Created: 4/25/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

51 TO 6 '









The lolloping Intelligence organliciiom participated In the preparation ol this estimate: The central intelligence Agency and lhe intelligence organisations ol the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force. The Joint* Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD on Z$ April mi. Concurring mere Thc Director olond Research, Department ol Slate; the Assistant Chiel of Staff /or Intelligence. Department ol the Army; theChiel ol Naval Operationsepartment ol the Navy; the Assislant Chiel ol Staff, intelligence. USAF; thr. Direcior /or InlelHoence, Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Special Operaltont; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director. Federal Bureau ol Investigation, abstained, the subject being ouMdeis iurisdictlon.



his estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdictioneed to know basts. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.

of Intelligence and Research, for the Department ol State

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Chief of Naval Operationsor the DepartmentNavy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff

of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission

Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation

to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for theDefense

of NSA for the National Security Agency

J. Assistant Director for Central Reference. CIA for any other Department or Agency

This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arranitement with the Office ot Central Reference. CIA.

When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain iteriod not tn excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested ol the forwarding agency to retain it In accordance with2 June

t TIllTllli nlin ml impmottiyLI Uuj leu,wiUlul


missionor^reteiation of which In anyTftaone: to ar^ertlauthorliedrohibited by


National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense

Atomic Enemy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation









Low Altitude


Research and Development

Major Electronic

Milestones in the









. Ballistic Missile System

. Ballistic MissUe

. Ballistic Missile Syslem

. Ballistic Missile

. Ballistic Missile


Close Support

Ground-Launched Cruise-Type


Tyuratam Missile Te3t




Performance Under Operational

Milestones in the

Follow-on ICBM


Antisubmarine Warfare Missile

Submarine Launched Missile


Soviet Achievements in

Soviet Earth Satellites

Soviet Space Probes

Summary of Soviet-Announced Scientific Instrumentation


Major Basic and Applied Research

Soviet Capabilities for Specific Future Missions

Offensive Space

Possible Space Activities








Following page

USSR: Missile Test

Surface-to-Air Missile Complex at Kapustin

Surfacc-to-Air Guided Missile Sites in the Moscow4 Typicaluided Missile Site in the Moscow

issile System

USSR: Oblique Drawing of the Istia Guided Missile


Typicalissile System Site (Stalingrad.

Typicalissile System Equipment Layout (Glau.


Set Fire Control

Spoon Rest Acquisition

issile System (including Guideline

Field Typeupport Facility (Ladeburg. East

Permanentupport Facility Layout (Kuybyshev,

Launch Sites forissile System (Kapustin Yar

Test Range)

Sary Shagan Antimissile Defense Test

oot Antenna. Sary Shagan Radar Site No.

oot Building. Sary Shagan Kadar Site No.

oot Diameter Dish, Sary shagan Instrumentation

nd 10

oot Dome. Sary Shagan Instrumentation Site No.

Missile Launch Complexary

Kamchatka Peninsula ICBM Impact

Kapustin Yar-Vladimirovka Missileraining Launch Area. Complex G. Kapustin

urface-to-Surface Missile

urfacc-to-Surface Missile


Tyuratam Missileaunchossible Configuration of Completed Launch Area


-rupnyy and Kildin Class

Osa and Komar Class

Modified "Z" Class

Soviet "G" Class

Early Soviet Earth




To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of guided missiles, and thc major performance characteristics and dates of operational availability of such missiles. In addition, to estimate the objectives and technical capabilities of the Soviets in space. (The period covered runs throughxcept where otherwise stated.)


I. Soviet capabilities in guided missiles and space vehicles restajoreffort in research and development pursued over the pastears. The USSR now has two major missile test ranges at Kapustin Yar/VTadimirovka and Tyuratam. an extremely largeat Sary Shagan for the development of defenses against ballistic missiles, and other lesser test facilities (seehe ICBM and space programs have shared facilities on thc Tyuratam range All of these facilities have beenexpanded within the past two or three years.

hc Soviets have concentrated on thc development ofew systems at any one time. With the possible exception of thc first surface-to-air system, deployed around Moscow, there has been nothat Soviet guided missiles were


developedcrash" basis. Tlicnow have operationally available aboutndividual missile systems for surface, air, and sea employment. To date, they appear to have concentrated on initial satisfactionroad range of military requirements, and to have given Utile attention to second generation missile systems. Future Soviel efforts probably will place greater emphasis on development of such systems as well as the improvement of existing systems.

e have good evidence on thcof most of the current Soviet missile systems; our estimates of the remaining systems are largely inferred from Soviet requirements and technical capabilities. Our ability to collect and interpreton test firings of Soviet ballistic missiles and space vehicles has beengood. We are reasonably confident


our estimates of the operationaland thc general characteristics of Soviet missiles. We have loss confidence in our estimates of their accuracy, reli ability, and reaction time. We have little direct evidence on Soviet programs for operational deployment except for the surface-to-air systems and certain air-to-surface weapons, and even lessmissile production.

Surfoce-to-Air Missiles

Since7 the Sovietslexible and mobile surface-to-air missile systemhich appears to be the mainstay of the Soviet missile defense system againstThe early Moscow systemas been bolstered by the addition ofites, and possibly by the introduction of the more effectiveissileBoth systems are capable ofat medium and high altitudes up0 feet and would have some capability up to0 feet,if nuclear warheads were employed.)

In view of the widespread deployment of thend its potentialities for further improvement, we consider it very unlikely that the Soviets will develop an entirely new system to improve theiragainst aircraft andmissiles flying at medium and high altitudes. However, neither theor theppears to have been designed or sited to cope with low level attacks. We estimate that1 the Soviets will have available for initialurface-to-air systempecifically designed for medium and low altitude coverage of targets down to abouteet.)

Antimissile Program

There is firm evidence Lhat the Soviets have had under way for several years an extensive and high priority program for the development of defenses againstmissiles. This effort is apparently directed toward development of aintercept system. It is possible that the widespread and diverse Sovietwhich wc have observed represent developmental programs on more than one type of antimissile system. Tlie fixed nature of the installations and theprogression of activities towards work with longer range missiles leads us to believe that the main effort has beentoward defense against IRBMs and ICBMs.

We have no basisirm estimate for the date of firstoviet antiballistic missileor of its effectiveness against the various types of Western ballistic missiles. The timing of first deployment will beby the nature of the system--under development, the status of theprogram, its future progress, and the timing of the Soviet decision to deploy. We believe that for political as well as military reasons, the Soviets would wish to deploy antimissile defenses forew critical areas, even if the available system provided only an interim, limited capability. )

In the light of these factors and the intensive Soviet research andactivities, we estimate that in the

The Assistant Chief of Staff (or Intelligence.of the Army, believes that the available evidence permits more detailed understanding and estimates of the antimissile systems underat Sary Shagan and Uka Uian are reflected In this esUmate. See hla footnote to


he Soviets will begin at least limited deployment of ansystem designed for use against both ICBMs and IRBMs The earliest of these dates Is contingentoviet decision to assume Lhe high risks ofproduction and deployment prior to full system tests, and therefore isthe earliest possible date. Ifearly in Uie period, the capability of the system against IRRM* probably would be the more thoroughly tested. It should be noted that continuing success in research and development will beif the USSH is to achieve anyantiballistic missile capabilities. It is unlikely that systems which could be deployed during this time period would have discriminationagainst sophisticated decoys. research and development indefense, perhaps includingtechniq ucs, will undoubtedly continue as long as there are ballistic missiles. )

the course of its program toantimissile system, thc USSRa limited capability toafter they have made aorbits. However, we believe thatyears to come the Soviets archavearginal capabilityfavorable conditions forUS satellites

Air-ro-Aif Miswles

estimate that the Sovietstypes of short range (up to sixmissiles with HE warheadswith theiris good evidence of theair-to-air missiles in thc SovietSatellite air forces, and possibly

in the Chinese CommunisL Airoviet development of improved air-to-air missiles over the next few years isupon trends in Soviet fighter and Western bomber forces and in Soviet surface-to-air missile defenses.)

A> to Surface Miuilei

. air-to-surface antishipwhich has been operaUonal5 is believed to be widely deployed in naval medium jet bomber units. Twosystems are now estimated to be operational. The first is an improved antiship system whichange. The second. system,to have been designed for delivery by heavy bombers primarily against land targets. Both antiship missiles can be used against land targets with reduced accuracy, and. systemcould have an anUship roleecondary mission. )

Surface-fo-Stfrfoco Ballistic Minilei

he USSR hasamily of ground launched ballistic missiles whose ranges and other performanceprobably satisfy most current Soviet requirements for iong rangeattack and for support of theater field forces. Two short range missiles, with maximum ranges of.nd two medium rangewith maximum ranges of.ave been available for operational use for thc past few years. An IRBM of. range, now under development, will increase Soviet coverage of distant peripheral targets and permit greater flexibility of deployment within the USSR. The ICBM devclop-


program is discussed inelow.

implicity and ruggedness have been major criteria in Soviet developmenl ol ballistic missile systems Irom the short range to thc TCBM classes. All systems probably employ radio-inertial guidance, achieving operational accuracies of about one-half to. depending on the range of thc system. All use nonslorable liquid propeiiunts except the. missile which uses storable liquid Short and medium range Soviet missiles are designed for road mobility and rail transportability. The ICBM, and probably the IRBM, arc designed to be launched from fixed positions, and would bc heavily dependent on the Soviet rail net. Medium range, IRBM, and ICBM systems are suitable primarily for thcof nuclear payloads, but short range systems may be designed lo employHE, or CW warheads, depending on tactical considerations. }

ur evidence on Soviet production and deployment of these missile systems is far from satisfactory. Wc havepointing to several plants which may be engaged in production of ballistic missiles, but it is insufficient to establish producUon rates for any class of missile. Test range activities indicate the training of troop units to employ short andrange systems, as well as continued research and development to improve the performance of the systems themselves. Our best evidence on deployment relates to medium range missiles:. missiles arc probably now deployed in East. missiles are probably also deployed in the several areas near Soviet borders in the Baltic,

Carpathian, and Far Eastern regions.

evidence on future Sovietis likewise fragmentary andWe believe that thestrive lo improve the accuracy,ease of handling, mobility,times of all classes ofother things, this efiortlead eventually to solid orpropellants and to all inertial

ICBM Program

have relatively firm evidenceSoviet ICBM test range and theprogram from which we haveto derive basic characteristics ofsystemwithmargin ofits performance underconditions. In theearthe first successful flight testhe Sovietsenerally successful ICBMsLest range. Considering thepatterns in test firing in relationSoviet missile programs and loprogram which has sharedfacilities, and experience,that the USSR has beena careful and generallydevelopment program, at apace rather than

he sum of our Information isas to thc precise timing of initial Soviet ICBM deployment. However, we consider that the. ICBM by the endie probable manufacture ofmissiles beginning early in lhat

year, and the possible construction of launching sites In northwestern USSRre sufficient to support an estimate that as of0 the first operaUonal Soviet ICBM unit was trained and equippedewand launchers. This is referred to as initial operaUonal capability (IOC) date. Wc believe that since Uiat time, the USSR has had at least some capability to launch ICBMs. with high-yield nuclearand good accuracy and reliability, against targets in the)

or extensive coverage of US. ICBMs would have had to be deployed at launch sites in northwestern USSR or in the Soviet Far East. By aboutowever, thc Soviets. missile which could achieve full coverage of the US fromareas virtually anywhere In Uie USSR. ICBM launch sites wouldbe near rail lines.)

' The Aula (ant Chief ot SUff for InteUlgtnee,of lhe Army. believer lhat by early lvflO. the Sovieu hadjn. mlnllr satis-factory for emergencynterim ICBM launch facilities andew missiles possibly wore deployed lo audi facilities. He believes Uiat an IOC with fully developed, deployed, operational missile launch faclllUca did not occur0

'The ahhief of Hava] OperationsDepartment of thc Navy. beDerea Umprobably had an emergency capability loew missiles from test facilities (as opposed to operational launch sites) aUrUng earlyactors which beareployed operaUonal ICBM capability and which are mentioned In the osumaje weigh heavily In hla |udcmrot. These In-cludffT

_Jhe lack of ICBM troop training activity, and the lata of firm evidence on operaUonal IdlM alUa. In addition, the first appearance of what appears to be an operational type she at Area CalTynraUm which was estimated Ui be completed In0 or early lOfil leads him lo Judge that operational launch sites were not available before tlnl Ume.

e estimate that, wiUi thc present type of guidance, Soviet ICBMs wouldEP' of about. undercondiUons inut the actual figure could be considerablyor somewhat less.ery highis assigned to improving accuracy, the operaUonal CEP of portions of the Soviet ICBM force might reachs earlyut wc5ore likely date for such an achievement)

lthough it will probably continue to be modified and improved over the next few years, Uie present Soviet ICBM has the inherent disadvantagesery large, nonstorable liquid-fueled system. It is probable, therefore, that Uie Soviets willew ICBM system using either storable liquid or solid fuels,into it compatible elements to increase flexibility and decrease vulnerability in deployment. Flight-testsollow-on ICBM system could begin at any time, and wc believe thatystem could become operational in3 or after.)

Long Range Aerodynamic Vehicle*

here are indications of currentinterest in long range, cruise-typeWe believe Uiat Uie Soviets are developing, and could have available for operaUonal useround-launched, ramjet propelled vehicle,peed of about Machlight alUtude of0 feetange in excess. This system couldesearch role, but if employed for weapon delivery or reconnaissance it

" Circular error probable (CEP) is the radiusircle within which UieoreUcallyercent of the missiles reaching the genera) vicinity of thc Urgei will Impact.


would complicate Western air defense problems.

