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OCIopy No.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STA Ft' STUDY
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WORLD CO&'iUNIST STRATEGY (Its Devolopiient from Autumno
(Reference Title: ESAU
Offlde of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATIONTHE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAOE LAWS.SC.. THEOR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (Its Development from9 to
orking paper, the thirderies of studies of the dispute between the Soviet and Chineseparties about the strategy and tactics of the world Communist movement. This paper, beginning with theof Mao and Khrushchev in Peiping in9 and ending with the Impasse that followed the Paris "summit" meeting, includes the period of one of the most Important developments in world Communism in recentand scornful Chinese attacks on Soviet positions in the spring
The period encompassed by this paper was one primarily of Chinese initiatives and Soviet responses. Two more papeis in this series will treat the period of the Bucharest conference of Communist parties In0 through the Moscow conference of Communist parties ineriod primarilyoviet counter-offensive.
We are grateful to analysts of the f
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SUMMARY
Khrushchev apparently cane to Peiping In9 In the mistaken belief that China's dependence on the USSR would force the Chinese party to accommodate to his globalstrategy crltlclxed by the Chinese for almost two years. In Peiping, he publicly rejected the Chinese contention that the Bloc shouldore militant and revolutionary strategy all over the world under theof Soviet military power; and Suslov endorsedpositions, perhaps thus disabusing Maoelief that the Chinese had support among Soviet leaders. Tho Chinese Intensified their attacks on Khrushchev's positions after his departure.
In several speeches in the USSR subsequently,reaffirmed his belief In the overriding importance ofeneral war, and his feeling that Western leaders were coming to tbe same view. He stated his favorong-term accommodation with thein terns ofpolitical, economic, and ideological pressure on the West but In terms of avoiding war and/or serious risks of war. Inter alia, he criticized Mao's thinking as Trotskyist and as playing into the hands of the enemy; to Peiplng's dismay, heonciliatory line oo DeGaulle's proposals for ending the Algerian war; he failed to endorse Chinese positions on several Par Eastern issues; he derided Chinese domestic policies; he accused the CCP of conceit; and he warned that opposition to fundamental Soviet policies would not be tolerated.
By the endoviet public lecturers were openly referring to difficulties In tbe Sino-Soviet relationship, probably in order to prepare the Soviet populace for tbe possibilityadical deterioration In relations. himself suggested at the time that the relationship had deterioratedangerous point.
President Eisenhower's State of the Union message0 was given differing emphases by Moscow andformer picking out of the message some of the more hopeful signs (in tbe Soviet view) that the United States was prepared to ease international tensions, and the latter citing it as an example of the deceitful American practice of talking peace while preparing for war. In the Chinese view, the apparent American Interest in detente wasmoreaneuver to buy the necessary time to overcome Soviet military superiority.
That Mao was proselytizing in the Communist world against Khrushchev and Khrushchev's strategy was evidenced in0 during the visit to China of an Eastgovernment delegation. Stao told the East Germans that he disagreed with Soviet policy on disarmament and Berlin and that China would not sign any disarmament agreementit was given its legitimate seat in tho United Nations and unless the United States withdrew from Taiwan.
Throughout the early parthere were growing indications of Chinese annoyance with Soviet disarmament policy. The Chinese probably believed that anydisarmament agreement would tend to freeze Communist China out of the nuclear club, would undermine the Soviet capability to fight local wars, would throw away the Soviet military advantage, and might even be the beginning of an East-West acconmodatioji achieved at China's expense.
At the Warsaw Pact conference int is likely that joint Chinese-East German pressure was brought to bear on the Russians for the sharing of nuclear weapons but that this pressure was resisted. On the question of strategy, thereomplete impasse. Moreover,reportedly criticized Chinese actions against India and Indonesia in strong terms and complained that Peiping had refused to support the USSR's attempts to reduce world tension, had not followed the USSR's lead by demobilizing any part of its armed forces, was too insistent on following its own independent policies, and was harming the cause of Communism.
In February, the Chinese in their journals said in ef-feat that the cold war could not be meaningfully abated; that the danger of war would continue to exist and the bloc must prepare for all contingencies; that disarmament negotiations were more or less useless; that the bloc should concentrate not on negotiations with the West but on building its own resources and scouring its own strength.
In0 the Chineseomprehensiveof Soviet theory, strategy and tactics in the form of five lengthy and acrimonious doctrinal statements which In effecth Congresshaving revised, emasculated and betrayed Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese rejected Khrushchev's views on the possibility and advisability ofong-range detente with the West and contended that coexistence could mean only an armed truce; they argued that wars, particularly local and colonial wars, were inevitable so long asremained; and they minimized the possibility of peaceful
accession to power in the non-Communist world. InKhrushchev's ideological innovations and the strategy which these Innovations reflected, the Chinese were not calling for general war, although they may have believed this inevitable. Rather, they wore attacking Khrushchev'srevolutionary conception and putting forth anon the conviction that the West could bo defeated sooner than Khrushchev thought if the USSR and the world Communist movement were more aggressive.
In broader terms, the massive Chinese attack onpositionsecision to bring before the entire Communist world the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of thehallenge sustained by one of the most serious charges one Communist party can make againstcharge of abandonment of revolutionary positions.
The question of strategy toward the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin"'colonial and semi-colonial"all along been highlyin the Sino-Soviet dispute. During the spring0 there were several developments relating to the question of Soviet aid to these areas, the question of support of "liberation" movements, the specific case of the Algerian rebellion, and the growing Chinese interest in African
ariety of reasons, the Chinese seemed to oppose the Soviet aid program to non-Communistat least, the scale of such aid and the priority it enjoyed In Soviet thinking. The Chinese had alreadytheir belief that such aid would strengthen non-Communist governments to the detriment of the revolution. They may have believed further that such aid could otherwise be used to support their own economic development and that Soviet aid programs might facilitate the expansion ofinfluence at the expense of Chinese influence.
The Chineseuch stronger line than did the Russians on the need for supporting "liberation" movements which In turn would pursue aggressive policies. Thecontended that the Communist party in each country that had not attained independence should seek at the earliest opportunity to take ovor the Independence movement rather than to leave leadership of such movements In the hands of genuine nationalist parties; that the Communist party In each country which had attained formalmust put enough pressure on the nationalist government to get Communists taken into the government or at least toro-Communist government; andolicy of
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prolonged cooperation with the national bourgeoisie inpolicy advocated byalmost certainly lead to disaster. Perhaps mostfor the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese argued that the Bloc should abandon its cautious policy towardmovements and give them all-out support, even If thisisk of local wars with the Vest.
Differences between Moscow and Peiping over tholiberation" struggle and the specific issue ofof "liberation" movements have been illustrated in their respective attitudes toward the Algerian rebellion. Ia the period discussed In this paper, the Chinese evidently calculatedontinuation of the Algerian war would advance both the interests of tho bloc and their ownfar more thanegotiated settlement, and they seemed to view Khrushchev'scautious--for DeCaulle's proposals to end the waretrayal of the "colonial liberation" struggle.
In the spring0 the Chinese considerablytheir attention to African affairs. The principal Chinese effort was made at the second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference, held in Guinea in April. trong bid to dominate the proceedings and the organization itself. The Soviet and Chinesereportedly clashed on the question of strategy.
It is unlikely that China was instrumental in the Soviet decision to wreck the summit conference inlthough the Chinese had long argued that negotiations must not take priority over revolutionary struggle, their public pronouncements on tbe eve of the summit Indicatedrather than opposition. Of greater importance,the failure of the summit evidently emboldened Mao to pressew and critical stage his initiative within the world Communist movement against Khrushchev's strategy and tactics.
No sooner bad the summit collapsed than'Sovietincluding some from Khrushchev himself, indicated tbat, although the long term struggle with the West would not be abandonedolitical, economic and ideological level, the USSR would still not take serious risks ofwar and would continue to be interested in negotiations with theif it bad to wait for years. Thisof "peaceful coexistence" clashed head-on with intensified Chinese urgingadical change In Soviet policy.
I. KHRUSHCHEV IN PEIPING AND AFTER
Khrushchev in Peiping,9
At the Washington Press Club onn American newsman asked Khrushchev what would be the purpose of his visit to Pelping after his tour of the United States.eplied Khrushchev before giving an Innocuous reply "is apparently the most 'difficult* question."
As we have seen (seehrushchev was greeted on arrival in Pelpingarrage of articles by CCP leaders which vigorously defended Chinese foreign and domesticagainst Soviet criticism, accused "some people" of "Ignorance ofmplicitly attacked Soviet policy toward the uncommitted countries, and implicitly warned Khrushchev that the same Russian errors which led to severe losses for the Chinese Communist movement ins were now being repeated in the colonial areas. In addition to all this, Chinese objections to Khrushchev's negotiation tactics had been spelled out in the CCP'sparty journal on the very day that Khrushchev hadin the United States.
To add to Mao's discomfiture, there was the fact tbat Khrushchev was coming to Pelping after his talks withEisenhower. Mao may have reflected that the President had seen fit to journey to Western Europe to consult with his allies prior to his talks with the Soviet premier.in responsepecific questionugust as to whether Khrushchev intended to consult with his allies prior to his US visit, Khrushchev had cavalierly dismissed the question:
We will probably exchange views with our friends in one way or another,o not think that we need all gather for any discussions. The question of ensuring world peace is so clear that it isontroversial one for the socialist countries. That is why we are sure that all the socialist countries will approve our activity in thatemphasis supplied)
Khrushchev obviously was aware that the question ofworld peace" was not "so clear" to his Chinesehe was ready to wave them off in this manner maya belief that his Chinese comrades were stilldependent on the USSR and would have no alternativego along with Soviet policies. If this was his belief,
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Id his two public speeches in Pelping, Khrushchev Hade little effort to meet the objections to Soviet strategy that the Chinese had been voicing for almost two years. In his arrival speech oneptember he said that "everythingbe done to clear the atmosphere and create conditions for friendship among peoples." In his banquet speech the same evening he reasserted bis belief that the bloc would defeat tbe West In peaceful economic competition. He said that President Elsenhower and other Western leaders bad begun toore realistic understanding of the world situation and that Elsenhower In particular "understands the need to relax international tension." Therefore, he continued, "we on our part must do all we can to exclude wareans of settling disputed questions." There was "no other way" than that of peaceful coexistence.
Then, aiming straight at the heart of the Chinesethat the bloc could pursue more militant policies all over the world under the shield of the Soviet nuclearKhrushchev said:
we must think realistically andthe contemporary situation correctly. This, of course, does not by any means signify that if we are so strong, then we must test by force the stability of the capitalist system. This would be wrong; tbe peoples would not understand and would never support those who would think of acting In this way.
A few sentences later, he may have been aiming at theexhortationsore revolutionary line In thecountries:
The socialistire the hearts of men by the force of their example In building socialism and tSus" lead them to follow in their footsteps. The question of"when "this or that country will take the path of socialism isby its own people. This, for us, In tbe holy of holies. (emphasis supplied)
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If ftfao bad had any hopes of relyingo-called "China lobby" In tbe Kremlin allegedly led by Suslov, Sus-lov's speech In Pelping two days earlier cannot have given him much encouragement. Suslov was somewhat lessthan Khrushchev about the possibilities for relaxing tension but he nonetheless supported tbe broad outline of Khrushchev's global strategy. While he spoke of forces in the West interested in keeping up the cold war and of the
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"projected relaxation" of tension, he insisted that "wars must be prevented because in our age--the age of the atom and of rocketthreaten Mankind withsufferings and disasters" (emphasishis line ofthe development of militarythreatened civilisation and by implication required an adjustment of Sovietvigorously rejected by Mao.
Suslov also made it clear that he supported Khrushchev's long-range policy of seducing the uncommitted countries by trade, aid and example rather than by the more revolutionary method the Chinese believed necessary for many or most of these countries. Be said:
The socialist states resolutely support the strivings of the countries of Asia and Africa to develop their national economies. Ve are extending help, and, as ourgrow, will extend still more help, to all countries of Asia and Africa. (emphasis supplied)
Finally, Suslov defended Khrushchev's trip to the DS as having been accomplished "with honor, dignity and brilliance, and with Leninist adherence to principle." Is effect, he was reminding Mao that he would not support the insinuations in the Chinese press that Khrushchev bad watered down Leninist principles in making his trip to the United States.
The very fact that Khrushchev allowed Suslov to head the Soviet delegation to Peiping prior to his own arrival andime when Sino-Soviet relations were so strained suggests his confidence that Mao would not be able towhatever differences in the Soviet leadership there may have been over foreign policy. The sending of Suslov may even have been intendedeliberate demonstration to Mao that the Soviet leadership was united on Khrushchev's foreign policy.
Whatever arguments Khrushchev and Suslov used tostrategy, the Chinese were cool to them. There wasto issue the customary pious joint communiquein his departure speech, made thethat "we Communists of the Soviet Unionour sacred duty, our primaryutilize allin order to liquidate the cold war." ThisKhrushchev could no longer speak for China on
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That the confrontation between Mao and Khrushchevthe Chinese anniversary celebrations bad proceeded far from smoothly is further suggested by P
developments that took placetTJRTT There
is, torpersonally
told at least one visiting delegation triat the CPSU had handled the denigration of Stalinery abrupt manner, that Molotovaliant party memberorld of experience, and tbat "peacefula reference to prolongeda theory wltb no historical precedent. In short, Mao, in talks with foreign Communist parties who were in Pelping to celebrate the anniversary was evidently lobbying against Khrushchev's tactics. That Mao would have gone to the extreme of praising Molotov to foreign parties must have been regarded byas unwarranted Interference in tbe internal affairs of tbe CPSO, along wltb Mao's violation of "proletarianIn challenging Khrushchev's tactics.
The official Polish Communist delegation to thecelebrations came away convinced, accordingeport from the Mew York Times. Rosenthal (New that there were important "differences of approach and policy" between Moscow and The Polish Communists gathered from talks in Pelping with both'the Russians and the Chinese tbat Chineseat being left out of the summit talks bad increased and had been made quite clear to Khrushchev. According to the Poles, the Chines* also were annoyed with Khrushchev for not giving sufficient support to Pelplng's campaign to take over Taiwan. (Asas argued) The Polish sources alsothat Chinese Communist resentment at being left out of high-level negotiations was one of the motivations behind Pelplng's decision to stir up trouble with India over tbe boundary question. The Incident was said to be Intendedeminder to India, the Soviet Union, and the West that there were important areas of the world where settlements could be reached only by direct negotiation with Pelping. Two subsidiary motives for the attack on India were alleged to be Nehru's ouster of the Communist government In Kerala and the belief that the Indians bad given too much aid and comfort to Tibetan refugees.
Khrushchev's Formal Report to the Supreme Soviet,ctober
Khrushchev's speeches in tbe USSR after returning from Pelping reaffirmed his belief In the struggle for peace as "the main task of today" aod directed oblique remarks to the Chinese Communists for advocating tougher policiesthe West, In these speeches, Khrushchev also reaffirmed his apparently genuine fearuclear holocaust. Thus, la
Vladivostokctober, he cautioned that the OS and the USSR could not confront each other like "two cocks ready to lay bold and neck each other." He recalled that in his meeting with President Elsenhower, the President hadhis fear of war and Khrushchev had replied that "only an unreasonable person can be fearless of war in our days." While it was necessary to fight If wareople" it was "unreasonable to be eager for war Khrushchev also reaffirmed his confidence in the Presidentan of peace and "farsightedness."
peech in Novosibirsk onctober, Khrushchev defined his understanding of peaceful coexistenceay which indicated that Mao had expressed concern to him that the "coexistence" line would retard the revolutionary strug-
gle
Peaceful ooexlstence must be understood correctly. Coexistence means the continuation of the struggle between the two social systems, buttruggle by peaceful means, without war, without the interferencetate into the domestic affairs of another state. One should not be afraid. We must struggle reso-lutely and consistently for our ideas, for our way of life, for our socialist system. Tbe partisans of capitalism too will not, of course, abandon their way of life, their ideology; they will fight. We hold that this struggle must be economic, political and ideological, but not military, (emphasis supplied)
Khrushchev's formal report to the Supreme Soviet onctober was his first effort to describe the mainof Soviet policy since his talks with President Eisenhower. This speech was the high point of Khrushchev's climbdetente."
