5 April 1
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
IN FULL
SOVIET SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS REGARDING BERLIN AND GERMANY
SubmUftd by ihe
DIRECTOR or CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following Intelligence organisations participated in the preparation of thu csttmat* The Central intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organtiatlone ot the Departments of State, thehe Navy, the Air Force, ana The Joint Staff.
Count* rut In bp the UNITED STATUS INTELLIGENCE BOARD
onpra ftftf. Concurring were The Director ofand Research, Department of State; the Assislant Chief of Staff for intelligence. Depa'lmml of the Army; theChiel of Naval OperationsDepartment Of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF; the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff; the Assistant ta the Secretary of De/erne. Special Operations; and the Director Of the National Security Agency The Atomic tnergyRepresentative to the USIB. an* th* AssistantFederal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,bfeet
being outside of their fm NHr
N9
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Pate Ihl
SOVIET SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS REGARDING BERLIN
AND GERMANY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin and Germany over the next six months or so.
CONCLUSIONS
believe that in the relativelyUie USSR will presentenewal of negotiationsquestioneace treaty forew status forcertainly. Khrushchev stillto negotiate on this mattertorisis bychiefly because he desires toriskshowdown in thisof East-West confrontation. Hestill hopes that, if hc keepsthe threatnilateralfearshowdown willAlliesake concessions at thetable.
raising this issue once againchief concern will be toUie East German regime byeventually eliminating thein Berlin, and by bringingto recognize the permanenceof that regime. The Sovieis
also hope Uiat success in this willWest Germany's confidence in its present policy of participation in NATO's military effort, since itrimary Soviet purpose to check the buildup of significant military power in llie Federal Republic. (Paras.
n any negotiations whifch take place in the next few months, the Soviets would almost certainly not hold fast to their maximum demandeace treaty with "the two Germanies" and the immediate conversion of West Berlin into afreenstead they willon getting an "interimof the kind outlined at Genevahich wouldirst step "toward eliminating Allied occupation rights in West Berlin. The USSR might in the course of negotiations reduce some of its previous demands concerning such an interim settlement if it could obtain an agreement, which, at least by impliea-
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tion.ime limit on these occupation rights. This outcome would be intended lo lay the groundwork for later advances and would be. in the Sovietajor gain. )
f higher level negotiations do not take place, or if they break down, the USSR might agree to refer thc problem to lower level talks. More likely, however, it would move toloc-sponsored peace conference and would eventually sign its long-threatened separate peace treaty with the GDR. Subsequently, thccould transfer to the GDR control
over Allied access and, sooner or later, permit that regime gradually toolicy of harassments. As another way of exerting pressure, they might choose to exploit the vulnerabilities of German civilianourse which would not directly threaten the Allied position but could seriously undermine the integrity of West Berlin. Under this or any other policy, however, the USSR is likelyer negotiations, alwaysthat the Allies can be induced .topeacefully to the eventual loss of the Western position in Berlin.)
USSION
Policy Considerations
ecent Soviet public and private statements make it clear that the USSR Intends to raise the issue ol Berlin and Germany again,ormal diplomatic initiative to this end will probably bo launched in the relatively near future Khrushchev has indicated anto wait for the West German elections due in September, and he would probably like to be able to poinl to some activity on this question at the Party Congress in October. His manner and timing in raising thiswill depend on lhe movement of events generally in East-West relations, which will in turn be heavily conditioned byin such crisis areas as Laos and Cuba. In general wc believe that the Soviets would consider thc Berlin Lssue too sensitive to press very hard-if tensions were already highof developments elsewhere. But anof disunity or disarray in theAlliance, such as may result from thc present Internal crisis In France, might lead the Soviets to believeavorable moment had arisen lo demand new negotiations. In any case, we believe that the Soviets will try toay, sometime during the next six
months or so, to revive this problem from its present relatively dormant state.
he course of events in the last two years. Including the Soviet proposals at Geneva and Paris, indicates that the Soviets, in returning lo this issue, will be raising it primarily for the sake of certain objectives with respect to Berlin and Germany themselves, rather than because they wish to use itever inother questions. These objccUves have remained essentially unchanged since Khrushchev precipitated the Berlin crisis in the winter. The USSR believes that its puppet regime in East Germanybe finally stabilized so long as West Berlin continues to exist in the heart of the countryoute ofenter of anU-GDR activities,eminder of Western refusal to reconcile itself to the permanent division of Germany. In addition, Moscow seeks to use the advantages ot ils strong local position in the Berlin area to extract greater internationalecognition for the GDR, both in order to
eriod ol decline unUl thc springhe refugee flow began to increase. In lhe first quarter0 persons escaped through West Berlin, approximatelyercent more than during the corresponding period
strengthen that regime and to extinguish latent German hopes lor reunification on any olher tlian Soviet terms Further, the Soviet* hope that, in the long run. legalising the dm-non ol Germany wouldotential military threat to the GDR on the partearmed Wesl Germany.