Naval Launched Missiles

ubmarine launched. On thc basis of analysis of observation reports and photography of Soviet submarines, as well as on statements by Soviet officials, we believe that two classes of missilesubmarines are currently operational. Both probably carry th= same.. ballistic weaponEP of one to. One submarine, the converted "Z" class, can carry two missiles; thc other, the "G" class, can probably carry three or four. Neither can launch when fully submerged. We believe that the Soviets probably are developing nuclear submarines capable of carrying and launching ballistic missiles while submerged. Wc estimate that they could have available for initial deployment In2 ballistic missiles. range. It Is possible that the Soviets have elected to equip nuclear submarines with missiles of the typeto the converted "Z" and "G" classes, in whichew could bcthis year. We believe that the Soviets are also. supersonic cruise missile designed to be launched from surfaced submarines. This system could be operational this year.)

urfaCe Ship Launched Two classes of missile launching destroyers arc now operational with the Soviet fleets. Theyay employ cither of two short range, cruise-type missiles, both of which arefor use against ships. It is possibleew cruisers may be modified toeither of Ihese destroyer launched

missiles as well as adaptations of land based surface-to-air systems Thealso havehort range missile, guided or unguided, for use in patrol craft. )

j ram

n seizing an early lead in space and following iteries of dramaticthe Soviets have sought lo bolster, both at home arid abroad, claims of the superiority of their system. The USSR has sought to maximize thc Impact of Ils achievement with spectacularn occasion timed to coincide withpolitical moves. Intervening shots appear to have been designed largely to provide data for thesehile the Soviet space shots have collected scientific data, the scientific aspects of the program seem to have been fairly selective, andarge degree applicable to the support of future Soviet space missions.)

he importance which thc Sovietsto the space program Isby the assignment of leadinglo ils direction, by the wealth of theoretical and applied research being conducted in its support, and by theof resources and facilities lo itsSpace vehicles havemore than one-third of the total number of launchings from Tyuratam in thei years. The impressive Soviet record now includes: orbiting of thc world's first earth satellite and by far the largest satellites; launching of the first vehicles to impact thc moon and tothc reverse side of thc moon; launching of the first vehicle lo transfer from earth orbitrajectorylinct; orbiting and recovery ol thc only


satellites suitable for supporting manned orbital flights; and. mostUie successful orbiUngan. )

he reliability achieved in Soviet space shots has been much lower than that of the Soviet ICBM. Tlie Soviets have achieveduccessful launchings of space vehicles, but we believe Uiat there have been nearly as many launchings which resulted in failures. Moreover,of Uie vehicles which werelaunched apparently did notas planned Most space failures were apparently caused by factors unique to Uie space program, such as Uie addi-Uon of upper stages to Uie basic booster and in some cases Uie requirement to launch at stipulated times.)

o date the USSR has apparenUy not Launched any space vehicles specifically for military purposes. However, many of their space experiments have providedwhich would be useful in thc development of future military space It would be technically feasible at present for Uie Soviets to equip earUi satellites for such military support roles as communications, reconnaissance,or collection of weather data. Wc estimate that such systems could appear at any Ume. There is no evidence that Uie Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. However, Uie Soviets haveundertaken research andin this.area. Soviet success in space as exemplified by the Venus probe, the

most recent successful orbitingan, and Uie capability to orbit still heavier payloads over the next few years, leads to Uie conclusion Uiat the Soviets are technically capable of achieving an orbital bombardmenttoward the end of Uie period of this esUmate. Moreover, the Soviet leaders might seek to derive some psychological or political advantage by hinting or even boasting Uiat the USSRignificant capability in such weapons. Theof vehicles for which Uie Sovietsilitary capability or otherachievements in space could lend credence to such claims. )

e believe Uiat Uie Soviets willto capitalize on their possession of very powerful propulsion systems. Thc USSR could now place in0 pound satellite, and tht.'. orbital payload could be increased to0 pounds in An instrumented lunar soft landing probably can be made this year, and additional deep space probes probably will be attempted during the next year or so. Finally, there isUiat Uie Soviets are nowiquid rocket enginehrust of some one to twoalf million pounds which could be available inuch engines could bc used in clusters inime period lo Launch earth satellites ofons.)



TbMi i


Warhead Weight


Surl-eeio-AJr Miwito.:




Alr-lo-Air Missiles




Air-lo-Surface Mlnto




Naval UuDcbcd Ma-






Uie H

uc PfOI-Li fc.lf



Uie early

ie IWO gaj|a















I mm


ISO ft. against. oo

ft. against. on land,

150 ft. sgaioat












Kited site*.

effective. Altitude


Low supersonic



Destroyers. Destroyers.

Surfaced or tall awash.

a detailed summary of each missile category, covering all eallmaled charaeUristics and olherncluding possible develop men is, see Aunei D.etailed summary of eallmaled Soviet capabllltlea in space flight, ace Suction VIII.

tba views of laof Stall for Intelligence, Oepartmcot of tbe Array, and UM Assistant ChUe of Naval of lhc Navy, oa this date, sat Ihetr footnotes, page 5.




SURfACF-TO-AfP. MlSSILFShe Soviets have developed relatively few surface-to-air missile systems, each designed to counter it specific threat, or take advantage of scientific and technical advances to assist in solving air defense problemsonsiderable Impetus to the early Soviet research nnd development in this field, but made no significant contribution after

he major Soviet facilities for testingmissile systems and for training troops in their use are located at the Kapustin Yar missile test range (seehese arc centeredomplex extending overquare miles which contains four launch areas, associatedand support facilities, and ansimilar In appearance to knownnuclear weapons storage sites. Training facilities probably canAM troops at any one Ume.

t the lost range, the Soviets havea generally similar pattern in theof the two SAM systems nowAfter extensive componentand testing at researcharge flight test program was conducted at the test rangeaunching facility specifically designed for research and development. Subsequently, prototypes of operational sites were constructed for more complete system testing and for training of operational crews.


his is the arbitrary US intelligenceof the first operaUonal Soviet SAM system, which was deployed only In the area around Moscow. In9 orhe development of this SAM system was placedriority basis and development time was telescoped. After testing on aprototype site, construcUon of missile sites at Moscow was begunt about Uie same lime as thc complete prototype site was

being constructed at Kapustin Var. Deploy-ment of the system was begunnd tlie entire complex was probably operationalt that timeites hadense and cosUy complex around Moscow on two concentric rings with radii approximately. and. from the center of the city (sreypicalherringbone" site hasaunchJoinedoad network (see

reliminary tracking informationis provided to the Moscow SAM defense by radars which arc deployed around Uie cityircleadius ofloser In, about. from the outerarget would come within range of Uie tracking radar located at each site. This radar, designated "YOYO" by UScan simultaneously track targets and scan for additional targetsrc in both the vertical and horizontal planes. Bachite Is believed capable ofas many asargets simultaneously. However, the limited coverage In azimuth meansumber of sites are required loarget against attack from all quarters. Theommand type of guidance system. It appears to beto both chair and electronic Jammingegree which Is heavily dependent upon the Jamming techniques employed and on the skill of Uieadar operator.

issile originally designed lor use with this system is unboosted andiquid propellant sustaincr motorhile Its maximum speed Is on thc order of. Itowacceleration which limits somewhat Its engagement capability against supersonic tar-gels The missileayload ofounds, and Its CBP is estimated0 feet. Maximum intercept range will vary. depending upon Uieand type of target; for example,


a directly incomingat highits range Is on the order ofumprobably designed for an nltitudeol up0 feel, the missile should have some effectiveness up to0 leet. particularly if armeduclear wai-head. Its minimum effective altitude iseet.'

here is some evidence that themissile, designed as part of theystem, may be utilized in someiteseplacement for thc. The use ofoosted missile in theystem would increase the system capability, particularly against targets which can beforhort lime.

e have considerable information onand logistic- support for the SA-1Production of components andhas been reportedumber of plants In the Moscow and Leningrad areas.Direct logistic support for thc Moscow sites is provided by six assembly, storage, andfacilities located near the Inner ring and connected to the launch sites by(see

he chief advantages of theystem are its ability to handlerge number of targets and to direct an extremely high rate of fire against them. However. It was apparenUy designed primarily to counter the massed air raid threat of thcnd. Even before completion nf Uie deployment around Moscow, it ts probable that concepts of the threat had changed and that other defense techniques weremore appropriate. Moreover, the limited azimuth coverage of each site makes therather iruiexlblft. and In its present con-nguraUon It Is completely immobile. The magnitude of effort Involved ln its deployment probably also argued against its use in less critical areas. The Soviet answer to these problems was the development of theystem.

resent Nuclear Warhead CapaulJIUe.v" (Limited Distribution)

SA 2

e have considerably less InformaUon on thc development cycle of theystem than on that of the SA-I; however. It docs not appear to have been similarly compressed. Deployment of this syslem was delayed unUI prototype launching facilities were completed al Kapustin Yar and training was underway. Based on tlie expansion of these facilitiesinc believe that the system had been proved and had becomeprior to the end of Uiat year. Moreperationalites have since beenin the USSR, but also In some of themany more are believed to exist. Severalitesin Uie Moscow area probably areto supplement theefenses. Such widespread deployment indicatesof thes the standard Soviet SAM system for defense against medium and high altitude air attack.

ypicalite (seendonsists of six revettedoughly circular pattern ofeet ln diameter and linked byroads to facilitate loading. Inside the circleevetted Are conlrol system, and associated van-type trucks and trailers which probably house radar and computing equipment and power generators. Displaced several hundred yards from tbe otherare an acquisiUon radar, an IFF set. and three revetted missile hold areas.

heuidance system, like that of thes believed torack-while-scan radar. This radar, nicknamed "FRUITonsists of four separate antennasingle, mobile mount (seelthough the radarelatively narrow look angle, the cnUre mount appears capable of rotationertical axis, and at least one of the parabolic dishes can moveorizontal axis as well. Used in conjunction with the fire control radar is an acquisition radar,"SPOON BEST" (see. SPOON REST has also beenap-filler radar tn peripheral areas of the Soviet Bloc. Under optimum condi-


lions, the guidance system could probably handle two targetsime, with more than one missile in the air against each target. However, these targets would have to be within the approximateradur look angle of the FKUIT SET. TheystemIs somewhat less vulnerable to counter-measures than the SA-1.

he missile used with theystem is the QUIDEUNE. first observed Inarade (see Figure II) olid propellant boosteriquid sustainer motor, which give it aspeed on the order of Mach 3. The GUIDELINEayload ofounds, ond CEP is estimated aleet. Maximum intercept range ts estimated. bul will vary depending upon type of target, approach angle, and otherfactors; for example,i-recUy Incoming,ie range would be on the order ofa. Maximum eflecUve alUtude capability is0 feet with some effectiveness up0 feet, especiallyuclear warhead. Lowcapability probably will averageeet, but variations in siting conditions and targets could result in low alUtude limits as higheet or as loweet.

achite is believed to be assignedissiles, of which six are probablyon launchers and six are kept on trailers parked In missile hold areas at each site. In addlUon, forites, thereupport facility ln whichore missiles per site are uncraled. prepared, checked out. and held In storage on trailers ready to bc moved losites. Unassembled missiles are also stored In theearly completed field support facility has been observed at Ladeburg. northeast of Berlin (see. Sitesore permanent nature, butUie same functions, have been observed throughout Uie USSR (see. Tliey contain assembly and checkout facilities, additional facilities for unloading and disassembly, storage areas for warheads, boosters, fuzes, fuel, and oxidizer, and narea for ready missiles stored on trailers. Although we have not identified nuclear stor-

age at any of the support facilities, wcUiat thc system could employ nuclear warheads.

he firing scheme of thcite ts not known There is some evidence Uiat missiles may bc launched in pairs, but it is alsothat they are launched singly. In cither case lhe tracking und guidance equipment would be Ued up for the approximate onealf minute time of missile flight.another missile or pair of missiles could be launched. Since reload zniare estimated to require approximately five minutes, the first launcher or pair of launchers would be ready to fire reloadedJust prior to (In Uie caseingle missile) or shortly after (in Uie case of pairs) Uie last on-launcher missile. This situation applies to thc six misdles on launcher and the six additional ready missiles at the site. The time required to bring additional missiles from thc support facilities, generally located at some distance from the sites, would depend upon their relative locations and the extent or prior planning.

heystem appears designed to cope with Uie threat posed by small numbers of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons ratherassed raid threat. Flexibility and mobility are Its chief advantages aver then contrast to Uie massiveites, each of which is capable of defendingimited sector around Uie target area, eachite appears capableegrees coverage. Theystem can, at relaUvely low cost, bc deployed widely lor defense of large cities, of small but important fixed facilities, and of forces ln thc field. This flexibility is obtained at the expense of target handling and rale of fire relaUve to Uieowever, lhc shorter Ume of flight of the boosted GUIDELINEgives Uieetter capability against high altitude and high speed targets and against targets with small radar cross .sections.

lthough all of Uie observed sitesrevetments and other fixedall components of Uie system are mounted on wheeled vehicles and areof Independent movement by road or rail.

Not considering Uavel time, we estimate that ubout lour hours Is required to take down or to set up thc equipmentite. Mobility exercises have been observed in East Oermany.