Khrushchev began by contending thatore sensible understanding of the relation of forces on the international arena Is now beginning to prevail in the West." The West wasmore sober evaluation of tbe situation." This new Western evaluation was "bound to lead to tbe conclusion" that the West could not use its military forces against the socialist world. The factors favoring peace were thestrength of tbe Bloc, the rise of the newly independent countries, the peace-loving forces in the capitalistthemselves, and the "many statesmen" in the West who "begin to understand" that war threatens destruction.
Peaceful coexistence, continued Khrushchev, was not something to be desired or not desired. It was annecessity" proceeding from the "present situation in theamely that both sides "possess weapons which would cause perilous consequences if they were put into action." Moreover, said Khrushchev, coexistence was the existing state of affairs: the question was how to coexisteasonable basis."
Reasonable coexistence, he continued, presupposedconcessions in the Interests ofosition based on principle but which at the same time was "flexible Lenin had taught, he went on, that the working class,
before as well as after it has gained power, must be able tolexiblecompromise and come to agreement whenever life and the Interests of the cause demand it.
"Mutualerm which he repeated several times, did not mean that there would be any ideological concessions or compromise on "principles." However, he continued, looking over his shoulder toward Peiping, "we have no reason to fear that the peoples of the socialist countries will be seduced by the capitalist devil and give up socialism. r.uk' differently means not to believe wholly in the strength of
A paragraph later, Khrushchev was again pointingat Peiping when he recalled Lenin's "flexiblepolicy" during the period of the Brest peace
It was during the period of the Brest peace that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin set the cask of concluding peace with Germany In order to Insure for the young Soviet state thefor peaceful construction of socialism. Lenin and tbe party then had to conduct astruggle against Trotsky, who came out then with his Pilate's objections and puthis notorious slogan of 'neither peace norby which he played into the hands of the German imperialists. it is known that Trotsky's adventurist policy used by Gorman imperialism against tbe Sovietuch were the fruits of adventurism in policy. (emphasis supplied)
The very invocation of Trotsky, the arch heretic, Is indicative of the seriousness of the charge Khrushchev was here making against Mao Tse-tung. Trotsky is virtually an "unperson" in Soviet media. Despite the fact that some of
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the policies advocated by some of the "anti-group"7 could have been identified by Khrushchev with Trotskyism, he did not go this far even with his own Internal party opponents.
Second, Khrushchev was in effect contending that just as Trotsky "played into the hands" of the GermanMao was now playing into the hands of the Western Tor the West could employ the Mao'sline against the USSR. In Stalin's Russia, people were not infrequently shot for "objectively" playing Into the hands of the enemy.*
After thus severely condemning Mao's policy, Khrushchev went on to deny that the USSR was insincere when it spoke of peaceful coexistence or that it was advancing the slogan simply for tactical reasons. Thisistortion, heMarxism "has novor considered that war among states is necessary for the victory of the working class."
Khrushchev then listed the various indicationshaw was occurring in international relations. These included the nuclear test talks, the foreign ministers' conference, the various exchanges ofof which were ofsignificance." He described his visit with President Elsenhower particularly important and far-reaching step in the direction of radically improving relationsthe USSR and the US and generally relaxingtension." Many outstanding American personalities, he said, "with the President at theirnderstood the longing of the American people for peace and wanted to find ways to consolidate peace. Moreover, his visitetter understanding in the United States of the Soviet desire for peace.
Khrushchev then reversed the Soviet attitude on DeGaulle'september proposals for ending the Algerian war. Although these proposals had previously been denounced in the Soviet pressraud, Khrushchev now said that DeGaulle's"may play an important role in settlement of the Algerian question." It would play this role particularly if It was supported by "realistic steps." He called forcoordination of the mutual interests of the parties"
CCP retorted in December by reiterating their praise of Stalin as havingenemy of imperialism."
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recalled that "historically developed closo bonds exist between Algeria and Prance." Khrushchev thus left the clear impression that he mightrench-FLN settlement which would leave Algeria associated with tho French Re also left the clear impression that he favored serious negotiations to bring the long bloody war to an end.ew days of this statement, the French Communist party reversed Its previous hostility toong net culpa.
The impact of this statement onIn tbe context of Khrushchev's calls for "mutualhardly be exaggerated. ear, Pelping had beenthat the Algerian rebels wereplendid example to national revolutionary movements throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. onth before, Chinese spokesmen had publicly calledore revolutionary line in the uncommitted countries. For Khrushchev to swing closer to the French lino on Algeria atime- foi whateverhave been viewed in Pelping as tantamount to betrayal of the revolution (see
In speaking of Taiwan, Khrushchev gaveildof China's rights to the Island: "the legal and moral right is on Its side." Turning to Korea andboth areas in which Pelping had for some time beenthe use ofcautioned against the use of force. His "Impression" was, he said, that the "United States Is notilitary conflict there (in Southontrary to Pelplng's line then and now tbat. was building up for aggression. With regard to Laos, Khrushchev said the USSR was "against the existence of even tbe smallest source of war in Laos which could give food to the aggressive forces." sensible approach" there, he said, the "skirmishes taking place could be soonand the situation could be "normalised."
With regard to the Sino-lndian border dispute,maintained his neutral attitude: he was grieved that casualties occurred on "bothe thought the Issues could be resolved to the "satisfaction of both sides."
Inolution to disarmament, Khrushchevpainloomy picture of the consequences of war--consequences not only for the capitalists but for all. ew war, heoming close to Ualenkov's heresy4 thatwould because mankindsacrifice, devastation and suffering."
Khrushchev concluded this remarkably conciliatory speechlea for lasting peace.
The Soviet Government deems it its duty to our people and to all of mankind tothe achieved relaxation of tension in international relations, and to adhere firmlyourse leading from relaxation to aliquidation of international tension, and to turn the achieved relaxationasting
peace.
In the above speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev put himself on record before the Russian people asong-range accommodation with the West and as prepared to make as well as to receive concessions in order to achieve the accommodation. He attributed sincerity to Western leaders, particularly to President Elsenhower, in wanting peace. In effect, he told his audience that having seen for himself the state of opinion in the United States, he was convincedong-term stabilisation was possible. This is not to say that Khrushchev had overnight abandoned the "world revolution." He did seem to believe, however, that this revolution wouldong-term affair which could not be promoted aggressively in the nuclear era.
For Mao, this speech must have been an abomination. Tbe0 Red Flag and People's Dally articles, the whole theoretical structure of Soviet foreign policy, were in large part directed at this speech. The speech probablyew downward turn in thetroubled Sino-Soviet relationships. The lines between Khrushchev and Mao were now drawn in classical fashion. Khrushchev was calling Mao an adventurist and Trotsky!te who was pushing ahead much too fast both in his domestic programs and in his plans for world revolution. Mao was in effect calling Khrushchev an appeaser and was soon to callevisionist for abandoning the traditionalviews on imperialism, war, and peace.
Khrushchev'sctober speech, as indicated earlier,tatement of the upper limits of Khrushchev's detente policy. The strategy underlying this policy can be gleanedonfidential "Peace Plan" formulated by Khrushchev and disseminated to Communist parties throughout the world in early October. In this plan, Khrushchev contendedore or less lengthy period of peace was necessary in order to buy time for the bloc to outstrip the West In economic production and for the revolutionary forcesthe world to prepare themselves "morally and materially."
The prospects began by asserting that the CPSU expected firm support for peace from all the fraternal parties. The CPSU, it continued, had long-range plans for the building of socialism throughout the world. Although there hadlight improvement In the world situation, the utmost effort was still required so that peace might be prolonged as long as possible.
During this peaceful phase, the socialist camp would be in an increasingly good position to give moral as well as material support to the socialistommunist) forces of non-Communist countries for the building up of themovements. In conditions of peace, the "genuine" socialist forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America could build up their revolutionary movements morally and materially.
Thus, Khrushchev's two directives to the world Communist movement in9 were: first, be careful to avoid all actions that might lead to war; and, second, continue to build up the party against the day when revolutionary action might be feasible.
In anotherthe Hungarianecember, Khrushchevong step forward in his ideological indictment of Mao's domestic and foreign policies. This time Khrushchevarning that such deviation would not bewarning which seemed to have little effect on Mao.
'Khrushchev began be reviewing the lessons taught by the "mistakes" of the Stalinist Rakosi:leadershipjin.Hungary-lessons which, be declared, "other Communist and workers parties cannot but heed." He warned against "armchair leaders" who "order the massese warned against "disregarding objective conditions" and ruling "by decree" instead of by persuasion; he avowed that although noleaders were guaranteed against mistakes in socialist construction, "one must have the courage openly to admit one's mistakes and to correct them in time." In all this, he seemed to be aiming at Mao's headlong economic policies.
Turning thenefense ofh Congress and the reevaluatlon of Stalin, he did not agree with "some people" who contended that theStaliOization .question should "not have been raised so sharply." The Chinese had already indicated their dislike of Khrushchev's handling of this question ath Congress.
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Then,eries of passages that were unmistakably directed at Mao, Khrushchev warned against foolishness and conceit and stressed the need for discipline in themovement.
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Even now the enemies of socialism do not abandon their plans of smashing thecamp and are, of course, looking for the weak links in it. They want to rout thecountries one by one. we must bear this danger in mind, because it is real, and we must do everything to deprive our enemies of these hopes. In these sinister plans the only ally of imperialist aspirations and Hopes can be our foolishness.
If we become conceited, if we commitin our leadership, If we distortof Marxism-Leninism dp th"cCommunism, these_be_ exploited by the enemies of.'was' done in
ur enemies will attempt to set one socialist country against another in order to weaken the forces of socialism. We must bear in mind that the striving to make thecountries quarrel among themselves, to undermine the relations of friendship and brotherhood between them, is one of the forms of class struggle employed by our enemy. This is why the immutable principles of proletarian International jam are_the supreme. Irrevocable-law of "the
We must make sensible use of tbe greatOf the socialist system and strengthen the world socialist camp in everyWe must be masters of Leninism. We must not fallor go too-far, ahead. We most, figuratively speaking, synchronize our watches. If theof this or that"country becomes conceited, this can only play into tbe hands of the enemy. In this case, the socialist countries themselves, tbe leadership Itself, will help the enemy to fight socialism, to fight Communism, and this cannot be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
In these passages, Khrushchev was conceding that Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated to the point that they were in serious danger of being "undermined." Mao'spolicies, he implied, might lead to insurrection as did Bakosi's in Hungary. Mao's foreign policy, he warned again, was playing into the hands of the imperialist enemy. Finally, he warned Uao that he must obey the "supreme irrevocable" law
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of proletarianis, submissionnd that independent courses would not be
A few passages later. Khrushchev was back againMao's position on peace and war. "No Communist party anywhere, if it really ise said, "has ever said tbat it hopes to achieve its alms through war. Norcould it say so." Although thisistortion of the Chinese position, itebuke to Mao's view that armed struggle should be encouraged and supported In many areas of the world.
Returning to the theme of his Supreme Soviet speech, Khrushchev contended that the fightstable and durable peace" was one of tbe principal tasks of the Communist The importance of this struggle, he said, was "hard to overestimate."
Public Criticism of Pelping In OSSR
By the Slno-Soviet relationship had tooint that Soviet spokesmen began to crit lcime their Chinese allies in public. ecember, a
.Soviet speakerub-Tie lecture at Moscow University bad referred toin theSoviet relationship. Re specificallythe Sino-Indian border dispute and the "cold andreception" given Khrushchev on his visit to Pelping In October. Onecember, another Soviet public speaker In Moscow criticized the Chinese commune programnd asserted that the Chinese Communists' cultural timetable was off byoears, in view of the country'sand poverty. Onoviet diplomat In Goneva, talking to newsmenovlot official wbo could bo so quoted but not identified by name, reportedly lamented Communist China's activity in connection with tbe Sino-Indlan border dispute as "more than untimely" andevelopment that would be "Inopportune at any time."
Onecember, the eightieth anniversary of Stalin's birthday, Prayda and People's Daily presented diverging in-terprotatIons of Stalin which highlighted the strategic and doctrinal differences between the two parties. Pravdaalanced presentation of Stalin's achievements and' failures and avoided his views on war and foreign policy; People's Daily, on the other hand, attended almost exclusively to Stalln's virtues and, in what wasriticism of Khrushchev's detente line, reminded its readers that Stalin had urged the needhigh degree of vigilance against
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imperialism." The Chinese editorial1 statement by Stalin in which he warned that "should the warmongersto lies to trap and deceive the people in order to drag them into another war,ar would becometatement ignored in recent years by Soviet media and In striking contrast to Khrushchev's current emphasis on the possibility of excluding war from human life forever. The editorial also praised highly the Moscow declaration of the Communist parties in Novemberan exchange of charges between the Soviet and Chinese parties that the other had departed from the declaration.
In sum, Khrushchev apparently came to Pelping in the mistaken belief that China's dependence on the USSR would force the Chinese party to accommodate to his global strategy. In Pelping, he publicly rejected the Chinese contention that the Bloc should pursue more militant and revolutionaryall over the world under the protection of Soviet military power; and Suslov endorsed Khrushchev's positions, perhaps thus disabusing Maoelief that Mao had supporters among Soviet leaders. The Chinese Intensified their attacks on Khrushchev's positions after his departure.
In several speeches in the USSR subsequently, Khrushchev reaffirmed his belief in the overriding importance ofa general war, and his feeling that Western leaders were coming to tbe same view. He stated his favorong-term accommodation with the Westn avoidance of war orthat might lead to war) based on mutual concessions. Inter alia, he criticized Mao's thinking as Trotskyist, and as playing into the hands of the enemy; to Peiping's dismay, heonciliatory line on DeGaulle's proposals for ending the Algerian war; he failed to endorse Chinese positions on several Far Eastern issues; he derided Chinese domestiche accused the CCP of conceit; and he warned thatto fundamental Soviet policies would not be tolerated. By the endoviet public lecturers were openlyto difficulties In the Sino-Sovlet relationship and, as Khrushchev himself suggested at the time, the relationship had deterioratedangerous point.
II. THE WORSENING OF THE DISPUTE
In the first two months0 there was abundantthat the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy was not only not being resolved but was becoming more bitter. This was apparent in divergent reactions to President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, in the Red Flag editorial on New Year's Day, in the Chinese response toanuary speech, in Sino-Soviet clashes infront organizations In January and February, andharp division between them at the Warsaw pact conference In February.
The President's State of the Union Message
The sharp contrast between Soviet and Chinese views on the possibility and desirability ofetente with the United States was well illustrated in the divergentto Presidentanuary State of the Union message. Moscow, in its limited comment, did notthe President personally, picked out of the message some of the more hopeful signs (in the Soviet view) that the United States was prepared to ease international tensions, and was in general quite restrained in whatever criticism it offered. The Chinese, on the other hand, were unreservedly critical both of the President personally and whateceitful effort to talk peace while preparing for war.
