CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
. C.
OFflCE Of THE DEPUTY OIMCTOB (INTELLIGENCE) ST September iofii
Mr. McGeorge 3undy MEMORANDUM PORt Mr. Benry Fovler
Mr. Ooorgsr. Alexia Johns aa Mr. Paul H. KLtse Mr. Richard Btssell Kr. Henry Rowea
Bloc Aid and the Belgrade Conference
Pursuant to our discussion at tba Planning Group luncheon ofmtudy of the relationship of Bloc aid to the positions taken "by the participants at the Belgrade Conference of Neutral Katious. Ihe study ves prepared at the request of Walt Rostov.
HOtenr-ffiWiaT JB
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS1
CIA/RR EPNo.
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid and the Belgrade Conference
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of Bloc aid, If any, on the positions adopted at Belgrade by each of the participating countries. An attempt is made to determine if there is any correlation between the stands taken at the conference and the nature and magnitude of the aid being provided by the Bloc. eneral discussion of Bloc aid to the conference countries, as wellurvey of the main issues and alignments at Belgrade, precedes tbe country-by-country analyses.
Conclusions
The Belgrade conference of nonallgned countries, which took placeeptember, brought together heads of state and other representatives from someountries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including most of the underdevoloped countries which have received Bloc economic aid and all of those which have received Bloc military assistance. With few, but significant, exceptions, there is little or no indication in the activities at Belgrade that Bloc aid had more than an indirect influence on the positions taken at the conference. Political considerations peculiar to the individual countries appear to have been the determining factor behind the positions and alignments among the conferees. If the Bloc aid program in itshad any significant impact on these positions it probably was in reinforcing the particular form ofpursued by the individualpaths usually having been chosen prior to receiving Bloc aid. In most cases the impact offrom the Bloc or theis imperceptible andountry's position was the reverse of what might be expected if only aid ls considered. The clear-cut Communist line of Cuba, where the Bloc's
9 -rr?
economic and military support is essential to theof the regime, can obviously be linked to the impact of Bloc aid. Negotiations for the supply of advanced Bloc military equipment, such as those being conducted by Iraq and which have been completed by Indonesia, may have had an impact on the extreme positions adopted by these countries. However, the UAR, with similar negotiations under way, showed no inclinations towardro-Sovieton East-West Issues, and its anti-colonial stance isthe result of Bloc aid.
For its part, the Soviet Union probably considerssupport for the Communist cause it has aroused through its aid programsesirable but not essential by-product of the Bloc's efforts in the aid field. While Moscowthe aidital feature in the advancement of Communism, it has not demanded specific political quid pro quo's in its policy of expanding economic relations with even the most Western-oriented neutrals. For the time being the cultivation of such neutralism serves Soviet purposes. At times the USSR has even restrained the enthusiasm for Communist programs in certain countries in order to calm the fears of potential aid and trade customers inareas.
Thus, while it cannot be categorically stated that Bloc economic and military aid has promotedro-Communist or anti-Western atmosphere in the nonaligned nations, it is apparent that such assistance has tended to fosterstrong sense of "neutralism" already present in these countries. We feel, therefore, that Bloc aideflection of Moscow's willingness to ride along with and to strengthen this wave of neutralism rather than being the immediate cause of an anti-Western or pro-Soviet attitude on the part of these countries.
General Discussion
Twenty of thearticipating countries at Belgrade have received pledges totaling more thanillion in Bloc economic credits and grants, or more thanercent of all Bloc economic aid extended to the underdeveloped countries since the program began Eleven of the countries have received all of the more thanillion in military aid extended by the Bloc. During the same period, the US has extended more thanillion in economic and military aid to the Belgrade countries, and5 US aid to these countries totals more thanillion for economic andillion for the military.
'-fi ;'-
With few exceptions, there la little directbetween positions taken at the Belgrade conference by the participating countries and the degree to which they have become Involved in Bloc economic or military assistance programs. Political considerations appear to have been the controlling factor behind these positions; theseincludeill-defined orof national interest, personal and national prestige, and other problems or principles peculiar to individual nations. Each leader interpreted issues and adopted positions in the light of these considerations and tailored his ownof nonallgnment to suit these concepts.
