SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID AND THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ( S-693)

Created: 9/26/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND flfiPO&TS1

SUBJECT: Slno-Soviet Bloc Aid and tho Bolgrado Conference

The purpose of this paper ls to assess tho Impact of Bloc aid. If any, on the positions adopted at Belgrade by each of tho participating countries. An attempt is made to dotermine If there is any correlation between tho stands taken at the conference and tho nature and magnitude of the aid being provided by the Bloc. eneral discussion of Bloc aid to tho conference countries, as wellurvey of the main issues and alignments at Belgrade, precedes the country-by-country analyses.

Conclusions

The Belgrade conference of nonallgned countries, which took placeeptember, brought togother heads of state and other representatives from somoountries of Asia, Africa, aod Latin America, Including most of the underdeveloped countries which have received Bloc economic aid and all of those which have received Bloc military assistance. With low, but significant, oxceptions, there is llttlo or no indication in the activities at Belgrade that Bloc aid had more than an indirect influence on the positions taken at the conference. Political considerations peculiar to tho individual countries appear to have boon the determining factor behind the positions and alignments amoDg the conferees. If the Bloc aid program in itBhad any significant impact on theso positions it probably was ln reinforcing the particular form ofpursued by tho Individualpaths usually having been chosen prior to receiving Bloc aid. In most cases the impact offrom the Bloc or tbeis imperceptible andountry's position waa the reverse of what might be expected if only aid ls considered. Tho clear-cut Communist line of Cuba, where the Bloc's

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economic and military support is essential to theof the regime, can obviously be linked to the impact of Bloc aid. Negotiations for the supply of advanced Bloc military equipment, such as those being conducted by Iraq and which have been completed by Indonesia, may have had an impact on the extrome positions adopted by these countries. However, the-UAR, with similar negotiations under way, showed no inclinations towardro-Sovieton East-West issues, and its anti-colonial stance is not the result of Bloc aid.

For its part, the Soviet Union probably considerssupport for the Communist cause it has aroused through its aid programsesirable but not essential by-product of the Bloc's efforts in tho aid field. While Moscowthe aidital feature lo the advancement of Communism, it has not demanded specific political quid pro quo's in its policy of expanding economic relations with even the most Western-oriented neutrals. For the time beiog the cultivation of such neutralism serves Soviet purposes. At times the USSR has even restrained the enthusiasm for Communist programs in certain countries in order to calm the fears of potential aid and trade customers inareas.

Thus, while it cannot be categorically stated that Bloc economic and military aid has promotedro-Communist or anti-Western atmosphere in the nonaligned nations, it is apparent that such assistance has tended to foster the strong sense of "neutralism" already present in these countries. We feel, therefore, that Bloc aideflection of Moscow's willingness to ride along with and to strengthen this wave of neutralism rather than being the immediate cause of an anti-Western or pro-Soviet attitude on the part of these countries.

General Discussion

Twenty of thearticipating countries at Belgrade have received pledges totaling more thanillion in Bloc economic credits and grants, or more thanercent of all Bloc economic aid extended to the underdeveloped countries since, the program began Eleven of the countries have received all of the more thanillion io military aid extended by the Bloc. During the same period , the US has extended more thanillion in economic and military aid to the Belgrade countries, and5 US aid to these countries totals more thaolllloo for economic andillion for the military.

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With few exceptions, thoro is little directtoolween positions taken at the Belgrade conference by the participating countries and tho dogree to which they have become involved In Bloc economic or military assistance programs. Political considerations appear to have been the controlling factor behind these positions; theseIncludelll-deflocd orof national interest, personal and national prestigo, and other problems or principles peculiar to individual nations. Each loader interpreted Issues aod adopted positions in tho light of these considerations and tailored his ownof nonalignment to suit these concepts.

