PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK ON THE US (NIE 11-61)

Created: 4/6/1961

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IS

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 1 (Supersedes)

PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK ON THE US

CIA HiSIDHiCAL REVIEWELEASE AS SANITIZE!)

Submitted boOr CENTRALlollau;ng intelligence organisations varlwlnatedo,

State,p. the Harp,he Joint Stag mm the /rational Security Agency

p (he UNITEDLIG ENCE HOARD

'Z,LA,"aJH' M-

taff fat InMUgcw.l thehe!eport^",

WVmec. Joint Staff, thea: theo I Director

Federa, Bureau of inuestlgatiou. attained, the sublect betla outage Ol hit jurisdiction

TlWItro OIGIIUDUTOH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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WARNINO mntenal contains information

DISTRD3UTTON: White House

NaUonal Security Council Department of State Department of Defense

TARIE Or' CONTENTS

P

THE PROBI.KM

ASSUMPTION

SCOPE

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

NATURE OF THE WARNING PROBLEM

VARIABLES AFFECTING THE WARNING PROBLEM

Soviet Decisioneriod of Colni

Soviet Decisioneriod of Tension

Level of Intelligence Alert

Nature of Soviet Preparations and Attack

WARNING FROM CERTAIN SOVIET PREPARATIONS FORreparations for Attack by Long Range Striking.

Preparations for Clandestine Attack

Preparations by Theater and Naval Forces

Defensive Preparations

National Mobilisation

Other Preattack Preparations

WARNINGOMBINATION OF.

-

PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK

ON THE US

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the advance warning of Soviet initiation of general hostilities against the US which could be provided by intelligence, focusing on the period between the present and

ASSUMPTION

For purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that during the period underno US-Soviet agreement on arms control or system of mutual inspection will be in effect.

warning of Soviet attack discussed in this paper is that which intelligence might be able to give prior to the actual launching of an attack. We do notwarning, which might be obtained from US or allied early warning radar or other tactical detection devices, such as devices to detect ballistic missiles in flight. Nor do we discuss the possibility ofchance warning from sources such as weather stations, military andaircraft, or naval and commercial ships at sea whose primary mission is not

warning. Tlie possibility that the USSR might resort to an ultimatum and thus itself warn of attack in the event of ais also excluded from

The warning estimate is made in the light of our current estimates on Soviet strategy and present and future Soviet military strengths, especiallyhapter IV and Annexes. It takes into account the detailed findings of theSystems Survey Committee of the United Stales Intelligence Board.

CONCLUSIONS

imect access to tin:f the highest level Soviet decision-making bodies is not now available lo USand may never be achieved Hence, Ihe warning problem is one of collecting indirect evidence, largely fragmentary in nature, and of interpreting it in order to reach judgments about the USSR'scourse of action Any warning given by intelligence would be the end productrocess of reasoning from incomplete evidence. It wouldudgment uf probability rather than an unequivocal warning of Soviet intent to attack.

2 If the USSR decided to attack the US, the varied preparations preceding such an attack would almost certainly include some activities susceptible of detection. The number and variety of indicationsand recognized, and therefore the certainty witharning judgment could be made, would be aflectcd by the scale and pace of Soviet prejiarations, the success of Soviet security measures, and many otherelements which cannot bein advnnce. Intelligence would evaluate these indications in relation to other concurrent Soviet activities and to the international political context within wliich they occurred, in an effort lowhether the Soviet intention were to attack, to threaten, to deter, or to be ready to defend and retaliate.

c believe that the Soviets would feel it essential toalance among the objectives of achieving sui prise, delivering an atlack of great weight, preparing to

defend against retaliation, and preparingnd carry on the war. Many preparations and activities,those associated with defense and recuperation, might be detected well in advance of an attack but would be subject to considerable ambiguity as to Soviet intent and as to the timingossible attack. Last-minute preparations to launch an attack could permit morewarning but would be less likely to be available in .lime.

ith respect to Soviet preparations lo launch intercon linen til striking forces against the US, our ability to obtainis limited and declining:

a At the present time, there is virtually no chance that intelligence would be able to provide advance warning of Soviet use of ground-launched ballistic missiles in an attack. Intelligence capabilities to derive warning from preparations byballistic missile forces may improve somewhat, but given foreseeable obstacles wc believe they will remain very poor.

b. If the USSR prepared toassiveeavy and medium bombers andchances are better than even that some aspects of an operation of this size would be detected in time to provide a. degree of warning before the Soviet bombers arrived at North Americanwarning lines. However, intelligence could probably not provide warning if the Sovietsighly securetoeduced force of.ombers and tankers.

c. Tho chances of obtaining warning from piv|ur.itnjn3 by long range bomber forces will (Iwliiic, in pari been use ofImprovement* in SuvicL security over airions, but primarily because the growth of Soviet missile capabilities will shiil the main strike iole away from bombers.

d We believe that under normal US icadiness conditions andere is sonic chance, although small,eneral departure inlo tlie open seas of Soviet submarine forces large enough lo include all presently operational missile submarines would be detected in numbers sufficient to cause additional alertThere wouldair chance that such forces approaching US coasts could be detected,ew hoursay before the submarines reached missile launchingrior alert would raise the chances and increase theof any warning given

e. US techniques for submarineidentification, and surveillance will probably improve, thus increasing the chances of deriving warning indications from the movements oftypes of Soviet missile submarines. On lhe other hand, warning capabilities would be considerably less against Soviet nuclear-powered missile. ballistic missiles.

eriod of international tensionoviet attack, intelligence might be able to give successivewarnings which would have aeffect. Kven if such warnings contained no firm conclusion ns to Soviet intentions, they could provide the basis for critical decisions regarding USmilitary, and intelligence actions.

rim lost pj liic.se might include decisions to uudei' akc exceptional collectionwhich could in turn increase theof the warning judgment

onsidering all the factors affecting Uie problem of warning, we believe that In most circumstances of an actual Soviet decision to attack at present or in the near future, intelligence could give warning of increased Soviet readiness, and couldossible intent to attack,ew days or more before the attack WarningsrooaWe Soviet intent are likely lo be given, if at all,ew hours before attack.