IfWestern orany impact on the views expressed and the positions taken, it was in reinforcing the peculiar forms of politicalhich generally have been chosen by the nonaligned countries prior to receipt of Bloc aid. The more moderato ofsuch as India andaccustomed to taking positions which they feel support neither side in the cold war, hence should offend neither or both equally. Tbe more rabid amongthose recently freed from some form of European domination, such as Guinea andaccustomed to taking anti-Western positions and to greeting each East-West issue with an almost automatic bias, or at least suspicion, against the Western position. This they would do regardless of aid programs; even the more moderate Afro-Asians have only recently overcome their traditional bias against the West.
In some cases, particularly among the "giants" of the conference, the impact of aid was negligible or even Yugoslavia, with little bitter experience from Bloc aidrime recipient of US aid, adopted ananti-Western, generally pro-Soviet position. On the other hand, Nehru and Nasir, the former backed by both Western and Bloc aid and the latter heavily dependent in both the economic and military spheres on continued large-scale Bloc aid, adopted moderate stands, urging the US and USSR to resolve their differences, but not siding with either.
The West African states receiving significant amounts of aid from the Bloc tended to be more extreme onand more pro-Soviet on East-West issues, while older Asian neutrals like Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon, which have had mixed experiences with Bloc aid, leaned toward It is doubtful that Bloc aid was more than one of many factors in arriving at these positions. Indonesia's President Sukarno, usually billed as one of the foromost
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spokesmen for the nonaligncds, drifted far to the loft atcourse which was probably reinforced, If not prompted, by the extensive Bloc aid he has received,tho commitments for modern weapons which are desired for the campaign to "recover" West New Guinea from the Dutch.
With regard to the conference itself, there woro two schools of thought on where its attention should bo focused. Those countries like India, Burma, Afghanistan, Nepal,Saudi Arabia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Sudan sought to draw the full strength of theto urging the great powers to solve their problems without recourse to war and to impressing them that the nonallgned countriesital interest in theof peace. Others, like Indonesia. Iraq, Ghana, Guinea, Cuba, andesser extent the UAR, Morocco, Mali and the Algerians, sought to focus the attention oT the conference on the traditional Afro-Asian grievances summed up In the usual Leninist phraseology of anti-imporialisra and Nehru's pre-emption of moderate leadership appears to have led Tito to attempt to take ovor leadership of the extremists by acting as their spokesman.
Some cduntries among the extreme group worked to have their pot anti-colonial arguments Included in thedocuments. The final documentsompromise in which the general appeal for peace, addressed to Moscow and Washington, was offsetonger document carrying most of the anti-imperialist line, but which acknowledged that classic colonialismying issue. It took note ofew specific anti-colonial Issues, such as the Algerian and Angolan wars, and the quostion of foreign bases in Tunisia and Cuba.
At the same time as this battle ragod, another was under way botween those who felt tho conference documents should take strong substantive stands on major East-West lssues--stands which usually reflectod pro-Soviet or at least anti-Westernthose who believed thowould lose its moral force and flavor if it expressed judgements on substantive issues such as the German question.
Tho final conference documents also reflected this split,ictory indicated for those led by Nehru who sought flexibility and not firm positions on East-West questions. All nuclear testing wasSoviet unilateralof tests was nottho great powers were urged to resume the moratorium and disarmament negotiations. Attention was called to the German problem, but only in the context of an appeal to avoid the use of force, andeneral statement endorsingolf-determination,
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and independence for all nations. Nearly all members agreed on the need for reorganization of the UN, but few couldsomo specificallySoviet "troika" concept for tho Secretary General's office. Those who pressed for flexibility at the conference woro India, Burma, the UAR, Saudi Arabia, tho AlgerianGovernment, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Lebanon, Sudan, Cambodia, Coylon, Nepal, and Afghanistan. Those pressing forusually pro-SoviotIraq, Cuba, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea and Yugoslavia.
In judging the performance of the Individual countries it should be noted that tho conferenco had two public images: that conveyed by the unfettered, flamboynnt speeches of the participants as they basked in the limelight of worldand that conveyed by the formal conference documents, which reflocted the results of hard bargaining and thofor unanimity. The speeches were much morethan the documents and many wero anti-Westernense transcending even tho usual anti-colonialist theme. Inthe positions of the individual countries, comment is first devoted to the public image and then to tho's' tactics in the bargaining behind tho scenes asln clandestine reporting.