Moscow is also keenly aware or thegains which would accrue fromconcessions In this area.artial Western retreat would be exploited among Americas allies. In both parts of Germany, and most or all among the West Berlincrs, as proof that the "world relation of forces" was shifting irrevocably in favor of the Bloc, that the US was unwilling In this new phase to maintain its commitments, and that further Western retreats were inevitable. Inthe Soviets would hope to undermine West Germany's confidence in Its present policy of participation in NATO's military effort, since itrimary Soviet purpose to check the buildup of sigruficant military power in the Federal Republic.
ertain sense Khrushchev is under pressure to make progress in the near future toward these objectives. This is not because he is being urgedpecific group of other Soviet leaders toarder line. Nor does our considerable evidence on thedispute indicate that the Chineseexert an important influence here. Thc commitment of Soviet prestige In thc Berlin situation doesind of pressure on Khrushchev to make good, although this has probably become somewhat attenuated with the passage of time and the postpone ment of several potential showdowns But the chief pressures arc those arising trom the weaknesses inherent in the position of the GDR. which has continued to encounter serious problems In consolidating its rule and developing its economy East German boss Ulbricht is the spokesman for these pressures, and while Ulbricht himself may have littleweight in Soviet councils, the USSH as the party ullimatcly concerned to maintain and extend Communist power in Central Europe shares fully his desire lo stabilize thc GDR by repairing these weaknesses.
as the Soviets are lo achievethey nevertheless remainUiat Berlin Is potentially thepoint in Uie enUre range ofconf rontations. Despite his evidentKhrushchev probably sUII doubtsWestern Powers are actually willingsubstantial risks of general war overof East German administrationaccess to Berlin. Nevertheless, heUiat the US is so deeply committedthat it might react forcefully Into interference with its access toHe would clearly prefer, to seekvia negotiation, at least until heopportunity to gauge the tempernew American Administration. Thisis reinforced by his desire to preservepose and to demonstrate,resorting lo unilateral measures, thatoffered the Allies every chance for asolution.
while Uie USSR ultimatelyof West Berlin and fullthe GDR, Moscow has realized fromlhat these goals must bestages. The "free city" is intended asstage, while the subsequent proposals"interim status" for Wesl Berlin areto prepare the wayfreeWestern agreement lo theall-German commission would betoward full recognition of the GDR,agreement loeacethe two German states. The Sovietstheir full program to require ayears; what they seek1tartprogram, not only to bring itsnearer, but also to establish thethat rurther steps are to follow.
Probable Soviet Tactics
t some point in tbc course ol its dlplo matic explorations with the new USthc USSR will probably broach the idea ol negotiations on Berlin and Gennany. While the forum and time cannot beMoscow will probably seek to obtain formal talks, perhaps at the highest level, and to schedule them for some lime during this
Having achieved lhc participation ol tlie GUU in tlic Foreign Ministers' Conferencehe Soviets would probably press for this again if the talks were held at thatelatively correct approach seems to be the preferred Soviet tactic at present, and the USSR probably will not resort to strongunless it judges that negotiationsbe obtained ln any other way.an invitation to negotiate will probably be accompanied by semiofficial, low-keyof the vulnerability of the Western position in Berlin. The Soviets may alsosporadic harassments during this period by thc GDR against German access through the Soviet Zone and across the sector border within the city.
The maximum Soviet position calls for concluding peace treaties with both German states and. as an Integral feature of thisthe conversion of West Berlindemilitarized freeailing this,has threatened toeparate treaty with the GDR and thereafter to turn over to that regime the control of Allied access routes to the city. These demands may well be the initial Soviet position in any new negotiations, but the USSR showed Itself ready, both at Geneva9 and at Parisofor lesser Immediate gains, and wcit would probably prove willing to do so again.