The TASS summary of Eisenhower's message began bythat
the President emphasized in the message that in his final year at the White House be isto throw every ounce of his energy intoworld peace...
TASS further quoted the President as being "always ready to participate with the Soviet Union in serious discussion of these subjects (nuclear testing) or any other subjects that may lead to peace with justice." It went on to qualify this, however, by pointing to the President's stress also on the need to maintainigh degree" of military effectiveness.outine commentaryanuary, Moscow radio's North American service outlined some of the proposals in thespeecb and commented that "we in the USSR can fully agree with the general trend of the President'sn the same day, Moscow's European service called attention to the fact that many sections of the American press hadEisenhower's speech as further evidence ofurther relaxation of international tension.
The Chinese views on the President's message were set forth In more authoritative media and In much more bellicose torms. Theaily editorial ofanuary began Its frontal assault by contending that the message was "most convincing evidence of the imperialist nature of the United States." In going through the text of the message, itit was not possible to detectrace" of any concrete steps the United States would take towards relaxing tension; nor did Eisenhower make "any proposal" favorable to peace.
From the State of the Union Message, said People's Daily, "only one conclusion could bewas no change whatever in the "fundamental policy of arms expansion and war preparations which the United States has longhe Chinese editorial pointed out that the United Statesas speeding up Its programs for the development ofmissiles;as speeding up the construction of two IBBM bases in Italy;as continuing to prepare for war in the Far East: . its recently concluded military alliance with Japan, its continued arming of Chineseforces, its repeated boasts that it would defend theIslands, and its expansion of missile bases in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan;as threatening to resume nuclear tests at any time;ad mapped out in the NATO Council inen year program for strengthening NATO and giving it the power to carry on large scale nuclear warfare as well as greater flexibility to conduct local warfare;as stepping up tbe armament of West Germany with nuclear arms and missiles.
In the Chinese view, the essence of America's two-faced strategy of talking peace while preparing for war was that it was aneuver designed to "win time to regain military superiority." To support this view, People's Dailyeport by an American research group to the effect that the major problem facing. in the earlywas the need to eliminate tho missile gap. Since this task could not be achieved rapidly, according to the report, evenhock plan were instituted, gaining time was of the utmost importance.
In sum, the Chinese Interpretation of American detente tactics was that they were nothing moreaneuver to buy the necessary time to overcome Soviet military superiority. By Implication, this meant that those people, such aswho thought that any meaningful detente could be achieved evenimited period, were in fact playing into the hands of the West. For while the bloc was makingarms cuts and while bloc vigilance was beingby the phony "spirit of Camphe West would bo
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stealthily trying to gain the missile lead and to strengthen its military position. inal show of exasperation, People's Dally contended that this American double-dealing was "Being recognised for what it was by "more and nore people from East to West" and "though it still may deceive some people at present, it cannot fool them for long." In short, even Khrushchev would soon awaken.
In the0 Issue of Red Flag, Yu Chao-liIn terms similar to those cited about the Chinese argumentetente. . waswo-faced strategy of puttingmokescreen of peace while continuing to suppress the national liberation movements and to build up its military position throughout the world. To strengthen peace it was necessary to continue to strengthen the struggle. imperialism; all viewpoints which overestimated the strength of the enemy and underestimated the strength of the people were wrong.
An article in another Chinese Journalanuary put the warning even more blatantly. If the bloc took the Western desire for peace at face value and failed to see that the West was really interested in gaining time toits strength, it would be led to disaster:
We are wrong If we fail to see the 'two hands' of the imperialists. It will be even worse /Tor us7 if we should mistake their secondary poTicyelaxation, Of tension7 for their main policy /regaining their strength/.
GDR Delegation in Pelping
That Kao was taking his case against Soviet tactics to the Communist world was indicated again in January during the visit to Peiping of an East German government delegation headed by GDR Deputy Premier Henrlch Rau. Kao
told the East Germans that he
disagreed
WTTHJoTTcy on disarmament and Berlin. Heatisfactory disarmament agreement couldby negotiation and he believed that theof the camp should be used to force the West toSoviet disarmament proposals. Mao further saidChina would not sign any disarmament agreementit was given its legitimate seat in the Unitedunless the United States withdrew from Taiwan. Thevehemently told the East Ger-
mans not to support me soviet; planree andWest Berlin because West Berlin was unquestionably
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part aod parcel of East Germany. The Western powers, the Chinese reportedly believed, should be thrown out of Berlin
Differences Over Disarmament
In his long speech to the Supreme Soviet onhrushchev sketched tbe outlinesomprehensive military strategic doctrine, bringing together the ideas about modern war he had been propounding publicly since In essence, this doctrine is based on therole of strategic nuelear weapons in modern war. In contrast to the old battlefield-oriented concept of war prevalent in past Soviet military doctrine, Khrushchevthat in the future war "theree little to resemble previoushat war would "begin in the heart of the warring countries" and tbat every strategic area would be subjected to attack during the "first minutes" of
war.
Against the background of this latest step in therevolution in Soviet military thinking tbat had been going on in the USSR Khrushchevne-third cut in the Soviet armed forcesillionthat this troop reduction would saveoillionear for the Soviet economy and that it would not in the least diminish Soviet fire power or reduce the effectiveness of its deterrent. Khrushchev further offered the "hope" that "other countries" would follow the road to curtailment of their armed forces, expressed the view that disarmament "paves the way for stable peace and economic development for all countries and allnd contended that the money saved could be usetTTo aid all the economically underdeveloped countries. une, after the collapse of the summit, the USSRew disarmament program in which several of the above-mentioned Khrushchev statements were reiterated.
Whether or not Khrushchev was seriously interested inisarmament agreement, it was apparent that the Chinese Communists doubted tbe wisdom both of the Soviet troop cut and of the disarmament program.
Two days after Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet6 January People's Daily editorial applauded the disarmament aspects of the speech asanifestation of the Soviet closlre for peace and as an example of Soviet confidence in its own strength. At the same time, the Chinese paper contended that. was' building up its military strength in order to facilitate its capabilities for both total and limited war, noted that West Germany would soon expand Its own troops by
one-third and suggested that the United States was not eager for disarmament but only for an "arms drive infor war."
To ship aheadoment, Chinese objections todisarmament policy were to become even more explicit in June. une, two days after the new Soviet disarmament proposals had been presented to theeople's Dally editorial Insisted polemically that the bloc must "strengthe rather than reduce its armed forces.
n the face of the armed-to-the-teeth, ambitious imperialist bloc headed. it is entirely necessary for the socialist countries toigh degree of vigilance and strengthen their armed forces in order to defend their socialist homelands and preserve world peace. (emphasis supplied)
One day later,une, the Chinese delegate to the WTTU Meeting in Peiping, Liuember of the central committee, all but openly criticised the Soviet troop cut and Soviet disarmament policy in general. Liu went so far as to extract specific quotationsanuary speech and the subsequent Sovietproposal for purposes of refutation and ridicule. He began bis remarks on the Soviet disarmament proposals by claiming that "people" who took those proposals seriously were suffering from an "unrealistic illusion."
The. purpose of putting forward such ais to arouse the people throughout the world to unite and oppose the imperialist scheme for arms drives and war preparations, to unmask the aggressive and bellicose nature ofut there are people who believe thatroposal can be realized while imperialism still exists and tbat the danger of war can be eliminated by relying onroposal. This is an unrealistic
Elsewhere in bis speech, Liu quoted without attribution and rejected Khrushchev's view that arms funds could be used for "'assisting underdeveloped"downright whitewash" of Imperialism. Nor could one say--and again he was paraphrasing Khrushchev'scrlng general progress to peopleorld without armament, said Liu, was possible only "when the socialist revolution is victorious throughout the world.'
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A still further Indication that the Chinese wereby Soviet disarmament policy was Liu's insistence that "the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries should continue to develop their lead in the sphere ot atomicbe implication beingisarmamentest ban, would inhibit that lead from being maintained and developed and would particularly Inhibit China froma nuclear power. finally, Lin Implied tbat anyagreement was worthless because even after Its conclusion "imperialism can still tear it to pieces."
thy should Pelping have objected to unilateral Soviet troop cuts and Soviet disarmament proposals? Khrushchevprovided one possible answer in hisanuary speech when hepurposes ofor not the troop cut would "undermine" the Soviet deterrent. claimed that It would not, because, as he had stated many times before, the West was deterred both from all-out and local war by Soviet strategic weapons, Mao, on the otherad been contending for some years that although the West was deterred for the time being from general war, it was not deterred from local wars. Mao may well have been concerned that the Soviet troop cut would undermine thecapability to fight precisely the kind of war tbat Mao regarded aswars.
Mao may also have been concerned with the long range drift of Soviet disarmament policy. Although it is generally assumed in the West that Khrushchev is notisarmament agreement, It Is difficult tothis view with the very obvious concern expressed in Liuemarksune about "people" who think that the danger of war can be eliminated by "relying" on disarmament proposals. Even if Mao exaggerated theof Soviet disarmament proposals, there seemed toerious Chinese concern that the USSR might be jeopardizing its military superiority. Last and certainly not least,may well have feared that the signingest ban with the West would obliterate Its own chances touclear power. Just one week after Khrushchev'sanuary speech, Peiping--ln Its first statement In more than two years onproclaimed that It would not be bound by any disarmament agreements to which it wasarty and signatory.
Another point made by Khrushchev in his Supreme Soviet speech that must have been read with great Interest, if not dismay. In Pelping was about the relative military strength of the two camps. ey passage, Khrushchev stated that "Impregnabilityather relativehat Is, that
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tbe USSR's enemies "mill not be marking time /and7 can make good tbeir temporary lagging /In nuclearnd may, sooner or later, draw even with us." Khrushchev watered down thisaragraph later when he contended tbat meanwhile the USSR would not"sit with armsut he nonetheless left open tbe possibility that the West wouldtate of nuclear parity with the USSR in the near future, perhaps five years. Pelping was presumably not pleased by such an admission inasmuch as tbe Chinese had been contending7 that the West could never catch up if the USSR did not fall victim to the spirit of detente and reduce its military program.
Differences in the front Organizations
During the first two monthsoscow andin two Communist front organizations--the Worldmeeting In January, and the International Unionexecutive council, meeting in February. Inat the WPC executive committee meeting In Rome,between Moscow and Pelping ' [
Iso acute that the Chlneae mewner ot tnecmamixToe boycotted the two-day discussion on the international situation. The main rapporteur, the British delegate, John Bernal, reportedly spoke at length about Sino-Soviet differences regarding the concentration of propaganda efforts on the European situation (as the Russians wanted) or on support of the colonial struggle (as the Chinese wanted) The Soviet delegate intervened in the discussion to reject the Chinese "accusation" that the USSR wanted to Isolateand wasolicy aimed atmodus Vivendi" with theChinese charge subsequently reported by other sources. The discussion reportedly went on for more than two hours without reachinginimum of clarification" primarily because thereeneral tendency to acquiesce to the Soviets.
Int the IUS executive committeeIn Tunis, there were Sino-Soviet differences over tbe question of cooperation with Western student groups. to Belgrade radio, the Chinese offered formal amendments to dilute the Soviet-sponsored resolution calling for theof the possibility of greater cooperation with the Western student organization. Moreover, the Chinese abstained on several of theesolutions adopted. According tothe IUS executiveroad program of practical cooperation with Western and Yugoslav students groups which was carried with only one dissenting vote, that of the Chinese delegation.
The Warsaw Pact Conference: 0
The conference of the political consultative committee of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty in early February was called by the Russians to coordinate bloc strategy for the forthcoming summit meeting but, of equal importance, to discuss the pressing issues of global strategy that divided Moscow from Peiping and threatened to divide the blochole. It is reliably reported that efforts at conciliationonclusion supported by the outbreak of violent polemics from the Chinese just two months later.
Before going into the details of the conflict tbatat the meeting itself, it might be instructive to examine some of the evidence that joint Chinese-East German pressure for nuclear weapons sharing was brought to bear on the Russians on the very eve of the conference. lbricht announcedtrongly worded warning to the West Germans that the East German government would request its allies to put rocket weapons at its disposal in order to cope with the threat of West German atomic armament. Ulbricht had already indicated his intention to do so in anage letter he had sent to Adenauer onanuary. The difference in the Soviet and Chinese reaction to this East German threat was striking. Moscow repeatedew times in foreign language broadcasts to Germany, but it offered nocomment either approving Uibricht's suggestion orthat it might comply: If tbe Ulbricht throat hadaneuver conducted beforehand with the Russians to intimidate the West Germans and to discourage West Germany from seeking nuclear weapons, it is hard to understand why the Russians did not seize on the Ulbricht initiative to dramatise the threat.
In contrast to Moscow's marked restraint on theeoplgls pally editorial on 4the very eve of"the Warsaw Pactthat the request was "not only fully justified but necessary." This Chinese support for the proposal can be compared withebruaryof the Warsaw Treaty states which took an optimistic view of the "definite change for the better" in thesituation and made no mention of the possibility that Moscow might transfer rocket weapons to East Germany. In fact, the declaration referred once again touclear free zone in Europe which would include
the GDR.
While it might seem improbable that Ulbricht should have been trying, with Chinese support, to force the Soviet hand on the matter, the opposite assumption, that the Russians may have decided to proceed with the atomic armament of East
Germany at this moment, six weeks beforepowerconference and three months before the summit, looks even more unlikely, And, if the gambitoint GDR-Soviet one, It is difficult, as already indicated, to understand whydid not Join in more enthusiastically.
If the Chinese did encourage such an East GermanIt is not hard to see the reason. The Chinese may have well have believed that if the Russians could be pressed Intouclearlimited andto the East Germans, the case againstuclearfor China would be drastically weakened.
Continuing Soviet resistance to pressures for nuclear-weapons sbarlng was suggested tbe very next month in anletter addressed by Khrushchev to the EuropeanAgainst Atomic Armament, made public by TASS onarch. Released about six weeks after President Elsenhower hadat bis press conferenceebruary, the possibility that the United States would share nuclear weapons with its European allies, the letter was clearly calculated to warn thattep would force the USSR to follow suit. stressed the "undeslrability of expansion of tbe so-called atomic club" and cautioned. action to supply nuclear weapons to 1ts allies would set offind of chain reaction in the dissemination of nuclear weapons all over the world." It is of Interest, in this connection, that Soviet news reports on tbe President's press conference stressed the unlikelihood that Congress would amend the law in order to permit nuclear-weapons diffusion while Chinese newsconcentrated on the likelihood that such nuclearwould take place.
To turn to the conference itself, ebruary report of the Chinese delegate, or "observer" Kang Sheng, anmember of the CCP Politburo, wasinority report.* It differed notably, both in tone and in substance, from the much milder Declaration issued by the Warsaw Treaty membersebruary. Kang acknowledged that "certain procedural agreements had been reached" on disarmament, but he attributed this not to the good will of the West but rather to the "repeated struggles" by socialist forces and national revolutionary forces throughout tbe world. He reiterated the now-standard Chinese line that American talk about "peace" wastratagem to lull tbe bloc. He added thenew charge that this stratagem was also designed to "dismember the socialistas deliberatelyto produoe Sino-Soviet tensions. Moreover, said Kang,
The CCP'is credibly reported to have protested-later that Kang's role was restricted and his views ignored.
the American "peace" strategem was designed topeaceful evolution" in the socialist countries, anof Chinese fearsoviet-American rapprochement would lead to the growth of revisionism and other centrifugal forces in the individual communist states.