DISCUSSION

OF THE WARNING PROBtEM

9 The ideal contribution of intelligence to the defense of the USoviet attack would be lhe communication to US decision-mnklng officials of clear and unequivocal winning that the USSR intended to launch an altackpecific future time andarticular manner, this warning to beto decision-makers far enough into permit them to decide upon and take effective countcrmcasurcs. To approach this ideal standard, Intelligence would need lo have prompt and direct access to dependable sources of Information on the proceedings of the highest level Soviet decision-making bodies, or at least to their means ofdecisions to Immediately subordinate echelons. Such access does not exist at the present time and may never be achieved.

nre urns lances, which havethroughout the period of US-Soviet confrontation, any warning given bymust derive from the collection and evaluation of evidence on Soviet activities and behavior. Given the considerable effort by the USSR to prevent the collection of vital information about Its military capabilities and preparations, even indirect evidence of Soviet Intentions will always be incomplete. Nevertheless, were the USSR to prepare to attack the US, the varied preparations which would lie undertaken would almost certainly yield di*crete items of Information susceptible of collection by one or more channels of in-telllKcncc acquisition. These items ofwould not necessarily establish aintention to attack, inasmuch as they might also be consistent with an intention lo

threaten, to deter, or lo be ready lo defend and icUllate Thus the warning problemone of eotlecling indirect evidence, largely fragmentary in nature, and ofit in order to reach judgments about the USSR's intended course of action.

o cope with the warning problem in these Icims. the Intelligence community has developed over the yean techniques for col-Iccling. evaluating, and correlatingderived from Soviet activities andThis effort has included attempts to determine what general and specificthe USSR might make prior tohostilities, to identify those preparations tnost susceptible to detection by Intelligence, la direct collection assets towards promising sou ices of information, and to establish special channels for the rapid transmission andof information which may beto the warning problem. This effort is guided" by the United States Intelligence Board; substantive continuity Is maintained by the Watch Committee of thend by its staff In the National Indications Center.

hrough these mechanisms, acapability for collecting and evaluating infotmatinu has been focused on the warningair understanding of the norms of Soviet behavior has been acquired,igh degree of expert knowledge can now be applied lo the problem of discerning apparent abnormalities which might signify Sovietfor war. However, because of lhe impossibility of predicting in advance precisely what abnormalities would become apparent should the Soviets decide to attack, warning could never be derived automatically from ex-

or improved mechanisms. IL wouldbe the end productrocess offrom incomplete evidence, and would thereforeudgment of probability rather than an unequivocal warning of Soviet intent lo attack.

udgment would rest in jwrleighing o( indications of Soviet physical preparations These indications might be found in any or allide variety olranging from specific Sovielto ready the long range striking forcesiy generalized preparations to increase the ability of the Soviet productive base to withstand the effects of US retaliation. To date, it Is in this urea of physical activities that intelligence has best been able losurveillance and to recognizein Soviet behavior. Despite theintelligence has developed to acquire am! weigh evidence of Soviet physical activity, however, any attempt toarning judgment from physical preparations isto serious limitations.

hysical preparations undertaken some Lime before the initiation of war would offer the longest potential lead-time forbut in most cases only the mostconclusions about Soviet readiness could be drawn from Lhem and no conclusions could be drawn as to the pace and timing of the activities. Indications of last-minute Soviet preparations would be much more significant but many of these final preparations would beoto thf launchinghe attack that there would be very little time to obtain the information, to assess it, and lo communicate warning Lo decision-making officials Hence, the most specific warning which might be given by intelligence on the oasis of Soviet physical preparations would probably Be the least timely.

1 j. In addition to physical preparations.might acquire evidence of Sovietwhich did not in themselves increase' military readiness but which the USSR might undertake prior to the initiation of hostilities. Examples are abnormally heavy censorship measures, changes in clandestine agent opera-lions, urgent and simultaneous recall of key

Soviet personnel hi Western countries, and unusual restrictions on foreign nationals in the USSR. While such evidence mightthe warning derived fiom analysis of militaiy pi epilations, it would notonvincing basis for warning in the absence ol indications of increased readiness to attack. Finally, and most important, there is virtually no single preparation, activity, orof these which would establishthat the USSR actually intended to

is. Inarning judgment, intelll-fjrncc would evaluate physical preparations and Other activities in Uic context of Ihepolitical posture This context has lo do wilh the way in which the USSR is conducting its international affairs at any given time: the vigor of its challenge to the West over various issues, the apparent degree of commitment of the Soviel leaders to various positions, and Ihe politicaligh Soviet and BlocThe political context introduces more evidence but also new complications to the warning problem. Soviet foreign policy ini-Llallves, actions, and positions are themselves often difficult to interpret. The possibility exists that interpretations of the USSR'sbased on its political posture would impede or confuse the attempt to arrivearning judgment based on physicalOn the other hand, analysis of Ihe political context can serve to strengthen the warning Judgment. This analysis is becoming more important to the warning process asmilitary capabilities grow and reaction limes are compressed, and as the USSRthe West politicallyider range of issues and geography.

I is evident from the foregoingthat any warning given would becomplete nor unequivocal. The mote indications collected and recognized byand the more comprehensive theof Soviet capabilities and behaviorto intelligence, the better would be Ihe basis for Judging the Soviet course of action. But the sum of the available indications and knowledge would almost certainly beas to Soviet Intentions. Therefore,

in ii uiukr (he most favorable circumstances, intelligenceonlyale piotoilxllly of Soviet attack was high. Sonic indication o( the Conn, Kale, or time of nlluck might be ascertained from the character mid poo* of Soviet prepaialions. bul heie too there would be uncertainty in some respect*

arning canseful function even where attack cannot be predicted wilh complete certainty. Warnings of lesserof certainly may be given inay thai Iheyumulative effect. Such successive warnings, even II Ihey did nola firm conclusion thut the USSR Intended to attack, might stillasis forimportant political, military, ordecisions, They might be adequate, for example, lo justify undertakingmoves lo copeeveloping crisis, placing US military forces al one or another slage of alert, or invoking special intelligence collection measut OS. Such actions might lead the USSR to change its intentionsattack, and this in tuin wouldproduce indications which might cause intelligence lo modify its previous warnings.

he process of warning is completewarnings given by intelligence areas valid by decision-makinggovernment. Intelligence must be ablecredibility for its warningmust therefore make as complete asn showing of evidence. Includingof possible alternative Interpretattons.whatever warning is given.judgment which did not carryto responsible policy officials couldmuch an intelligence failure as no

VARIABLES AFFECTING THE WARNING PROBLEM

ne of the most important variablesthe warning problem is thesituation obtaining at the timeoviet decision to attack'ecision could be takeneriod of comparativecalm oreriod ot heightened international tension, perhaps occasioned by

local hostilities, other major variables, re-laied In boinc degree tu theension obtaining, are the level ofalert prior to the initiation of theattack, the nature of the Sovieland the nature of the Soviel alUicfc itself These factors would have bearing not only on Ihe chances of intelligence warning, but also on the specificity and timing of the warning which might be given.