4G In view of the widespread deployment of llieystem and the polentinlilies lor further improvement, wc consider il very un likely that the Soviets will develop an entirely new system to Improve their capabilities against aircraft and air-to-surface missiles. Rather, we estimate that the Soviets willimprove theo Increase ils range tomprove ils ability to engage small, fast targets at high altitudes, andIts ECCM capabilities. Research and development work for tills purpose may be underway at Sary Shagun or Kapustin Yar. and we believe that modificationsimprovements In thc system could begin to appear this year.

low Altitude System

urface-to-air missile system designed to engage targets at low altitudes hasbeen under development by the SovieU for two or three years. Photography ofYar in9est area (seehich contained two sitesew type, each having four launch pads. One site, which was probably usednd D, was complete and occupied, while the other wns in the final stages of construction. The lack of revetments around the sites would


allow the launchers to be trainedow angle of elevation. Moreover, the of the guidance radar onower indicates its design for use against targets at low altitudes. At least one of the It and I) launchers contained two missile-like objects abouteci long. The site pattern suggests lhat the missiles are carriedransporter (possibly tracked) which backs up lo the launcher (oi transfer of the missiles. Thc missile is believed lo employ semiactive radar homing all the wayuidance system. It Is probably poweredolid propellantof the Integral suslalner-boostcr type.

his system, designatedrobably will become operational1 We estimate that it willinimum altitudeof abouleet under optimum sitingaximum altitude capabilityaximum range0 foot CEP.E or nuclearhe system probably will bc mobile, and thus suitable for defense of field forces as well as fixed targets. It prob ably willontinuous wave radar for target tracking. The acquisition radar has not yet been identified, but existing radarsotential for use with this system.ystem probably will be deployed so as to supplement existingefenses.

' Estimated payload wcased upon analysts of photoeraphj and theavailabilityompatible nuclear warhead.



iomoler 2feet


Maximum Incr intercept AIM0 feefDependent onIntercept-autical Milesf Type and Approach

Weighi Maximum Velocity Propulsion System CEP


Kerosene and Nitric Acideet




figure 9

Photograph; Sur(oce-ro-air missile guidarxe system. Gfau. Soviet Zone. Germany.



Scan Sector in Azimuth ond Elevation egawatts

UnambigiousNautical Miles



Fuze Guidance Power

Probe Beacon


Fuel and

Missile Fin' . r. r

Fm Span 91


Dependenl on Torgct Type ond Approach

0 feet0 Nautical Miles

ounds Mach'3

Solid Piopcllanl Liquideel


Maximum Intercept Altitude Maximum intercept Roogc

Warhead Weight Maximum Velocity Propulsion System







figure 13





SOVIET ANT1MISSUEhere Is firm evidence that the Soviets are pursuing an extensive and high priority program for the development of defenses againsi ballistic missiles Known Sovietand studies on tills subject dalend an active research and development program appears to have been underway for several years. Photography of the Saiy Shagan area in0arge, elaborate facility which we believe to beprimarily In antimissile wort (sec1. The Sary Snagan areaone of the major Soviet guidedresearch development and test areas, second only In magnitude to the Kapustin Yar/Vladlmlrovka complex.

Research and Development Activity

his very sizable activity coversquare miles and contains housing aecornmo-tfaStoat for shoot yj.rtoobototraphk interpretation indicates that there are more thanajor electronics and communications installations, Including seven or moresites,ootoot building containing an antenna,foot diameter steerable dish antennas,oot diameter radar dome (see These facilities are located near. impact area or the Kapustin Yar ballistic missile lest range. Close to the Impact area are two complexes which contain probable launching sites: launch complex "A" includes two modifiedites- launch complex "B"oncreteecieet, which appears capable oflarge vehicles, and two semicircularsites which may be launching padsew type (see. Some of the facilities at Sary Shagan are three or four years old. and extensive construction work Is still in progress.

he Soviets have Installed somefacilities in the Uka area of thePeninsula not far from the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi (see. Construction at Uka has lagged behind that at Sary Shaganear or two and the installation is small by comparison. Out

evidence indicates lhat it include*foot dish,oot dome, and oneThere arc other instrumentation sites in the vicinity to monitor ICBM test shots to the area, and these may also contribute to antimissile research.

he Soviets have been collectmg basic data useful for development of an anUrnissilefor several years. irings into the highly Instrumented impact area at Sary Shagan have included. range, andesser number o( shorter range missiles. Thearray of facilities at Sary Shagandesigned to Investigate phenomenawith mid-course and terminal phases of the trajectories of these missiles. of similar data on the ICBM isaccomplished by the facilities onbut It is probable that considerably less data on the ICBM has been collected.We believe that tills iuvcs'-ig^tivc cilorL is directed loward developmenterminal Intercept system. The possible launching sites, drive-through building, faculties for han dling explosives, and buildings which might be used for missile fabrication or assembly, all indicate that the antimissile system under -development at Sary Shagan employs aas the Intercept vehicle. Consideringstate-of-the-art and the requirementsby the nature of thc system, wc believe lhat the Intercept vehicle willultiple-stage surface-launched missile probablyolid propellant booster. Judging from past Soviet practice with surface to-air missiles, we believe that command guidance will be

he missile probably will be equippeducleart present, suchappear lo offer the best promise for destruction of incoming ballistic missiles. Two of the nuclear devices lested by tlie USSR8 might lend themselves to antimissile defense applications. Wc have no evidence of Soviet nuclear teste at very high alUtudes0 feet or in space) and believe that

E.Present Nuclear War Head Cu liabilities." (Mmlled Distribution I

Admittedly, these two hypotheses do not cover lhe entire range of possibilities Indeed, the widespread and diverse Soviet acUvltles which we have observed may representprograms on more than one type ol antimissile system, and it Is logicul toUiat the Soviets have done at leastwork designed to cope with the various ranges of Western ballistic missiles confronting them. Some of the installations and activities at Sary Shagan have beenwith workystem designed for defense against short range ballistic missiles. But the fixed nature of the installations and the general progression of the activitieswork with longer range missiles leads us to believe lhat Uieffort has been directed against IRBMs and ICBMs.1

MileitCnei in me Program

e believe that at the present time, the

Soviets lire well advancedrogram to cc-Uccl basic data, conduct technicaland test antimissile system eompo-

"The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, believes Uiat the available evidence permits more detailed understanding and estimates ol the antimissile systems under develop? ment at Gary Shagan and Ukaeflected tn this analysis. Based on this evidence he beUeves that there arc Uuee different, but Interrelatedefforts.:

s. Defenses against short and medium rangemissiles (up toOOhich can be deployed byvidence Indicates thatsystems tests began for one such syslem Inevelopment on these defenses is believed to be supported by one AMM launch eomple* at Sary Shagan and two subordinate target missilen. missiles and one for TOO nm mladies. The AMM launch complex contains two modifiedties, which Indicates the use ofsystems In defenses against short ranee baUlsUc missiles.

b. MulUple-lnslallaUon. Gsed-poslUon defenses against IRBMs and ICBMs wliich can be deployed during Uieased on Urget mli-silr firing rates and other evidence, systematicof components for this system probably began Inroving of these components against the ICBM probably began at Uka In

c Advanced investleaUons to Improve AMMequipment against all types of missile and space thirsts. The single InstallaUon concept isbe only one of these advanced invesUea-

they lack basic eflects data on high altitude and space detonations However, we do not believe lhat tlie luck ol such data wouldSoviet deploymentuitable nuclear warhead for an antimissile missile.

Mo joeook Component!

he electronic componentserminal intercept system must be capable ofarget; acquiring It; or "discriminating" a missile nosecone from tankage and decoys; and trackhe nccccone as well as guidingthe antimissile missile. It is not clear which of several possible approaches to this complicated problem the Soviets have selected. Thc precise role of each of the large radar installations at Sary Shagan lias not been determined. Nor. because of the other missile and space activities conducted at and near Sary Shagan, is It certain that all of these are Involved ln antimissile work. From the anatpda or tlv* racClUcs at SaryaU hypotheses have emerged, one pointing,oncept employing several electronics installations, the other to aconcept.

nder the multiple-installation concept, the major radar installations at Sary Shagan would be employed in combination to perform the electronic functions of an antimissileAs an alternative hypothesis, it Isthat Uie Soviets are seeking toall Uie radar functions of an antimissile systemingle installation as Uiey did ln the case of thendystems. In the first hypothesis, acquisition und tracking could be accomplished bywith electronic components essentially complete for beginning of electronic test checkout In Uie second hypoUiests. the radar jnoot building Is Uie critical component and an important factor inthe status of Uie program. of0 revealed thatie building shell Itself appeared to bethe installationhole was still under construction. Testing will probablythis year, and about two years probably will be required to complete tests ofomplex Installation.

nents AnUmtssile missile tests and Integrated systems tests may have occurred in0 oruch tests al that time would lend support lo the multiple installationIn the single installationintegrated system lests could not beuntil Uie periodo

he timing ol the first Sovicl deployment o( an antiballistic missile system will bemostly by Uie current status of the testing program, its future progress, andof success. However, this timing could probably be accelerated by an early CoV.ct decision that lhe system then being tesled would prove to be satisfactory for operaUonal use. ecision must beew years before on operational capability is achieved. If Uie Soviets are confident thai their present approach wiU in fact resultorkable antimissile system, and If they attach great urgency lo early deployment, they can accelerate this deployment by rtartlnf*construent! the production olbefore Uiey resolve all Uie technical problems, as they did In Uie case of thentiaircraft system. Among Uie most serious of these problems ts Uiat of achieving thcand discrimination to cope with the numerous, widely dispersed balllsUc missiles of various types and ranges which Uie West will possessew years, including types wllh sophlsUcated nosecones and penetration aids.

e have no basisirm esUmate for the date of the first operational deploymentoviet cntiballistic missile system, or of Its effectiveness against the various types ofballistic missiles. Judging by Uie acUv-iUes at Sary Shagan and Uka. we believeystem designed for use against bolh ICBMs and IRBMs could first be deployed in Uie Thc earliest or these dates is contingentoviet decision toUie high risks of starUng producUon and deployment prior to full system tests, and therefore is considered Uie earliest possible date. If deployed early in tlie period, the capability of thc system againsi IRBMswould be the more thoroughly tested. It should be noted that continuing success In


research and development will Ik- necessary if Uie USSR is to achieve any operaUonal anti-ballistic missile capabilities, It is unlikely that systems which could beduring this time period would have discrimination capabilities againstdecoys.

e believe thai the Sovicis would wish to deploy antimissile defenses lor Uieof atew critical areas, even if the available system provided only an Interim, limited capability. ourse would be consistent with the high priority they have accorded to Improving their defenses against Western nuclear strikes. Moreover, the early deployment of an antimissile system, even if its effectiveness were limited or uncertain, would almost certainly be regarded by theas having great political Impact and as weighing significantly In the world balance of forces. We therefore esUmate Uiat the USSR will probably begin at least limited deployment of an antiballistic missile system in.

oviet research and development indefense, perhaps Includingtechniques, will undoubtedly conUnue as long as there are ballistic missiles. The Soviets almost certainly will design their first system inay Uiat improvedcan be Incorporated as they become available. Improvements mightetter intercept vehicle ordiscrimination techniques. Acapability against targets outside the atmosphere probably could not be achieved until sometime

Anlisatelli'e System

or some time to come, the Soviets are likely to havearginal capability under most favorable conditions for Interference with US satellites. Kven detection andin Uie early orbits of any satellite will bc difficult, especially so If the satellite Is dark, unannounced, or camouflaged. It will also bc difficuli for thc Soviets to Identify lheofatellite In the course of Its program to develop an antimissile missile sys-


tern, the USSR couldimitedcollision courseest uinge ifto destroy such vehicles after theyparameters were established. Thca number of orbits. This couldinformation on US programsbe accomplished irom thc Saryprovide incentive for Sovietingainst satellites withantisatellite capabilities. However, welow orbits. Wllh an extensivebelieve that the USSR will have amight be accomplished sooner with adestruction of satellites on theirsn. missilethe latter part of the decade.

OOT ANTENNA (Nicknamed "HEN ROOST') SARY SHAGAN Radar Site No.'2

OOr BUILDING (Nicknamed 'HENAHY SHAGAN Radcu Silc No. I



OOT DOMF (Nicknamed "HENARY SHAGAN Inslrumenlolion Sile No. 6


vidence on Soviet development o< air-to-air missiles is largely limited lo reports ot early experimental workadar beam rkler missile. According to German returnees who hid worked on the project, this missile,"ShM" by thc Soviets, was Testing ol alr-lo-airprobably is carried on at the Vladlml-mvka test range (see. In the past two years, wc have received uonsideiablr evidencr on the deployment ol air-lo-air missiles. Some Sovici fighters in Ihe USSR and East Germany are believed to Ik equippedadar beam rider missile and lo have engaged in operational training. Missiles using infrared guidance principles probably are also operationally deployed In the USSR. There is good evidence thaiSatellite air forces are being equipped with the beam ridci missile, and there an WJlTM indications ot the introduction ol ali ic-aii missiles into tht aii lorct ol CommuChinx

iTtt beam ndci inlssikow .standard armament foi the FARMER EThis aircraft may also be equipped with infiared homing missiles for use in clear weather. There are indications that some of the new Soviet fighterand possiblyndarmed with air-to-air missiles. The type o( missile has not been determined.

e estimate that the USSR probably now has three atr-lo-air missile systems available lor operational use:

a.Soviet .designationhis radar beam rider Is probably an improved version of thc original "ShM" missile Itangejn. and Is limited to use with suitably modified all-wcaUier fighters. Op-

erational limitations will probably cause this missile to phase out after Uie next few years lishort range infrared homing inl:>sile limited to tail attack under clear air masst is usable with mostincluding day fighters. Its range varies from. with day fighters to about. with all weather fighters.

c.the basis of requirements, early German reports, and Soviet technical capability, wc believe lhat the Soviets at one lime had underemlac'lve radar homing missileange ol about three lo. for use with all-weather fiKhlers. We estimate thatystem is now operational, but there is no evidence of its deployment.

oviet development ol improved air-toalr missiles over the next lew years is contingent upon trends In Sovici fighter and Weslern ooinbu force4 and hi Soviet surfacc-to-aii missile defenses Improvement' could include ii'-nhistirailedrange* hltd lurger puyiondj-uclear). Gin present estimates ot the nuclear wcaponr available in Uie Soviet stockpile do notarheadiic and welghl suitable lor air-to-air missiles, although the possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviets havea warhead for such use " The need to safeguard Uie pilot from nuclear eflects wo-jtdi.*Aile nf coo'ldr-raMy longer range Uian any estimated to be now available.