Kang was most emphatic in his veiled argument against the Soviet disarmament policy. The burden of his argument was that. would never agree to any real disarmament plan. At the same time, indicating China's own refusal to disarm, he falsely alleged that existing Chinese forces were less than half their original size and reiterated the position taken by his government onanuary that the CPR would not be bound by any disarmament agreement in which it did not participate. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact declaration said that the "Warsaw Treatyf which China is not one, "arrived at the conclusion that the situation is now more favorable than ever before for fruitful disarmament talks.'
After detailing American Military threats andKang went on to implicitly rebuke the USSR for its failure to support China in its disputes with India and The CCP, he said, had always 'regarded an attack against any socialist country by the imperialists andas an attack against China."
The impasse that must have developed between the Chinese and the Russians at the Warsaw meeting is suggested further by the fact that Kang Sheng's speech was not reported nor even mentioned by any bloc media except those of China.
eople's Dally editorial reviewing the Warsaw meeting struck hard at Soviet policy. "It isnot tot began polemically, that the West had in fact stepped up Its armsclear implication being that this was no time for talk of disarmament. The American peace strategem, it warned, was designed to "subvert, corrupt, split and destroy the socialist camp." Itvicious and sinister strategem."
In addition to the public evidence of Sino-Soviet discord
at the Pact conference, there
reports of the nature and scopeoenina-Tne-scenss sino-Soviet conflict at the Pact meeting. According to the first, the USSR, supported by the East European satellites, alleged that West Germany was the greatest immediate threat to the socialist camp and that the best policy to follow In such conditions would be to lessen world tensions and toapprochement with the West, particularly the United States, so that the German problem could be solved. The Asian Bloc, led by the Chinese, argued that the United States was the only
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enemy of Communism, first, last and always, and that one should deal with it only from an uncompromising position of strength. It may be recalled tbat Khrushchev inpeech asserted that only "madmen" couldeneral war under current conditions; and he went on tothat the nearest thingadman then in view was, not any American leader, but Chancellor Adenauer, who wasat great length. The Soviet desire to concentrate its fire for the moment on West Germany rather than the United States is an example of the kind of flexible differentiation tactics used by Khrushchev to probe differences in the Westerndisapproved by Peiping on the apparent grounds that Khrushchev was overestimating his ability to split the Western allies and that, in any case, fire should be concentrated on the main enemy, the United States.
According to the second source, Khrushchev made the main speech at the conference and attacked recent Chinese actionshe border dispute with India and the overseasdispute with Indonesia) in strong terms. Khrushchev said that these actions had compromised the Bloc's policy of friendsblp with the non-Communist countries and had thusmuch support for the Communist cause. Khrushchev also reportedly criticized the severe attitude adopted by thetowards Yugoslavia, on the similar grounds that theChinese attacks created disunity among the bloc Khrushchev also complained that the Chinese hadto support the USSR's attempts to reduce world tension. China, he said, had not followed the USSR's lead byany part of Its armed forces and had failed to support Soviet disarmament policies and the banning of atomic Khrushchev further reportedly alleged that tbe Chinese party was too insistent on following its own independentand that China's refusal to associate itself more closely with economic and political policies adopted by the other socialist countries towards the rest of the world was harming tbe cause of Communism.
This general attack on the Chinese, delivered before representatives of the entire bloc, illustrated the gravity of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev probably hoped that his harsh criticism would make Peiping reconsider its course; he also probably hoped to forestall any influence that China's independent views might have on the actions of otherregimes. He evidently failed, however, to forestall the Asian satellites from supporting Peiping, and he may not have completely obliterated sympathy for Peiping in East Germany, Albania andof which had in the past demonstrated considerable antipathy to Khrushchev'stactics.
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Konev's Speech to the Pact Conference
Some revealing clarification of Soviet strategicwas provided at the Warsaw Pact meeting in an unpublished speech by Marshal of the Soviet. Konev, thereplaced commander of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.
Konev reportedly began his speech to the Defenseof the bloc countries by contending that there were only two ways of exit from the current state of affairs: either complete disarmament and coexistence, or theof the cold war and the possibilityhot" war. It was not necessary to explain, he went on, that the Soviet Union was counting on notar occur. Konev went on to recount the radical changes in the internationalsince the end of World War IX that benefited' the bloc, but he cautioned that the bloc had not overtaken the West in all the basic military and Industrial fields and particularly that the Western industrial and economic potential stillthat of the bloc. He continued that the peacefulof the bloc would lead to unprecedented powerew years and that, in the meantime, bloc policy was not to permit the occurrence of war of any kind for any reason. Konev went on to suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States badtate of weapons parity which nullified the use of rocket and nuclearinasmuch as neither side had an effective means of defense against rocket weapons. The lack of defense against rocket weapons, said Konev, was the core of the matter and, was at the root of the Soviet issue to negotiate.
He continued by arguing that the question of rocket defense was now occupying first place in Soviet military thinking.
In sum, Konev's rationale for the detente tacticsby Khrushchev was that Soviet defenses and overall Soviet strength were not yet strong enough to warrant an attack on the United States or to accept any risk ofwar. Konev was asserting in the most unequivocalthe Soviet belief in, and the .rationale for, mutual deterrence.
T
Konev's emphasis on the lack of an effective defense against missiles was consistent with statements made byin hisanuary speech to the Supremeonly "madmen" could contemplate war now, that the USSR as well as the West would "suffer great calamities"eneral war (although less than the West), that "impregnabilityather relativend that modern methods of waging
war did not give "anyufficient advantage to justify an attack. Neither Khrushchev nor Konev closed the door to the possibility that the USSR would have andefense before the United States would--at which time Moscow mighttrike-firstas of0 neither Khrushchev nor Konev appeared to be confident of that achievement in the foreseeable future and the Soviet party apparently had not adoptedtrategy. On the contrary, Moscow seemed to be confident tbat the Bloc could strengthen itself, by means short of war, to ain or aroundwhich the world revolution could advance rapidlyinal triumph, stilleneral war. In the meantime, the Soviet party seemed anxious to prevent the international situation from deterioratingoint where one side or the other mighturprise attack. It was precisely on this question of acceptable risk that Peiping most emphatically disagreed.
War and Peace
Onebruary, the periodical China Youtheries ofuestions and answers on tbe subject of war and peace which represent one of the frankest and mostChinese discussions of the question ever published in open media. lose examination of these questions and answers is helpful to an understanding of the fine points of the Chinese view on the likelihood of war, and on the possibility and means of averting it.
Theheses may be summarized as follows: t is increasingly difficult for imperialism toorld war, owing to the growing strength of the bloc, its neutralist friends and the forces of peace; 2) the principal reason why. dares not strike is that the USSR has superiority in missiles; espite the Soviet military lead and despite the fact that time is on the bloc's side, it is impossible to say that war will not break out, because as long asexists there remains tbe danger of war; y using peaceamouflage, the West is trying to gain time to expand its armaments and close the missile gap; hefor disarmamentong and complex one and "no results are possible immediately" because imperialism cannot do away with armaments; for this reason, to rest the hope of lasting peace on the possibility ofisarmament agreement is to indulgeream; ar Is inseparable from class struggle and aggression, and wars are tbe necessary fruits Of imperialism; t is possible to striveairly long period of peace but, at the same time, we need "to strengthen our own resources, hold fast to Marxist-Leninist policies,
- /
expose ceaselessly Imperialist schemes, arouse the fighting spirit of the worlds people andasting warless world" can be brought about only by the abolition of the imperialism; e seek peace but never beg it from the imperialists; e must support all "Just revolutionary wars" in order to weaken imperialism and secure peace; e cannot seek peace by compromise; here Is no foundation to the view that war can never again be the means of settling international disputes because we can never be sure that imperialism will relinquish war; e oppose war but we do not fear it.
The implications of theseof which have beenbloc policy are evident: the cold war cannot be abated; the danger of war will continue to exist and the bloc must prepare for all contingencies; disarmament negotiations are more or less useless; the bloc shouldfirst of all not on negotiations wltb the West but on building its own resources and securing its own strength; and the bloc must actively support all "Just" wars.
in.
LENIN ANNIVERSARY POLEMICS
The Chinese Communist indictment of Soviet strategy, which had begunow key in the fall7 and had become Increasingly shrill in the period shortly before Khrushchev's trip to the United States,ew pitch In Using thepril anniversary of Lenin's birtheg, the Chineseomprehensiveof Soviet theory, strategy, and tactics in the form of five lengthy and acrimonious doctrinal statements, two in Red Flagndwo in People'sndpril)peech on the anniversary itself by Politburo member Lu Ting-i. The initial Soviet reply came in Politeburo member Kuusinen's anniversary address onpril,in articles in Pravda and Soviet Russia in June, and finally from Khrushchev himself at the Rumanian Party Congress the same month.
Until the publication of tbe Lenin anniversary articles, the Chinese Communist attacks on Sovietthe doctrine which reflected thatgenerally been cryptic and moderate. The Chinese Lenin anniversary articles were ofar-reaching and fundamental nature that they could only be compared In importance to such water-sheds in the post-Stalin era as Khrushchev's secret speech of With copious documentation from Lenin and Marx and pointed references to the ideas of some of Communism's most notorious heretics such as Bernstein, Kautsky and Tito, the Chinese in effect accused Khrushchev of "revising,and betraying" the most fundamental and sacred Tenets of Leninism. Such an attack could not but have the effect of calling into question Khrushchev's leadership of themovement.
The three principal targets of the Chinese fire were the very three basic ideological innovations which Khrushchev personally had presented toh party congress and which provided the doctrinal rationalization for his more flexible post-Stalin global strategy. These were Khrushchev's new doctrine on peaceful coexistence, on the non-lnevitabillty of war, and on tbe possibility of peaceful accession to power in non-Communist countries. The Chinese articles rejected all three of Khrushchev's Innovations: theyuch narrower definition of coexistence which in effect meant the continuation of the cold war; they contended that wars,local and colonial wars, were inevitable so long as Imperialism remained; and they minimized the possibility of peaceful roads to power in the non-Communist world.
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In attacking Khrushchev's ideological innovations and tbe nev strategy which these innovations reflected, the Chinese were not calling for general war or contending that general war was inevitable, although, they may have thought It inevitable. They were attacking Khrushchev's gradualistconception and putting forth an alternativebased on tbe conviction that the West could besooner than Khrushchev thougbt If the USSR and the world Communist movement were more aggressive. The Chinese had sanqulne estimates of the revolutionary potential in many areas, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They believed that the Soviet deterrent could be Invoked torevolutionary action in many of these areas withinimal risk of global war. They feared that Sovietwould unnecessarily delay the revolution in the short run and perhaps lead to stagnation in the long run. with this fear, presumably was the belief thatgradualism was much too confining for Chinesetowards Taiwan and for its role as the self-appointod leader of the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped areas.
Before going into the details of tbe polemics, three observations might be offered. The first is tbat theattack on Sovietallowing for theoversimplifications and misrepresentation of that strategy -cannot be understood outside the context of the shift In Soviet strategy in recent years. The Sovietdesire for detente is generally put In quotation marks In the West. Such skepticism is undoubtedly warranted if iti is meant to apply to the view that Khrushchev isin detente for detente's sake or In achieving lasting peace in terms of tbe present status quo. Heand Indeed has said that he canetente to extend the Soviet sphere of influence and to undermine the Western alliance system. Yet be appears to believe tbat he can achieve these goals without resorting to the actual use of Soviet armed force andinimum of armed violence on the part of Communist parties throughout tbe world.
The second observation is that the Chinese anniversary attack was probablyirect attempt to sabotage tbe summit meeting scheduled for Hay. Khrushchev's summitwasymptom andoot cause of Sino-Soviet strategic differences. Chinese comment on the eve Of the summit made it evident that Mao expected the summit to be held even though be expected little "progress" to be
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made.* Finally, the Chinese attack must be viewed in the context of the accumulation of twoalf years of frustration with Soviet tactics. In the Chinese view, the Soviet leaders were not only exercising excessive caution but even where they were exerting the mostonpressure was being exerted in behalf of Soviet and not Chinese aspirations- The Chinese may well have thought that while Khrushchev was taking steps to clean up his own backyard by "normalizing" the situation inhe should have been willing to exert similar pressure to "normalize" the situation in Communist China's. Taiwan. Similarly, while Khrushchev'stactics were aimed at making gains for the USSR inthe weakening of the Western alliance system and the Western recognition of the status quo in Easternwere relatively few advantages of such tactics for the Chinese and considerable disadvantages. uclear test ban, for example, reached by aon Berlin, could endanger Chinese aspirations touclear power.
Peaceful Coexistence or Continuation of Cold War
One of the three issues In debate between Moscow and Pelping on the Lenin anniversary polemics was the question of peaceful coexistence. Neither rejected the concept but the Soviets placed their emphasis on the need for something more stableere armed truce while the Chinese put their emphasis on the impossibility and undeslrablllty of anything more stableemporary armedecause the Chinese believed that local wars and armed rebellion were inevitable, they could see no prospectenuine detente except by sacrificing potential gains.
The question of coexistence was defined by Khrushchev ath Party Congress6 as one of threequestions" of present day international development. He told the Congress and he has been saying since, thatcould triumph peacefully, that ituestion of coexistence or "the most destructive war Innd that the opposing camps must do more than exist side by side but must "proceed further, to Improve relations, strengthen confidence and cooperate."
alleges that
-uiijwbe ueiuguLjon in kbtcuw on innoi tne summit sought to have Khrushchev scuttle the conference.
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Although Khrushchev's professed desire for relaxing tensionsmentionedregarded with much skepticism in the Vest, there does appear in this case toelationship between his protestations and his Khrushchev appears to believe he can use ato wreck the Western alliance system and to seduce the uncommitted countries. He seems to think that theof these goals would be retarded by the use of bloc armed force or by armed coups on the part of local Communist parties; he is preparedong-range political andstruggle with the West in which history is on his side; his policy is fundamentally tempered by his fear of nuclear war, and he calculatesontinuation of the cold war without any- relief could leadot war he does.not want. The rigidities and consequent failures of Stalinist foreign policy would in anyif the post-Stalin Soviet leadership had not been confronted with theore flexible foreign policy. The coalescence of these various factors in Sovietfear of nuclear war, the confidence in peaceful triumph, the desire for greater floxibility--help explain the Soviet desire for detente,
Soviet awareness of the technological imperative was posed in the sharpest terms yet by Kuusinen on
ar, using new means of masswould be madness. Such are the dialectics of military-technical progress that newof war begin to exert pressure on behalf of peace. To Marxists there is nothingin this. The classics of Marxism have never denied that new weapons not onlyevolution in the art of war but can influence policyenin, as Kxupskaya relates, foresaw that rthe time will come when war will become so destructive as to beemphasis supplied)
In this remarkable passage, the Soviet ideologue wasnuclear weapons to an importance never anticipated In orthodox doctrine, which held with Lenin that, so long as imperialism remained, war was inevitable. Kuusinen was in effect elevating these new weapons to the role of anagent in the historical process which coulda revolution so profound that it "could influencehat the Russians were hard pressed to justify this inversion of Marxism-Leninism is apparent from the fact that they were forCed to quote not Lenin or Marx but Lenin's widow, Krupskaya.
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The fact that Kuusinen madeasic assault on tbeof Leninist ideology is good evidence of the realistic Soviet appreciation of the consequences of nuclear war.
Kuusinen also posed in the sharpest terns yet offered by any Soviet spokesman the Soviet confidence in theirability to triumph over the Westinimum ofviolence.