IfWestern orany Impact on the views expressed and the positions taken, it was ln reinforcing the peculiar forms of politicalblch generally have boon chosen by tho nonaligned countries prior to receipt of Bloc aid. Tbe more moderate ofsuch as India andaccustomod to taking positions which tbey feel support neither sido ln the cold war, honce should offend neither or both equally. The more rabid amongthose recently freed from some form of European domination, such as Guinea andaccustomed to taking anti-Western positions and to greeting each East-West Issue with an almost automatic bias, or at least suspicion, against the Western position. This tbey would do regardless of aid programs; even the more moderate Afro-Asians have only recently overcome thoir traditional bias against the West.

In some cases, particularly among the "giants" of the conference, the impact of aid was negligible or even Yugoslavia, with little bitter experience from Bloc aidrime recipient of US aid, adopted ananti-Western, generally pro-Soviet position. On tbe othor band, Nehru and Nasir, the former backed by both Western and Bloc aid and the latter heavily dependent ln both the economic and military spheres on continued large-scalo Bloc aid, adopted moderate stands, urging the US and USSR to rosolve their differences, but not siding with either

The West African states receiving significant amounts of aid from the Bloc tended to be more extreme onand more pro-Soviet on East-West lssuos, while older Asian neutrals like Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon, wblch havo had mixed experiences with Bloc aid, loaned toward It Is doubtful that Bloc aid was more than one of many factors ln arriving at these positions. Indonesia's President Sukarno, usually billed as one of the foremost

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spokesmen for the nonaligneds, drifted far to the left atcourse which was probably reinforced, if not prompted, by the extensive Bloc aid he has received,the commitments for modorn weapons which are desired for the campaign to "recover" West New Guinea from the Dutch

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With regard to the conference itselfp there were two schools of thought on where its attention should be focused. Those countries like lndiar Burma, Afghanistan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Sudan sought to draw the full strength of theto urging the groat powers to solve their problems without recourse to war and to impressing them that the nonallgned countriesital interest in theof peace. Others, like Indonesia, Iraq, Ghana,uba, andesser extent tho UAR, MoroccoMali and the Algerians, sought to focus the attention oT tho conference on the traditional Afro-Asian grievances summed up in the usual Leninist phraseology of antl-lmperlalism and Nehru's pre-emption of moderate leadership appears to have led Tito to attempt to take over leadership of the extremists by acting as their spokesman.

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Some countries among the extreme group worked tc their pet anti-colonial arguments included in the cor. ence documents. The final documentsompromise in which the general appeal for peace, addressed to Moscow and Washington, was offset by a longer document carrying most of the anti-imperialist line, but which acknowledged that classic colonialismying issue. It took note ofew specific anti-colonial issues, such as the Algerian and Angolan wars, and the question of foreign tjases in Tunisia and Cuba.

At the same time as this battle raged, another was under way between those who felt the conference documents should take strong substantive stands on major East-Westwhich usually reflected pro-Soviot or at least anti-Westernthose who believed thewould lose its moral force and flavor if it expressed judgements on substantive issues such as the German question.

The final conference documents also reflected this split,ictory indicated for those lod by Nehru who sought flexibility and not firm positions on East-West questions. All nuclear testing wasSoviet unilateralof tests was nottho great powers wore urged to resume the moratorium and disarmament negotiations, attention was called to the German problem, but only in the context of an appeal to avoid the use of force, andeneral statement endorsing "unity", self-determination.

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and independence for all nations. Nearly all members agreed on the need for reorganization of the UN, but few could accept--and some specificallySoviet "troika" concept for the Secretary General's office. Those who pressed for flexibility at the conference were India, Burma, the UAR, Saudi Arabia, the AlgerianGovernment, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Lebanon, Sudan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal, and Afghanistan. Those pressing forusually pro-SovietIraq, Cuba, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea and Yugoslavia.

judging the performance of the individual countries it should be noted that the conference had two public images: that conveyed by the unfettered, flamboyant speeches of the participants as they basked in the limelight of worldand that conveyed by the formal conference documents, which reflected the Tesults of hard bargaining and thefor unanimity. The speeches were much morethan the documents and many were anti-Westernense transcending even the usual anti-colonialist theme. Inthe positions of the individual countries, comment is first devoted to the public image and then to the*s" tactics in the bargaining behind the scenes

The following statements on each participant at the Belgrade conference Include summaries of aid received from the Bloc and from the United States. The figures arenoncomparable for the following reasons:

Bloc aid is compared only with US aid. In several cases, particularly for those countries formerly subject to the United Kingdom, considerable additional Western aid has been granted.