' Clear sir mass. Absence ol clouds andbetween missile and target. The terrr, ii equally applicable to day or nlghl opcraUons. In addlUon. an infrared system Is also degraded by bright background such as while clouds and attacfc angles Close to Uie sun.

"Annex E, "ESUmalcd Present Nuclear Warhead Capabilities." (Limited DisUlbutior.-



oviet alr-to-surface missile (ASM)began shortly alter World War II when the USSHumber of German ASMs as well as the technicians who hadthem.he German team haduidance system known as the "Kernel" which was incorporated In the first Soviet ASM. We do not know when theof this system began.

or the most part, testing of Sovietmissile systems is carried on from the Vladimirovka rangehead (seehich is adjacent to the Kapustin Yar rangehead. Research and development on largemissiles Is also centered at VUdimlrovka (sec. Facilities at Vladimirovka associated with airborne missile development Include an airfield complex with facilities for assembly, checkout, and loading of ASMs and possibly AAMs.


TL We believe that the first Soviet air-to-surface missileecame operationally available lnIt is now standard equipment In most naval BADGER units. Thisubsonic missilepeed of aboutaximum range of about. It can carry an HE or nuclear warhead ofounds, andEP ofeet against well-defined radar targets. The characteristics of the "Komet" guidanceeam rider with semiactive homing, limit its employment primarily agiinst ships at sea. However, it is believed lo have some limited application with degraded accuracy against coastal targets.

riginally designed to be carried by the. BULLhcmposes certainon the BADGER (TU-lfl) Jet medium bomber, which is now used as the launching alrcralt The missile must be carriedand In launching the BADGER must fly at an altitude of0 feet al

greatly reduced speed. Under thesethe BADGER'S operational radius is reduced fromo. with one missile or to. with two. This radius can be increased by aboutercentingle aerial refueling.


limitations of theystem,the vulnerability of theprobably have led the Soviets toa follow-on system primarily forships. This system, theecame operational In0 orWe estimate thai it Is capableound HE or nuclear warheadmaximum range. at lowspeed.

do not know which of severalsystems Is employed by themissile might be guided to Lhe targeton the launching aircraft; It Isimple Inertial or preset systemWe believe that the systemradar terminal homing against shipgiving it an estimated CEPcoastal targets, where homing isthe CEP would be aboutADGER is the most likelynd the system probablyIf any restriction on the aircraftalthough operational radius wouldi educed.


c believe that improvements Jn Western air defenses have led thc USSR to provide its bombersore extended stand-oiTConcurrently with Uiehcprobablyonger range air-to-surfacc missile system, theo become operaUonal In0 orhich canound HE oraximum range of. We believe thai thc missile is powered by aengine, and that would cruise lo the vicinity of the target al altitudescel andf


Because ol its concurrent development wiUind its greater range, we believe that thcas designed primarily for use against land targets. With all-inertialits CEP against such targets wouldbe, If used against ships, therobably would have lo employ inadar terminal homing guidance system which wouldEP of about ISO feet. In this case, however, either its range would have to be reduced or other alrcralt or ships would be required to aid In detection, requisition and identification of the target, and possibly in guiding the missile.

hcrobably was designed for use with the BEAR and BISON heavy bombers. We estimate that theeighs0 pounds. The BEAR or BISON could carry two on an operational mission. Wea range degradation ofor these aircraft when carrylnr; one such

missile,ercent when carrying two It Is possible Uiat Uie BADGER could carry this missile, but we believe it unlikely lhat the BADGER would be employed in this role.

he Soviets are also capable of developing air-to-cur face missiles designed to home on radar transmitters and air-launched decoys to simulate medium or heavy bombers. These systems could now be operational, but there is no evidence of their development.

Future Development!

e believe that the USSK has afor and may develop during the period of this esUmate an air-launched missileaximum range.igher survival potential than theallisticruise type missile might be developed to meet this need, and we are unable to esUmate its characteristics at this time,



Wc have mote extensive evidence on the development of ballistic missiles In the USSR than on any other Soviet missile program. There have been numerous reports fromreturnees who participated In the early phases of this program. Continuing andhas been derived from observation of test activity at the Kapustin Yar range; many hundreds of ballistic missile firings have been detected,"range itself has been extensivelyThis large body of evidence enables us to estimate the progress of the Sovietprograms with considerablealthough our confidence In the details varies.

The Soviet program, conducted at high priority since World War TJ, has been well-coordinated, extensively supported, and staiTed with capable personnel. Missiles known to have been developed or to be underat Kapustin Yar Include those with maximum ranges ofm. Theaccuracy, and other performance characteristics of these missiles are generally good. We believe that Ln the development of these systems maximum use has been made of proven components. The two active Soviet ballistic missile test ranges (Kapustin Yar for missile: vpi.rn. :ir.rior ICBMs and space vehicles) probably have been mutually supporting with respect to component testing and experience.

The Kapustin Yar range extends from thc rangehcad. located aboutiles east of Stallnjjrad, generally to the cast.ew line of fire was established to an impact. from the rangehcadest of Lake Baikal (see. Testing of missiles began atYar in the fall By the end

"etailed account of ballistic missileol KApustln Yar. see Annex F, "SovietTest Ranee ActiviUes." (Limited Distribution)

onstruction of permanent facilities had begun and the range probably had been extended. The continued growth of thc range has been confirmed bywhich shows that facilities almost doubled7or surfacc-to-surface missiles, there are now overozen research and developmentsites and more thanimpler sites used for troop training (seeivouac area capable ofroops is located near these sites.

e believe lhat all short and medium range missiles (Opun. range) have been produced for severalormer automotive plant in Dnepropetrovsk probably produces propulsion systems for. missiles, and it may also be engaged In airframe production and final assembly of these missiles. However, we cannot determine the mix of missiles or the magnitude of the production programunderway at this plant. Nofacility can be associated withm. missile production. We have nothat. missile is InPrototypes and test vehicles for this program probably are made at Plantalirungrad, which has been thc center for Soviet development of ballistic missilesG. This plant probably also manufactured the Initial lots ofm. missiles and ICBMs. Including boosters for space vehicles.

n general, wc believe that lor missiles witb maximum rangesm. or less, HE, nuclear, or CW warheads will be employed depending upon nuclear stockpiles, missile accuracy, character of the target, and resultse estimate that for missiles with rangesm. and over, only nuclearwill be employed, although wc do not exclude thc possibility of CW usem. missiles for certain limited purposes. Wethat the USSR is capable of developing techniques for missile dissemination ofwarfare (BW) agents, although wc have

"iscussion o( warbcad yields, see Annex K. -Estimated Piesent Nuclear WarheadLimited Distribution 1

ii ||

no specific evidence relating BW and missiles research and development. In view ofconsiders lions we consider BW use in ixillistic missiles unlikely, although possible (or certain special purposes.

obility appears toasicIn Soviet ballistic missile design, and wc have- good evidence of road mobility on some systems with ranges. and less. The size and weight of. missiles may be such as to limit road mobility to selected first class roads. Ln the case of road mobile systems, it Is probable thatcarriers and support vehicles are readily adaptable for rail transport. The ICBM. and probably the IRBM, arc designed to be launched from fixed positions, and would be heavily dependent on thc Soviet rail net.

. Ballistic Missile System

fter World War II, the Soviets began productionype missiles and initiated firings' at Kapustin Yarhis missile program appears to have been dropped,and has been succeededecond generation short range missile which uses slorable liquid propellants. We estimate that this missile, nicknamed SCUD and designatedecame operational Recent reanalysis of photographs of thc SCUD, which was displayed70 Moscow (see Figure, Indicates that it probablyaximum range ofa.m. instead of the previously estimatedomparison of the relative volumes of the separate fuel tanks Indicates that the missile could utilize nitric aciderosene type fuel. We estimate thai lhe SCUDound payload andEP of aboutri Ms guidance system probably Is of thc radio-inertial type, bul could be

. Ballistic Missilehe Soviet Union has alsourface-to-surface ballistic missileange. This missile is probably based on the German-designed0 and

the Soviet-dcaljjncd Korolov missile, both of which Incorporated an engine using non-storable liquid fuel and delivering0 pounds thrust. ie Soviets have probably fired several hundred missiles to this range. Therobably reached an initial operaUonal capability It probably employs radar track-radio command guidanceEP of. Warhead weight Is estimated alounds. Within about the next year, Uie Sovietswillollow-on system with Im-prcred cp-rationa! characteristics.

um. Ballistic Missile System

he USSR hasedium range ballistic missile systemange ofjn. nicknamed SHYSTERseeotal of'issiles of this range have been fired. Firings are still occurring at theYar range, some for troop Iraining. some for other purposes. We estimate that Uieecame operaUonal Some SHYSTERS are probably deployed In East Germany. In addition, there are Indications that this missile and/orissile is deployed In Uie Carpathian. Baltic. ;uid_ Far Eastern areas of Uie USSR


Thave provided good evidence on the characteristics ofjn. missile. It probablyadio-inertial


'.Varhcad weight is estimatedounds. We believe that the SHYSTER usesliquid propellants.

. Ballistic Missile. missile was first observed in the0 Moscow parade (see. The lest firing of. missile system was begun inmce thai time,irings of thisave been observed'^,

These missiles were launched from Kapustin Yar to Impact areas located.onger range firings to the impact area at Saty Shagan in conjunction with the anti


piogram. The system probablyan Initial operational capability in8 or

SIconsiderable evidence

on th* characteristics of theHie engine probably consistsluster of fourchambersingle unit,otal thrust ofounds. There islhat such an engine was

believe that theadio-inertial rather than an all-inertial guidance system, and that itEP ofarhead weight is estimated atounds.


firing to the ICBM Impact area on Kamchatka from the vicinity of Sovetskaya Gavan in the Far East Maritimeistance ofhis is thc first evidence of the launching of this missile from an area other than the Kapustin Yar missile test range, and indicates that it probably is deployed in the Far East Maritime Area. There Is alsothat this missile and/or the SHYSTER is probably deployed In the Baltic andarea.

. Ballistic Missile System

he latest Soviet surface-to-surfacemissile to be testedissileominal range. The flight test program for theissile was Initiated innd wellcore have been fired to date. C*

^these operations

There have been diflerences between thisand thc initial phases of otherspecially In the firing rales. Other programs have begunhort firing period followedull of several months, whereas the launching tempo for this missile hat been sustained. Based on the program to dale, we believe this missile probably will become

operaUonal In1 or in Uie first half

reliminary analysis

indicates Uiat this system is probably new, ratherimple modification or lightened nosecone version of. or other ballistic missile. The propulsionuses nonstorablc liquid propellants, is single stage and may have two combustion chambers,

ethat tne guidance system is radlo/iner-UaL We.believe tho accuracy will probably be at least as good as Uiat of Uie0un. There are do firm data available to indicate Uieweight, but we believe It wouldounds,oundseasonable planning figure.

future Systems

onsidering Soviet technology, we believeide range of Improved characterisUcs could be uicorporated tn future ballisticsystems. We have no evidence as tonew systems which may becomeduring the period of this esUmate.Improvements which might beinclude: gross weights substantially lessiven payload Uian is Uie case formissiles; Improved guidance and control. Including accuracy: storable liquid or solid fuels; and staging. In view of SovietrdizaUon and stress on reliability, we do notreat proliferation of models.

Close Support Missiles

onsidering general Soviet progress In Uie missile field, we believe that the USSR could also have developed close support missiles for use by the ground forces. We estimate that the Soviets probably now haveingle stage missileange ofards, capable ofhaped HE charge against tanks or other hard targets. It Is possible Uiat they havemissiles with simplified inertial guidance components capable ofound payload lo ranges on the ordero.

Ground-La un dieruise-Typeecent Soviet statements, as well as other inlormatlon. Indicates that the USSRurrent Interest in long range cruise-typeWc estimate that the Soviets arcand could have available Ioruseround-launched, ramjet-propelled vehicle,peed o( about

Machruise altitudeeet,ange In excess. Vehicles ot this type could be employedesearch role for investigation of structures andsystems in theystem could be employed for weapon delivery or reconnaissance, and would further complicate Western air defense

This photographroop training area at the Kapustin Yar missile test range was taken inhe erected missile, believed to be the0s approximatelyeet longeet in diameter. The mobile support equipment throughout the area is similar toround handling equipment.



Designation IOC Dole Maximum Rgrtge Propuliion Configurer ion Guidance Accuracy

Maximum Warhead Weight Ground Environment



.0 pound warn. Storable Liquid Propulsion System Single Sloge

Probablynertial But Possible All-lnorriol. CEP0 Poundi (approximately)

Road Mobile Wifh Missile in Fueled Condition



S. Dnignaiion IOC Oui* Moninum Range



Mo'imum Wo<head Weight Ground Environment

tsiiMAirn oiARAOtfiiSTics



roboblf lOXAeiOline

geoundi Road Mobile



U. S. Deiig nation IOC Date Maximum Range Propuliion Configuration Guidance Accvraey

Maiimun War heed Weight Ground Environment



liquid, probably LOX/kerowne

Single Stage




Rood Mobile



ICBM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMe have relatively firm evidence on the Soviet ICBM test range and lhe test-firing program, from which we have been able tobasic characteristics of the ICBM vehicle, its propulsion, nosecone, and guidance system, as well as same of the ground supporl and logistic requirements for Its operational From these dala, we can alsothough with some probable margin of error, some of thc basic factors affectingICBM performance under operationalincluding general ranges, accuracy, and reliability. Finally, these data can be combined with other evidence toense of thc tempo of thc ICBM development program and the degree of success thc USSR has achieved. However, the sum of ouris inconclusive as to the preciseof the initial ICBM deployment, and as lo the scale and pace of the operationalprogram.ull examination of the evidence and factors pertinent to tho deployment program is reserved for aestimate, it is necessary for theanalysis to Include brief discussion of some of these matters.