Naturally the task (of peaceful economic competition) is difficult. But we say and have said that socialism has tbe strength of example. Violencetrength in relation to those who want to establish its power. But with this tbe significance of violenceitself, for after that it is influence and example that will tell. It" is necessary to show, ractical way, by example, the significance of Communism. This is what Ilyich said. (emphasis supplied)
Elsewhere, Kuusinen projected the "main trends of historicaln tho second half ofh century; thewas for the0 to dawn with most or much of tbe Western world still non-Communist. Be predicted no gains In territory for the bloc and in fact minimised theof successful Communist revolutions In the Western capitalist countries even by tbe dawnew century.
The need for flexibility and elasticity In formulating policy and tactics was also-strongly defonded in thelies to the Chinese. Hatkovskiy, deputy director of the Central Committee's Institute for Marxism-Leninism, wrote in Pravda onuno that only left wing Communists would deny "possible compromises" and, quoting Lenin, asserted that compromises were not to be equated with opportunism. Then hesnrtmd one of the most essential elements in 'Sovietthe belief thmt differences In the Western alliance could be exploited-fey a: readiness to make temporary accommodations:.:
Lenin taught that one could not wage tbe most complex struggle for Communism, theagainst tbe International bourgeoisie, while rejecting out of band agreements and compromises on individual issues withit onlyand the exploitation ofthey only temporarythe interests of the enemies. By compromising in some instances, In the interests of theof the revolutionary movement, Communists are not deviating from their positions of principle.
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Kuusinen made the related point that Soviet policy also differentiated among Western leaders and that such tactics were essential.
Division among influential bourgeois circles in undoubtedly significant for the success of the struggle for peace. Lenin has already pointed out that it isatter of indifference to us whether we are dealing with those representatives of the bourgeois camp who are attracted to asolution of the question, or with thoseof the bourgeois camp who areto
In short, Moscow justified its tactics on tho grounds that an undifferentiated hostility towards the United States and towards all Western leaders would not enable the USSR to exploit differences of view and interests among theallies and Western statesmen.
The Chinese rejected all three Soviet explanations of their coexistence tactics: that nuclear weapons left no other choiceore moderate approach to the West, that the bloc could ultimately triumphinimum ofviolence, and that it was necessary to pursue bloc almsaximum of flexibility.
On the question of nuclear weapons, Red Flag dismissed them on lfi April in these terms:
hichever way you look at it, none of the new techniques, such as atomic energy, rocketry and the like, has changed the basic characteristics of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution pointed out by Lenin.
On the question of peaceful triumph, the Chinese argued that peaceful coexistence was "conditional"temporary breathing space (which) can always come to an end." In the Chinese view, coexistence would have to be interruptedeither by imperialist-launched "unjust" wars or by historically inevitable "Just" wars for national liberation or capitalist emancipation, both of which the bloc must
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On the question of flexibility, Peiping contended that Soviet tactics were diluting firm Leninist principles and straying toward opportunism. We have already seen that at the Warsaw Pact conference the Chinese strongly objected to one aspect of Moscow's tactics--focusing on West Germany
rather than. as the main enemy at the moment. These objections were again voiced by People's Dally onpril and by Lu Ting-1. People's Daily wrote
It Is entirely necessary to opposein West Germany and Japan and militarism fostered by. in other countries. But now it is the war policy. imperialism that plays the decisive role in all this. from this point IS departing fromeart and essence of the "matter"! Ir the peace-loving people -of the world do not concentrate tbeir strength on exposing this war policy of the American authorities and continuallyerious unflinching struggle against it, the result will inevitably be grievous calamity, (emphasis supplied)
Luaid:
f the proletariat in the capitalist countries is to win emancipation, if the people of the colonies and semi-colonies are tonational liberation, If the people of the world are to safeguard world peace, theof the struggle must be directed. imperialism. (emphasis supplied)
Still another Chinese objection to Moscow's flexible tactics concerned the strategy for the "peace" movement. In the Soviet view, tbe fight fortheof the Western alliance which is the principal goal of thistbe most Important goal of the present stage. To achieve this goal, Moscow believed tbat the "peace" movement should concentrate exclusively on peace and should not handicap or expose itselfommunist tool by supporting wars, such as the Algerian, for example, which the Communists regard as "just." To the Chinese, putting "peace" before "just" wars was bad tactics. They probably believed tbat the world Communisttheymore to gain by keeping alive the Algerianthan by disruptinggoal which they probably regarded as Illusory in any case. For such reasons, Luppealed polemicallymerging" of the struggle for peace with the struggle for liberation:
In order to oppose the aggressive policy. imperialism, all the world's revolutionary and peace-loving forces must be united. World peace can be further defended and effectively defended only by merging the struggle of the
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peoples of the socialist countries, theliberation struggle of the colonial and seal-colonial peoples, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat In the capitalist countries and tho struggle of all people's for peace, forming thenighty antl-lmperiallst front and dealing firm blovs at the Imperialist policies of aggression and war...
Separation from the liberation struggles of colonies and semi-colonies and from the struggles of the proletariat' and" working people in the capitalist countries, will greatly weaken the forces in defense of world peace and serve the interests of (emphasis supplied)
"Peaceful" Revolution or Armed Uprisings and Violence
Throughout Communist history, there has always been controversy between those on the right who have maximized and those on the left who have minimized the possibilities for peaceful acquisition of power. imilar and related controversy has existed between those on the right whothat since revolution Is inevitable, it needs little outside stimulation (poltalkivaniya) and those on the left who, agreeing it is inevitable, nonetheless believe init along.
Ath party congresshrushchev hadig step toward the rightist position. He deemed it "quite probable" tbat the forms of transition to socialism would"more and more varied" and that these forms "need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances." and civil war, he contendod, were not the "only way" to remake society. Particularly In the highly developed capitalist countries, where itraditional Institution, parliament might become an agency of "genuine democracy" for the workinga vehicle for Communist control. Khrushchev further implied that the peaceful path to power might be particularly possible in those capitalist countries where capitalism was in the former colonial For, he seemed to suggest, capitalist resistance would be greatest in those countries which were most advanced:
The winningirm parliamentarybased on the mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and of the working people would create conditions for the working class of many capitalist and formerly colonial countries to make fundamental social changes.
Of course, in those countries whereis still strong, where itre-mendous military and police machine, serious resistance by reactionary forces is Inevitable. The transition to socialism in these.countries will take place amid sharp revoluTionary class struggle. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, despite the qualifiers and escape clauses, the dominant impression left byh Congress revision was that the chances for peaceful takeover in the West were quite good, particularly in the weaker capitalist countries, but not excluding the more advanced countries. As we have seen, the new textbook of Communist strategy issued in the fall9tep forward in this rightist course. It defined indefinitely the'questlon of Communist takeover of power in the more advanced countries and strengthened the doctrinal rationalization for achieving power peacefully.
This emphasis on the possibility of peaceful takeover was pronounced In Kuuslnen's0 reply to the Chinese. Projecting ahead to tbeuuslnen held out little hope for any kindommunist takeover in the advanced capitalistsaid he could offer no "firmfor the development of thesethe colonial and former colonial countries, hethat the second half of theJudging by everything, will be markedomplete liberation of the oppressed peoples and dependent countries." That is, the colonial countries would have completely eliminated Western political and economic Influence, but they would notbe non-Communist. This timetable did notaximum of direct revolutionary violence.
The Soviet belief that overtaking the West in economic production would provide the key to tho future was reflected In the four goals that Kuuslnen posited for theirst, he predicted that the USSR would overtake the West in per capita output, then in the volume of national income, then in the level of labor productivity, and finally in the level of per capita consumption. Second, after these goals wereomplete Communist society would be built in tbe USSR. Tbe other countries of the camp would "march up the hill with the USSR.'1 Third, there would be theliberation" of the colonial countries. And finally, the peace forces would grow to such an extent that "any war? would become impossible. Gone was Kaganovicb's5 thath Century would see thevictory of Communism.
Khrushchev's defense of this slow revolutionary tine-table was that revolutions could not be Bade without thorough preparation, particularly In the colonial countries where conditions had "not yet matured." Shevlyagin, writing In Soviet Russia on 10 June, warned against "terrible eager to spread revolution where conditions are not ripe:
Lenin understood the good Intentions of comrades who hasten to race ahead and to speed up the advent of the socialist revolution, but he warned very decidedly against the danger of their transformation into Lenin's teaching on 'compromises' acquires greatunder contemporary conditions, when th* Communists, particularly those in countries where many tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the winning or nationalhave still to be performed, must be able to conclude alliances, not only with thebut also with some strata of the national bourgeoisie in tbe interests of tbe struggle against the foreign yoke. ne must not limp behind events, but one also must not runprematurely Issue slogans of soclal-iWton who rons"ave not yet matured. (emphasis supplied)
Shevlyagin continued by pointing to the "left wing de-vlatlonlst" demand of tbe Iraqi Communist party in9 for inclusion in the Iraqi government. Hethat tbe failure of this precipitous "left wing" demand should be "instructive" to other Communist parties of the East and Latin America "if they are faced with basically the same tasks." In short, Moscow was advising Communist parties in the backward areas not to beurry either to enter the government or to seize power.
Regarding the Chinese desireore revolutionary strategy, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorln, writing in Kommunlstn the Lenin anniversary, bluntly warned against those left-wing Communists who demanded theof the world revolution and who contended that the revolution could be brought about "only by war" or through armed struggle.
eninecisive battle with tbe so-called left Communists wbo were attempting to shove Soviet Russia intothe war with their arch-revolutionary
phrases about 'the victory of the world At that tine Lenin formulated his well known position on the impossibility of nudging revolutions and of the inadmissabllity of interference in the affairs of otherfor Importing revolution from without.
Lenin wrote: 'It is supposed that tbe Interests of the international revolutionnudging of it, and that such nudging can bo accomplished only by war, not byuch 'theories' have nothing in common with Marxism, which always denied the nudging of rovolutions--the sharpening of classleads to revolution.'
So long as the two systems arethere will be inevitable struggle betweenpolitical and ideological. This is tbe unbreakable law of social But from this it does not follow that the battle must lead to armed struggle. Tem-phasis supplied)
While Zorin may have slightly exaggerated theon revolution, the Chinese polemiciststhat the concept of violent revolution "liesroot of Marx's and Eogel'shat it wasto promote and to "support" such revolutionsslightesthat the present epoch wasfavorable" for tbem, and that local warssalutary in bringing them about. pril Bed
he spearhead of US aggression atis directed primarily against the colonial and semi-colonial states and Independent In order to realize world peace, the people of the whole world should support the national independence movement of the colonTal and semi-colonial states, supportstfug-gles of tlie independent countries againstsupport Just wars" for nationaland against imperialist aggression, (emphasis supplied)
Luaid that the people of the whole world must "promote the development ofnd again:
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No force on earth can hinder or restrain the colonial and semi-colonial peoples from rising In revolution and smashing the yoke they are All revolutionary Marxist-Leninists should support these just struggles resolutely and without the slightest reserva-tion. o force on earth can binder or restrain the proletariat and working people In tbe capitalist countries from rising in All revolutionary Marxist-Leninists should likewise support these just struggles, resolutely and without the slightest reservation, (emphasis supplied)
In yet another passage he said:
The Marxist-Leninists and the modernstarting from fundamentally different stands and viewpoints, draw fundamentallyconclusions on this situation. Theregard this as an unprecedeottdly favorable new epoch for the proletarianIn the countries of tbe world and for the national revolution in the colonies and seal-colonies.
The Chinese strongly Implied that local wars would be favorable for the bloc because they could be turned into revolutionary opportunities in which the local Communists could then seize power. Thepril People's DallyLenin's warning after World War-1 that "propaganda for peace was damaging the prospects for protracted war being turned into revolution." Even more blatently, thepril Red Flag suggested that local wars which involved the use of bloc forces could be exploited to communize other countries.
Since the armed forces of the socialist countries fight for justice, when these forces have to go beyond their borders toa foreign enemy, it is only natural that they should exert an influence and have an effect wherever they go...
In short, tbe Chinese were understandably concerned that without war, the spread of Communism wouldifficult task. Communist power has in fact been established andlargelyirect result of two world wars. The
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Chinese thus bad good reason to be more pessimistic than Khrushchev about the prospects for spreading revolutionpeacetime.
Inevitability or Noninevitabllity of War
Atht party congresses, Khrushchev hadimportant innovations into Leninist theory on the inevitability of war. Ath congress, he said that the present correlation Of forces in tbe world indicated that "there is no fatalistic inevitability ofnd that,the danger of war existed, the opportunity andbad been established for "ensuring not merelyasting peace." (emphasis in original) Att congress, Khrushchev stated this thesis more sharply when he said that the new balance of forces in the world wouldreal possibility of excluding world war from the life of society even before th* complete triumph of socialism,"and that "any attempt at aggression" would be stoppedimplying that local wars could be avoided as well.
In addition to these doctrinal innovations suggesting that the bloc had or would soon have sufficient power to deter tbe West from both general and local war, Soviet military and political leadsrs had for some time prior to0 been contending that localth* nature of th* opposed alliance systems and the nature of nuclearbound to spread. While such* and ar* undoubtedly Intended forn* of deterring the West from localalsoenuine Sovlot estimate that th* westn fact deterred from.using fore* in any area of th* world provided that local Communists do not attempt to seizey fore* or th* Communist power*ot initiate aggression. Kuuslnen fortified this lmpre*-'in hi* anniveraary reply to the Chinese when h* said that th* "rapid atrcaa" of historicas now flowingir*ctlon which would finally make "any war" Impossible.
Perhaps th* frankest statement of Soviet views on th* question of local wara came in an article in International Affair* (no.n tha Leninryl Th* article wa* Olearly intendedeply to Chlneae views on the
Th* section on war began by oontandlng flatly that the Woet waa deterredlocall a* from global war. Tha balance of forceaestraining affect on th*powers a* regards so-called local war*." It then want on to ahow that tha frequency of local wars
had declined by about ono-third as compared with past Moreover, not one of the local wars5 "hasirect gain to the imperialist forces." Finally, although there were five local wars5here had been In this quantitative decline of local wars, the "decisive" factor was the might of the socialist system.
In sum, the Soviet argument was that local wars wereless and less unlikely because of the might of the bloc and that even in those cases where local wars had occurred the bloc had succeeded in preventing the West from improving its position.
Perhaps even more important, the article went on to warn In effect that the USSR would do all in its power to ensure that revolutions in various countries did not lead to civil wars in which the bloc mlgbt be forced into supporting one side while the West supported the other. -
In the atmosphere of rapid socialcharacteristic of the present era, peaceful coexistence, while not retarding social changes in countries where these changes are ripe, must at the same timeituation in whichprocesses in particular countries do not lead to military clashes of thesystems. The situation is shaping favorably toourse of events. (emphasis supplied)
In short, the USSR did not want to be committed to interveneliberation" war in Africa or Asia or the Middle East in which thereigh probability that the West would intervene on the other side. Revolutionary gains must be made without great risk of civil war.
How was this to be done? In its very nezt paragraph, the article contended that
this situation opens up new, unprecedented horizons before diplomacy. As methods ofand diktat are relegated to the background, methods of negotiation assume evon greater
In plainer language, the USSR could make revolutionary gains via negotiations and without the risk of war.
Soviet views on the non-inevitability of war seem to be the result of several converging elements in their current strategic thinking. First, the Russians have exhibited both
in doctrine and inelief that the likelyof general war in the nuclear era are prohibitive. Second, they appear to believe they can attain theirin the middle run without the risk of general or local war. Third, Moscow's conservative thinking on war isrelated to the present instability of the balance of terror. So long as neither side has an assured strike-second capability, both must live within the ever present dangereteriorating international situation which may at some point induce the other side to strike first, and perhapsby surprise. Whileear on the Soviet side undoubtedly decreases as the Russians build up their missile capabilities, it is doubtful that they have yetoint where they can be assured of an invulnerable strike-second capability. Moreover, after both sides achieve an invulnerable strike-second capability, the Russians will probably be even loss inclined than at present to take large risks of general war.
