OFROGRAM
I. Introduction
Five years ago, before the beginning ofrogram, the United States had organized against the threat of surprise attack by tho Soviet Union every available measure in the classical intelligence bag of tricks. These efforts had given us considerable knowledgethe capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. But much of this was hard to verify and difficult to interpret. There remained manyconcerning the types of military systems under development, the rate at which they were increasing their power, and their ultimate aims for its use.
This half-knowledge of the Soviet Union and uncertainty of Its true power position posed tremendous problems for the United States. We were faced with the constant risk of exposing ourselves to enemy attack or of needlesslyreat deal of money and effort on misdirected military preparations of our own.
To meet this situation, we determined to embark onrogram to give the Unitedirm foundation of hardon which to make our intelligence judgments. The program hasarge part of the most important areas in the Soviet Union and has provided informationreat variety of subjects important to our evaluation of the Soviet power position. Our main emphasis, however, has been directed against four critical problems, namely, the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet miiailc program, and the Soviet Air Defense System.
II. Intelligence of Soviet Offensive Capabilities Against. andies
A. Manned Aircraft
The Soviet bomber force has been, and remains today, the main offensive striking force of the Soviet Union. For several years, the status of the Soviet bomber programontroversial topic. intelligence.
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rogram has confirmed thatinimum long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Sovieta* shown that some Soviet aircraft plants have probablyerted to the production of transport aircraft andew may possibly be engaged in some aspect of the miasilr program. It has also shown, however, that the Soviet Union has recentlyew medium-range bomber with supersonic capabilities.
During the life ofrogram, we have covered numerous Soviet long-range bomber air fields. From this coverage, we have been able to confirm our estimate of the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers and have acquired data on the nuclear weapons storageassociated with them.
B. Ballistic Missiles
Ever since the first Soviet ICBM vehicle was launched inoviet propaganda has claimed that the world power balance washifting in the direction of the Soviet Union. For several years, we havefn aware that the Soviet Union was engagedigh-priority ballis-Uj tic missile development program. We have had and continue to have the ability to acquire data of actual Soviet ballistic missile flight tests.
rogram, however, has enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved in the Soviet missile test program.
One of the most significant items of information acquired byas revealed by our coverage of the Tyura Tarn rangehead in the fallmmediately after the first Soviet ICBM firings. Thefact was that the Soviets had only one launch facility at Tyura Tarn.
The photography showed this facility toassive concrete structure sufficiently large to permit the launch of even larger vehicles than the relatively heavy Soviet ICBM and space vehicles.
Tht- photography also showed that the Soviets were conducting all of their missile nnd space firingsingle launcher duringeriod, clearlyifferent concept from that used by the
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United States in the prc-launch checkout, erection, and firingissile. In fact, when these data were made available to U. S. missile experts, some of whom assisted us in our evaluation of the photography, theyembarkedareful review of our own concepts for the use of launch pads.
This photography also provided us valuable insight into possible Soviet operational doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. Iteliance on rail as the major means of logistic support and operations. The rail line actually ran onto the launch pad.
From these data and related information on Soviet transportation systems, we are led to believe that the Soviet operational deployment of ICBMs will be directly associated with their rail system. Byean that the missile and its supporting equipment would be carried on trains and moved from one prc-selected site to another, thus making it difficult for us to determine the precise location of any given missile unitontinuing basis.
Even though the Soviet Union was able toonsiderable testing program from this one launch pad. photography of Tyura Tarn90 has shownecond and third launch complex were in varying stages of construction. The third launch complex isew type. It is eoo early to tell its intended purpose, but wc have speculated that it may be usedew type ICBM or that it may be the prototype of operational sites for troop training.
In summary, the photography collected byasritical factor in our assessment that the Soviet ICBM program has not been and is notcrash" program; instead. It is an orderly, well-planned, high-priority program aimed at achieving an early ICBM operational capability,
In addition to our coverage of the ICBM test range at Tyura Tarn, we have also had excellent coverage of the Kapustin Yar missile test range where- Soviet intermediate and short-range missiles have been tested for the- pastears. allistic missiles have been fired on this range in recent years.
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7 coverage of Kapustin Yar provided us our first information on the number and type of launch pads being used in this program. It also showed that the Soviets were dovetailing theirof operational equipment and troop training directly into their research and development program.
that in the Soviets had doubled the number of launch pads and had available quarters for
training aboutroops in the operational use of these short- and
intermediate-range ballistic miaitia.. It is apparent that the Soviet
ballistic missile programynamic and growing program.
In addition to our coverage of the two major ballistic missile test ranges, we have given top priority during the past year to the
" ThdeHC7ing ot Aching sites for operation ICBMs. as by far our best system for collecting such We haveumber of the most highly suspect areas in the Soviet Union without havingingle launch site formissiles. We were able to prove, however, umber of sites reported to us by other sources did not actually exist.
We have had no opportunity to cover other large andareas in the Soviet Union, and the mission ofasgive us the maximum amount of coverage possible In theseview of the Soviet boast about the shifting power position and ourthat the Soviet Union couldmall number of missilesfor use against the United States, we felt that it waswe provide the President with additional assurance of the truethe Soviet ICBM program before he was to meet Khrushchev in This was particularly important in view of the fact thatwere the direct outgrowth of the Berlin crisis generatedSoviet
C. Atomic Energy
rogram hasarge body of valuableon the Soviet atomic emergy program. This information has covered the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of stockpile sites.