Tyuratam Missile Test Range

All Soviet ICBMs and space vehicles have been launchedangehead neareast of lhc Aral Sea (see. Thc tcsl range extends generally to the northeastjn. to an Instrumented impact area near Klyuchi on the Kamchatka Peninsula (sec On severalin connection with certain ICBM and space launchings. the range has been extended up. into the Pacific Ocean through the use of* four Sibir-class Instrumentation ships.

Thc Tyuratam test range hascommunications, control, instrumcnta-

llon, and logistic facilities, which are sufficient to support ICBM and space operations ofgreater intensity than those which have been conducted so far. On the basis of successive photographic coverage and olher

evidence, three launching areas are believed to be completed:

hen the range wasthc Soviets Installed alaunch pad OTer the edge of aThis is termed launch area "A" by(see. It was usedICBM and space launchings fromat least9

he Soviets begana pad closely resembling the firstknown as areat wasfor use in about

hey began workairpads without pits, known as"C" (see. Launch areaprobably completed In0 or

he evidence from Tyuratam Indicates that the Soviet ICBM system ls heavilyon rail support. Missiles destined tor launch areas "A" and "B" are delivered by rail to nearby ran drive-through buildings where extensive checkout and prelaunchoperations are performed. Missiles are then transported directly to the launch pad by rail, and there is evidence to suggest that propellants as well as much of the support equipment necessaryiring are also brought to the pad in this way. Relatively little lime appears to be required on the pad. On one occasion, when only one pad wastwo missiles were launched in less than three days Launch area "C" waswhile under construction, and Its final configuration is not definitelyIt also has rail-served checkoutnearby.ail spur enters thc pad area, it appears that missiles are to be transported from checkout buildings to pads by road. Launch sites of this type would necessarily be near rail lines,reater degree of flexibility, dispersal, andcould probably bc achieved.

ICBM Test Firings

he first successful flight test in theICBM development program occurred inilli thc firingissile from


Tyuralam to Klyuclii. Since that time, we havearge volume of evidenceto thc teat range launching of ICBMs and of the space vehicles which have been interspersed with them <* Intelligence on this activity is acquiredariety of technical collection means, including radar, acoustic detection, and electronic interception oftelemetry. We are confident thatall successful launchings from Tyuratam have been detected, and some information Is available on failures as well. We have very littleeta-meniof components or on static testing associated with this program.

ince the beginning of the firinga total of aboutCBMs and space vehicles have been launched from Tyuratam. all of which are believed to have used basic rocket boosters of essentially the sameThe rate of booster utilization ln actual firings was about8 and then increased to roughlyer year9boutave already been u'Ullted in the first three months

f these launchlngs. aboutave been generally successful ICBMs which reached the vicinity of intended impact areas onor in the Pacific. To date, thc inflight reliability of Soviet ICDMs on the test range has beenercent; the reliability achieved in space shots has been considerably lower, probably because of the addition of upper stages and other complicating elements. Firings in the ICBM test program fall Into four time periods:

few Initial firings ofKamchatka betweenndfollowedull of nearly sue months

period of increasinglyost of them to Kamchatka butshots to instrumented ships in. from thc rangehead.

period of less frequent firings inhalfncluding four to Instru-

etailed account ol ICBM teat activity at Truiatam. see Annex F. -Soviet Missile Test Ranee ActiviUes." (Limited

mented shipsange of. In January and July, followed by another lull of nearly sia months.

esumption of frequent firings loIn

he total number of ICBM launchings over this sy, year period Is small bywith Soviet practice In medium and short range missiles.

Many of thc Soviet space shots have cccurreeTdurlng thc lulls In ICBM firings, and it Is apparent that the ICBM and space programs have shared availabletest range facilities, and experience which has been mutually supporting. In light of these factors, we conclude that the USSR has beenenerally successful but careful ICBM development program, at apace rather thancrash" basis.

f^rr/sicol Characteristic*

the extensive data which haveUS Intelligence has reasonableIn Its general description of thesystem, despite the fact that noWestern observer has ever seen aMost of our evidence is from theof test firings and photography ofbut we have acquiredInformation from manvIfd-Hing, for example.^]

"Ja Soviet lunar probe. Inwe nnd that the Soviet ICBM systemin important respects to US missiles.

The Soviel ICBMboosterery large vehicle, withtakeoff weight ofotal thrust al takeoff ofpounds. This thrust IsUie use of five main rocketbum nonstorable liquidICBM Is eithertaged oris. all engines are Ignited at


but lour of tlic five engines, andfuel tanks as well, are Jettisoned atThe vehicle Itself Is probably of heavy, airframe-type, welded aluminum construction.

osecone and Payload. The Soviets have developed nnd tested ICBM nosecones of two different weight classes, one extremely heavy and the other somewhat lighter. Both are designed for high speed re-entry. Tlie pay-load is protected from thc heat of re-entryype of ablative material which ls different from 'hat used on any current US nosecone. The very heavy nosecones, varying In weight00 pounds and capable ot carrying maximum payloads0 pounds, were used on ICBMs launched from Tyuratam in the first two phases of the firing program. This class of nosecone was tested extensively In firings to Kamchatkand was probably proof tested. into the Pacific in October of that year. Most of the firings in0 phase ofighter noseconeounds, capable of carryingounds of payload. This nosecone was proof testedum. into thc Pacific in

It Is probable that the Initial developmentery heavy nosecone was made necessary by the great weight required for high-yield nuclear warheads when the Soviet ICBM was first on the drawing boards, and by the Soviet state of the art in re-entry techniques at that time. Subsequent advances In Soviet nuclear technology probablyigh-yieldsuitable for useighter weight

Range. Nosecone weight is critical to the range of the Soviet ICBM. Given the basic similarity of the boosters used in all Tyuratamoviet ICBMery heavy nosecone wouldominal maximum range of. This range Isto variations of some hundreds of miles depending on missile trajectory, thc latitudes of launching sites and targets, and direction

iscussion of warhead yields, see Annex E. 'Kstlmated Present Nuclear WarheadLimited Distribution)

of fire in relation to the earth's rotation.ICBMs with heavy nosecones could achieve extensive coverage of US territory only if they were deployed in northwestern USSR or In the Soviet Par East. An ICBM with lighter nosecone. however, would have amaximum range oflo thc same variations. Soviet ICBMs of this lype could achieve full coverage of the US from deployment areas virtually anywhere in the USSR, Including Tyuratam Itself.

nder Operations! Conditions

hc data available for estimating Soviet ICBM accuracy and reliability underconditions are far from adequate orWe have taken into account the growing body of evidence on Soviet test range results and on Soviet state-of-the-art In criticalcomponents, at the same time attempting to minimize thc use of analogies to USBut even If wc had exact data from thc test range and had examined thc Sovietthe estimate of system performance under actual wartime conditions would stillassumptions as lo the capabiliUes of Uie troops, thc readiness of Uie units at Uie Ume of firing, and Uie precise circumstances ofnone of which can bc known wtth certainty In advance.

ccuracy. The Soviet ICBM guidance system uses radio and inertial elements,anner which differs in some respects from US techniques. Inertial components within the missile control most of Uie powered phase of the missile's flight, with corrections made by ground-based radio command only In the last seconds before burnout. The datalo us are not sufficient to permit more than an approximate determination of the CEP of Uie Soviet ICBM system. We estimate lhat with the present type of guidance, Soviet ICBMs wouldEP of about. under operational conditions Inut the actual figure could be considerably greater or somewhat less. Thc figure given Isas an approximation for an entire ICBM force, with crews of various levels of competence firing against targets al various ranges.


Tlic CEP ol thc Soviet ICBM system will prohabiy continue to Improve,ateln part on technical 1actors and In part on thc priority thc USSK attaches to it.ery high priority assigned to accuracy, and therefore to lhe necessary troop training and introduction of more refined components, the operational CEP of portions of the force might reach. possibly as earlyut weSore likely date for such an achievement. However,oviel ICBM force would notbe trained or retrofitted for highly re fined accuracy. The Soviets probably would regard the present level of accuracy asfor many types of potential targets.

here Is no evidence ot the development of all-lnertlal guidance for use in large Soviet ballistic missiles. However, the greaterwhich could bc achieved with this type of guidance may induce the Soviets toIt Into their ICBM system, despite the probability that Its accuracy would beInferior to thai of radio-inertialnce. If so, all-incrtlal guidance could be introduced for operational use3 or after.

1 IS. Reliability. Wc estimate that as ofercent of thc USSR's ICBMs on launcher would be "readyis, both the missile and the launcher would be in commission and ready to bc committedaunch countdown. The lower limit of this range approximates the percentage which might be maintained ready In continuous peacetime operations for an indefinite period. The upper limit might beheprepared their force for an attackpecific time designated well inaximum readiness. Thc ready missile rate is expected to improveear or so and then level off. ^Ranges comparable to those given above mightercent

ith respect to reliability on launcher and in flight, wc estimate that as ofercent of the USSR's ready

ICBMS could successfully go throughleave their launchers at scheduled times or not laterinutes thereafter, and detonate In the vicinity of assigned tar-

is. within about three CEP's of their aiming points. As In thc precedingthe upper limit would be more likely lo be achievable if the Soviels had provided time for peaking their forces on launcher prior to an attackpecific Ume Thesemight Increaseercent

A general approximation of theoviet ICBM force can lie made by combining the factors discussed obove. On this basis, we esUmate that if they wereIn aboutercent of Uie total number of Soviet ICBMs.on launchers would detonate in Uie vicinity oftargets withininutes of scheduledomparable esUmate3ercent. In theory, half of those missiles detonating in the vicinity of theirwould fall within the CEP. As Indicated Inhese estimates are based on imprecise data and involve assumptions of unknown validity regarding Uie conditions under which Uie force might be employed.

Reaction Times. The Soviet designparticularly with respect to Uietechniques employed at operaUonalites, will critically affect ICBM rcacUon times. Assuming that rapid reaction time hasoviel objective, we estimate the following minimum reaction time for ready missiles under thc three alert conditions indicated:

CondiUonrews on routine standby, electrical equipment cold, missiles not fueled. Reactionours.

CondiUon II: Crews on alert, electrical equipment wanned up, missiles not fueled. Reactioninutes.

Condition HI: Crews on alert, electrical equipment wanned up, missiles fueled and topped. This condition probably could not be maintained tor more than an hour or so. Reaction0 minutes.

etargeting Techniques. It would be technically feasible for the USSR lo haveretargeting techniques to minimize Uie degradation in the effectiveness of an ICBM force caused by reliability factors. The



way ofiven level otofpecific number of targets Is simply to salvo thc total number of missiles theoretically required. This might involve firing more than one missile against each target. With retargeting, however, the same theoretical assurance could be achieved with fewer missiles by sal vol ng. say. only one missile against each target, determining whether or not that missile proved unreliable on launcher or during thc powered phase of Its night, and directing additional missiles against only those targets left uncoveredof failures. This would require the availability of standby missiles on launchers, which had been counted down and Into which alternate; trajectory data could be Inserted as needed. Standby missiles not used lncould be employed against additional targets or could be held In reserve.

There Is no evidence that the Soviets have actuallyetargeting capability into their ICBM system, but we would not expect lo have evidence of this type. Ir light of its potential advantages, we regard It as possible that the Soviets haveapability for retargeting. Provided that standbywere ready on their own launchers and counted down along with thaw of the first salvo, the Soviets could probably detectretarget, and launch additional missiles with delays of no more thanoinutes.

A refinement of the retargetingcalled reprc^raming. could bein an attack designed to strike targets or warning lines as nearly simultaneously as possible. This technique Involves theof first salvo missUes on extremely high trajectories so as to lengthen their time of flight; standby missiles can then be launched on lower trajectories which will tend tofor the delays incurred by retargeting. This would require major modifications to the ICBM system, and testingype we could expect lo detect. No such testing hasWe believe that the Soviets do not noweprograming capability, buiigh priority eflort the technique could probably be developed and cheeked out by3

Kven more highly refuted retargeting techniques are theoretically possible, such as the determination of probablo missile Impact points while thc missiles are en route to the target. On thc basis ofetermination, the degradation in system effectiveness caused by guidance errors could be reduced. Because of their considerable cost and thethey would introduce. Uie Soviets arc not likely to employ such techniques.