The first Bod Flag article by Yu Chao-lipril was almost entirely devoted to refuting Soviet positions on war. Its central thesis was twofold. First, it agreed with the Soviet view that the West was deterred from general war, and it went on to imply that the Russians were acting too timidly under the circumstances. Second, it held thatwo-camp war was unlikely, local wars were inevitable. Itthat the bloc should support those local revolutionary wars which were "just" and strongly oppose those imperialist-launched local wars which were "unjust."
It is not generally understood in the West that the essence of the Chinese position is not that general war is inevitable. The Chinese doctrinal articles, like those of the Russians, hold thatar is possible. But they do noteneral war in the near future as inevitable or even likely. This view is quite explicit in Mao'sline which was revived in the fall8 and whichentral place in the Yu Chao-li article. to Mao, the Imperialist cliques were only "using the rumor that war between the USSR and. may break out at any momentmokescreen to bide their schemes tothe The imperialists were said to be using the threatwo-camp war in order to apply pressure on their own peoples and to expand into the "intermediate zone" between. and thehe Middle East. The "real and direct contradictions" in the world since World War II, said Yu, "are sot contradictions between tbe Soviet Union and. The Soviet Union and the United States can and are actually coexisting peacefully." In practical terms, therefore, Chinese doctrine holds that there is less dangerwo-camp war than does Soviet doctrine.
The second central element in the Chinese view, closely related to the first, Is that while general war is unlikely, local wars are not only likely but inevitable. Because the "real and direct" contradictions in the world since World War II have been in fact not between the two camps but rather within the non-Communistis, "the contradictions between the reactionary cliques of an Imperialist country and Its own people, the contradictions between the imperialist colonies and their colonies and semi-colonies, and tbeamong the imperialistwill inevitably lead to civil wars in the capitalist countries, to wars between the capitalist countries and the colonial countries, and to wars among the imperialist
Of those three kinds of inevitable wars, Yu seemed to believe that "colonial" wars are most probable. . aggression at present is directed primarily against the colonial and semi-colonial states and independent he said. One of the "special features" since World War II had been the surging movement for national independence in colonial areas and the "continual suppression and use of force by imperialism to smother the movement." Thecould not voluntarily give up their plundering of the colonies and semi-colonies, because the very survival ofdepended on its obtaining raw material producing centers and markets. This being the case, "nationalwars will remain Inevitable."
Yu identified three different kinds of wars that had broken out between imperialism and tbe colonial areas, and he implied there would be more of the same in the future. These werears launched by imperialism to suppress actual colonies,ars of aggression against countries which had achieved national independence, andnational liberation wars" carried out in tbe formivil war to oppose imperialism and "its running dogs." All these kinds, he said, "are still being carried out both "separately and simultaneously." In sum, Yu considered both Western-initiated and bloc-sponsored or bloc-supported colonial warsontinuing feature of the world.
Tbe second type of local war which Yu seemed to consider most likely was civil warapitalist country. Quoting Lenin, and with an eye cocked at Khrushchev's thesis on the possibility of peaceful takeover of power, Yu said:
Civil wars are also wars. Whoeverthe class struggle cannot fail tocivil wars which in every class of society
constitute the natural, and under certaininevitable continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle. All the great revolutions prove this. To repudiate civil war, or to forget about it, would mean sinking into extreme opportunism and renouncing the socialist revolution.
Finally,good Leninistthat there were irreconcilable contradictions between thecountries who were struggling for markets and rawthat would lead to war. Both Worldnd World War II, he contended, had begun as war among the imperialistand there could be no guarantee that World War III would not begin the Same way.
Who can guarantee that West Germany and Japan will not tread their old path? Again, who can guarantee that West Germany will notew war of aggression in the-West:and Japanew war of aggression in Southeasturthermore; who can guarantee .that thereurrenee of thelearl ifirbor incident, or that there, Willi not ,be aSmewi-'Wor^war araong^the imperialist countries?
The Chinese views on the inevitability of local wars were stated even more succinctly and more revealingly by central committee member Liu Chang Shengune in his speech to the WFTU meeting in Peiping. Liu specified four types of Inevitable local wars: imperialist wars of suppression against the colonial countries, imperialist wars of suppression against the people in their own countries, national liberation wars in the colonies, and peoples' revolutionary wars in thecountries. The first two kinds of local wars wereaid Liu, and tbe second two were "just." it was the bloc duty, he said, to uphold just wars and to oppose unjust wars. It was "entirely wrong" to believe that such local wars could be avoided and it was also wrong to talk indiscriminahtly (as the Russians did) about opposing war in general withoutpecific analysis of its nature."
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In short, the Chinese do notthe Russiansthe West is deterred from local as well as from general war. The Chinese therefore estimate that the bloc will have to continue to use force against tbe West whenever the West initiates local war. Moreover, the Chinese believe that local or civilof the bloc's own making or those it can exploit to its owninevitable and should be fully supported. While the Russians have not disavowed "Just" wars or aid and support to those fighting "just" wars, their present emphasis is on the possibility of eliminating
allImplication, both "just" and "unjust." Their lack of material support for the Algerian rebels isthat they do not believe their interests are presently served as much by stirring the colonial fires as by pursuing tbeir diplomatic objectives with tbe colonial powers.
Another reason for the difference in the Russian and Chinese approach to local wars is that the Russiansetente which tbey believe they can employ to spread their influence and power and they are aware that they cannotetente and support local wars at the same time. The Chi-neseaare not interestedetente, believing as they do thatetente will harm both world Communism and their own interests, and therefore are interested in stirring up local wars, particularly in the colonial areas in which they can spread their own influence.
In sum, the Chinese Communist Lenin anniversary attack on Soviet Ideology and the revolutionary strategy reflected in that ideology in effect accused the Russians of "revising, emasculatinguadd betraying" Marxism-Leninism. Such an attack could not but havetthe effect of calling into questionleadership of the Communist movement. The three principal targets of the Chinese fire were the very three basic ideological innovations which Khrushchev personally had presented tob party congress. They rejectedviews on the possibility and advisability ofong range detente with the West and contended that coexistence could mean only an armed truce; they contended that although general war could be avoided by persistent and defiantstruggleolicy of strength, local wars wereso long as Imperialism remained and that it was the bloc duty to foster and support "just" wars; and theythe possibility of peaceful accession to power in the non-Communist world and contended that those who emphasized on such possibilities were traitors to the cause.
IV. THE "COLONIAL LIBERATION" STRUGGLE
It has been suggested throughout thlsseries that the question of strategy toward the underdeveloped countries In Asia, Africa and Latin"colonial and seal-colonial" areas, or, in Pelplng's view, thehighly Important In the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The Question of Soviet Aid
Central to Soviet strategy in these areas is theus* of aid and trade designed to alienate thecountries from Western markets and from Western political influence, and thus to promote neutralism by making these countries less politically and economically dependent upon the West. Moscow evidently envisagesIts aid to the uncommitted countries as its own gross national product rises during the course of theSeven Year Plan and beyond.
As the eminent British economist Alec Nove has pointed
out
ong-term view, the building up of the internal economic might of the bloc may be the decisive factor (in winning the East-West struggle). On the available evidence, this is the view of the Soviet leaders... vidently believes that the uncommitted countries must naturally gravitate toward the Soviet way when the USSR and its allies are capable oftbe Western world, and are morethan America. It is also evident that an economically mighty bloc will be far better equipped to supply the needs of the underdeveloped world, to outbid the West, and to disorganize the 'capitalist* markets at will. (emphasis supplied)
(For Nove's discussion of this Soviet economic strategy and the serious long-term threat It poses to the Westernin the uncommitted countries, see his "Communist Economic Strategy: Soviet Growth and)
ariety of reasons, the Chinese Communistsoppose this Soviet economic strategy or at least the scale on which it is given and the priority it occupies in Soviet strategic thinking. They may believe that Khrushchev's aid will only strengthen non-Coatmunlst governments and inhibit rather than facilitate the ultimate "socialistt has been shown that Chinese doctrinal statements In the fall
9 seemed to cast doubt on tbe wisdom of Soviet aid to the underdeveloped countries on the grounds that thegovernments could not be trusted to continueforeign policies or to pursue genuineprograms or to raise the standards of living In their own countries. Pelping held up the specter of theseregimes gravitating back into the Western campthey were replaced in the near future by Communist or Communist-front governments. Pelping may also understandably believe that the underdeveloped blochave priority on Soviet capital. Finally, Pelping may also believe that Soviet aid programs mightthe expansion of Soviet influence in these areas but will not facilitate the expansion of Chinese Influence.
Several developments In tbe spring0 tended to confirm Pelplng's growing concern over Soviet economic policy toward the uncommitted countries. Perhaps the mostwas the provocative and impertinent question put to Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan In Iraq by an NCNA The correspondent, during an Interview ofby Iraqi and foreign newsmen onpril, bluntly asked the Soviet leader
What Is the Soviet position on the question of developing the national oconomy of tho Afro-Asian countries, and how does It differ from the Western position on this question?
That Mikoyan took this questionrovocation is evident from his reply which is worth quoting at length.
I can assure the NCNA representative that
thls question is just as favor ablo for tho Afro-Asian peoples whoiTd""^
countries as raw material appendages ofdoveloped countries, as spheres of influence or capital investment.
We are trading with these countries onadvantageous terms. We are not foisting our goods on it hex to the detriment of theirindustries. Far from obstructing, we are doing our beet to assist in the industrial advance of the economically underdeveloped
We help those countries not to draw them into blocs as the Imperialist powers do; we do not attach any political strings to our assistance. We respect the sovereignty of those countries, and we help strengthen it. (emphasis supplied)
Further discord between Moscow and Peiping over the question of economic policy toward the uncommitted countries was manifest at the Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Conakry in early April. The Indian secretary On the permanent secretariat of the conference reported that there hadlash between Moscow and Peiping over tbe formulation of the economic resolution agreed to at the conference. The Chinese wanted toassage which said that Afro-Asiancould be facilitated "the sooner the cold war is ended and international tension is reduced." Peiping contended, according to the report, thateference would "create illusions among Afro-Asian countries that the Imperialists want our economic development aniseriously believe inand world/peace." The Chinese attitude reportedly shocked both the Soviet delegate and some observers from the Communist-front organization, the World Peace Council. for its part, must have been very pleased with theof the resolution because it had been contending for some time precisely that the funds saved from disarmament could be used to aid the economic development of the uncommittedries.
Further evidenceof ^Pe'ipin&'s opposition to the .Soviet aid program was reflected in the differing Sino-Soviet approaches to the Afro-Asian economic Conference in Cairo in earlyoscow radio commentary, broadcast to Africaay,tbat most of the newly liberated countries needed to free themselves from economic dependence on foreign monopolies and that, in order to accomplish that goal, they could "rely" on Soviet aid.
Relying on this (Soviet) aid, economically backward countries can develop their economies more quickly and create those branches ofwhich they need,
The Chinese delegate to the conference, Man Han-Chen, stressed quite to the contrary that the newly developing countries must "rely on their own efforts." Although heistinction between disinterested Soviet aid and that of tbe West, the burden of his remarksarning against aid fromlea for self-reliance and intra-African and Asian cooperation,eminder that Chinese historyconclusively that foreign aid was not essential to industrialization and economic development. After warning that any country which "relied" on so-called "imperialist aid" would inevitably be forced to surrender national tbe Chinese delegate said:
We advocate that the Asian and African countries be economically independent and rely on their own efforts, and that we cooperate, aid each other, and develop our trade relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In this respect, the experience of the Chinese people affords powerful proof. In old China, we bad to Import every year large quantities of wheat and rice from abroad. But today,ears after liberation, our grain output has more than doubled.
In short, China achieved rapid economic developmentreat deal of aid and there was no reason why the newly developing countries could not imitate* her.
The same point was made in the0 issue of the Chinese journal "Research on International Problems." The Chinese People's Republic, the article affirmed, wasweaker than "certain newly risen Asian countries which have Just won their nationalet the Chinese people, in building up its national economy, "mainly relied on their own strength."
Perhaps the most direct indication of Chineseabout Soviet aid programs came in Kuusinen's Leninreply to Chinese attacks on Soviet global strategy.
Kuuslnentrong defense of the Soviet aid policy to the uncommitted countries in polemical terms which left the clear impression that the Chinese opposed such aid. He pointedly contrasted Soviet economic obligations to the bloc with Its "wider understanding of (its) international duty" which included the extending of aid to "any liberated people" even if they were not "members of the world socialist system."
People who for centuries bore on their shoulders the yoke of colonialist exploitation now need not only moral and political support, but also economic aid for development of theireconomies.
As for our relations with countries which joined the socialistCPR, the SPRK, the DRV, and the Mongolian People'sthese relations were determined from the very outset by the principles of socialist Close alliance, brotherly friendship, mutual aid, and cooperation in construction of socialism andis the basis of these relations.
HoweverL veider unclerwtandjng of tho international duty of our socialist country. We understand tbat duty to include extending aid to any liberated people even if they are mi. not members of tbe world socialist
The road to consolidation of theof liberated countries Is the road oftheir national economy, advancing their culture, and improving the living standards of their'people. Industrialization is of enormous importance for such countries. It is in this matter that young states need support most.
This line of argument ran directly contrary to the line the Chinese bad taken in Octoberso long as these young countries were led by bourgeois nationalists, they could not hope to industrialize, to improve the living standards of their people or to make much progress towards economic independence from the Wost.
In the June issue of the Soviet monthly Intcrnation_al Affairs, Moscow againengthy defense oi its aid policy under the title "Sovietits 'Critics.'" Although the "critics" were identified only as Westerners, it was evident that Moscow had some non-Western critics in mind as well. For example, tho author took pains to refute the argument tbat Soviet assistance to former colonies robs it of the opportunity to "export revolution" and wascontrary to Marxist doctrine,ine to be takenestern audience. The author also pointed out that the struggle In the underdeveloped countries "will not be solely, ortruggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgooisie" but would insteadtruggle of all the oppressed countries againstthis was the reason why the Soviet government was "giving economic and technical assistance to the former colonies on an inter-governmental basis rendering It to nations, and not to some classes within(emphasis supplied) The counter argument, implicit In this statement, was that Soviet aid should be confined to revolutionary movements. The article went on the quote Khrushchev that Soviet assistance to underdeveloped countries would increase as the Seven Year Plan developed and it in fact promisedpecific part of Soviot resources would beset aside for this purpose.
Support of "Liberation" Movements
Since the Bolshevik revolution the Communists have been facodhronic dilemma in their dealings with nationalist independence movements in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Should they ally themselves with
nationalist parties in these areas seeking genuine If so, would they not then be incurring tho risk that these nationalist allies would turn on them once they became strong enough or onoe they achieved power? What should be the role of the Soviet Union toward support of these nationalist independence movements? Should it actively encourage and support all such nationalist revolutionaryor would this Interfere with Soviet diplomatic goals in the Western world?
The dilemma is as old as the Second Comintern Congress0 when Lenin and the Indianhe first major discussion of theover these and related questions. In Lenin's report to thee told the assembled delegates tbat "we (in the committee) fought over the question as to whether it is proper theoretically and on principle to declare that the Communist International and the Communist Parties are bound to support the bourgeois democratic movements in tbe backward countries." The solution reached was that "we should not deal with bourgeoismovements but with revolutionary nationalisthe Communists, said Lenin, should support liberationonly "in cases when these movements are really If they were not, the Communists were "obliged to fight against the reformist bourgeoisie in those countries."