Soviet Dotiiioneriod of Colm

is possible toirm Sovielto attack the US, madeimeadvance of the launching of thedecision of this nature might be madeSoviet leaders concluded that theya military superiority over thedecisive as to permit them to defeatwithout receiving unacceptablereturn, or if they concluded that theplanning an eventual attack on thethai Iheir best chance of survival layfirst. The Soviets' assessmentworld balance of forces at presentthe next few years, as we haveelsewhere, is unlikely to lead them totheseowever, theyreach the former if theytechnological breakthrough In afield, and the latter if theywhich convinced them thaiintended to attack.

firm decision made well Inenable the USSR toongprepare, probably under conditions ofsecrecy and possibly accompanied by

'Bee, "Main Trends in Sovietand"0 ITOP SKCRKTIt should bethat ihr Assistant Ctilvl ol Stan. Intelligence.lsvnted to that paragraph He believes that'is evidence of offensive missile and bomber production and deploymentefinite Intent by the Soviet rulers tolenry at the earliest practicable daU. tic feels wc aretty crHlcalonth period In *hlrh the USSR may well sense It has UieIhe Sov>ct leaders may presa Ihaland ofTcr Ihe US the choice of wai or of backing down on an Issue hrreloforevital to our nationalfit*

iiyjf

is lo deceive tin- US as In So rtet iiiii'-iiiiiiH Ou ihe otherould

give (lie US intelligenceime lo collectirwd range or indiealcrs which might progressivelyeaningful Initiallyst. such preparations as were delected would probably not liavc an emergency character and would probably lie regardedormal development ol Soviel militaiy capabilities. At some point in Ihe course ol these preparations, however, the Soviet actions might be recognized byas clearly at variance wilh normalof activity and development of Such recognition might stem from analysis of tlie preparations themselves, or from the discovery of unusual Soviel secrecy or deception attempts. This would alertand would cause II lo re-examine the accumulated indicators. As Uie lime of attack approached, actionsast-ininule Character might be observed which wouldour ability to give warning.

e can also conceiveoviet decision Lo attack on very short notice, also in the absence of any external atmosphere of rising tensions. ecision mightes-peiate attempt at pre-emptive attack, arising from false or misinterpreted informationthe Soviets to conclude that the US was attacking or preparing imminently to attack Uic USSR. While wc doubt that such awould ever actually arise, weexclude it.' Nor can we completelya similar short-notice decision arising from some irrationality within the lop Soviet leadership. In cases of this sort, minimal Soviet preparations would ensue and the time available for their detection would be very short. The chances of warning might rest heavily on tho possibility that the Soviet forces designated Lo carry out the attack, themselves surprised, would fall lo exercise appropriate security measures. Nevertheless, if detected and correctly Interpreted, last-mlnutc Soviel

'See NIKo. "Main Trends in Soviet. Caps. blliliM anil0 (TOP SECHF,T)

picpiiiriuiins forudden ultack would lendrnillunieale any warning judgmentreatl urgency.

Soviel Decision ineriod ol Tcniion 24 i: ' the two situations we have just discussed, thereide range ofmore likely circumstances underoviet decision lo attack might be Luken. These Involve Soviet responses tocrises and local conflicts which neither tlie USSR nor the US originally intended should lead lo general war. The Sovielmight decide to attack because theythat an actual or threatened ititervcn> lion in the USSR's sphere of vital Interest could not be countered by limited means. Or they might conclude that tlie USSR hadengaged beyond retreat in some area where Ihe Western Powers would be prepared to tisk general war. In either case, liteleaders might decide that general war and all that il involved was preferable to sub-milluigerious reversal and lhat It would be lo their military advantage to attack first.n this situation the decision lo attack would be accompanied by sonic degree of po-ilical tension,ery high degree, which could in itself give rise to preliminary warning. However, the Ume period overrisis reached an acute stage could vary considerably, and this would affect the ability nf intelligence to assemble apattern of Indications. If therief period of time, and if Soviet military readiness was alreadyor if tho Soviet leaders decided to attack with only minimum preparations, the indications obtained might be few If, on the other hand, the USSRertain amount of lime to prepare and position Its forces, fur-Uier and more specific warning might befrom Uie pace and nature of tbe Soviet preparations.

s also possible Ihalocal crisis the USSR would decide to engage US or allied forces locally while hoping lo avoid general war. This course of acUon would restalculation thai Soviet objectives could be

imited implication of force and lhal lhe US would be deterred from initialing an attack on lhe USSR itself. There would clearlygreat danger thatituation could develop inlu general war. The Soviet leaders would Imvo to recognize that the US might eoi:ch:de dial expansion of hostilities was inevitable and therefore itself seize the advantage of launching the first attackeneral war. Fnced with this possibility, they might at some point decide Ui launch such an attack Lhemselves. in the givenSoviel forces would presumably be close lo full readiness and maximum security precautions would be inertainof intelligence and military alert In the US would also obtain. Warning of Soviel intent to expand the local conflicteneral war might be inferred from, among other indicators, those giving evidence ofpreparationscale, character, orat variance with thcie required for the local engagement in progress.

he period of rising tension attending an international crisis or local war would in itself constitute warning of an Increasing likelihood of Soviet attack, but ineriodmight have its greatest difficulty Into determine Sovieteriod of tension would bring intelligenceigh degree of alertness and perhaps lead it to take exceptional measures to collectabout Soviet activities. InSoviet activities. Intelligence- would have to recognize that the USSR might be carrying out military preparations, not on the basisirm decision to initiate general war, but for purposes of Intimidation or in order toits defensive readiness and its abilitys jii'.ack. It, possible thijjt Soviet preparations for war might be undertaken because of aof US policies and actions, by which the Soviet leaders considered that they were about lo be forced into general war, against their real desire. The importance of aUS estimate on this point would be very great, yet it would he particularly dillicull tu make such an estimateeriod of rising tension.