Techniques to Evade ll MEWS. Although we have no evidence of Soviet Interest ina capability to evade BMEWS, thc SovieU theoreUcally could, if they desired, evolve measures for countering BMEWS even when this early warning system ist is probable lhatew tests they could proveapability to fire their current ICBMs on somewhat loweredat certain selected targets,ew gaps In the planned BMEWS coverage. With substantial modifications, the current Soviet system could acquire ato reduce the chances of BMEWSby using extremely low or extremely high trajectories, but CEP would probably be degraded0 nm. With moremodifications, the present syslem could piobablyound warheadange of0istancelo permit southern trajectories from the USSR to the US, but CEP would probably be degraded to at leastun. The modifications envisaged above would require considerable testing which would probably be detected While Uie USSR could probably develop these techniques byheir operational advantages seem so marginal lhat we regard them as unlikely.

in the. The evidence derived from flight testing is adequate lo gauge the general progress of Soviet efforts to prove oul Uie configuration, propulsion, guidance, and nosecone of their ICBM system. In thc first two periods of thc test-firing program,he Sovietsotal ofenerally successful ICBMt, most ol them to the land impact area on Kamchatka where Uiey could make de-


measurements on accuracy and effects. The Intensive second period of test firings was climaxed by the probable proof testing of heavy nosccone missiles. into thc Pacific, ln light of these teatthe time elapsed since thc beginning of the firing program, the wealth of Soviet experience with shorter range missiles, and the additional data on booster performance provided by the space program, we believe that the Soviets wereosition lo consider. ICDM satisfactory for initial deployment by thc endith theresults from the third period of the firing program, they were probably In aposition with respect to theirm. missile by about

he establishment of an operationalhowever. Vequlres notertain confidence In thc weaponalsothat missiles, trained personnel, and launching and ground support facilities be available for operational use. The last of these would require the longest leadprobablyonths to two years for Initial sites.

oncerning the availability of missiles, we believe that inhe USSR began the manufacture of producUonis. complete missiles of an operational type, which, however, could also be modified for use as space boosters. ICBMs produced prior lo that time are believed lo have been prototypes, manufacturedcientific research Institute near Moscow, whereas other Soviet Industrial plants have apparently been Involved In the manufacture of production missiles. We base these judgments on Soviet progress in missile development, on information about plantand 'especially on the increasedof missiles Indicated by the doubling of the rate of ICBM and space launchlngs These evidences lend credence toby Khrushchev and other Sovietthat "series production" of ICBMs began early that year Wc still do not know therate of production However, normal Soviet practice in other military andprograms points to the probable avail-

ability by9 of at least some ICBMs above and beyond the numbers expended in firings.

s for operating personnel, we haveidentified any ICBM-reiatcd training

possible that

some such training was accomplished Inwith test firings. In any case, much of the necessary training would be donefiring at all. Normal Soviet practice with other missile systems, however, seems to call for fairly extensive training^"

usually at

special facilities constructed aPthe range-head. These facilities support the training activity and are also used to check out the operational handling and launchingThe newly-constructed launch area "C" at Tyuratam can be interpreted asacility. It probably also represents the approximate configuration of an operational launching facility.

e are still unable to Identify positively any ICBM launching facilities other than those at the test range. Nevertheless, thereumber of locations on which we have evidence pointing to the existence offacilities, either completed or under There are at least three suspect rail-served locations in northwestern USSR, the ares most suitable for deployment. missile. Construction activity at these locations was apparently underway. suggesting that some sites were prepared concurrently with the development of the missile. Fragmentary information on possible construction of ICBM sites in other areas, while very limited, is consistent Inwith the development. missile.

n balance, wc consider that theby the end9. ICBM satisfactory for initial deployment, the probable manufacture of producUon missiles beginning earlynd thc possible con-


of launch sites in norlhwcslcrn USSRrc sufficient to support an estimate Hint ns olne first operatlona) Soviet ICHM unit was liained and equippedew missiles and launchers. This Is referred lo as IOC date. We believe that since that Ume. the USSR has had at least some capability to launch ICBMs with good accuracy and reliability against targets in the US."

eyond this point, however, any esUmate of Soviet operaUonal ICBM sUength isdependent upon Interpretation ofin Uie evidence which permit differing judgments. The question of the probable magnitude of current and future SovietICBM strength will be examined in the forthcoming, "Sovietfor Long Range Attack."

Follow-on ICBM Devolopmenl

s wc have Indicated, the current ICBM is already reasonably accurate and reliable, rugged, and capable of delivering high-yield

Assistant Chief ol SUIT for Intelligence,of Uie Army, believes that byhe Soviets hidm. missile sails-factory lor emergency deployment lo Interim ICBM launch [acllltles andew missiles possibly were deployed to auch faculties He believes ihai an IOC with fully developed, deployed. operaUonal missile launch facilities did not occur0

-The Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUonsepartment ol thc Navy, believes theprobably had an emergency capability toew missiles from teat facilities (as opposed to operaUonal launch sites) iiarUng earlyactors which bear againstdeployed operaUonal ICBM capability and which are mentioned ln the esUmate weigh heavllv In hlr. Judgment These In-ctudef"

Jlhe lack of 1CDM Uoop training acUvtty, and the lack of firna evidence on operaUonalites. In addlUon, thc first appearance ol what appears ta be an operational lype site nll Tyuratam which was estimated to be completed In0 Dr1 leads him to Judge that operaUonal launch site* were not available before that lime.

warheads against targets anywhere in lhe US. It will probably continue to be modified and its performance characteristics Improved over the next few years. Decoys und nosecones with reduced radar reflectivity may be developed for it. Somewhat greater flexibility willbe achieved in the deployment concept, and much efiort will be directed towardsthe logistic support, maintenance, and communications facilities necessary lo the most effective employment of an ICBM force. But tile present ICBM Is extremely bulky and must be fairly eMfneul'it has the relatively slow reaction Umeery large ncnstorablc liquid-fueled system with Uieproblem of holding the missile for periods of time, and it does not readily lend itself to deployment in hardened sites.

t is probable, therefore, lhat the Soviets would find It desirable toew ICBM system which would Incorporate some of the improvements mentioned above and would overcome disadvantages Inherent in thesystem For example, while we do not exclude the possibility that the presentcould be adapted lo use missiles with storable liquid propellants, thc better course for the USSR would almost certainly be toew system using either storable liquid or solid fuels, and to build inlo it other elements compatible wtth sueh fuels. Greater flexibility and less vulnerability in deployment would bc desirable characteristicsollow-on ICBM system, even though rail service will probably conUnue to be an essential element in the preferred Soviet deployment concept

ollow-on ICBM system may already be under developmenl without our knowledge. Wc would expect detectable flight tests to begin someonths to two years prior to first operational availability. Such tests could begin at any time, and we therefore believeollow-on ICBM system could become operational in3 or after.

NAVA'. LAUNCHEO MISSILE. There is little evidence of Soviet research and development on specific missile sysiems for naval application.

However, over the past few years we haveciveti considerable information, some of it provided by defectors, "on the operationalof naval-launched missiles In both the surface and the submarine fleets.

here is good evidence lhat the USSR ' is building destroyers equipped lo launchcruise type missiles. Thccould adapt land-based surface-to-air systems for use on destroyers, but there Is no evidence that they have done so. The first of the missile-launching destroyers,the Kildin class,odificatton of the Kotlin class destroyer. It is capable of launching missiles against either ship or land targets from its single, stem-mounted This class (seeade its first appearanceut there is some evidence that It was under development as earlyhe Kildin served as the prototype for the missile system which now appears in the new Krupnyy class (seearger missile-launching destroyer. This destroyer class was first Identifiedut may have been under development as early The Krupnyy mounts two launchers, which are essentially thc some as those on thc Kildin, one forward and one aft. Each launcher is servicedeck house which contains the missile handling and checkout equipment. Good evidence indicates that nine missiles are stowed below decks for each launcher on the Krupnyy. and eight on thc Kildin. The launching cycle time is on the order of 10 Thc Krupnyylatform on the stern apparently for thc useelicopter which can serveorward observer when missiles are fired to full range At least four Kildlna and six Krupnyys were probably opera-

tional at thc beginningy ipsa, the Sovieis had available two types of surface-to-surface cruise missiles.ndor use by destroyers.

ne of these,an be used against both land and ship targets. The guidanceprobably permits the missile to bepossibly with radar track radio command override feature, with terminal homing against ships. It probably flies at high subsonic speeds and at altitudes0 feet. When employed againit atarget, the elfcctive range of the missile is limited by the detection capabilities of the overall system. Therefore, when the firing ship is employed singly, the effective range of the missile is limited too. by the target acquisition range of the ship's radar. The use of another shiporward observer lo detect and acquire targets for the launch ship may extend the effective range of the missile. orun. by useelicopter or aircraft. hore target, the missile wouldange of atm. without forward observation. Theound HE orwarheadndEP of about ISO feet against surface shipsun. against shore targets.

heupersonic crubie-type missile designed for use only against ships. Its range, estimated. when usedingle ship, can be extended. with assistanceorward observerhip or aircraft. Its guidance system Is similar to that o' the. this missile probably approachesow altitudeeet) and then dives into thc water short of the target so that the warhead will explode under the ship. Payload andare believed lo be the same as estimated forgainsi ship targets.

c have photographsew class of patrol craft (designated "Osa" class) with four structures which appear to be launchers (see. Conversion of smaller, motor torpedo boats (designated

KtUmated Preaenl Nuclear Warhead CapablllUet- (Urnlled Dfctflbutlonl

"Komar" class) to carry two similarIs known to heefector has reported that patrol craft arc being equipped with "rockets" to be used to attack ships We cannot determine whether these launchers are designed for guided missiles or free rockets. Effective range would notthe radar horizon.

have been reports of theof both surface-to-surface andmissiles on one or two cruisers.reports indicate that tests haveoperational status of the system lsThe surface-to-surface systems maythc same as those on thedestroyer, and the surface-to-airbe adaptations of ther SA-3types. There is no evidence ofof cruisers designed tomissiles, nor do we believe thatan extensive program for the conversioncruisers.

Antisubmarine Warfare Missile Systems

is some evidence indicatingprogram for developing advanced ASWsystems exists. Tlie USSR has theand technical capabilities toASW missile systems and thennd tracking equipment. Basedand our appreciation of thethe art. we estimate that the USSR maya missile for use ln ASW.that an active development progamunderway, we estimate that adepth bomb could be availableby surface ships with adequatetracking equipments tic-launched homing torpedofiredubmarine couldissile couldbe used against surface ship targets.

Submarine Launched Missilo Systems

first indication that the Sovietstheir submarines with missilesby reportsfquipped wllh hangar andstructures It is probableewsubmarines wcte converted to carry

subsonic cruise-type missiles for use against land targets al ranges. Sightings of such submarines sUll occasionally occur, but we doubt that this system is currently


we believe Uiat the Soviets area supersonic cruise missileange of. which Is designed lo be launched from surfaced submarines. This system could be operational this year. The submarine for which this missile system was designed has not yet been identified.

6 there hate been severaland photographs of modified "Z" class submarines with enlarged sails. On the top alt part of the sail arc located two hatches, which are seven feet in diameter (see. Theie is no firm evidence Uiat these hatches cover missile tubes, but we believe Uiat these submarines have probably been modified to carry and launch two ballistic missilesach against land targets. Six such "Z" class conversions have beenin Uie Soviet fleets to date.

There Is some uncertainty as to the range of Uie missile employed by Uie modified "Z" class submarine, although Uie evidence points to thc probability thai Ihese missiles are ofjn. maximum range.. SCUDs Uie only knownmissile which uses storable liquid propellants. and thus could be adapted for useubmarine. However. Khrushchev has said the USSR possessedm rocket. Bal-HsUc missiles have been test fifed. range at Knpustin Yar for some years, and wc believeissile of this range could be adapted for installationubmarine.

Sinceew construction long range submarines, designated Uie "G" class, have been identified (see. This submarine alsoarge sail, much longer Ihan lhat of thc converted "Z" class. There

three pairs of fairing doors in the top of the sail, which couldolal of three or lour hatches of the type seen on the converted "Z" class. We estimate that thc "G" class submarine probably is armed with



missiles of the type carried by the

"Z" class conversion. For missile launching.

both the converted "Z" and the "G" classwould need to be surfaced, or more

likely with the sail awash. Since It has not been established that the fairing doorsballistic missile tubes, the possibilitybe excluded that" class is equipped with cruise-type missiles.

e believe that Soviet planners would consider lt operationally desirable to havesubmarines capable ofballlstt;ieicntbly whileThere Is some evidence whichan active development program, and we believe thatrogram probably is underway. We estimate that Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, each capable of carrying

and launching while2 ballistic missiles. range could become operational. This system wouldew missile using either solidor storable liquid fueL Wc estimate that il wouldound warhead andEP of one to three am Wc would expect Uiat this missileould he tested at Kapustin Yar.e would be able to identify itew missiler and Uiat approximatelyonths of testing would be required before It could become Il is possible that the Soviets have elected to equip nuclear submarines withballistic" missiles of thc type attributed to Uie converted "Z" and "G" classes. If this Is theew Sovietmissile submarines could bethis year.



he Soviet leaders clearly believe that achievements in space enable them tothe world that in the realms Of science, technology, and military strength, the USSR stands in the very tront rank of world powers,eizing an early lead and following iteries of dramatic successes, they have sought to bolster, both at home and abroad, their claims of the superiority of the Soviet system. The USSR has sought to maximize thc impact of its achievementn occasion timeu to coincide with international political moves Intervening shots appear to have been designed largely to provide data for these "firsts."

hc announced goal of the Soviet space program has been mannedtravel. Many of the Soviet space activities to date, culminating in the recent manned satellite, have In one way or another contributed to progress toward this eventual goal. While the Soviet space shots havescientific data, the scientific aspects or the program seem to Iiave been fairly selective, andarge degree applicable lo thc support of future Soviet space missions.

e have no direct evidence on thc pri-orily of thc Soviet space program relative to that of the military missile program. The two programs have used the same basic launching vehicles and shared the same launching facilities; to an extent, they have been mutually supporting. To date tlie USSR has apparently not launched any spacespecifically Tor military purposes, and wc have no preseni evidence pointing tooviet intention However, many of their space experiments have produced information which would bc useful in thc development of future military space systems. It would be technically feasible at present for the Soviets to equip earth satellites for such militaryroles as communications, reconnaissance, navigation, or collection of weather data. Their present satellites possess thc attributes of payload. stabilization,'-n'. lor :iurh missionsestimate that they could appear at any time.