US aid includes grants, loans, and credits; Bloc aid consists almost exclusively of Credits.

US aid for themost part has been delivered or is in the process of being delivered; the US figures, consequently, contain relatively little in the way of future obligations. The Bloc figures, on the other hand in several important cases represent largely obligations for future assistance and in most cases future obligationsignificantof the total.

Bloc figures represent the total of economicresources available to the recipient country from the Bloc. In several cases, non-governmental assistance from the US and other Western sources of private capital is (or has been) of major significance to the recipient country.

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AFGHANISTAN

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

Bloc5

Afghanistan has accepted aid from both East and West,'but the Bloc's more0 million inand military aid is acknowledged to be of decisive importance to Kabul's development and defense, and hasira foothold for the Communist Bloc in the country. Moreover, the Afghans are currently inof seeking more aid for their Second Five-Year Plan and probably are to receive additional military aid, includingircraft. Bloc aid, along with Soviet propaganda support for Afghanistan in the Push-tun is tan dispute with Pakistan, could be used to argue for Afghanistan's pressing an extremist positionto the USSR. Prime Minister Baud, however, fell in with the moderates of the conference. He hit colonialism, advocateddmission to the UN, pressed for UN reorganization and extended recognition to the Algerian Provisional Government. On Germany, he deplored .the division of the country and the use of "policies ofrce" but avoided strong stands on East-West issues.

- generally sided with Nehru, agreeing toention of Pushtunistan in the conferenceor specific formulas forhe'Afghans did, however, support Cuban insistenceeference' to the Guantanamo naval base. Bloc .aid had no demonstrable effects on Afghanistan's position at Belgrade.

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ALGERIA

Aid, in millions of5

strongly supported by Soviet propaganda and with limited amounts of Bloc military and financialtho Algerians have no particular cause fora pro-Soviet line on East-West matters. Prime Minister Ben Khedda concentrated on his own struggle for Algerianreaping support for his fight from all, including specific reference to the issue in the conference documents. He laid strong emphasis on colonialism,of nuclear

tests, and condemned militarymuch

is known, although the extent of support ior Algeria, in the documfuggests strong politicking on the colonialism issue The limited assistance received from tho Bloc does not'dppear to have significantly affected the Algerian

BURMA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

"

Bloc5

Military

Burma has received little Soviet aid so far, but this year acceptedillion credit from Communist China which boosted it into one of tho more important recipients of Bloc aid; Rangoon has also been flirting with Blocfor military assistance. So far, though, Bloc aid haselatively minor role in tho country andexerts little or no influence on the government'sposture. u delivered the most statesmanlike address of the whole Belgrade conference, out-doing even Nehru-.on the importance of the peace issue and criticizing anticolonialism based on revenge apd racialism. Behind theu appears to have been Nehru's strongest aid in pressing for flexibility and moderation. Bloc aid had no apparent effect on tbe Burmese stand.

CAMBODIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars,5

'

An important recipient of US aid, Cambodia alsoassistance froa the Slno-Soviet Bloc. TheBloc aid at this stage should preclude it froa beinga minor factor in Influencing Cambodian foreignfact its function at tiaos has been to pressure tho USnew aid commitments. Sihanouk stressed the colonialalso hit hard on tho division of Germany, Vietnam,Laos. He criticized tho two "blocs" for their rolesand pressed for plebiscites in divided countries. arguedIcirmor it under tbe supervision ofto have been in the Nehru

camp, favoring flexible.cy in positions on East-West Issues.