nalysis of the significunce of lhe USSR's political and propaganda activities would be very difficult. Most such activities under-taken preparatory to altack on lhe US mighl ii ifJer greatlypected in any period of heightened tension. Such activities could in themselves beas defensively motivated or as partar of nerves, and they would thus nul establish that the USSR had the intention to attack. However, taken in coiijuiicUon wilh other kinds of indications, they might enable intelligence to give warningreater degree of certainty.

level of Intelligence Alert

ne significant effecteriod ofas it applies to the warning problem would be the effect on the intelligenceitself. Since warningroduct of judgment, there are variable human factors which must be taken into account. Alertness would vary depending on the manner in which the crisis developed, its intensity, andThere are many ways in which the alertness and effectiveness of intelligenceunder crisis conditions. For example, field reporting and Intelligence analysissharply focused on the crisis situation, new sources of information held in reserve for such situations are put into use, resources of the intelligence community are more closely integrated to deal with the crisis, andis increasingly disposed lo consider whether current evidence indicates hostileOn the oUier hand, in the eventong sustained crisisigh degree of tension, key personnel would be subjected to fatigue and strain. If at one stage orapparently mistaken warninghad been made, undue caution might come into play.1

l"s possible that preliminary warnings would result in US precautionary measures which would lead lhe USSR lo cancel orack, in this case, what appeared to be awaiitltie would in fact liavcanceli licence tnicllt have accomplished lis warning mission, yet nul be able to demonsllrite thai it bad done so.

O frfiWf.

-H'-o -

rkushe volume olIncreases and Uu-it rclialMllly. on Ihe whole declines,aiyc number of ambiguous reports fiom inadequately Hlenltficd souice* of un-certain reliability. There is also an increase in the number of report* fiom soutces of known iclidbility, some of which sources come into playesultrisis situntion. In these circumstances, communicationsmay be overloaded, with resulting delays in the transmission and receipt ofHowever, il is not possible forlo suspend judgment until moreand satisfactory evidence becomesUnder the pressure of time in acrisis, the intelligence warnings given mny bo leys reliable or more tentative.

ntelligence could employ emergencyprocedures under conditions of crisis in order to nnpiove the quantity and quality of infonnatlon available. Specialmensuies could be directed againstcontrolled territory. Agents held inforituation cnuld be activated. Some exceptional measures would providepossibly of great value, on Soviet capabilities and readiness, and Inferentially perhaps on Soriet intentions to attack. Some measures in this category. In particular air penetrations, could have the effect oftensions or even of precipitating Soviel attack. For intelligence to employ thcin would require policy decisions; these might or might not permit their use and would in any case cause delay.

No'ure of Soviet Preparations ond Attack

ie we are without access to Soviet war plans* Intelligence cannot know inwhat precise preparations the Soviets would consider essential before launching an attack against the US, or what the precise form and scale of the attack would be. This means that even if intelligence had complete knowledge of all Soviet physical preparations, we could not conclude thatarticular level of readiness had been attained theconsidered themselves fully prepared for

war; conversely, we could not say calrgni Ically Hull been use some one type ofd not vet been accomplished tho Soviets considered themselves utipieparcd. Beyond this, many specific elements bearing on the characteroviet attack and affecting Uie warning problem could not be estimated with ceitainly. Examples are: how much of the Soviet military establishment would be alerted prior to an attack on lhe US?what delivery syslcms would be used in what quantity in such an attack? What forces would be allocated to targets In the US as opposed to targets elsewhere? Whatfor defense and recuperation would be undertaken prior to launching an attack? Over Ihe years, however, we have accumulated enough knowledge of Soviet thinking about military strategy to narrow somewhat the range of likely alternatives:'

ti Is clear that theilitary factor of greatThe USSR would therefore takeprecautions to prevent theorthcoming attack.already Ught. would bepossibly augmented by strenuouslo deceive the US as to Sovietand preparations. Manybe dispensed with in the Interestssurprise. But in balancing theof various factors, the Sovietstake Into account theignificant weight oflo defend against USpreparing for national recuperation.

Soviet military doctrinegeneral war as extending beyond theexchange, and as includingmajor land campaigns and navalThe Soviets regard broad military,and human resources asIn the outcome of such ain preparation forttack on theUSSR would be constrained tovariety of actlviUcs, not direclty related to

'See NIBMain Trend* In Sovietand0 (TOP SKCRfcm Chapter IV.

O I> l.

: i

attack hut calculated to preserve vital military and other nlicni'llift (or phases sub-sequtnt to tlie initial nuclear mehfiHgg.

c. finally, in planning nu nlUck on the US the Soviets would have lo consider the great variety and widespread dispersal of US and Allied nuclear delivery capabilities. They could not contemplate an attack against US territory alone, but would need also tofor coordinated operations against US and Allied overseas nuclear delivery bases and nuclear delivery forces at sea.

variety of preparationsand tactics employed, and scaleof attack could range verythe broad limits set forth above.obtained by intelligencevary in frequency, numberand would have to be analyzed inalternative hypotheses as to theand scale of the Initial .Sovietmany instances, intelligence couldonly point to the various types ofUSSR could be preparing to launch,it might be able lo provide ajudgment as to the more likelyNevertheless, the foregoingto illustrate that thereidepolentia) sources of warningor all of which could serve intoasis for the warning

WARNING IHOM CERTAIN SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

this section we discuss the abilityintelligence community to deriveof Soviet altack on the US fromof preparations the USSR mightpreparations for altack by long range

'striking forces, for clandestine altack, forrations by theater and naval forces, and for air and civil defense, as well as certain other preparatory activities designed to increase the general level of national readiness. Inthe significance Of these various types of preparations, we must consider hot only the abiliLy of intelligence to detect them and Uie Kmc necessary lo recognize and evaluate Ihem. hut also Uie likelihood and liming of

their occurrence and their validity asof viel ini.he analysis re-Iccls our judgment thai, in preparing for an attack on Uie US, the Soviets would tty loalance among the desirableof achieving surprise, delivering anuf great weight, preparing to defend against retaliation, and preparing toand lo carry on the war. We regard this judgment as applicable lo most circumstances In which the USSR might decide to attack, but as indicated In earlier paragraphs, Uiere are conceivable circumstances which would alter our warning capabiliU.es considerably.

the discussion which follows, wethe various types of preparationsthe USSR might undertake somay assess our ability to derivefrom Ihem. This procedureof artificiality. It obscures theamong all types offrom tlie likelihooderyof Soviet preparations andbe under way simultaneously, andthe effect of analysis of thecontext. In general, therefore, Uieof certainty with which thecould be made is likely lo bethat Implied by the followingof certain types of preparations andin isolation.