The following statements on each participant at the Belgrade donference include summaries of aid received from the Bloc and from the United States. The figures arcnoncomparable for tho following reasons -
Bloc aid is compared only with US aid. In several cases, particularly for those countries formerly subject to the Unitod Kingdom, considerable additional Western aid has been granted.
US aid includes grants, loans, and credits; Bloc aid consists almost exclusively of credits.
US aid for the most part has been delivered or ls in the process of being delivered; tho US figures, consequently, contain relatively little in the way of future obligations. The Bloc figures, on the other hand in scvoral important cases reprosent largely obligations for future assistance and ln most cases future obligationsignificantof the total.
Bloc figures represent the total of economicresources availablo to the recipient country from the Bloc. In several casos, non-governmontal assistance from the US and other Western sources of prlvato capital is (or has been) of major significance to the recipient country.
AFGHANISTAN
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
since4
5
has accepted aid from both East and West, but the Bloc's more0 million inand military aid is acknowledged to be of decisive importance to Kabul's development and defense, and hasirm foothold for the Communist Bloc in the country. Moreover, the Afghans are currently Inof seeking more aid for their Second Five-Year Plan and probably are to receive additional military aid, includingircraft. Bloc aid, along with Soviet propaganda support for Afghanistan in the Push-tunistan dispute with Pakistan, could be used to argue for Afghanistan's pressing an extremist positionto the USSR. Prime Minister Daud, however, fell in with the moderates of the conference. He hit colonialism advocated Peiping's admission to the UN, pressed for UN reorganization and extended recognition to the Algerian Provisional Government. On Germany, he deplored the division of the country and the use of "policies of force" but avoided strong stands on East-West issues. Privately, he generally sided with Nehru, agreeing to forego mention of Pushtunistan in the conferenceor specific formulas for Germany. The Afghans did, however, support Cuban insistenceeference to tho Guantanamo naval base. Bloc aid had no demonstrable effects on Afghanistan's position at Belgrade.
ALGERIA
Aid, in millions of US5
Although strongly supported by Soviet propaganda and with limited amounts of Bloc military and financialthe Algerians have no particular cause fora pro-Soviet line on East-West matters. Prime Minister Ben Khedda concentrated on his own struggle for Algerianreaping support for his fight from all, including specific reference to the issue in the conference documents. He laid strong emphasis on colonialism, banning of nuclear tests, and condemned military pacts. Privately, not much is known, although the extent of support for Algeria in the documents suggests strong politicking on the colonialism issue. The limited assistance received from the Bloc does not appear to have significantly affected the Algerian
BURMA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Economic Military TOTAL
4 96
US5ST"
has received little Soviet aid so far, but this year acceptedillion credit from Communist China which boosted it into one of the more important recipients of Bloc aid; Rangoon has also been flirting with Blocfor military assistance. So far, though, Bloc aid haselatively minor role in the country andexerts little or no influence on the government'sposture. u delivered the most statesmanlike address of the whole Belgrade conference, out-doing even Nehru*on the importance of the peace issue and criticizing anticolonialism based on revenge and racialism. Behind theu appears to have been Nehru's strongest aid in pressing for flexibility and moderation. Bloc aid had no apparent effect on the Burmese stand.
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CAllBODIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc5
An important recipient of US aid, Cambodia also accepts economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The magnitude of Bloc aid at this stage should preclude lt from being moreinor factor in influencing Cambodian foreign policy; in fact its function at times has been to pressure the USnew aid commitments. Sihanouk stressed tho colonial issue, but also hit hard on the division of Germany, Vietnam, Korea, and Laos. Hecritidzod the two "blocs" for their roles in Laos and pressed for plebiscites in divided countries. He also argued for disarmament under the supervision of neutral governments. Privately, he appears to have been in the Nehru camp, favoring flexibility in positions on East-Vest issues.