CEYLON

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

Bloc5

Ceylon has accepted aid from both East and West but time has been so deeply involved vith the Blocas to jeapordize Its neutral position. Bloc aidare Important to Ceylon, but certainly notBandaranaikc called for an end to the war threatspeech at Belgrade, suggesting the demilitarizationand the need for negotiations between the She specifically criticized the Soviet decisionnuclear testing and Moscow's "troika" proposalsUN. She called for increased aid to thoboth Eastfor Chincso Communist

admission to theappears to have carried

little weight, buteiinxioly in the moderate camp. ,Bloc aid probably had little or no Influence on this position.

CONGO

Aid, in Billions of US dollars, fron:

Bloc5

Lato arrivals at the conference, Congo leaders Adoula and Glzenga created mixed impressions, as would be expected from their well-known positions prior to the gathering in Belgrade. Adoula's well-balanced, moderate speech and his support for the UN earned kudos from the moderate camp, while Glzenga's pro-occupation with Lumumba's ghost brought forth some short-lived emotion. Altbough Glzenga haasome financial assistance from the Bloc, as well as massive propaganda support, ho focused on Congolese problems and avoided pronouncements on other issues. Both Congo leaders arrived too late for most of the backstago activity, but Adoula earned special praise from Nehru for his balanced performance, while presumably Gizenga lined up vith the

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CUBA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

Bloc5

Dependent on the Sino-Sovlet Bloc for both its future development plans, for tho uconomdcthe country ns measured in torms of sugar sales, andmilitary assistance necessary for itsCastro regime has ample reasons fortrongposition. Sinces tho magnitude ofaid effort has grown, so has grown Cuba'sof the Bloc propaganda line on everytraight Communist-line speech on allurging special treatment, not of generalof specific issues such as testing, foreignthe same anti-Western,tlments, anda staunchly pro-Soviet posture throughout the Dorticos appears to have alienated most ofconferees, but gained mention of Guantanamo indocuments, apparently on the grounds that aissuo rated some specific mention. While itpossible to demonstrate that Cuba's position isresult of Bloc aid, it can bo argued thataid the Castro regime would not be able to assumetaken at Belgrade by Dorticos.

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CYPRUS

Aid, in nil lions ol US dollars,sinceS

Military

Cyprus was one of the five participants at the confer-once that has not received Bloc aid--although offers have been made--and has no reason for feeling beholden to the USSR Makarlos publicly condemned colonialism, Soviet tests, and the erection of barriers in Berlin. He called for *'lf-do-terraination to be appllod to Germany as elsewhere. Hakarios appears to have been among those counseling moder--atlon, although he probably carried little weight.

ETHIOPIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, froa:

Bloc since5

Ethiopia has accepted4 million in Blocbut relatively little has been accomplished underand the degree of Bloc influence is ratherSelassie expressed strong support for the USnified Germany, and for free access He said classic colonialismead issue inAfrica, buton such issues as "est Irianappears to have thrown his weight

with tho hvtun group in favor of flexibility in East-West negotiations, and of the conference focusing on peace issues.

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GHANA

Aid, In millions of US dollars, from:

BlocS

If thereirect correlation between foreignthe posltlons takenountry ln internationalwould seem prudent for Ghana to have followed aat the conference, as it has negotiations underadditional aid from both Bloc and Western sources. rimary target of the Bloc's economicAfrica. While currently cultivating Its existingAccra, Moscow standn ready to extend further aid if Although no military aid agreements are knownbeen concluded as yet, recent developmentsthe Bloc nay soon be active in that field also* doubtful, however, that this aid has been decisiveGhana's position in world affairs, althoughhas had some influence- Nkrumah at Belgradestrongly antl-colonial speech, and on East-Westfavored the Soviet line, especially onstressed the needemilitarized Germany, forandummit meeting between the US Betroika"or officialsthe UN Secretaryfor

n IK nd for heavy emphasis on the colonialism issue, but split with Kasir on criticism of Israel. Bloc aid seems to be only one of many factors in Nkrtimah's anti-Western position.