bovict Achievements in Space

he importance which thc Soviets attach Ui the space program is demonstrated by thc assignment of leading scientists to itsby the wealth of theoretical and applied research being conducted in its support, and by the aUocation of resources and facilities lo its implementation. Space vehicles have constituted more than one-third ol lhe tolal number of launchings from Tyuratam in the past iVi years. The impressive Soviet record now includes: orbiting of the worlds first eauUiUby far the largest satellites; launching of the first vehicles to impact the moon and to photograph the reverse side ot the moon; launching of thc first vehicle to transfer from earth orbitrajectorylanet, orbiting and recovery of the only earth satellites suitable for supporting manned orbital flight; and. most recently, the successful orbiting and recoveryan.

our distinct phases can bc discerned ln the Soviel space program to date:

I. II. and III, launchedere instrumented satellitesto collect data on space near thein the case of Sputnik II whichdog. to provide some biological

I, II, and in. launchedwere all Instrumented lo collect databetween the earth and thc moonrespect lo the moon Itself (sec

Soviet effort loan01 to thc orbiting ofsatellites. Five of these. SputniksVT, IX, and X. each probablylife support system suitable tor mandesigned for hisseeasinputniks IXin1 This effortith the successfulan in Sputnik XI

Soviet effort to launch anprobe probably began inwiih whal appear lo have been twoattempts torobe toward





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Mart In February lflfil, lhe SovieUwith Sputnik VII torobe toward Venus Irom an orbiting satellite, and succeeded later in the month with Sputnik Vill

he reliability achieved In Soviet space shots has been much lower than that of the Soviet ICBM. Most space failures werecaused by factors unique to thc space program, such as the addition of upper stages to thc basic booster and in some cases theto launch at stipulated times. The Soviets haveucccaaiui launchings ol space vehicles, but we believe that there have been nearly as many launchings which resulted In failures. Moreover, several of the vehicles which were successfully launcheddid not function as planned,nik I. which was probably Intended to hit the moon, missedide margin and went Into orbit around the sun. The recovery system contained In Sputniks IV and VI failed to function successfully. Thc first attempt toenus probe succeeded In orbiting the earth satellite. Sputnik VII from which the probe was to be launched, but failed during Injection Inlo the trajectory towards Venus.

he Soviets desire to accomplish"firsts" Is probably another factor in the relatively low reliability of their space shots. They huve undertaken some very challenging operations, and in their lunar and planetary shots haveendency to move on to the next challengeiven type of operation is successfully demonstrated. This approach has contributed to theSoviet record in pioneering spaceThere Is evidence from public and private statements, however, that some Soviet scientists have been concerned lest political goals interfere with sound scientific progress.

Launching Facililiei

IM. Both of the major Soviet ballistic missile test ranges have been involved in the space programboutertical firings have been detected at the Kapustin Yar range. According to the Soviets, the purposes of such firings have included upper atmosphere re-

search, sodium vapor election, photograph ing the earth's cloud cover, and space biologythe recovery of live animals. All launchings ol earth satellites and space probes have taken place al Tyuratam. Although the majority of the launchings here have involved ICBM tests, there are Indications thatwas designed wiih the space program clearly in mind. The facilities al launch areas "A" andarelxe and design which could probably handle vehicles with thrusts on the order of several million pounds. Tyuratam should thus be able lo satisfy the ground handling and launching facilityfor much of the Soviet spaceover the nextears.

ropulsion. All earth satellites and lunar vehicles, with the possible exception ofnd II, arc believed lo have used lhc same basic launching vehicle as tbe ICBM. One additional upper stage was added for the launching of the Luniks and Sputniks IV, V, VI, IX, X, and XI. Two upper stages were apparently added to the basic booster in thc successful Venusof them to place Sputnik VIII Into orbit around the earth and tlie other to power that portion of thewhichrajectory towards the -planet.

he dala available on the Venus shot indicates thai with one additional stage the Soviet ICBM booster placed0 pounds into orbit around the earth. This is the largest payload the Soviels have succeeded In orbiting. We expeel additional increases in launching vehicle capability through further improvements In staging and the use of Improved fuels, which could Increase the orbital payload to0 pounds in

ew rocket engine, which mayo 2Vi million pounds of thrust, could be available for first flight Inew rocket engine test facility near Kuybyshev indicates lhat the Soviets arcdeveloping such an engine. Clustering o( two to five of these engines, which could probably be achieved.ooster capable ol orbiting payloads ofons. On several occasions. Khru-


as alluded to plans (or orbiting pay-loads of this magnitude

ISA Sfrucfurej. The design andof the Luniks and the Sputniks, asor otherwise publicized by the Soviets, indicate that relatively heavy structuraland fabrication techniques are used in the design of their space vehicles. Theof high thrust launching vehicles has permitted thc use of these heavy structures and of equipment which Is probably notThis in turn provides some benefit with respect to uie (jutenUai reliabilitypace system and ils instrumentation

In the area ol re-entry,appear lo have made major1 in both ICBMspace vehicles. Thc Soviets havethat they now have adequatetechniques to protect space vehiclesre-entry into the atmosphere and tosuccessful landings.

he Sovietsand successfully demonstratedand complex instrumentation forsatellite and lunar spaceof thc USSR's large payloadwe do not believe miniaturizationa prime requirement for Soviet design to date. Thissupported by analysis of the spacewhich has been publicly displayedSoviets. However, as mission increase, the Soviets will beattend more to the question of Improvement of thesystem used in Lunik HI Iscontinue and similar techniques couldin weather and possiblysatellites and Inother planets.

racking and Surveillance Systems. The extensive system used by the Soviets to track space vehicles, including optical observatories, radio telescopes, photographic stations, radars, radio direction-finders, and interferometers, appears to give them the capability for space tracking and surveillance from within their

own borders This capability is supplemented and extended mainly by ships at sea with some assistance from other Soviet Bloc and Western countries and from Soviet stations hi the Antarctic. However, the Soviets lack Ihe worldwide facilities available to the West. The recent effort to initiate negotiationsracking facility in Australia indicates adesire lo extend their present system We cannot estimate how many missions could be handled simultaneously, to date the Soviets have notapability for detailed tracking and readout on more than two objectsime.

Major Baik and Applied Research Area*

e have estimated tliat payloads on the order0 tons will become possible in the latter half of thc decade. The missions which can then be accommodated wouldbe capable of prolonged flight and changes in flight path long after initialinto space. However, such mission capabilities would require further extensive research and technological advances inkey areas.

Soviets are aware of thcby nuclear rocket engines forand very limited evidence Indicatesare engaged in nuclear rocketWe estimate that thctest firingrototype systemstage use or space maneuveringmade as earlynd that testbegin

present the small internal powerfor space payloads are beingthc use of chemical batteries andHowever, increased demands forpower are expected to arise inime period. Ecological lifewill require greatly increasedextremely heavy demands would bcby electric or plasma propulsionThese demands could be met bypower sources, and there Is evidencebeing done in this field. Tlierecognise the propellant weightafforded by electric and plasma space pro-


systems'* Although none ol themissions require the use ol this type of propulsion, we believe Uiat basic research ii under way in this area However, wcthat the first test flights of prototype electrical or plasma propulsion systems in space ore not likely to occur until lale in lhe decade.

he Soviets are carryingroadof research applicable to the develop menl of extremely long range spaceand navigation systems. This research includesds cfn theory, radio wave propagation, maser and other low noise signal amplifying devices,theory and engineering, radiohigh power transmitting tubes, and solid state physics- The caliber of the Soviel work to date Indicates that the USSR is among world leaders in such specialities as radio astronomy and solid state physics. Wcthat the USSR will be able to satisfy Its requirements for communications andof space vehicles, despite Its apparent recent difficulty In raauitalnlng continuous communications with the Venus probe.

he USSR has Intensified its physiological research on the control ofstress factors. This workthc functional characteristics of thc human operator in space vehicles and includes research on the effects of acceleration,oxygen saturation, vibration and noise, and confinement over prolonged periods Research directed toward the developmentompletely closed life-support systemis also underway. Tbe USSR Is alsoactive research on methods forman against the radiation hazards ol prolonged flight within and beyond Lhe Van Allen belts.


Soviet Capabilities for Specific Future Millions

xploration of Cis-Lunar Space. The Soviols probably have obtained sufficient dala

"8iKh ayalem* are very low

thrust bul hleh specificar* uicUas

Inr planetary takr-oR and

(teat promise forinacc travel.

from their own and US experiment* about the near0 miles) space environ ment lo allow them to begin bm-aslronnulic tests with organisms and animals In lhe eis-lunar region in the near luture Thehave already conducted someto lunar and interplanetaryandore thoroughof these regions.

Unmanned Earth Satellites Earth satellite vehicles offer significant advances over conventional techniques for acquiring Information ondeployment andfor weather Surveillance, and forThe USSR probably could have developed and used such devices, bul has not done so.

As the US program for reconnaissance and early warning satellites develops, welhat thc Soviet Union will try lo find ways to destroy them, possibly with counter-satellites. In view of the cost anddifficulties to be overcome, we estimate that thc first Soviet capability usingorbiting vehicles to disable UScould occur sometime after the middle of the decade. (Other Soviet capabilities against satellites are discussed In

Unmanned Lunar Flight. We believe lhe USSR will place an instrumented satellite into orbit around the moon ln the near future An instrumented lunar soft landing probably can be madelthougheat would require notetrorocket. but

more accurate guidance and more refined attitude orlentr.tion than that tested on Lunik UI. In order todataanding, the SovieU might use instrumentation packages similar to their automatic radio weather sialions which are released from aircraft.

landing techniques arcpayloads including rocket systemscontroloft landing onas well as lunar restart and launchwill probably be developed.indicate that the USSR isan unmanned mobile vehicle foe

^ TT, 1* I


exploration of thc lunar surface. The size and weight of this vehicle, whichankcttc. would require abooster much larger lhan now nvnllable. Its soft landing, using an advanced launching vehicle of about five million pounds thrust probably could not be accomplished before5 (see,.

anned Earth Orbiting Flight. The have now successfully demonstrated their capability to orbit andanned earth satellite. Additional missions of this typoi ue undertaken duiihg the nexl year or so. We believe that future manned re-entry vehicles will be made more maneuverable In order to exploit lhewhich glide-type vehicles ofler over the capsule-type vehicles currently being used.anned glide-type recovery vehicle could be demonstrated, at thc earliest,e believe that3 lhe Soviets could with conventional propellants have the capability to make limited angular or altitude changes in the path of manned earth satellite vehicles outside the atmosphere. As the payload-in-orbit capability Increases, thc capability to make repeated path changes can be expected. Inncreased maneuverability of the vehicle should permit the Soviets to effect rendezvous with an earth orbiting vehicle.

dvanced earth orbiting space stations suitable for sustaining life and for performing scientific or military functions for extended periods of time (several months or more) are believed toart of the Soviet program. These stations would have to be able to keep their positions as well as make minorin position as desired. We estimate

arge, long-lived space platformon thc order0 tons could be established. barring thc-Of unforeseen space hazards which preclude It.

Lunar Flights.successes with manned earththe development of large boosterSoviets are believed capable of aflight with reasonablesuccessf recoverablesatellilesnd of lunaricUirn to earth Lyestimated to be the earliest possible dates.

OH endive Space Weapon*

is no evidence that thcdeveloping offensive space wetpons some of the Soviet achievements inbe necessary initial steps in theof space weapons, and thcundoubtedly undertaken studies andin this area. Soviet success inexemplified by the Venus probe, thesuccessful orbiting and recovery ofand the capability to orbit stillover thc next few years, leads tothat the Soviets areof achieving an orbitaltoward the end of the period of Moreover, the Soviet leadersto derive some psychological orby hinting or even boastingUSSRignificant capability in The launching of vehicles the Sovietsilitaryother Soviet arhievements in spacecredence to such claims.

'fable 5

i-ossim.i; sovikt si>ack activitiks

I'lOgram Objectives

diloa fcpn*riil ourhe carlicat .mrIM' future limeia

iMch ea. Ii apreifie 'rtm euuui

folly arcomnluhiiil. Wc believe lhal several could hive becu aceorapltalicd Inor mW. il Ihe Sovieu> do ao. Based mi our unearlaiatylo ipreiac Soviet ipacc objectivesoMpetiUoa biWtr. Soviet pror;raau. trc du ixiIaccomplish meal of every one of Uirae objectives within lhaliOM period*.

Aorta; Fll/hl;

OO pounds, lo* orbit

Military saUlliles

Conn onkomUoas

Weather luri-oDlaooa

Force deployment and mappias



Soft landing*

Laod>aC and eiploratMo <TaoaeUe)

UaaaW Earth Otbti"*

GlHtt'-type vehicle recovery

M ancu vcrabieini au m;lmoaph* r-

ie; conventional rieopuUon) rendezvous (convenlionallaucuveraWi outside atineaphrnr (nuclear


Spar*oni)r PH,hl

Cu eu raaa vi(aic.


The specified time periods tor manned aecoroplWieoenu arc predicated on Ihc Soviets havingumber of almilar unmanned venture*.


Scientific insl'umen'oliort uniu

St ot oge bottery

-cxhousr volve

fifing mechoniim

Radio tiirfrcliori finding block

&Ollcy foiicrobe lei' lobos

Motion devi cc






Wc liuvc lilllr info* million on which iomi cstimMr of Hit' oprrnlianal reliuiv-UyKmirtT!;eas poMlbk rrti.-iUililic*. For mtrU yrnrs after an IOC. iin- roiiauimy ofprobably

improve, and .Mien levrl olf. tmiu wlurrc noted tlir following rrliubililics nrr for thi' oral period,Wtfrom lhc IOC" those cn-Wn where the IOC lias been recent, tu is in tlw fuUirr, improvements juc generally specified.