CEYLON
Aid, In millions of US5
Ceylon has accepted aid from both East and West but at no time has been so deeply involved with the Blocas to jeapordize its neutral position. Bloc aid and trade aro Important to Ceylon, but certainly not decisive. Mrs. Bandaranaike called for an end to the war threat in her speech at Belgrade, suggesting the demilitarization of Germany and the need for negotiations between the major powers. She specifically criticized tho Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing and Moscow's "troika" proposals for the UN. She called for increased aid to tho underdevelopedboth East andfor Chinese Communist admission to tho UN. Privately she appears to havo carried little weight, but was definitely in the moderate camp. Bloc aid probably had little or no influence on this position.
SECRET.
CONGO
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
since4
5
Late arrivals at the conference, Congo leaders Adoula and Gizenga created mixed impressions, as would be expected from their well-known positions prior to the gathering in Belgrade, Adoula's well-balanced, moderate speech and his support for the UN earned kudos from the moderate camp, while Gizenga's pre-occupation with Lumumba's ghost brought forth some short-lived emotion. Although Gizenga hassome financial assistance from the Bloc, as well as massive propaganda support, he focused on Congolese problems and avoided pronouncements on other issues. Both Congo leaders arrived too late for most of the backstage activity, but Adoula earned special praise from Nehru for his balanced performance, while presumably Gizenga lined up with the.
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CUBA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
since5
Military TOTAL
1
Dependent on the Sino-Soviet Bloc for both its present and future development plans, for the economic well-being of the country as measured in terms of sugar sales, and for large-scale military assistance necessary for its survival, the Castro regime has ample reasons fortrong pro-Soviet position. Sinces the magnitude of the Bloc aid effort has grown, so has grown Cuba's sycophantic echoing of the Bloc propaganda line on every world issue. Dorticostraight Communist-line speech on all major issues, urging special treatment, not of general principles, but of specific issues such as colonialism, "troika",testing, foreign bases. Privately, the Cubans pressed the same anti-Western, anti-US sentiments, anda staunchly pro-Soviet posture throughout the Dorticos appears to have alienated most of the other conferees, but gained mention of Guantanamo in the final documents, apparently on the groundsatin American issue rated some specific mention. While it is not possible to demonstrate that Cuba's position is the direct result of Bloc aid, it can be argued that without such aid the Castro regime would not be able to assume the stance taken at Belgrade by Dorticos.
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CYPRUS
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc5
Cyprus was one of the five participants at thethat has not received Blocoffers have beonhas no reason for feeling beholden to the USSR. Makarios publicly condemned colonialism, Soviet tests, and the erection of barriers in Berlin. Be called forto bo applied to Germany as elacwhore. Privately, Makarios appears to have beon among those counselingalthough he probably carried little weight.
ETHIOPIA
Aid, in millions of US5
Ethiopia has accepted4 million in Bloc economic aid but relatively little has boon accomplished under tho agreements and tho degree of Bloc influenco is rather slight. Hallo Selassie expressed strong support for the UN and for nonalignment,nified Germany, and for free access to Berlin. He said classic colonialismead issue in Asia and Africa, but touched on such Issues as West Irian and Bizerto. Privately, he appears to have thrown his weight with the Nehru group In favor of flexibility in East-West negotiations, and of the conference focusing on peace issues.
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SECRET
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GHANA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
5
If thereirect correlation between foreign aid and the positions takenountry in international affairs, it would seem prudent for Ghana to haveoderate course at the conference, as it has negotiations undor way for additional aid from both Bloc and Western sources. Ghana hasrimary target of the Bloc's economic offensive in Africa. While currently cultivating its existing tics with Accra, Moscow stands ready to extend further aid if Although no military aid agreements are known to have been concluded as yet, recent developments strongly suggost the Bloc may soon be active in that field also. It is doubtful, however, that this aid has been decisive in determining Ghana's position in world affairs, although it probably has had some influence. Nkrumah at Belgradetrongly anti-colonial speech, and on East-West issues generally favored the Soviet line, especially on Berlin. He stressed the needemilitarized Germany, for general disarmament, andummit meeting between the US and USSR. Hetroika" system for officials immediately under the UN Secretary Goneral. Privately, he pushed foron Germany, and for heavy emphasis on the colonialism issue, but split with Nasir on criticism of Israel. Bloc aid seems to be only one of many factors in Nkrumah's anti-Western position.