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GUINEA

Aid, in millions of US5

Guinea, strongly bound up with the Bloc through economic and military aid programs, was cast with Ghana, Indonesia, Yugoslavia,ew others as one of tho extremist,pro-Soviet participants at Belgrade. Foreign Minister Bevogui spoke most vigorously on colonialism, and on other questions fell in with the Nkrumah lino, both publicly and privately. Guinea's support for the Soviet Bloc has been evident for sometime and may well be derived in part from its growing dependence on Bloc aid and trade. It would be difficult to argue, however, that the aid program i3 tho reason for Guinea's present stance in East-West relations.

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INDIA

Aid, ln millions of US dollars, from:

Bloc5

Although India is the third largest recipient ofand the largest recipient of economicishas receivod even largerthe West, primarily the US. While continuing toaccept Bloc aid offers, Nehru's performance athis policy of nonalignment. eluctantalmost to tbe end, Nehru addressed his remarkspeace Issue, stressing the need for theto urge tho great powers to negotiate theirwithout committing tbe conference to specific standsGerman question. He said the present crisis lnrelations overshadows the issue of colonialism andsought to temper the violently anticolonlal linemany others. Be expressed regret at the Sovietrosume nucloar testing. On Germany, he asked forof the "fact" of two Gorman stressedfor free access toled the

moderates and was thewf the conference

documents. Foreign aid appears to have, at most, only an indirect effoct on Nehru's attitude; his desire to have both East and West continue to support India mayto his unwillingness to be sharply critical of cither ,

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INDONESIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

Bloc since

Military TOTAL

583

+

The second largest recipient of Bloc economic nndaid, Indonesia in all probability has beenthis support in adopting more favorable positions*tonot only at Belgrade, but at other times as well. 0 million in economic aid extended by theuse ln key areas of the country's Eight-Yearand with the three military services in0 million in military equipment andfrom the Bloc, the Indonesians areoorincur the wrath of Moscow. They mayeedSoviet largess with pro-Soviet gestures, butappear to be little more than manifestationsSukarno's peculiar brand of neutralism. shown an ususual willingness to meet Indonesianmilitary equipment on favorableand military aircraft, such asombers, all of which are still of primein tho Soviet arsenal. The Indonesians arefor the Bloc's all-out support for their claimsNew Guinea. onforence sponsor at Belgrade,declared in his major speech that the mostof world tensions is not the ideological clashgreat powor groups, but rather the continuation ofthereafter ho hammered awayimilar heolution on the basis ofsaid thattemporary" division of Germanythen so be it. On the UN, he stressed thereorganization to take account of the increasingof the neutrals. He omitted all reference totestiption t *vid merely voiced support forappears to have beenhe

violentspecially the Africans. as persuaded to omit mention of West New Guinea from tne documents While the causo-and-cffect relationship is more subtle than elaborated here, Bloc aid and the Communist support of Indonesian national goals probably have had significant effects on Indonesia's position between East and West.

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IRAQ

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

since4

Military TOTAL

has received more0 million in Blocand military aid since the revolution in the summerbrought Qasim to power. Prior to the revolt, Iraqaid exclusively from the West, but the Bloc hasalmost completely and is carryingide rangeln all key sectors of the economy. Moreover,are currently engaged In seeking additionalfrom the Bloc, probably including guided missiles,and probably more land armaments. Thesemay have exerted some influence on Iraq'sthe conference, although Baghdad's leftist approachlong before Belgrade. Iraqi Foriegn Ministerappears to have outdone himself, turning'innan ran "amazing performance."followed the Communist line,"played

heavily On anti-colonialism, and repeatedly denounced; Western positions while apologizing for those of theommunist Bloc, lie called for tho recognition of two German-ies and for general and complete disarmament, without mentioning the Soviet resumption of testing. He denounced Western economic assistanceover fornd generallytrong acceptance of Soviet positions on East-West issues. Although not one of the leading lights, Iraq strongly supported the extremist group, both publicly and privately. Bloc aid has probablyignificant influence on Iraqi policies.