In Flight

Systems; *




Surface-lo-Surface (Cround Launched):








Oill lablr.












0 (SO)




t) As of

. Sulfonic, destroyer-launched.

. Supmonic, destroyer-

launched.nnd. Launched Irwn

nucleai sub


estimated nEi.iAiiii.rrrus

US n







Ml. Sfpt*'l">r. ..

on iMi-ii^i: >yitt;in.



1 Will

i in |



M" lu.iiil riliTr


i.m. lionling.


lar limiiiii/

iijfeitv*hich mi- "fi-ndvA Kadi- mi-olli-tau-d.n in. iu-wjuinii^Hiiiin ii mid wlikli i- con-idtwd lo In* tominiiuil lo


- Tin* pif arc.,whichfi.Hj/ iiiiicIht wiiliin Hit

fc-amrod time limits.

' Tho pcrceiiLtge ofUuikIi-mI,t. orlnatlyotelthree CEPs of (he liming

' In tlicsehose missile*ood enough U> try U. launch will he lo-dod.hip. mxi aircraft.

' Themode for iiir-lo-wiifacc aiid nir-lo-air miisilcs do not include losses due to nirernft iiIxwm which nr.-caused by factor* not related lo missiles.

Reliability figure* arcd..ble for llieissile.

For lhc view* ofblaut Chief of Stiff for liilclhe.-nec, JX'lMrtmeiil of live Army,- Awiaiii-ilCtaYf of Ni.iid UiieralHiiit.irliiK.-iii of ihchc Iheir- 30





Wc have no good evidence on the reaction times or Soviet surface-to-surface missile units. However, based on our analysis of the characteristics of these systems and general Soviet capabilities, we estimate the following reaction times as of

. missile,ueled state by avehicle, could be fired aboutresurveyed position.

throughlthough theseare capable of varying degrees of-we estimate that they would besimple presurveyed sites whenimminent. The reaction timesalready deployed will vary withof alert and will be approximatelyas discussed underndbelow. For units in transit atofours will be requiredthe first missile after the unitat the presurveyed or prepared site.

c.ndc estimate thcnd probably theill probably utilize fixed sites. The Soviet designparticularly In the respect to thetechniques employed at operational launch sites, will critically affect ICBMtimes Assuming that rapid reaction time hasoviet objective, we estimate the following minimum reaction times for ready missiles under thc three alertindicated:

Condition I: Crews on routine standby, electrical equipment cold, missiles not fueled Reactionours.

Condition II: Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles not fueled. Reactioninutes.

Condition III: Crew; or. alert,quipment warmed up, missiles fueled and occasionally topped. Thisprobably could not be maintained for more than an hour or so. Reaction0 minutes.

Air-lo-Ai. and Air-fo-Surfaec Missiles

Thc AAMs and ASMshort enough reaction and reload time that they arc not the delaying factor in the takeoff of the

Surfocc-lo-Air Missiles

All SAMs, including those mounted on ships, willeaction time Df no moreinute when alerted. The reload time will vary with the type of missile system.

Naval Missile Systems '*

The reaction times in minutes for naval systems arc estimated as follows:



Rum ah ks DD Subsonic.


IS No reloadlass Sub 15 No reload Advanced Sub

"No estimates of reacUon and reload times arc available lorjn. supersonic cruise missile dcsicned to be tiredurfaced sub-marine.



here Is inconclusive evidence concerning lhe Soviet organizations responsible forand producing hardware, constructing operational facilities, and training personnel to operate guided missile weapons systems. Our view of these Is based largely upon our general knowledge of Soviet organization, practices, and relationships In dealing with military and civilian programs. Other than Soviet statements, there is even less specific information, although there are usefulin the Soviet miliiary concerning thestructure which controls theof guided missile forces.

ecisions concerning major programs upon which the strategic goals of the regime depend are highly centralized at the level of thedirectorate formed by theof the Central Committee of theParty and the Presidium of the USSK Council of Ministers. Thc Party Presidium makes the policy decisions on the missile weapons systems with which the Soviet armed forces are to be equipped and on the overall resource requirements to be devoted to the guided missile program. The Presidiumclose supervision over the organization! responsible for translating Ils decisions into military capabilities and approves such major adjustments In the program as may seem necessary in the light of technological develop mcnts and changes in the Presidium'sgoals. Ultimate responsibility for control of forces using guided missiles also is centered in the Party Presidium. The mechanism for operational control of military forces isfrom but closely coordinated with lhat required lo develop, produce, and deliver all thr1 elements of the missile weapons system Thtoughout the operational organization and command channels, there are also significant


variations of control depending upon the type and mission of the weapons system considered.

Z. Thcf severalro vides thc basis for the Presidium's decisions on tlie composition of tbe guided missileswhich will serve ils slrategic goals and on thc relative priorities to bc assigned thc individual missile systems. The Ministry of Defense is the principal source of proposals for weapons systems. The Academy of Sciences provides supplementary proposals andprograms designed to advance the state-of-the-art. The USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR State Scientific Eco nomlc Council, and lhe Ministry of Finance work out estimates ol the resource andrequirements ol alternative programs and their Implications for other major economic and political goals of the Presidium. When the Presidium reaches its decision, theseplanning and financial organs incorporate the missile program into the overall economic and financial plans. Detailedof developmenl. production, andschedules is carried out by the economic bureaucracy ol the Soviet Government.

ranslating the policy decisions on aprogram into complete weaponsIn the hands of troops requires aeffort to develop and produceguidance, ground supportand warheads, to construct thesupport facilities, and to train thethe current administrative structurethe Soviet economy, the complexity ofand the competing nature ofamong various weapons systems,likelypecial executivethe Council of Ministers lsimplementing the guided

program approved by the Presidium. Sueh



executive authority would be headedouncil ol Ministers' Presidiumpiobably O. K.eputy Chairman of the Council of Ministersull member ol the Party Central Committee, who has an extensive background in weapons production tt would probably include the Chairman or most uf the State Committees, the Minister of Defense or the Commander-in-Chief of Rocket Troops, and the heads of the planning and financial staff organs The functions of this executive authority would be to coordinatee participatingo make the necessary day-to-day decisions using the USSR State Planning Committee as its administrative arm. and to submit key problems promptly to the Presidium for review and decision.

he Ministry of Defense is responsible for the military aspects of the guided missileformulating strategic and tacticalspecifying military requirements,within the framework of militaryparticipating In design and testing, military acceptance of finished hardware, troop training and construction, andof operational facilities. Coordination of this activity with development andorganizations is probably effected through an executive authority with the Council ot Ministers. Within thc Ministry of Defense, the Chief Artillery Directorate is the principal organization designated to carry outthat apply to the procurement, quality control, and maintenance of equipment for all the force components The force components (ground, air. rocket, naval, PVO) of the Min is try of Defense, organise the forces for thc employment of guided missile systems.

6 Thc research and development phase of thc program is centered In research institutes and design" bureaus subordinate to andby the State Committees, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, and the Defense Ministry. The production of hardware for missile systems probably is carried out In plants under the guidance of the Stateand. for nuclear matters, under the

Ministry of Medium Machine Building Many plants under the jurisdiction of thef the National Economy, however, perform an essential subcontracting role.

In addition lo operation ot ine test ranges, the Ministry of Defense is responsible for thc training of the troops for the guided missile systems Part of the troop training program is carried oul at thc test ranges.for the administration of test ranges, and probably for troop training as well is divided between the lorcc components of the Ministry ol Deiense and higher technicalThis division of responsibility seems to be based upon Uie mission of the particular missile system and tlie component to which it is primarily assigned foruse. Responsibility for theof operational facilities for surface-to-surface and surface-to-air systems probably is centered in the Ministry of Defense.

In0 the USSR announced the formationew missile command, the "Rocket Troops of thc Soviethich has been designated one of the mainol the Soviel armed forces. Like the other major component* (ground, naval, air. and airhe new command iswith the organization, doctrine,administration, and logistic requirements of ils forces. In addition, according tostatements, the Commander-in-Chief of Rocket Troops is In lhe direct chain ofcommand, at leasl with respect to long range ballistic missiles.

Organization and Conlrol of lhe Space Program

Interagency Commission forCommunications under theCouncil of the Academy ofhas the prime responsibilityprograming, andresearch Administrativethe program appears lo be dividedauthorities who direct scientificand military authorities whopresent launching vehicle program.




tslflf fillfil.


Summary Table IV


Reference Dealenailon

CepeWlliy Dew 1




I.fixl(IM and lyp-i





iacrtlal but poaWM* ei aver


Radar om-

K naa.

Hi Xo-ewer. CW

U N*

U^hid ackd cwodKam

Ihlioad la Im aularaiiK>



n p i V * t W BJBJ

im ting* ard teearary Road -noMt. Rood


arly ISM. Uf ltti


I Jan.




'itwH .al







Heavy noacfon* veraion Llc'tter noirto i" vifulon

HU' VII -faaeeeeat

motefor Summary Tablo IV.

OTHER: fen*derln,o.iet profea. Iu la.Sttd.ellealIbe DM h- had it rapabuii.port

lagle etar .aiaafle *Hk aofQ0et-U. ceaaMe yl deUwia, rrtial fhtaaroaai oepable mlOT poaaduafaa eav lhe ardorv. We eatla-mU Ibal Un Ita* of law lalaJu probably baaarotopede* afM'al^aal

halIxaU en deretoptnf ard eou*SabM faruaaudOau-cbrdropelledebMfe -Hi* aof abeul Mart-ight altitude of about TQ0CO fori,anee In cieeeaa.

In lb*he So'leU wil! probably have under developmentn baDlalleDttlrable rlutr-iGtr-rlatlei for auchmight Include fnil miction tlmea, etorable liquid or aolldmproved guldant* ayeiemi and greater .'nihility. Weptet the Soviets lo follow rilnhllihtd daveloptnenl pat term hy depend In* on provenlrnpllclty, and high reliability.

Ve evaluate thii program as "probable" villi varying degrees of con6deuce, concerning detailedissile lined wili probable goarious iiagts ol development which ar* not necessarily reflected in thi* table.

Tbc date when the first operational unit is trained and equippeden missiles and launchtt*.

'allistic misjSle can be fired lohort as approximately one-third the maximum operational rsnne without serious increase in CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

' CEP is the radiusircle within which, statistically, one-half ol the Impact* will occur- Inherent missile accuracies arc somewhat better man in?specified in the table which take into considr-ration average degradation factors. Tlie accuracies specified arc approximate, figure!ll ranges lo which Ihe missiles are likely to be fired.

type of warhead employed with Soviet ballistic missiles will vary with the specific mission ofmissile. In gene ml, however, we believe thai for missiles with maximum ranges. or less, high explosiveuclear, or chemical warfare, (CW) warheads will be employed in Accordance with Soviet militaty doctrine, depending upon nuclear stockpiles, missile accuracy, character of the target, and results desired. We estimate that for missiles with. and over, only nuclear warheads will be employed, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW.usc. mivilcs for certain limited purposes. We believe that Iho USSHapable of developing techniques 'or missile dissemination of biological warfare (BW;lthough w* have no specific evidence iclnting DW iad missile rcst'iircli and development. In view of operational considernlions wo consider BW use in lhc ballistic missiles ur.-likely, although possible for certain special put posts.

' Should the Soviets eo desire, ICBM accuracy eould he improved. as earlyut we regard lQBSore likely dale for such anIt is pointed out thnl the rotation of tlie earth, the latitudes of the launch point and target affect thc maximum rangeallistic missile, with the InSU-

j, eds* becoming significant at the longer ranges. For thendaximum range indicated Is nominal,onrotallng earth aad in some cases, be Adjusted.

'.Ito views o(ssistniit Chief of SloC for Inielligence. Department of the Army, and thc Assislant Chwf of Naval Operation!1 Department of the-Novy, see lhcir footnotes,

Sumable V




OpmtiMM Ctasrteaay Dew'



Warhead '

Ota. type)


wllh radar tra ek/radio eom-maad ovtr-rtdt

boailaa agalaat

See paragraph.

A iipMeaW crahe ia

. against laud target*.

HI' or

andaunched. Hlg'i suUonle iiMd and a*- aJUt**.

ied hy forward thlp



HE orlear.

tVaatfi n<

OO Ns-rltar

1 (MOe ur. *.

ann pc**iblaurehtd. aiiperionle (or uio agalntt snip* only 3M' aitiewek.




for *u


or MO


7. "C" .

per tub Li -sarteeed

.'i ',




t* ww a* waw>*t


JtaeM oeaad war appreefcalwa cftale af lha art, we eetlmew lUt tbe UMR mar bataaO* lor um Ir At* Ae*Bn!ng that aa active development program la underlay, we ettlmai*aUlttlc-leuaefctd depth bemb eould be available lar ust by aurfacf th.ptndalllatlt-lauBehtd homing torptdoe firedubmarfne could ba aval labia.

evaluate Ihit program at "probabla" with varying degreet of confidence ooncernlog detailed characteristic* Eaeh mitille tinted -III probably go tarougt various tltget of development whleh an cot neceaearlly reflected In thlt table.

datatba Im epeentlerael ualt It trained aad eavlppedew asjaatkaa aad

ts tbc tadNartJe aa trMtaV. taadtClcsQy. ooe half af the tapaett wulabtrmt attsaB* eeearaete. art. otae-hat better Uatt the aaaaaaaaaj tptlUithe uK* which take lataraaa etttrradattoa Uctare. aad fee aanJ aytaaaaa tasatdt thear loeaUco of tv it.rrtuag skip.

' Warhead Includes the tiplosore device and lta aasocteted fusiag aad firing meehenum.

Original document.

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