Preparations for Attack by Long Range Striking Foices

ability lo derive warning fromby long range striking forcesballistic missiles, long rangeand missile submarines) Is limited.this ability is declining as therole shifts increasingly to ballisticand as bomber forces Increase theof their operatHWi* and raise thetheir peacetime readiness. In addition.

..the more revealing indications pertaining to long range striking forces would be generatedhort time before an attack. On the other hand, if last-ndnutc preparations by these forces were detected, they wouldbe good indicators of Soviet intentions and could provide highly specillc conclusions as lo Uie likely lime of attack.

roiiiid-tMuncJieii Ballistic Missiles. Al the pioseut lime, intelligence has no means of providing -M'wn-cx- warning Ol tlie uset-listlc missiles in an attach. To approachapability, we will have to identify opeio-lioiial units and Iheiv means of command and control, and also achieve an understanding of the operational concepts underlying the deployment and stale of readiness of these forces. Even if wc succeed in these tasks, our warning capability will lemain severelyby the very nature of the ballistic missile weapons system. It is probable thatICBMs could be ready for firing after preparationsew hours at most, and lhat these preparations would involve very little movement or other noticeable

hereossibility that medium range ballistic missiles would need lo be deployed forward inlo the Satellites or closer to Soviet borders in preparation for coordinatedagainst Western retaliatory bases and other sLrenglhs in areas peripheral lo the Bloc. Such forward deployment need not be undertaken by the Soviets, however, and even should it occur it would probably require no moreay and would be very difficultetccL because of our imperfect knowledge of the present locations of such units, the routes of movement they would employ, and the nature of the prepared launch sites they would require, if any. In sum, there Isno chance of obtaining indications of preparations by ballistic missile units at present.

ng .Range Bombers. In any attack on the US at present or in Ihe next few years, It Is almost certain that the entire Soviet force of heavy bombers and tankers would beto operations against North America.1

Soviet operational strength in heavy bomberstankers, as ots estimated at about IS'J aircraft. Medium bombers and tankers arcalrd otn Long Kangc Aviation &ndn Naval Aviation. The Assistant Chief itT, IntelllRence, USAF. estimates the numberenry bu.-nbers and tankers alnd the 'lumber of medium bombers and tankersng "aiinc Avjonim atOO.

II is probable lhat some portion of Uicbomber* ami tankers ol Soviet Long Range Aviation would also be so committed, wilh Uie remainder allocated to targets peripheral lo the Bloc. Medium bombcis of Soviet Naval Aviation, equipped for Uic most part with antiship missiles, would probably also participate In IniUal Soviet operations by seeking out and attacking Western carrier task forces at sea The levels of training and readiness of these bomber forces haveconsiderably In ihe past few years, but it would probably sill)eek orays lo bring Uils entire force of0 aircraft lo peak readiness and towhatever redeployment wasprior to attack.

If Ihe Sovietsuch aeffort, it would bivalve increased and abnormal flight activity. Intensifiedactivities, urgent logistic preparations, and possibly the preparation of specialThe Soviets would take strenuous meas-uies lo maintain seeunty In these acUviues Nevertheless, evidence of such acUvitics would probably be delected in increasing quantity during Uic days preceding an attack, thus increasing the opportunities for intelligence to derive warning Indications from their

The chances of obtaining indications ot the foregoing type remain good at present, although they hnvo been materially reduced over the past year as separate,sources of Information on these forces have diminished. Moreover, theof indications could not always beand specific, especiallyime oftension. (In several past crises, most notably during the Iraq-Lebanon crisis.

he Soviets placed their bomber forces onalert, presumablyeterrent lo the West and in preparation for Iheofowever, the knowledge that the readiness of these forces was beingcould provide Uie basis for awarning which might boew days prioroviet attack.

fHHt-r-

nnriiailng Soviet security has coiistdcr-ithly rti'Brjided durability lo uchlcw time))'of flighu to Arctic staging bowi, on which Intelligence has heretofore placed great reliance Tor warning of attack onur expectation that the USSH woukl stage horn be rs ihroiigh Arctic bases in such un at-Uick icsts on several considciatiom.

Range Aviation trainingInvolve small-scale flights byand heavy bombers from home basesSouthern, and Far Easternbases in the Kola Peninsula, theand the Chukotsk PeninsulaIn these latter areas arefor temporary use by bombersRange Aviation; two Arctic baseito have nuclear weapons storage

range of the BISON Jetis niaigmal for operations agaitiblRefueled BISONs could conductagainst some targets in thefrom home bases, landing aton the return trip, but In mostwould require the aircraft toroutes, to operate atspeeds calculated to minimize fueland to forego evasivealtitude approaches, and othertactics. For operational flexibilitytarget coverage, BISONs shouldthrough Arctic bases and refueled

the small size of the heavySoviet delivery of an attack ofagainst the US would require theof mediumewof Long Range Aviation are nowbased In the Arctic; any othersthe *JS would need to stagein that area.

f tlie USSRassive bomberthrough Arcticattackthe departure from home bases of,liciafl including the entire heavyand liinkrr force andhird of the medium bombers of Long Rangeit would have to provide for last-minute main-

tenancedeployment lo singing bar.es, nnd servicing uiid fueling al staging bases, Bused on present Soviel patterns of activity, wc believe that atay oroukl be required for these piepaiatioiu and movements The chances are better than even that some aspects of an optiation of this size would be detected In lime to provide warning before the Soviet bombers arrived at North American radar warning lines. There would alwnyshance that the movement to forward baseshreatening ormaneuver rather than an attack. The problem ot distinguishing between practice maneuver and impending attack wouldbe greatest during Ihe winter months, when most Soviet air exercises into thearc conducted. But Indications ot this sort would produce urgent Intelligenceal least to the effect thai an Imminent attack was possible.