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LEBANON

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

Bloc since5

Lebanon has received no aid from the Sino-Soviot Bloc. Prime Minister Salam oderate position at Belgrade, stressing the survival of the remnants of colonialism and citing Israelcenter of Imperialist infection" spreading throughout Asia and Africa. He called for UW reorganization to take account of the new members. On East-West Issues, he expressed dismay at the Soviet test announcement on the eve of the conference. Salam appears to have been in the Nehru canp behind the scenes, with some regard for Nasir's views as well.

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MALI

Aid, in millions of US5

Military

Mali has accepted substantial Bloc aid this yearthe time of the conference was engaged in working outagreement with Communist China. Bloc militaryhas begun to appear In significant quantities andlikely that the Communist footbold in West Africaa substantial program for Mali, evenestern assistance as well. AtPresident Keitaore moderate roletwo African neighbors--Ghana and Guinea. He urgedand neutralization for all divided countries,Germany, but said the conference should noteither East or West, 'ganlzation of the

UNeat forappears to have

carried little weight,her- are Indications his relative mildness in public spilled over in his work behind tho Bcenes. Bloc aid may have had some influence on Mali's position, but loss than might have been expected. Keita's position at Belgrade, however, contrasts sharply with the Mali delegation's more extremist performance at the preparatory sessions in Cairo.

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MOROCCO

Aid, in millions of OS dollars, from:

S"

Bloc5

Economic

A recipient of some Soviot military sidt Morocco's position at the conference refloctod no significant pro-Soviot leanings. King Hassan hit hard at colonialism, especially on Mauritania, but was eore modorate on East-West issues. He vigorously condemned French nuclear tests io the Sahara, and noted that the Soviot test announcementoccurod Just at the time when first stepsdisarmament wore expected. On Germany, he spoke of the neod for the ied nations to medlato betweenreat powers.

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NEPAL

Aid, in millions of US dollars, since5

Military

M.ih

A recipient of roughly equal amounts of aid fron tho and thrO-vaunlstKing

r^endri l" * supported flexibility

ln .ions and moderation on He decried attempts to change the status quothrough negotiation, and urged tho conference toa relaxa-tion of tensions rather than substantivecold war issues. While deploring the remnants ofhe pointed out the British example ofnew situations and regretted Prance's inability tothe British. On the UN, Mahendra denounced theprinciple, but suggested strengthening the bodyrepresentation and by the admission of CommunistInfluence of Bloc aid on Nepal's stand apparently

SAUDI ARABIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from":

Bloc5

Saudi Arabia has accepted no economic or militaryfrom the Bloc. Foreign Minister Suwaijilin general terms, except for strong attacksFrench and Israelis, and on East-West issues urgedto contribute somethingias toward either

voted with the moderates, except on the refeisnce to Israel."

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JBLKfcJ"

SOMALI REPUBLIC

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

Bloc5

Military

The Bloc has made considerable progress ineconomic relations with the Somali Republic,n long-term credits thisaid probably will be forthcoming. howcvor, generally sided with the conferencerejected taking substantive stands for one side or He spoke ln general terms on the Germana peaceful settlement. Hetrong UNpraised the UN operations in the Congo, and asked who wish to alter the present structure of the UNto reconsider. He attacked Portugese andand declared the principle ofbeolonial territories, as wellto have been with the

moderates on oost lSb.cd and showed no inclinations toward favoring Soviet positions in East-West issues. Bloc aid probably played no appreciable role in deciding theepublic's positions at Belgrade,

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SUDAN

Aid, in Billions of US dollars, froa:

Bloc since5

Sudan, which recentlyillion Soviet credit, avoided positions either pro-Soviet or violently anti-Western and generally held to the views of tho Nehru moderates. Abboud's speech was temporatc and reasonable stressed the neod for UN reorganization,ost ban. and for Peiping's admission to the UN; he omlf-ed all reference to Berlin or the German question, Abboud appears to have worked well with tho . oth tho "flexibility" and peace Issues. Sudan'sprobably was not affected by foreign aid.