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The program has provided usarge amount of information on-ground, naval, and air installations and order of battle. It has been particularly useful innaval order of battle in the Murmansk and Black Sea areas.
In general, the program has tended to confirm our estimates of the size, nature, and rate of growth of Soviet industry.
The material has also been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts.
Iu- Intelligence Affecting. Deterrent Striking Force
A- Target Location, Definition, and Refinement
Prior to the inauguration ofrogram, much. target information was based on materials captured during and imn diately after World War II. Much of this information was becoming obsolete.
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B. Electronic Defenses and Radar Order of Battle
On nearly aU of the overflights of the Soviet Unionircraft carried special electronic intercept and recording equipment. The purpose of this equipment waa to determine the technicaland locations of Soviet radars and other electronic devices associated with the Soviet air defense system.
The electronic intercepts recorded byircraftus to establish the basic concept, magnitude, operationaldeployment, and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system over the past four years. This in turn has provided operational information for the planning of flight routes. air strike forces.
Prior torogram, we had no way to determine that the Soviet Union was in the process ofefense in depth covering the entire area of the Soviet Union with early warning and ground control intercept radars and their related weapons. Ii we batted our estimateseripheral defense concept we would have arrivedigure ofarly warning radars and associated equipment. On the basis of tho information collected by, however, we now estimate that the Soviet Union has0 prime radars withequipment.
This program has also allowed us to observe dynamic aspects of the Soviet air defense system by watching it in operation against. During the past four years we have observed the Sovietof prime heavy radars as height-measuring instruments and have seen the installation of special height-finding radars which giveonsiderable improvement in their ground-controlled intercept
Wc have seen the early deployment of hew type radars in the interior of the Soviet Union before they began to be installed along Soviet borders. as also permitted us to assess any differenceperipheral and interior defenses.
Wc have obtained technical information on airborne intercept radars and have observed the use of these radars in combat situations. Technical information also will assist the designers. electronics countermeasures equipment.
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rogram has obtained photography onundred fighter airfields. This has permitted us to determine the concept employed by the Soviets in their use of fighters as an air defense weapon. Moreover, the only information available to us on the latest Sovietighters was obtained from one oflights.
More important, however, the program has permitted us to observe these fighters in an active air defense capacity. We have photographs of various fighter types attempting to interceptnd have electronic intercepts of their air defense radars. We can also relate this information to our electronic intercepts of the early warning radars and get some idea of reaction time and efficiency of the Soviet fighter defense system.
D. Surface-to-Air Missile Defenses
Prior to the beginning ofrogram we knew that the Soviet Union hadassive system of surface-to-airinites located on two concentric circles around Moscow. Wa had some indication that they intended toimilar system around other major cities such as Leningrad but the evidence on this point was inconclusive.
rogram not only permitted us to obtain fulleron the Moscow SAM system, but it also proved conclusively that this system was not being installed around other cities.
e discovered from both photograph and electronic interceptew and more flexible SAM aystern was being deployed around all major centers In the Soviet Union. We have photography on approximatelyf the new sites and estimate that thereotaluch sites in the USSR. We believe that this secondmissile is the missile known to the inteUigence community as the "Guideline" missile with an estimated altitude capabilityeet extending upeetonsiderably reduced accuracy.
The data revealed byrogram not only confirmed previous estimates that the Soviets wereery high priority on their air defense program but also provided positive evidence of the progress achieved.
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The information on the Soviet air defense system, particularly that concerning surface-to-air missiles, hasirect bearing on. strike forces' planning. The discovery of the secondSAM system caused them to greatly increase their emphasis on low level penetration tactics.
Preliminary analysis of the photography collected on one of our most recent flights indicates that tho Soviets may be engaged in research concerning anti-ballistic missile radars and tracking. It is too early, however, to determine whether or not these developments include an actual anti-ballistic missile development program.
IV. Evidence of Basic Soviet Intentions
To the extent that Soviet military capabilities and trends in their development constitute evidence of Soviet intentions,rogram has provided usroat deal of important information.
esult of the firm information that we have collected, it is our present judgment that the USSR is not engagedrash effort to develop an overwhelming nuclear delivery capability. entioned earlier, the Soviet bomber program has been cut backinimum effort, and the ICBM development program appears to be an orderly, high-priority but not "crash" program.
Wc have seen that throughout the period the Soviet Unionto give great priority to the developmentefensive cspa-bility in the form of surface-to-air missiles, fighters, and air defense radars.
By giving us better evidence concerning the Soviet development of specific weapons systems,rogram has enabled. to tailor its own defenses more precisely to the actual Soviet threat.
The program has also given us increased confidence in our judgments concerning the issue of peace or war in crisis situations. Whenever the international situation becomes tense becauseroblemome particular area, we are concerned whether themight get beyond control--that someone on the other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war.
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It ts extremely difficult for me to sum up in words the significance of this effort to our national security. o not wish to exaggerate, norish to belittle other vital intelligence This photographic coverage and the data derived from it arc an inseparable part of the whole national intelligence effort. But in terms-of reliability, of precision, of access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution haa been unique. And in tho opinion of the military, of the scientists and of the seniorresponsible for our national security it has been, to put it simply, invaluable.
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