heftossibility that the Soviets would llmil their initial bomber attacks on North America to their heavy bomber forceew medium bombers. Security might be maximized by launching BEAR turboprop heavy bombers directly from home bases, with only BISONs and BADGERs employing Arctic bases. Intelligence could probably noland recognize Uic activities associated with till* launching ofeduced force of.ombers and tankers in time to provide warning prior lo their arrival at North American radar warning lines. Nor arc weosition to say bow many morethan this the Soviets could launch in an attack on the US before the chances ofadvance warning Indications became about even.

n support of long range bomber strikes on any scale, there would probably beies nol directly associated with the bombing units themselves which might indicatefor attack, perhaps as muchewdvance. These activities could include: Intensified Soviet efforts lo collect and report worldwide weather data; theot very strict control over air traffic within the USSR, especially along routes northward from Long Range Aviation bases;

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perhaps even mih ,uid Aictic icroniwis tbUtOd Mf*htl Suchspceially if they occurredioit jiertud nf time, would si lengthen whalevet preliminary orwarning might be jiu.'u

'riDi'iarmei The Soviel* now hove in operalioiiul umls more thanubmarines capable ol being on station off US coasts for brief periods without refueling al sea Aboutf these are conventionally powered missile launching submarines believed to be equipped for surface launching of ballistic missiles with ranges up tom. and theaie conventional torpedo altack types In addition, the Soviets probably now haveozen or more nuclear-powered submarines whose armament is not definitely known Virtually all of these submarines aie stationed in the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas, where thry have direct access to the open seas. The most specific and firmest warning of Soviet attack on the US which might be derived from Soviet nnvul preparations would stem from the activities of these long range submarines, although Indications could also be drawn from preparations by the remainder of the submarine fleet and by surface naval forces.

n recent years, Soviet submarines have conducted operations outside of Uloc coastal waters with Increasing frequency. There is strong evidence that Soviet submarines have occasionally reconnoltcred US coasls. but they have notegular pattern of patrols within missile-firing range of USUnless ihey establishattern, the Soviets. In deciding whether to employ submarines In initial attacks on the US. would have to weigh the risks of prematureof intent against the advantages ofweight of attack Tile deploymentwould require two or three weeks,on the routes and tactics employed. This of course would preclude submarinein an initial blow if the SovicLsudden decision lo attack on short notice. Hutoviet decision taken well in advance,eriod of tension in which the Soviets desired to increase their readiness, thereood chance that they would de-

ploy some portion of their submarines fiom Northern and Pacific Fleet areas. Given enoughould be done gradually so as to imiihiiije lhe risks of alerting the US.

ill. Wr believe lhal under normal US readiness conditions and surveillance, there is some chance, though small,eneralinto the open seas of Soviet submarine forces large enough to include all presently operational missile submarines would bein numbers sufficient to causealert measures. There wouldair chance lhat such forces approaching US coasts could be detected by our SoundSystem, perhaps as far out. Such detection would give rise to an aleit,ew hoursay before the submarines reached missile launching points.ould cause efforts by ASW forces lothe contacts and to establish surveillance, which In turn could lend specificity to Intel, ligence warnings.

During times of alert, present US planning calls for additional forward sea and airIf the US had been alerted prior to Soviet submarine departure from home waters, the chances of detectingorce of Soviet submarines would be raised. If early detection were achieved, it could have the very significant effect of providing more specific warningeek or two before the initiationoviet attack on the US.

Future Trends. Intelligence capabilities to derive warning from preparations by Soviet ballistic missile forces may Improve somewhat, but given foreseeable obstacles we believe they will remain very poor. As Soviet strength in ground-launched ballistic missiles grows,should achieve some identification of noils, some understanding of the Soviet Operational concepts regarding them, andsome capability to monitor theirTheremall area of hope thatpatterns of activity may becomereflecting various stages of readiness nf ballistic missile forces, and that through interpretation ol these and other indicators ol hicicasiilg Soviel war readiness It may be

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possible to mount extraordinary collectionagainst missile forces at the right time. However, the short reaction limes associated with ballistic missile systems could defeat all attempts lo delect their imminentnnd to communicate this information in time to provide advance warning.

The chances ol warning fromby long range bomber forces willThis trend will result in part fromof the trend towards increasing Soviet security in air operations The utility Ol bomber redeploymenthort rangecould he virtually eliminated if the Soviets established routine patterns of fairly large-scale activity at Arctic bases, and there will alwaysossibility that heavyneed not stage through such bases at all. Most important, however, the growth of Soviet missile capabilities will shift the main str.'ke role away fiom bombers. The probable Soviet employment of both bombers and missiles in Initial strikes between now and at3 may provide some temporaly bonus to intelligence collection because of the Soviet requirement to coordinate their

The ability of intelligence to providebased on the activities of Soviet missile submarine forces will depend significantly on the extent to which improved submarines and missiles are introduced into these forces. US techniques for submarine detection,and surveillance will probablythus increasing the chances of deriving warning indications from the movements of currently-operational types of Soviet missile submarines. On the other hand, warningwould be considerably less against Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarinesfor submerged launching of ballistic missiles from as much. at sea, which we have estimated could become Operational within the next year or so. Moreover, should the Soviets establish aof routine submarine patrols withinfiring range of US largnts. there would be very little Chance Of deriving warningfrom the activities of such submarines.

Prepared ioni for Cknidesline Allock

The USSU could also commit acts of war against tbe US clandestinely. In an initial attack it could, for example, employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons which had been inlioduced clandestinely into the us or into overseas bases. Tlie ability oflo give warning of an initial attack launched by such means would dependon the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had miscarrieday which would provide disclosure, that some individual privy to thehad defected, or on chance discovery. Discovery that Lhe USSR was attempting Louclear weapon into the US or one of its bases would lead intelligence lo give its firmest warning of Soviet intent to attack. There is no way lo estimate the chances of makingiscovery, since it wouldortuitous event. On the other hand, wethat the Soviets appreciate theof disclosure, and that in light of the other means of attack available to them they would be very unlikely lo attemptattack.6

Similarly, discovery of Communist plans for systematic sabotage of civil and military communicationsiven time wouldvery significant indications.activitiesesser order of importance, such as minor acts of sabotagearge-scale, might contribute lo our ability to give meaningful warning. We could not behowever, that such activities had been organized in conjunction with an attack on the US.

further discussion, sen. "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect lo the Clandestine IntroducUon ol Weapons of Massinto theated0, and the footnote thereto by the Assistant Director. Federal Bureau ofwho points outoviel decision la employ Ibis means would depend not only on Soviet capability with overt means to destroy US retaliatory capability; but also the US capability to launchfortes bcloie their destruction by overt Soviet menns.