TUNISIA

Aid, in Billions of US dollars, froa:

Bloc5

Military

Tunisia only recently entered into its first important aid agreement with theillion offer from the USSR.inhas received welluarterillion dollars in US economic aid. As expected, Bourguiba hit French colonial polV es hare' -t, and omitted mention

of Germany or .urguiba appears to have

been with the conferenc .iwucca n most questions, but was said to bo out of his element among the nonallgneds. Be successfully pressed for mention of Bizertc ln the confer-once documents. While Bourgiba publicly stated histo accept Bloc aid during the Bizerte crisis, he is not Involved in any significant economic or ellitarywith the Bloc and showed no sign of favoring pro-Soviet positions. The limited aid extended to the Bloc does not appear to have affected the Tunisian position.

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UAH

Aid, in millions ol US dollars, from:

Bloc5

A sponsor of the gathering andof its "big five" personalities, Nasir generally focused on the anti-colonial issue; he was anti-French, anti-Portuguese, of course anti-Israeli, andegree anti-American. He deplored blocs in general, as well as the artificial division of Germany, and he specifically condemned the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. Behind the scenes, Nasir supported Nehru on the need for the conference to avoid substantive stands on East-Vest issues. He workedtrong anti-colonial statement, while giving way toild referenco to Palestine. While the UAR is the largest single recipient ofs currently in process of acquiring such advanced military items as guided missiles and high-performance aircraft from the USSR under new military aid pacta, its positions at Belgrade, while stronglyon colonial issues, were not pro-Soviet in the manner of several other participants. While Bloc aid may cause Cairo to be circumspect on East-West Issues, particularly the Berlin problem, Nasir hasdisavowed those who argue ho must temper bis anti-Communism because of the .economic and military support he receives from the Bloc. His stature among the neutrals appears to have been enhanced by his conduct at the Nasir, along with Nehru, rime exampleonaligned leader who continues to receive entenslve aid from the Bloc, but who continues to steer his own course between East and West. His support of the Bloc was significantly less than his dependence on Bloc military supplies, including modern weapons systems. Bis position appears, at most, to be but indirectly affected by Bloc aid ,

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YEMEN

Aid, in millions of US5

Yemen is almost totally dependent on the Bloc for economic and military assistance and has tightly bound up its modest development efforts with Soviet and Chinese aid programs. ightweight at the conference, Yemenito the UN Prince Hassan, spoke primarily on colonialism, hitting hard at both the French and British. He called for reorganization of the UN and for an end to thorace, but avoided involvement in East-West issues, be appears to have followed Nasir's lead. Yemeni su,.ort for the Soviet position was less complete than is Yemeni dependence on Bloc economic support, which did notemonstrable effect on the Yemeni attitude at Belgrade.

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YUGOSLAVIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

Bloc4

Military TOTAL

T

A recipient of more thanillion in USmilitary aid, Yugoslavia: has received onlyhe Soviet Bloc and has had0 million inby the Bloc only to be cancelled or allowed to Despite the disparity in aid from East and West,disillusioning experiences with tho Bloc,with, and ln fact led. the conference extremistsgenerally pro-Soviet positions on the keyEast-West relations. As conference host, Titoonce ln statesmanlike tones once issue,second time in an anil-colonial. anti-Wes era, andmood. Ills views on most questions were wellthe conference, but thoith whichthem surprised many. to have

sought leadership of thence c .mistsounter to Nehru, pressingro-Soviet line on nuclearand the German issue, but in the end being forced to give in to the moderates. Yugoslavia is perhaps the best illustration of large-scale economic and military aid playing no discernible role in influencing positions adopted at Belgrade.

BRAZIL/ECUADOR/BOLIVIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

Economic Military TOTAL

US sitico5

ECUADOR US5

4 97

BOLIVIA US5

Although all threo of these countries have received Bloc aid overtures, particularly during the past year, none have yet accepted any long-term Bloc oconomlc aid, by their observer status, and in the caso of Brazil undercut by the recent departure of Quadros, these countries appear to have worked behind tho scenes on the side of moderation, but their impact was negligible by all indications. However, the Bloc's attempt to curry favor in Latin America appears to have strengthened their sentiments for Joining tho nonaligned nations.

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