Roy did not publicly disagree with Lenin but it wasthat he wished the adoptionarder line than Lenin toward the nationalist bourgeoisie in the colonial areas. Roy stressed that the Comintern should not seek to deal with bourgeois nationalist movements in the colonial areas but rather only with the most revolutionary parties and groups. Host Important, he contended that even though the colonial revolution in its early stages would not be arevolution, the revolution should be "in the handsommunist vanguard." Be warned that the leadership of the revolution should not be surrendered to the bourgeois
Roy's view that the Communists should not abandonof the colonial revolution to the nationalists even in the early stages of the revolution was incorporated in Mao's writings, the period in which he wrote "On New Democracy." Ma6's writings in this period suggested, first, that the "new democratic revolution" then developing In China
* See the Second Congress of the Communist International Publishing Office of the Communist International,
SESflET
would develop much the same way in all colonial and semi-colonial countries; and, second, that in the early stages of this "new democratic revolution" there would have tooint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. Mao was at great pains to distinguish this new transitional dictatorship both from past democratic revolutions in Western countries and from the socialist revolution that had occurred in the USSR. Politically, it meant in short that theparties in all underdeveloped countries should strive for participationovernment composed of allgroups. This would guarantee that even if thecould not take power by themselves early in thethey would not be submergedationalist*'regime. As Mao wrote in an essay on "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communistn
This kind of revolution is developing in China* as well as in all colonial and semi-colonial countries, and we call it the new democratic revolution. This new democraticeans the Joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classesOver the imperialists,collaborators andand opposition to the transformation of Chinese societyociety under bourgeois dictatorship. Economically, it meansof all big capital and big enterprises of the Imperialists, collaborators anddistribution of the land of theamong the peasants, and at the same time the general preservation of private capitalist enterprises without the elimination of rich-peasant economy... This kind of new-democratic revolution differs greatly from the democratic revolutions in the history of European and American countries, in that it results not in the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie but In the dictatorship of the united front of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat... This kind of new-democratic "revolution differs alsoocialistin that it aims only at overthrowing the rule of the imperialists, collaborators andIn China, but not at Injuring any capitalist sections which can still take part in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggles.
T
The Maoist claim to haveew typo ofgovernment valid for all colonial and semi-colonial countries in the period between the democratic and therevolutions was stated even more bluntly in Mao's "On New
Democracy" in January In that work, he identified three types of state systems in the world, classifiedto the class character of their political power. These three systems wereepublics under bourgeois dictatorship;
republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and
republics under the joint dictatorship of severalclasses. The third kind of government,*said Mao
is the transitional form of state to be adopted by revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries. To be sure,in different colonial and seni-colonial countries necessarily have certain different characteristics^ but theseonly minor differenceseneral framework of uniformity.
Mao's writings in this period thus laid the groundwork for the claims to be advanced by the Chinese Communists almost immediately after tbey took power that China, and by implication not the USSR, was the model for revolution in the underdeveloped countries. Implicit in Mao's analysiselief that the underdevelopeda variety ofnot move directly from theto the socialist stage of the revolution and that there wouldransitional period in which Communist parties in these areas would have to share power withand other parties of the left. An important consideration was probably the realization that most of the underdeveloped countries lacked the resources and level of industrialization to be transferred overnight intostates. Mostterms ofthe Maoist reiteration, in effect, of Roy's thesis that local Communist parties could not allow the nationalist parties in the underdeveloped countries to lead the "new democratic" revolution.
The Sino-Soviet debate over strategy for the colonial liberation movement in large part revolves about this* chronic dilemma of collaboration with the nationalist bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries.oviet writer was to point out inat the beginning of any nationalthe bourgeoisie assumes the role of hegemony" and there was no reason why there could notlengthy cooperation" between the Communists and part of the national bourgeoisie. In sum, the Russians were prepared for the time being to allow local Communists to play second fiddle to nationalist movements, in, the colonial areas even nationalist such as those in India, Indonesia, tbe UAR andwere harsh In their treatment of local Communists. To the Chinese,olicy of prolonged cooperation with
the national bourgeoisie meant an indefinite deferral of the revolution in these countries. It was essential for local Communist parties to seek right from the outset of anyindependence movement to gain control of that "tailing that, it was necessary to exercise continuing pressure on the nationalist leadership of the independence movement to force it to bring local Communists into theor to form governments that would either be pro-Communist or more easily manipulated by the Communists,
Tbe importance attached by tbe Chinese to the question of the leading role for the Communists in any colonial'movas stated0 article in International Study which sought to explain'why the Cuban revolution wasgood example" of nationalrevolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was so because the revolution first established its bases in rural areas, then surrounded the cities by revolutionary forces in the villages, and finally seized tbe cities and political power. Second, tbe Cuban worker-peasant movement was under the leadership and Influence of the Cuban Con-muniBt Party.' It was for this reason, the article continues, that the "strong Communist leadership" in the Cubanmovement was able to promote the "correct 'united-front' policy." Third, the Cuban revolution was dominated byelements of thewas dominated by elements who could be counted on to pursue tho revolution and not to take hostile action against the local Communists.
In sun, the Chinese strategy for tbe colonial and seni-colonlal areas Insists that local Communists can pursue "united front" tactics but only if theyrominent role in the leadership of the united front and only if they are reasonably certain tbat their nationalist allies will not turn on then once the "denocratic" revolution is If the Communists do not occupyeading position, warn tbe Chinese, the result will be future calamities such as occurred In Egypt, Iraq, India andparties will take power and be free to take action against the Communists. The correct united front, in short, is one similar to that pursued by tbe Communists, and not the one now being pursued, for example, by the Iraqi Connunists.
In two important articles In the Chinesepress spelled out once again the Chinese vlows on strategy toward the'bourgeois nationalist governments and independence movements in the underdeveloped countries. The first was an article in CjUna Youth no. 9,ay. The article began by noting that in theears since the end of World War II, "colonial and senl-colonlal" countriesotal
population of0 millions had achieved independence. It wondered in what direction these countries would devolop and what would be theirthe socialist stages. To find the answers to these questions "of great importance in today'st noted that it was necessary to study Chairman Mao's theories on China's new democratic"particularly those dealing with the roles of theproletarian class and bourgeois class' in the national democratic revolution." Because these Maoist theories were developed from revolutionary experiencetypical"and semi-colonial country, namely China, "they are applicable to other colonial and semi-colonialn fact, it was now claimed, Mao's theoriesew development and rediscovery of the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution in colonial and seml-colonlal countries."
The author then went on to identify three different types of national democratic movements in the colonialsince World War II. There were some countries such as China inomplete victory of the new democratic revolution had been won, thus completing the change from the first to the second stage of the revolution, that is, the building of socialism. This new situation was "possible only because the (Chinese) revolution was conducted under the leadership of the proletarian class and guided by the general theory of new democratic revolution of Chairman Mao"the implication being that all other colonialwould also have to be guided by Maoist theory. econd type of colonial country was that which had declared independence but which was still ruled by the upper bourgeois class and therefore had no real independence. In thesesuch as the Philippines and Malaya, the revolution had been stolen by the upper bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie had surrendered to the former. Finally, there were many countries somewhere between the first and second types inthe upper bourgeoisie was not inthe proletariat had not assumedof the revolution. Although the author did not specify, he clearly meant such countries as the UAR, India, Iraq, and Indonesia. In these countries, the national bourgeoisie had adopted various measures to weaken imperialist control and native feudal exploitation; moreover, being separated from the original colonial system, they "must be considered politically Independent and nationalist states," However, the author pointed out, "these countries have not sovered and dare not sever their relations with imperialism. They always let tbe imperialists retain varying degrees ofinterests, and almost without exception, allow the imperialists to retain their economic interests and welcome their investments." Moreover, with respect to domestic the national bourgeoisie of these countries "dare not
and cannot completely abolish native feudalism." In the process of economic development, thoy put the economic burdens of the people and enriched the monopolist bourgeois class. All this
indicates nothing other than the reactionary and compromising nature of the national bourgeois classolonial and semi-colonial country. It also fully proves the scientific conclusion of Chairman Mao contending that the national bourgeois classolonial and semi-colonial country cannot be depended upon for the complete overthrow of the imperialist and feudal forces in the new democratic
Furthermore, continued the author, the danger was great that the present national bourgeois governments in many of these countries might be replacedictatorship of the upper bourgeoisevelopment which could set back the newly independent country to the statusemporary semi-colony .
Free from Communist jargon, the political significance of this line of reasoning was the reiteration of theview, first enunciated in the fall9 (see Chapter VI, that the nationalist governments in most of the underdeveloped and so-called uncommitted countries were not worthy of Communist support because of their reactionary nature and would have to be brought down in favor of more "progressive" governments if the "new democratic revolution" were ultimately to be brought about.
The tactics advocated by the above author to restrain the reactionary trend of the national bourgeoisie was thatnited front in which the proletariat. thewould preserve its independence and freedom of action. The Communists should support that segment of the bourgeois class still opposed to imperialism but should struggle against the compromising segment. At the same tine, the proletariat should gradually gain strength and "take over the leadership of the revolution."
In short, the Chinese were not calling for immediate and direct revolutionary attempts against these governments but rather for an increase in pressure on those sections of the ruling groups which were not sympathetic to the Communists' minimum demands, an alliance with those groups which were sympathetic to thoseradual buildup of Communist strength, and finally an attenpt to replace the present governments with governments either pro-Communist or more amenable to Communist desires.
The article left the clear impression that Chinese thinking on colonial strategy was still more revolutionary and uncompromising than Soviet thinking. While thewere still talking about the need to bring down most of the nationalist governments in the colonial areas, an authoritative Soviet spokesman several months later would flatly state that the Communists could and should entereriod of prolonged cooperation with these nationalist governments.
Still another important Chinese Communist assessment Of the strategic situation in the colonial and semi-colonial areas appeared in Studies in International Affairs no. Of particular Interest was the article'son the almost inevitable need for nationalwars which would be supported by the socialist camp. Ths article contended that there had never been any colonial or semi-colonial people who achieved independence "without sacrificing thousands of their revolutionaryhis was so because
in the face of the powerful and fierce Imperialists and colonial powers, national liberation war Is necessarily an extremely important means by which the peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial areas may achieve the ultimate victory of their nationalstruggle.
Moreover, the article implicitly berated the Russians for their failure to endorse more enthusiastically the need for such liberation wars, it did this by calling attention to the fact that Lenin himself had "nevereneralof war" <as had Khrushchev). Lenin, to thesaid the author, had declared in "no uncertain terms" that "our Party may be sympathetic to such wars or in the choice of his quotation from Lenin, the Chinese author went so far as to Implicitly accuse theof "pacifism."
To pay lip service toto substitute the vulgar nationalismfor internationalism in theiragitation and actual work isven In thosethat profess to be Ideologically
To the Russian contention that civil wars and armedin the colonial areas would lead to hostilities with the West, the Chinese retorted that this was not so, that
active support of these liberation movements would strengthen peace. This was so because colonial unrest would weaken the forces of imperialism and therefore weaken theirfor war.
To support the oppressed peoples in the armed struggle against imperialism is anpart of our struggle for peace. This has been true in the light of facts. During the ten-odd years since the war, the rising tide of the struggle against imperialism and for national liberation as has been waged by the peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial areas, has seriously weakened the imperialists' capabilities for war and aggression andtheir plans for war, therebymost significantly to the defense of world peace. It follows, therefore, that byactive assistance to the nationalmovements, the world proletariat and the socialist states significantly contribute to to the defense of world peace. Whoever is genuinely struggling for world peace cannot but link the national liberation movements with the world-wide movement in search of peace and regard it his proper duty to render assistance to the national liberation movements in the colonial and semi-colonial areas. To deny this would not only mean the violation of Lenin's principles of proletarianbut also may weaken the forces in defense of world peace.
In sum, Khrushchev's strategy of caution in the colonial areas was notiolation of "proletarianfailure to support all revolutionary movements againstit would indirectly strengthen the hand of the imperialists by failing to exploit goldento weaken them.
The Case of Algeria
SE
The differences between Moscow and Pelping over policy toward the "colonial liberation" movement are nowhere better illustrated than in their respective attitudes toward the Algerian rebellion. For all Communists, the Algerianis the classical form of the "Just" coloniala war Initiatedolonial people in order to winfrom an oppressive colonial power. If Leninist dogma were the only criterion of Communist policy, the only
possible course of action would be to recognize the Algerian revolutionary government immediately and to aid it with all possible means.
The Algerian rebellion has never presented any dilemmas to the Chinese Communists. They recognized the FLNafter Itovernment in exilehey have consistentlyontinuation of thewar, hoping both that this war would be an example to other oppressed African peoples and tbat It would exacerbate political tensions within metropolitan Franceointevolutionary opportunity might present Itself there. Moreover, colonial wars, such as the Algerian, present the Chinese with unique opportunities to expand their prestige and Influence. They calculate that, because the United States will not dare cross its French allies and aid the nationalist rebellion, tbe Algerian nationalists will be Increasingly driven to look for support in the Communist camp. For these reasons, the Chinese Communists have never looked with favor on the prospectsegotiated settlement between the French and the Algerian rebels. Foregotiated settlement could cut tho ground from under their contention that the colonial powers will not withdraw peacefully from tbe colonies, and that, even when they do, it Isorm of deception designed to maintain more subtle economic influence.
For the Russians, the Algerian rebellion has been the sourceilemma. Although they are no less eager than the Chinese to spread colonial unrest and revolution, they must balance this goal against their equally importantrange goal of splitting the French away from the Western alliance. It is for this reason tbat the Soviet Union has never extended formal recognition to the Algerian rebeland only recently, in tbe wake of the summit collapse and the increasing Chinese rivalry in the colonial areas, has extended de facto recognition to the rebels.
The argument between Pelping and Moscow over Algeria-prior to the summit collapse, was an argument over sectional priorities within the common goal of expanding Communist power and influence. Because the Chinese had no relations with the French, bad little to gain from wooing the French, and were pessimistic over the possibility of breaking France away from the United States, they wanted bloc strategy to be concentrated on giving unequivocal support to therebels and to any other nationalist revolutionary movements in the colonial areas. The Russians, on the other hand, had diplomatic relations with the French, they believed
SBCRE
RET
they had much to gain /rom improving those relations, and they were confident that they could Increase the strains between Prance, the United States and France's other Western allies.
The differences between Moscow and Pelping over Aleeria
0oIitJon SuddfQly took an important step toward the French position, is speech to tho Supreme Soviet. Khrushchev
Prevlous Soviet position of hostility to DeGaulle'september proposalsease-fire in Algeria The new Soviet position was thatermination, if supported by real steps,
could play an important role in the settlement ofquestion." Within this context, Moscow also hle Tench-riJi <? eversal was
SJrlmbarrassingly. Initiated by the French Communist party which hadonth earlier denounced DeGaulle's proposalstall.
- uddenly made his tactical
h0Ot his meeting with the French President, scheduled for April, and prior
to the aummit meeting,vidently prepared to
o tbe French/ Khrushchev's
daJ8reDChtatement which
in effect called for Soviet deeds to substantiate Moscow's alleged interest In detente.