I'mpuriilioiit by Ihealoiil foicos

he rangeHflions neededrepare the diverse Soviet ground. tactical air, and naval elements lor gencialroad touna1 olineicavd readiness of these forces. Moreover, evenar imitated, by anucleai exchange, some advanceby thcaler and naval foicesare regarded by the Soviets as necessary lo protect those forces for subsequentas well ns lo liliuie Ihelr readiness for quick action lo lake advantage of whatever surprise the initial Soviet attacks achieved. The time required to carry out thesehowever brief, and lhe advisability of cairyhtg Ihem out before US retaliation destioycd transportation and facilities, argue strongly that some would occur before the first Soviet strikes reached US early warning hues, nlthoi'gh Lhe Soviets would make every effort lo prevent disclosure of Ihelr intention to attack. In drawing conclusions fromby theater and naval forces, it would be difficult to distinguish Soviet motivation as between Intent to attack the US. lo takesteps, or to establish aposture for political reasons. Thiswould increase during seasonalof ground forces and would be greatestime of heightened international tension.

heater Forces. Knowledge of lheof Soviet theater forces rests heavily on observation of the forces in East Germany, although wc have spotty intelligence coverage on forces within the USSH. Soviet ground and alt units In East Germany arc maintainedigh state of readiness, and they need not be reinforced prior to inltlollng attacks-It would piobabiy require very little time for ground mills and equipment to disperse from barracksprepared (xaitions. But we believe the minimum time necessary to prepare all Soviet forces in Germany foremployment wouldew dayseek, evenesire to minimize preparations in the interests of surprise.

he chances are good that Irregularities in the behavior of Soviet forces In Germany would be detecled by US and other Western

intelligence sources. Recognition of ansituation would dependegiec on the lime nf year, it would be mure difficult in the spring, summer, and fall, particularly during April, September, and October, when we have beenme accustomed lo expectSoviel preparations lor trainingThe annual training cycle would also affect the time necessary for major Soviet giound elemenls to assemble in forwardnear the West German border. The required lime could varyew hours during periods of normal training movement to as mucheek at certain other times of the year.oi ward assembly ofelements, if it occurred, would give rise lo the most specific warning which intelligence could derive from Soviet theater forcePreparations by airborne forces within the USSR would also be regarded as highly significant for warning, but our currentto observe their activities is only fair.

aval Forces. The bulk of the activenaval lorces, including major surface and submarine elements stationed In the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea, andareas. Is trained primarily forof Soviet coasts and for operations against surface ships. In recent years,warfare has received newThe necessity for the Soviets to begin carrying out some of these naval missionsew hours after an Initial attack on the US would probably require an inescapable minimum of advance preparations.Soviet doctrine calls for the dispersal of naval foices from present concentrations to other bases in the event ofIs frequently lhe introductory phase of major Soviet fleet exercises. While there isood chance ofreparations,deployment and dispersal, these could be accomplished gradually and underof great secrecy. They might take as 'littleay or as long as two weeks,on their magnitude. Considering our total intelligence coverage, including that provided by forward sea surveillance offfleet areas, the chances of detecting and recognizing such preparations arc fair.

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ravis. Our ability to derive warning lit-foritmtron from preparations by theater forces will probably decline somewhat, primarily be-muserend Inward lightening Soviet security will continue. Coverage of Soviet theater forces in Germany willritical factor It could be hharplyby loss of Intelligence access through Berlin or by Soviet measures lo curtail the movements nf Western military Unisonin East Germany. If in the future the USSR substantially reduced its Germanthere might from tliat time onwardreater chance of reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities Wc cannot count on this, however, because the Soviets might still regard whatever strength remained tn Germany as sufficient to begin operations without reinforcements. Utile change IsIn our ability to derive warningfrom the activities of naval forces other than submarines

Defensive Preparations

CO. In view of the threat posed by Western retaliatory power, the Soviet leaders would also undertake certain defensiveespecially In air and civil defense. Preparations of this sort would be goodof tension, bul would be equivocal as to whether Soviet intentions were attack, defense, bluff, or deterrence Because of their precautionary nature, defensivemight be poor indicators ofoviet attack.

irortion of Soviet aitforces, especially radars and Tighter units near borders and along airline routes, arc normally on alert. At times of tension or alarm, however, Soviet air defense alert forces arcthe past, additional fighters have been placed on strip alert and surfacc-to-alr missiles In the Moscow area have somctlmei been moved from hold areas lo launchers. At such limes, lite Soviets also impose more rigid controls over air traffic within the llloc. and intensify theirof Hlr traffic within and near BlocWe believe that because of the potential cfTecfs of US retaliation, there Is an excellent

chanrc that intensified air defenw measures would precede Soviet initiation nf hostilities against the US.

he Soviets would probably require atew days of maintenance and other preparations to bring their airaximum readiness,airly high degree of readiness could be attained with little delay. Because of the number of units involved, their widespread locations, and the presence of many of them in areas accessible lo Western intelligence coverage, the chances arc vety goodeneral Intensification of Soviet air defense measures would beFinal alerts and measures affecting civil traffic could be deferred until very lateurprise attack situation, however, thus limitingew hours the time duiing which warning Indications could be obtained.

ivil Defense. Measures which the Soviets could take to protect population. Industrial, governmental, and other assets from theof retaliatory altack include theof civil defense units, final preparation of shelter, and evacuation of key personnel and possibly elements of the population from likely target areas Published Soviet civil defense manuals make provision for several courses of action, evidently envisioningamounts of warning of Western attack.

a. evacuation of some elements ol the urban population and other deliberate preparations,ew days or more of warning.

o. declarationthreatening situation" and short-term preparations such as readying urban shelters and evacuating civil defense units to the suburbs,ew hoursay of warning;

c. extremely limited preparations such as rapid movement of the population to urban shelters,ew minutesew hours of warning.