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GUINEA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
5
113
IT3T
Guinea, strongly bound up with the Bloc through economic
Yugoslavia,ew others as one of the extremist,pro-Soviet participants at Belgrade. Foreign Minister Bevogui spoke most vigorously on colonialism, and on other questions fell in vith the Nkrumah line, both publicly and privately. Guinea's support for the Soviet Bloc has been evident for sometime and may well be derived in part from its growing dependence on Bloc aid and trade. It would be difficult to argue, however, that the aid program is the reason for Guinea's present stance in East-West relations.
INDIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
5
India is the third largest recipient of Bloc aid, and the largest recipient ofillion ishas received even larger amounts from the West, primarily the US. While continuing to seek and accept Bloc aid offers, Nehru's performance at Belgrade underscores his policy of nonalignment. eluctantalmost to the end, Nehru addressed his remarks to the peace issue, stressing the need for the nonallgned states to urge the great powers to negotiate their differences but without committing the conference to specific stands on the German question. He said the present crisis in East-West relations overshadows the issue of colonialism andsought to temper the violently anticolonial line favored by many others. He expressed regret at the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing. On Germany, he asked forof the "fact" of two German states, but stressed the need for free access to Berlin. Privately, he led the moderates and was the principal architect of the conference documents. Foreign aid appears to have, at most, only an indirect effect on Nehru's attitude; his desire to have both East and West continue to support India mayto his unwillingness to be sharply critical of either.
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INDONESIA
Aid, in millions of OS dollars, from:
4
5
M30
r^3o
second largest recipient of Bloc economic andaid, Indonesia in all probability has been influenced by tbls support in adopting more favorable positions to the USSR, not only at Belgrade, but at other times as well. With more0 million in economic aid extended by the Bloc, for uso in key areas of the country's Eight-Year development plan, and with the three military services in process of receiving0 million in military oqulpment andfrom the Bloc, tho Indonesians areoor position to Incur the wrath of Moscow. They mayeed to balance Soviet largess with pro-Soviet gestures, but often these appear to be little more than manifestations of President Sukarno's peculiar brand of neutralism. Moscow has shown an ususual willingness to meet Indonesian requests for military equipment on favorableguided missiles and military aircraft, such as,ndombers, all of which are still of primein the Soviet arsenal. The Indonesians are also grateful for the Bloc's all-out support for their claims to Dutch Now Guinea. onference sponsor at Belgrade, Sukarno naively declared in his major speech that tho most important source of world tensions is not the ideological clash between two great power groups, but rather the continuation ofthereafter he hammered awayimilar theme. On Germany, heolution on tbe basis ofnd said thattemporary" division of Germany is necessary, then so be it. On the UN, he stressed the need for reorganization to tako account of tho increasingof the neutrals. He omitted all reference to the Sovlot test resumption, and merely voiced support for general disarmament. Privately, he appears to have been with the violent anticolonialists, especially tho Africans, but was persuaded to omit mention of West New Guinea from the documents. While the cause-and-effeet relationship is more subtle than elaborated here, Bloc aid and the Communist support of Indonesian national goals probably have had significant effects on Indonesia's position between East and West.
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IRAQ
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
since5
Military TOTAL
has received more0 million in Blocand military aid slnco the revolution In tho summer8 brought Qanim to power. Prior to the revolt, Iraqaid exclusively from the West, but the Bloc has taken over almost completely and is carryingide range of projects in all key sectors of the economy. Moreover, the Iraqis are currently engaged in seeking additional military aid from the Bloc, probably including guided mlssilos, more aircraft, and probably more land armaments. These delicate negotiations may have exerted some influence on Iraq's position at the conference, although Baghdad's leftist approach was manifest long before Belgrade. Iraqi Forlegn Minister Jawad, however, appears to have outdone himself, turning in what Ambassador Kennan termed an "amazing performance." Both publicly and privately he followed the Communist line, played heavily on anti-colonialism, and repeatedly denounced Western positions while apologizing for those of the Communist Bloc. Ho called for the recognition of two German-ies and for general and complete disarmament, without mentioning the Soviot resumption of testing. Ho denounced Western economic assistanceover fornd generallytrong acceptance of Soviot positions on East-West issues. Although not one of tho leading lights, Iraq strongly supported the extremist group, both publicly and privately. Bloc aid has probablyignificant Influence on Iraqi policies.
