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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
- 1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERYOF FREE WORLD COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US AND UK
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The {allowing Intelligence organltattons participated in the preparation ot this estimate: Thf Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of Slate, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Stag, and AEC.
Concurred In by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
oneptember HSlre The Director ofand Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 'Intelligence),of the Navy; the rfi.nifa.it Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative la the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and theof the National Security Agency. The AssistantFederal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
L GENERAL CAPABILITIES
Weapons Capabilities .
Capabilities
JX PROBABLE PROGRAMS
Considerations
Candidates
Candidates and Special
. 1
. 1
3
3
S
. S
. 5
6 6
India
Japan
West Germany
Western European Groupings .
90
A; ESTIMATED CCSTS OF DEVELOPING ANNUCLEAR
.HET
SISCRET
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES OF FREE WORLD COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US AND UK
the problem
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of Free World countries other than the us and uk with respect to the development of an operational nuclearoth nuclear weapons and compatible deliveryver the next decade.
<NOTE: In this paper we deal with the potential of certain individual Free World countries and certain groupings of them to develop an operational nuclear capability at present levels of external assistance, the likelihood of their initiating programs, and also the forms such programs might take. Any significant change in the level of external aid would clearly alter the basic estimates in regard to timing, likelihood, and form, contained herein.)
J
!
The prerequisites to developing aweapons program are becomingavailable to nonnuclear states. Uranium is easier to obtain; manyare acquiring research and power reactors and are training technicians; information on weapons technology is more widespread. Nevertheless, theon deciding toeapons program are formidable. At the present state of the art, the most limited weapons program would cost in the hundreds of million dollarsoderate program of sophisticated weapons and delivery systems would run into the billions. We estimate that over the next several years
'The words "opcrailonal nuclear capability arc used with this meaning throughout this paper.
there will be no technologicalwhich would significantly alter the complexity and costs of these tasks. Furthermore, decisions onuclear weapons program remain profoundly influenced by psychological, political, and military considerations.
2.made tne decision to developnuclear capabilities. Assumingof outside aid, we estimateas follows:
a. France will almost certainly continue its program, and, if itthe difficulties shown in1 tests, it will probably have an initial op-
erational nuclear capability using light bombers and compatible fission bombs. Provided Francearge-scale etTort. by the end of the decade it couldaried strike capability usingmissiles with ranges up. with either high-yield fission or thermonuclear warheads, and possibly nuclear-powered missile submarines. Loss of the Sahara testing sites could create major problems for the French.)
produce an operational1 are Sweden and India.
is not likely to. If it then decided toweapons program, it could probablya device, have adeliverable byear orand fission warheads. missiles byof the decade. )
India decided within the nexttwo toeaponsodest capability, usingand fission weapons, bydecision by India to initiate awould probably be made onlyCommunist Chinese first explodedand if Communist Chinesebecame more truculent
e believe that no ether Free World country has made the decision touclear weapons program. Among the countries which might do so in time to
c believe it unlikely that any other Free World country or possible grouping of countries will initiate weaponsduring the next several years. Even if they were to decide to do so, we believe that none except Canada couldest device for atears after decision and could probably not, on their own, develop the types of weapons and delivery systems suitable to their needs before the end of this decade., Table II,
NMD
DISCUSSION
GENERAL CAPABILITIES A. Nuclear Weapon Capabilitieshe minimum requirement* for theand production of nuclear weapon* include: (a) accessupply of natural uranium; (b) the ability to separate weapon graderom natural uranium Ot lo pa-tract the plutonium produced In aand (c) the scientific and technical ability to design and fabricate tlie weapon. As indicated in Table I. these generalcan, or could within the period of this estimate, be metumber of countries. Moreover, as world uranium production and commercial sales of power reactors expand, it appears likely that. In absence of effective internationalountry without domestic sources of natural uranium will be able to acquire I: It is also likely that any country will be able lo obtain reactors which could be used for plutonium production, and could theoretically acquire the technical ability lo produce atew crude weapons. Whilenumber of countries supplyingto others impose restrictions on Its use and ultimate disposition, sources which are willing to sell without restrictions areand some purchasers are reluctant toto limitations on use.t Is theoretically feasibleountry which has produced weapon grade fissionable materials to design anduclear weapon without testing However, anweapon would be of uncertain reliability unless the producer hid been supplied with the detailed designreviously tested weapon Hence we believe it highly unlikely that any country would manufacture and stockpile weapons of original design without first having conducted tests. The finding of suitable test sites wouldery difficult problem for most of these countries. While countries could theoretically conduct nuclear tests underground, auch testing wouldignificant increase In costs, considerable time delays, and reduced diagnostic returns.
considerable time would elapse.
etween the decisionountry toa nuclear weapons program and the time when the first crude weapons arc produced.
This would
SELECTED INDICATORS
XXX- -Major
COUNTRY
France .
West Germany .
Italy
etherlands Norway Canada
Sweden
I
OF NUCLEAR WEAPON PRODUCTION CAPABILITY
Domestic Availability ot Uranium* XXX
X
Nuclear Research Program XXX
xxx
XX XX XX XX XXX
X XX
Nuclear Power ProgramX
p
X XX XX
J?
X X
Industrial Resources Capacity xxx xxx
xxx
XX
XX XX X
xxx
X XX
XX XX XX XX
with which JSoU can purchase uranium ore either with or without restricts on Its use oreet text.
Australia
true even in the caseroupingoint nuclear research and power program. This time would varyew yearsecade dependingountry's level of nuclear technology, itsindustrial and scientific potential, the availability of testing sites and type ofput sued, as well as the importance and urgency it might attach to the acquisition of such weapons In most cases, the bulk ot this time would probably be needed toand operate the main Installations for obtaining weapon grade materials, either plutonlunieactorrom an isotope separation plant.