Recent restatements of the Bloc's position indicate that the USSR continues to think primarily in terms of an "interim agreement" on West Berlin, valid onlyixed period, combined with provisionsornmlsslon in which the two German states would try to work out the termseace treaty. This win probably be. If not the initial Sovietallback position introduced fairly early in any discussions. Its chief virtue from the Soviet viewpoint is its "interim" nature; by this means the USSR seeks toestern commitment to further steps in the same directiontipulated future date
The main conditions for West. Berlinthis interim period would probably again be reductions in Western troop levels, controls on propaganda and subversive activities, and
the creationig Four commission to supervise lhe agreement. These provisions are designed to inject thc USSRinto the alTairs of Ihc.city and lo undercut the" Allies' original lights of occupation by meansewlimited in duration, lo which the USSRarty and with which thc GDR isThc formation of an all-Germanwould be intended to extract de facto recognition of lhc GDR.
Proposals of this sort, however, may not represent the Soviet minimum position. If Khrushchev came to feel that the West was willing to let negotiations founder at this point, he might offer an interim agreement on more moderate terms. Thc USSR might agree, for example,eiling on Western troops in West Berlin rather than insist on their reduction Or it might drop its demands for an all-German commission in connection with an interim status for the city. Its main effort would be to establish, at least bythat the new agreementune limit on Allied rights of occupation, andto lay the groundwork for furtheradvancesater date.
Our chief reason for raising the possibility of such modifications in the Soviet position is the USSR's evident awareness of thc risks of proceeding unilaterally toward its objectives in Berlin. Khrushchev's estimates ofand particularly US, reactions will be fully as important in determining Soviet policy as his own objectives and his appraisals of the USSR's bargaining advantages. The record of successively deferred showdowns since8 suggests thatmay have come to feel that his original expectations were founded upon anof the importance which the USto its position in Berlin, or, put another way. an overestimate of the ease with which he could exploit the USSR's growing military .power at the bargaining table. Apart from these considerations of military risk,is also aware that any major unilateral aciion on his part would virtually forecloseonsiderable period the possibility ofother issues with lhc West In anyexcept one of maximum hostility.
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lhc severity of the USSR'*will vary primarily Recording toof American Intentions and Western
unity.lear that Moscow sees no necessity to sacrifice anything of value In theon Berlin and Germany. We believe there is virtually no chance, for example, that the USSK would seriously consider proposalsa change in thc status of Kast Berlin or the establishmentround corridor between West Berlin and West Germany over which the ODR had no control.
Islose relationshipadvantages which the USSR wouldin any settlement this year, andof time for which It would beunderwrite this settlement. Wethe Soviets will not accept anywhich requires them to be satisfiedconcessions unless it also offersopportunity to raise the Issue again hinear future. The USSRbelieve that, although dangers areprospects for eventually absorbingand legitimizing the GDR arewhile the desire to avoid too sharpin relations with Uie Westvarious times put constraints uponpolicy, we estimate that the USSRaccepl any long-term sctUemcntIt Lhc opportunity to work loward
espite Soviet reluctance to movethe USSR will take care to Insure that the threat of such action ls kepi alive in thc minds of its adversaries. And indeed, if negotiatlont do not take place, or If they fail, the USSK will have to consider whether to resort lo further steps on lis own Onemove alend of deadlocked negotiations
would bo lo remand lhc problem lo further discussionower level. Khrushchev might acquiesce In Uiiseans ofest of nerves and providing some appearance of continuing movement on the question. More likely, however, he would announce plans toeace conference and. if the West still remained unwilling to make concessions, would finallyeparate treaty with the GDR
If trail reached this point, the USSR would still haveys of proceeding. II might transfer control over Allied access to the But Germans, who could sooner or later attempt, under Soviet guidance, to force lhe Wesl inlo dealing with them.recent Soviet and East Germansuggest that the chief meanseparate peace treaty might be harassment of German access. This policy would be intended to force the West Berlin Government to give up its ties with Bonn, to clamp down on anti-GDR activities, and in this fashion gradually to submit to Eastcontrolourse of action would allow the USSR to avoidime the issue of Allied rights, but it might be effective in undermining the independence of the city and the confidence of its population.
A policy of this sort, of course, need not waileace treaty. But we believe that the USSR will not permit its puppet regime to go very far in this direction- untilhus explored the possibilities ofconcessions from the new USIn any event. Soviet policy during and beyond the next six months is likely loariety of such techniques lo heighten periodically Uie pressure oneach lime offering the possibility of new negotiations.
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Original document.
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