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LEBANON
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
5
9
Lebanon has received no aid from the Slno-Soviet Bloc. Prime Minister Salamoderate position at Belgrade, stressing the survival of the remnants of colonialism and citing Israelcenter of imperialist Infection" spreading throughout Asia and Africa. He called for UN reorganization to take account of the new members. On East-West issues, he expressed dismay at the Soviet test announcement on the eve of the conference Salam appears to have been ln the Nehru camp behind the scenes, with some regard for Naslr's views as well.
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MALI
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
5
TOTAL
Mali has accepted substantial Bloc aid this year and at the time of the conference was engaged in working out an aid agreement with Communist China. Bloc militaryhas begun to appear in significant quantities and it is likely that the Communist foothold in West Africa willubstantial program for Mali, even though the country welcomes Western assistance as well*. At Belgrade, however, President Keitaore moderate role than his two Africanand Guinea. He urgedand neutralization for all divided countries,Germany, but said the conference should not side with either East or West. He urged reorganization of the UNeat for Peiping. Privately, he appears to have carried little weight, although there are indications his relative mildness in public spilled over in his work behind the scenes. Bloc aid may have had some influence on Mali's position, but less than might have been expected. Keita's position at Belgrade, however, contrasts 3harply with the Mali delegation's more extremist performance at the preparatory sessions in Cairo.
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MOROCCO
Aid, in miliiODS of USrom:
Bloc5
5 5
303
recipient of some Soviet military aid, Morocco's position at the conference reflected no significant pro-Soviet leanings. King Hassan hit bard at colonialism, especially on Mauritania, but was more moderate on East-West issues. He vigorously condemned French nuclear tests in the Sahara, and noted that the Soviet test announcementoccured Just at the time when first stepsdisarmament were expected. On Germany, be spoke of the need for the nonaligned nations to mediate between the two, great powers. Privately,
he appears to have vacixiatea
tween supporting the extremists on colonialism and the moderates on East-West issues. No perceptible influence of Bloc aid is indicated by the Moroccan stand at Belgrade.
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'.M
NEPAL
Aid, in millions of US5
A recipient of roughly equal amounts of aid from the US and theCommunistKing Mahendra both privately and publicly supported flexibility ln stands on East-West rolatlons and moderation on other Issues. He decried attempts to change the status quothrough negotiation, and urgod the conference to workelaxation of tensions rather than substantive stands on cold war issues. While deploring the remnants ofbe pointed out the British example of accommodating to new situations and regretted Prance's inability to learn from the British. On the UN, Mahendra denouncod the Soviet "troika" principle, but suggested strengthening the body by fairer representation and by the admission of Communist China The influence of Bloc aid on Nepal's stand apparently was nogligible.
SAUDI ARABIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc5
Saudi Arabia has accepted no economic or militaryfrom the Bloc. Foreign Minister Suwaijil denounced colonialism in general terms, except for strong attacks on the French and Israelis, and on East-West issuos urged tho conference to contribute something helpful to easing tensions, warningias toward either bloc. Privately he voted with the moderates, except on the reference to Israel.
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>:
i.
fist*..
.if.
SOMALI REPUBLIC
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
5
The Bloc has made considerable progress ln developing its economic relations with the Somali Republic,n long-term credits this year; additional aid probably will be forthcoming. President Aden, however, generally sided with the conference moderates and rejected taking substantive stands for one side or the other. He spoke ln general terms on the German question,eaceful settlement. Hetrong UNpraised the UN operations in the Congo, and asked those who wish to alter the present structure of the UNto reconsider. He attacked Portugese and French colonialism and declared the principle of self-determination should be applied to all colonial territories, as well as to Germany. Privately, he appears to have been with the moderates on most issues and showed no inclinations toward favoring Soviet positions in East-West issues. Bloc aid probably played no appreciable role in deciding the Somali Republic's positions at Belgrade.
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SUDAN
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc5
Sudan, which recentlyillion Soviet credit, avoided positions either pro-Soviet or violently anti-Western and generally held to the views of the Nehru moderates. Abboud's speech was temporate and reasonable, stressed the need for UN reorganization,est ban, and for Peiping's admission to the UN; he omitted all reference to Berlin or the German question. Privately, Abboud appears to have worked well with the moderates on both the "flexibility" and peace issues. Sudan'sprobably was not affected by foreign aid.