I ?iBh? bo obJectod that Khrushchev's verbal switch
MwdmhmDge Yet Khrushchev's J 'ignificant political act. Unless one assumes that the Russians covertly informed the FLN leaders not to pay any attention to those words, they mustmpact on the FLN which
5 tnet0cloMr to tbe Communi.ts HJst 'fench did not grant immediate independence.tatement must have undermined the position cf FLN
0 contlnue the war, or who at least, wanted toigh priceease-fire.
e dismissed
'was prepared to support a He may have calculated that negotiations* cease-fire were inevitable in any case and that
dvant-
upreme Sovietnotice that he was not prepared to do anythingsubhto
The Chinese Communists clearly regarded Khrushchev's tactics as ill-advised at best and disastrous at worst. They made no comment whatever on any portion of Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech, few portions of which could have appealed to them. They did not follow Moscow or the French party in publicly reversing their hostile attitudo toward DeGaulle'a proposals. ommentary onovember explicitly contradicted tho spirit of Khrushchev's statement byDeGaulle's proposals as "nothingrickn the months to follow, Peiping continued to indicate its oppositionegotiated settlement of tbe Algerianencouraged the Algerian rebels to fight through to final victory, and denounced the French proposalsolitical maneuver. Thus, oneiping radio said that, provided the Algerian people "carry on theirhey will certainly gain "final victory." Onovember, Peipingtatement from an Algerian leader who said flatly that "the Algerian war will continue with greater intensity from now on until Independence is achieved." ecember, In celebrating "Imperialists, 'Quit Africaeiping referred to French political deceptions and intrigues and said that the Algerian national liberation army was "growing mightier in battle and winning one victory after another." The FLN, it said, would "uphold their struggle until they won true independence" (emphasis supplied).
The differences between Soviet and Chinese statements on Algerian policy persisted right up to the eve of the abortive summit conference in May. arch address by DcGaulle on Algerianattacked byroundly attacked by Peiping as the statement of anand "reactionary."
Why did the Chinese Communists manifest such hostility toward Khrushchev's tactics?
They clearly calculatedontinuation of thewar would suit both the interests of the bloc and their own interests far moreegotiated settlement. The problem was that the.'Algerian rebels might decide to accept Frenchontingency which, the Chineseadmitted to tbe rebel leaders,ause ofconcern. Because the Chinese were so vitallyin keeping the war hot, they must have regarded Khrushchev's support for DeGaulle's proposals as akin to treason to the revolution.
In the final analysis, Peiping regards itself, and not Moscow as the leader of the anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa. It consequently must view with utmost dislike
that, because oflackuppopi revolutionary movements, it has become "China's task" to support the anti-Imperialist forces. The Chinese official complained that Khrushchev's visits to capitalistic nations like France could not benefit the socialist camp. KhruBh-chev, he complained, wasevolutionary loader like Stalin and he was trying to do things contrary to theideas of Marxism-Leninism.
The Chinese Communists looked with disfavor on asettlement in Algeria not only because they hoped to draw the Algerian rebels closer to themselves but, perhaps equally important, because continuation of the war would serveivid Illustration of their point that no colonial people could free itself finally and irrevocably without an armed fight. Algeria, in short,lassroom inthat the Chinese hoped would spreadhecolonial territories in Africa, and to the semi-colonial countries in Latin America and Asia. ed Flag article In mid-March referred to the Algerian exampio and also to the "massive armed resistance" in the Congo, Myasaland, Ruanda-Urundl and Uganda. The African people, said Red Flag, cannot be deceived; they know that "there has notingle case in history in which thewithdrew from the colonies of their own accord, nor willhing ever happen in the future." It summed up its belief In the Algerian example succinctly:: "This course (war for national liberation) persisted in by the Algerian people is of vital significance to the Africanliberation movementhole."
A similar line was takeneople's Daily article ofarch in the struggle in Latin America. he party newspaper wrote, was that Castro's triumph in Cuba caused the entire situation in Latin America togreat change." Why was this so? Because Cuba was the first country in Latin America to "employ armed struggle toictatorial government and theof the United States." The Cuban revolution, like the Algerian war in African eyes, was said toshiningfor Latin America.
Sf^RE
Onarch, Peipingpecial "Algeria Day" marked by considerable propaganda on Chinese support for the Algerian cause. The statement issued by the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian .Solidarity* noted that China's Algerian "brothers are now at the forefront of the struggle against imperialism andffirmed that the Algerians hadbrilliant example" for other African peoples, and continued to label DeGaulle's proposals to negotiate as an "intrigue" really intended to continueaction.
One of the principal Soviet dilemmas in handling the Algerian problem has been the danger that China, by adopting an irreconcilably anti-French stand, in sharp contrast to Moscow's middle-of-the-road stance, would be able toits own influence with the Algerian rebels, andwith the independent Algerian government, at the expense of the Russians. The growing Soviet concern over this possibility was evidenced in Mikoyan'spril press conference in Baghdad. Early in this-interview, Mikoyan had sternly replied to an obviously provocative question by the NCNA correspondent on the sensitive question of Soviet aid to the Afro-Asian countries. The Chinese correspondent had asked how the Soviet position on this question differed from the Western position. The very question was an obvious criticism of the Soviet position on aid and Mikoyan replied to it in kind. He said sarcastically tbat he "could assure" the NCNA correspondent that the Soviet position on the question was 'Just as favorable" for the Afro-Asian peoples as the position of the Chinese government. Rejecting the invidious comparison implicit in the correspondent'she denied that the Soviet Union "regards thoseas raw material appendages of industrially developed countries, as spheres of influence or capitaln short, Moscow was not playing the old imperialist game, however suspicious Peiping might be.
It was in this context that Mikoyan then replieduestion put to him by the Iraq News Agency correspondent on the Soviet position .On Algeria. The correspondent wanted to know why, if the Soviet Union was theefender of the Algerian people's rights,"it had not recognized the Algerian Government, "although there are countries which have done so?" The correspondent clearly had Peiping in mind. Whether the Chinese had put him up to thisquestion or whether it wasase of the Iraqi correspondent playing the Chinese off against the Russians, Mikoyan quickly responded to the spirit of the question and replied that: NCNA,
We are giving the greatest possibleto Algeria, even more so than do gOgg of the countries which have recognized thoGovernment. (emphasis supplied)
In response to the very next question as to whether the USSR would send volunteers to fight in Algeria, Mikoyan replied
sharply:
Do you understand what this would mean? When you think about it, you will understand that you asked this question to no purpose. Some people who beard your question will hasten to declare that the Bolsheviks want to occupy Algeria by volunteers and make it its colony (laughter and animation).
The mounting interest demonstrated by Peiping in the Algerian war was once again illustrated by the extensivegiven an Algerian rebel delegation which visited China frompril toay. It seomed apparent that thecame to Peiping in the hopes of receivingfor military ahd financial aid-. ay,'following the delegation's return to Cairo, NCNA reported the leader of tbe delegation. Vice Premier Krlm Balkacem, as having noted that China was "willing to support the Algerian revolution in its struggle against imperialism with all means." An NCNAay)2 May article in the FLN organ Al-Wnjahid quoted the paper as stating that "the assistance from the great socialist country (the CPB) is valuable and can contribute to the Algerian revolution in the military and financial spheres." Several newspaper reports from Paris quoted sources there to the effect that the Chinese had prepared to supply0 technicians wbo would give instructions to FLN fighters on how to handle new Chinese weapons and that the Chinese had solved the technical problem of delivering arms and other supplies. (See the Washington Post,une and)
Reports to the effoct that Krlmro-Chinese faction in the FLN against the "Europeans" such as Ferhat Abbas (see Washing ton Post articles cited above) were strengthened by the lavish praise accorded the Chinese by Krlm In his public statements In Peiping. Onay, in his final banquot speech, he said "We have been dazzled by what we have seen. The achievements of the big leap forward are evidont. Being limited ine have onlyiny part. Yet this suffices to serve as an example for us." Tbe final communique signed by the Algeriannoted in good Chinese fashion that permanent peace could not be achieved until the colonialist exploiters
had been "wiped out" and tbat the attainment of world peace depended on tbe "determined struggle" of the peoplethe world against imperialism and colonialism. The communique also noted that the Algerian provisional"greatly admires the economic and social achievements of the Chinese people in their socialisthe Chinese evidently could not get the FLN delegation to go so far as to condemn the United States, however. Whereas much of the communique noted that "both sldos" agreed topropositions, it was only the "Chineseccording to the communique, which-"severely denounced and criticized French imperialism, aided.t has long been one of the primary goals of the Chinese to link all the colonial and other problems of the world today to the American devil. That the FLN delegation stopped short of Joining inondemnation of American policy was an indication that there were limits to its willingness to antagonize the United States.
Tho fact that the Soviet media broadcast only brief news coverage of the FLN visit to Peiping and offered no independent comment was an indication that the Russians were not overjoyed with the Chinese for havingarch on them in their campaign to pose as the defenders of the anti-colonialist world.
Growing Chinese Interest in Africa
The emergence of several newly Independent African states0 and the Increasing importance of Africa in world politics came inevitably to have an impact on the Sino-Soviet dispute overof which, as we havo noted, revolved about the question of strategy in the underdeveloped world. Events in the springhat the Chinese were determined to assume aif not the leading, role in these areas, particularly in Africa. Onpril, the anniversary of tbe Bandungthere was formed inhina-AfricanAssociation designed "to support the joint struggle of the African peoples in opposing imperialism andew spring schedule Introduced by Peiping Radio's International Servicepril, the time devoted to broadcasts in English to Africa was doubled. The'principal Chinese effort, however, was made at the second Afro-Asian
secset
People's Solidarity Conference which met in Conakry, Guineapril.*
At that conference, for the first time at an African affair, the CPR overshadowed the USSR in terms of size and importance of its delegation, activity, and expenditures. The Chinesetrong bid to dominate the proceedings and the organization itself. Evidently disturbed with the strong Egyptian influence in the organization, the Chinese were reported to have made unsuccessful attempts to remove the headquarters from Cairo and to bring it under Chinese, or at least Communist control.**
According to the Indian secretary on the permanent secretariat of the organization, the conference was markedlash between the Russian and Chinese representatives over the formulation of the economic resolution on the region's economic development. The draft resolution carried the following passage which the Chinese reportedly wanted deleted:
Our task of achieving economic development will be completed sooner and better, the sooner the cold war is ended and international tension is reduced. The conference holds the firm view that relaxation of tension is the majorfor economic progress of Asian and African countries.
Chinese opposition to this portion of the draft, said the Indian seoretary, "surprised everybody, and especially the Soviet delegate." The Chinese argument, he said, was that
*" uller discussion of the conference, see Sino-Soviet Affairs, May,epartment of State. The first "People's" Conference of this kind was held in Cairo in7 and made emphatic claims to be regarded as the successor to5 Bandung Conference. The Cairo Conference7 assembled delegates from Africa and Asia. Aside from thefrom the UAR and the Communist countries, none of the others were official. The conference, In short, was designed to aid both Nasser and the Communists to spread theirinfluence in the Afro-Asian world among sections of the populace which both were trying to cultivate, TheSecretariat of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarityestablished in Cairoesult, was largely financed by the Soviet Union, Communist China and Egypt.
ee "The Asian
tho above reference would "create Illusions among Afro-Asian countries that imperialists want our economicand seriously believe in disarmament and worldhe Chinese persisted in their opposition to the passage, although it was polntod out at the conference thatwould enable Russia also to spare more funds for Afro-Asian economic development. The Chinese delegate wasto have replied: "My country is not an Imperialist country."
This example of the Slno-Sovlet dispute on the question of economic investment in the underdeveloped countries is not an isolated example. As has already been noted, at precisely the same time an NCUA correspondent in Iraq was impertinently querying Mikoyan as to the difference between Soviet and western imperialist plans for the economicof the Afro-Asian countries. onth later,ay, the Chinese delegate to the Afro-Asian Economicin Cairo would flatlyesolution setting up an Afro-Asian Investment fund on the grounds that this would open the door to imperialist penetration.*
The reasons for Chineso hostility to large-scale Western or Soviet investment in the underdeveloped areas have already been suggested. The point to bo made in this connectionhat the Chinese were so vehement in their opposition to any such investment programs that they were willing to incur serious liabilities in their approaches to the very Afro-Asian countries which they were Interested in wooing.
In sharp contrast, tbe Soviet delegation to the ferenee sought to project the USSRreat military and economic power from whom the African nations could receive technical and financial assistance without strings.
See "Asian Analyst,
V. POSTSCRIPT: CHINA AND THE ABORTIVE SUMMIT
It ia unlikely tbat Peiping was instrumental In tbe Soviet decision to wreck the summit conference in May. the Chinese had long argued that negotiations must not take priority over revolutionary struggle, Chinese public pronouncements on the eve of tbe summit seem toa feeling of resignation rather than opposition. Mao himself was quoted onay as having asserted that "the Chinese supported the holding of the summit conference, no matter whether this sort of conference made achievements or not, or whether the achievements were big orhe language here could almost bo Interpreted as an attempt to remove pressure from Khrushchev by saying in effect that the Soviet leader did not necessarily have to gainfrom the West in order to obtain Mao's post facto approval of tho conference.
In tbe very next sentence, however, Mao revealed the essence of his attitude toward summitry: "But the winning of world peace must depend mainly on the resolute struggle carried out by people of all countries." In short, summitry was acceptable provided that negotiations did not gainover direct action tactics.
If the breakdown of the summit cannot therefore* bo attributed in significant measure to the Chinese,ignificant turning point in the Sino-Soviet dispute. No sooner had Khrushchev packed his bags in Paris than the Chinese began an even more intensive campaign against Soviet strategic views. This Chinese campaign was soon tothe WFTU meeting in Peiping inhinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the Communist world that the Russians could no longer afford to minimize. The events at the WFTU conference willubsequent paper. It is important to note in this contoxt only that it was the failure of the summit that evidently emboldened Mao to pressew and critical stage his Initiative against Khrushchev's strategy and Mao was emboldened probably because he believed that the abrupt failure of the summit wouldevere blow to Khrushchev's prestige throughout the Communist world, particularly among those Stalinist elements in the Communist world who had all along shared Chinese dissatisfaction with the strategy of detente and coexistence.
The impending Chinese post-summit assault on Soviet strategy apparently did not come as any surprise to Moscow. Just three days after the summit collapse, the Soviet
theoretical journal Kommunlstent .to press with an article on the failure of the summit which seemed to be more interested in refuting the Chinese than in attacking the Western "provocation" at Geneva. The article, an unsigned editorial, seemed to be intendedreemptive move against anticipated Chinese callsundamental revision of Soviet political strategy.
"Some havehe editorial said, that
in the interrelationships between two social systems there is another 'third way out'; neither war, nor peace, that is the maintenance and even strengthening oftension... The 'third way out' is sheer mockery of the nations which thirsttable peace...
The article went on, clearly with the Chinese in mind, that "imperialist wars are inimicable to the forces of revolution, that revolutions can be brought about without war, that peaceful coexistence would not dull the vigilance of the people, and that economic power was the key to world It reiterated Khrushchev's significant statement in Paris onay:
The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that if not this government of the OSA, then another, if not another,hird, will understand that there is no alternativepeaceful coexistence of the two systems.
Finally, the article reiterated the Soviet confidence in Its disarmament policy,direct contradiction todisarmament would free funds to assist the underdeveloped countries. It concluded, again in explicit contradiction to Peiping, that the USSR was not begging for peace but that its policy was motivated by strength.
This article, and others like it in the Soviet press shortly after the summit collapse, seemed intended to serve notice on the Communist world that the summit collapse did notadical shift in Soviet foreign policy and world Communistshift which in fact did not occur The Russians were in effect saying that if Eisenhower did not wish to negotiate with them, they would wait for Kennedy or Nixon. If these results were unsatisfactory, they would wait still another four years. But, however much pressure on the West might be stepped up, they would not abandon the broad outlines at least of their coexistence strategy. Thisclashed head-on with intensified Chineseadical change in Soviet policy.
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Original document.
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