n the interests of surprise, lhe USSR might decide to forego civil defenseuntil the last feasible moment, but lo carry out any usefully comprehensivea start would have to be made before the initial strikes were sent off. Notification of

populace I* apparently Lo be tinnsiniltcil by wired public midivsspruscnti wc could detect Mich notice only by tlw loitul-toiis presenceestern observe; al theof one of these speakers whenns made, liut unless Lhedecided to leave the populations of Mos cow and other major cities unpiotecled. therea very good chance lhat the effects of such notification on the behavior of the populace woukl be detected promptly by Westernpress, and other personnel in the USSR Information concerning uigent civil defense activities, and especially of lhe evacuation ol key government personnel, would serve toother warning indications.

rends. The risk the USSR would be willing lo acceptesult of neglecting some ot all defensive preparations would depend in part on the degree of success which the Soviet leaders expected their own Initial attacks to achieve. Despite likely Improvements in Iheir nuclear delivery capabilities, we believe that in elemenLary prudence, they would bein the foreseeable future to forego all preparations toetaliatory blow, if lhe Soviet doctrinal emphasis on postslrike rccuperabillty Is any guide, then us Lhe de-strucliveness of weapons increases and thebetween attack and potentialdecreases, the more essential becomepreparations lo reduce initial losses and to protect national strengths. Including The ability of Intelligence to derive warning information from air defenseof the USSR will probably decline somewhat as air defense missiles replace fighter aircraft. The future utility of civil defense indicators will depend heavily on whether or not current Soviet programs are stepped up to the point where the civilsystem is normallyigh stale of readiness. There Is no evidence that Uieplan any such slep-up.

Notional Mobilization

CG If lhe USSR undertook lo mobilize its full warreat variety of indications would be obtained Militaiy measures could include call-up of reserves, retention ofclasses beyond the lime of normal re-

Iviiap, activation of additional units, andCrammg programs. Economic alio stirntlfic measures would arfeet weaponsand production programs,ol materials and manpower, andofajor mobilization would involve the growing dislocation olnational lifeK>tiod of months, during which time intelligence could give warning of progressively greater readiness for war. It is unlikely, however, that theof national mobilization activities would justify mote specific warning at any timethis period.

G? In the more likely circumstancesSoviet initiation of hostilities, tlie Soviets might undertake whatever partialmeasures were permitted byof time and security. These couldvarious degrees of strengthening of endre units, military pre-emption ofand transport, medical preparations, and many other similar activities. The Soviets, for example, couldew days call up the necessary personnel to bring all ground force units up to full strength, drawing upon lhe reserve system which they have maintained and arc now expanding In connection wilh military personnel cuts. Those units normally maintained at cadre strength wouldew weeks' training before Ihey could be con sidercd combat effective. If detected bysucli Soviet preparations would serve to support or confirm other Indicators and toeneral Impression ofabnormality. In themselves, however, evidences of partial mobilization would not reveal Soviet Intentions and would heoor guide lo lhe liming of an attack, since it would always be possible for the USSR to altack with its ready forces.

O'hcr Preoltock Preparations

Thereost of other possibleof Soviet preattack behavior, and we believe lhat some would be detected byMany of these are peripheral to tho actual readying of forces tor attack, defense, recuperation, and followup military action, but like mobilization activiUvs they could serve to strengthen Uic warning Judgment. Tlie.

chances are good, for example, thai prior to anhe OS somehe Soviet people would hei{ only lo moderate the panic winch could prevail if the populace, without prior warning, were suddenly ordered into sheltersold to evacuate at once to the countryside. Diplomatic indications which might precede an attack could include high level intra-Hloc meetings, efforts to secure the neutrality of certain non-Bloc nations, or even unusualoil the part of Soviet representatives in likely target nations. Intelligence would correlate such indications with evidence of Soviel physical preparations, but they woukl be very diltlcull lo evaluate, especially in time of grave international crisis.

e arc uncertain as lo our ability to derive warning information from the behavior olintelligence, communications, andsecurity organizations, in part because wcuide to likely preattack patterns Would Soviet intelligence collection activities be stepped up prior to an attack or be held in reserve for postattack use? What technique would the Soviets use in attempting lo mask an increase in urgent communications? Would the Soviets attempt to carry out their preparations without sharply restricting the movements of Western observers? We can conclude only that sharply Intensified Sovietn communications or over Westernreduce our ability to collect information but could in itself provide an in put to the warning Judgment. These same considerations would apply should the Soviets attempt to jam or otherwise interfere with critical Western communications.

ossible Soviet deception attempts couldimilar effect. These could range from diplomatic moves or propaganda adjustments designed to reduce tensions Just before anto the planting of false reports orunications about Soviet readiness and intent. Such efforts could confuse US intelligence analysisrucial moment and impedetimely judgments on other indications On the other hand, any discovery thatwas being practiced would be regarded by intelligence as evidenceossible Soviet intention tourprise attack

WARNINGOMBINATION Or INDICA1IONS

thewi haveby category the intelligenceSoviel attack on the US which mightfiom vnrious Soviet preparationsIn any true pieatlackit Is unlikely that indicationssingly, it is probable that weconcurrent albeitumber of categories Becausebe sure what combination olwould actually appear prior toof hostilities, no definitepossible of lhe muLual reinforcementderivable from manyas opposedew However,of certainty with which thecould be made would Increasenumber, variety, and interrelationshipdetected, recognized, andbe valid.

validity accorded to Indications byand by policyoulda degree on whether or not theseplausibly explicable In terms ofof action other than an attack onIf warning were derived solely fromof indications from, say. Sovietcivil defense, and partialit would In theory be no less validderived from observedbombers and ballistic missiles Thebe more specific and dramatic,be less likely to be available informer would be more ukely to bewould be subject to greater ambiguitySoviet intent. Analysis of Indicationsthese categories, especially If theylogical sequence, could permitgive successive warnings with

onsidering all the factors afTecling the problem ol warning, we believe that al present intelligence would detect some evidence of preparations associatedoviel decision lo attack The next stage, theof this evidence, would be more difficult. Wc think lhe chances are better than even

In most 1of an actual ^u-

vict decision lo attack, intelligence could give

ji; of ii- mm id Soviet readiness, and therefore couldossible intent tonut Intelligence could almost certainly not> warning of such an intention. Warnings of Increased Soviet readiness and possible Intent to attack could beew days or more before an attack, warnings ol probable Soviet intent are likely lo be given, if nt all.ew hours before attack

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