TUNISIA
Aid, In millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc5
Military
Tunisia only recently entered into its first important aid agreement withillion offer from the USSR,inhas received welluarterillion dollars in US economic aid. As expected, Bourguiba hit French colonial policies hardest, and omitted mention of Germany or Berlin. Privately, Bourguiba appears to have been with the conference moderates on most questions, but was said to be out of his element among the nonaligneds. He successfully pressed for mention of Bizerte in thedocuments. While Bourgiba publicly stated histo accept Bloc aid during the Bizerte crisis, he is not involved in any significant economic or militarywith the Bloc and showed no sign of favoring pro-Soviet positions. The limited aid extended to the Bloc does not appear to have affected the Tunisian position.
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UAH
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
5
439
sponsor of the gathering and one of its "big five" personalities, Nasir generally focused on the anti-colonial issue; he was anti-French, antl-Portuguese, of coursendegree ant1-American. He deplored blocs in general, as well as the artificial division of Germany, and he specifically condemned the Soviet resumption of nuclear tosting. Behind the scenes, Nasir supported Nehru on the need for the conference to avoid substantive stands onissues. He workedtrong anti-colonial statement, while giving way toild reference to Palestine. While the UAR is the largest single rocipient of Bloc aid"mores currently in process of acquiring such advanced military items as guided missiles and high-performance aircraft from the USSR under new military aid pacts, its positions at Belgrade, while strongly anti-Western on colonial issues, were not pro-Soviet in the manner of several other participants. While Bloc aid may cause Cairo to be circumspect on East-West issues, particularly the Berlin problem, Nasir hasdisavowed those who argue he must temper his anti-Communism because of tho economic and military support he receives from the Bloc. His stature among the neutrals appears to havo been enhanced by his conduct at the Nasir| along with Nehru,rime exampleonaligned leader who continues to receive entensive aid from the Bloc, but who continues to steer his own course between East and His support of the Bloc was significantly less than his dependence on Bloc military supplies, including modern weapons systems. His position appears, at most, to be but indirectly affected by Bloc aid,
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YEMEN
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
5
30
747
17
is almost totally dependent on the Blocand military assistance and has tightly boundmodest development efforts with Soviet and Chineseambassa-
dor to the UN prince Hassan,on colonialism, hitting hard at both the French and British. He called for reorganization of the UN and for an end to the arms race, but avoided involvement in East-West issues. Privately, he appears to have followed Nasir's lead. Yemeni support for the Soviet position was less complete than is Yemeni dependence on Bloc economic support, which did notemonstrable effect on the Yemeni attitude at Belgrade.
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YUGOSLAVIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
4
5
Ul
2 HI
recipient of more thanillion in US economic and military aid, Yugoslavia has received1 million from the Soviet Bloc and has had0 million in aid extended by the Bloc only to be cancelled or allowed to Despite the disparity in aid from East and West, and its disillusioning experiences with the Bloc, Yugoslavia sided with, and in fact led, the conference extremists in favoring generally pro-Soviet positions on the key issues of East-West relations. As conference host, Tito spoke twice, once in statesmanlike tones on the peace issue,econd time in an anti-colonial, anti-Western, and pro-Soviet mood. His views on most questions were well known before the conference, but the intensity with which he pressed them surprised many. Privately, he appears to have sought leadership of the conference extremistsounter to Nehru, pressingro-Soviet line on nuclearand the German issue, but in the end being forced to give in to the moderates. Yugoslavia is perhaps the best illustration of large-scale economic and military aid playing no discernible role in influencing positions adopted at Belgrade.
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H
BRAZIL/ECUADOR/BOLIVIA
Aid, Id millions of US dollars, from:
US5 US5 US5
Although all three of these countries have received Bloc aid overtures, particularly during the past year, none have yet accepted any long-term Bloc economic aid. by their observer status, and in the case of Brazil undercut by the rocent departure of Quadros, those countries appear to have worked behind the scenes on tho side of moderation, but their Impact was negligible by all indications. Howover, tbe Bloc's attempt to curry favor in Latin America appears to have strengthened their sentimonts for Joining the nonaligned nations.
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Original document.
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