As the number of power andountry increases, thefor producing plutonium will increase, which could reduce the time between decision and the availability of nuclear weapons. However, it is highly unlikely that countries which have not already initiated plutonium production programs could accumulateamounts of weapon grade materials in the next several years, given the presenton the use of purchased uranium In many cases, and even more Importantly, the absence of plutonium separation plants.
Furthermore, the steps betweenirst crude weapon nnd developing more sophisticated weapons are long and costly. If moreoken capability Is aimed at.isotope separation facilities for theof weaponould bea necessity in view of thecost of producing large quantities of plutonium. Advanced weapons development would require extensive testing. Moreover, in the caseountrymall capacity to produce weapon grade material, testing would consume material which would otherwise be available for weapons production.
that thereajor effortan operational nuclearoutside aid continues at roughly whatto be current levels, and thatmeasures placed upon bothand reactors remain effective for theyears, Table II below indicatestime periods lhat variousrequire toirst nuclearActual years arc given for France which has already tested, I
me uiiicr countries, The Time periods estimated are bosed upon the assumption that thewill be initiated sometime In the next year or two.
hese dates and time periods are also based on our estimate that there will be no significant technological breakthrough in the next several years which would significantly alter the complexity or economic costs ota nuclear capability. An example ofossible technological development would be the perfecting of the gas centrifuge process for Isotope separation. Compared to present separation methods, this process would require less electric power, be adaptable to small capacity production, and be more easily concealed. An advance of this kind would increase the number of countries which could afford to produce weapons, but would probably not advance Lhe dates suggested in Tabic II.
TABLE ii
ESTIMATED TTME KHjl IKED FOR SELECTED COI'NTRIES TO PBODl'Ct AST NUCLEAR DEVICE
DEVICE
tested mmo-imii
ears artcr decision
ear* afterears alterears alterears afterears alter decision
WMD
Delivery Capabilities
ii operational nuclear capability requires not only nuclear weapons, bui also the ability tohese weaponseasonable degree of accuracy against potential targets The specific delivery requirements ofcountries vary considerably, beingln large partountry's geographic position and the defensive capabilities of the potential enemy, f
' On the other hand, most of the European nations and Canada would requireand long-range systems to giveapability against the nearest major Soviet targets.
abilities of the various countriesa suitable delivery system, andtune required to do so. also vmryAll the countries listed inprobably could produce or acquire somedelivery capability by the time theirof nuclear weapons becameHowever,ew of thesebe able during the nextears toand produce on their own suitableaircraft, and cruise-type ormissiles. Even the more advancednow lacking modern deliveryprobablyears toproduce limited numbers ofor shorter, andears to develop IRBMs Moreover,ihe development of deliveryisthrough lack oforgreater thethe defensive capabilities ofwould also Increase, thussophistication needed In the
H. PROBABLE programs A. General Coniideralion*
the above review indicates thecapabilities of various countriesof developing an operationalit does not answer the question whether they will actually do so. Decisions to go ahead onrogram, or to carry outrogram once launched, will dependomplex of considerations bothand international. These include in the case of any specific country the nuture of its political relations with other states. Itsmiliiary requirements, and general psychological and emotional factors such as the intensity of the desire to increase national prestige, the domestic opposition to theof nuclear weapons, etc. Theburden ofrogram would in all casesajor factor to be considered sincerogramew crude weapons and an unsophisticated delivery system would cost several hundred millionore ambitious program, involving modern aircraft or missiles with compatible warheads, would require expenditures of up to several billions of dollars. (Seeor more details on the costs of various types of weapons andsystems.)
The weight of the factors mentioned above is not fixed and may change as costs and difficulties change and the political-strategic factors alter. The prospect of an agreement among the major powersuclear test ban, for example, especially if it were viewedorerunner to broader disarmament steps, would undoubtedly strengthen forces opposed to the spread of nuclear capabilities.pessimism as to the likelihood of any realistic disarmament agreement could in some casesweden, India) tend toopposition to the acquisition of anuclear capability.
Despite these unccrtainlies, wc believe il possible to suggest which considerations will probably have most weight in particularand to indicate their likely course for the next several years at least. Mostconsidered In this paper are unlikely to be able to develop an operational nuclear capability in the period of thisecision is made shortly.
ET
Unlikely Candidoles
e believe It unlikely that Belgium, the Netherlands. Norway. Switzerland. Australia. Italy, and Canada will Initiate Independentweapons programs in the next few years. For the smaller countries ln thu group the costs ofinimum program suitable to their geographic location would beeven if spread0 years, and would require substantial increases in presentSuch increases would probablysimultaneous cut-backs ln high priority economic and other military programs. Even Canada and Italy, despite their considerably greater potential, would feel the economic squeeze of such programs.
IB. Moreover, these countries probably do note possibilityucleardeemed necessary for theirmay be obtained in time more cheaply and easilyajor ally or friendly power. In most of these countries, moreover, andin Norway and Canada, theretrong and persistent domestic opposition to the creationuclear capability and to the spread of nuclear weapons. However, at the same time many of these countries will probably continue to improve Iheir overall capabilities In the nuclear field and develop their present peaceful programs with one eye cocked to the future possibility lhat they may eventually decide to develop an operational nuclear capability Independently, or. Ifcircumstances should be favorable,with olher more advanced powers.
C. likely Condido'ei and Special Gates
pecial considerations apply to thecountries or groupings withto develop independent operationalcapabilities.
have already made the decision to developapability. OtherJapan, and West Germany -have almost certainly notecision to develop an independent capability. They have, however, tbe overall potential and have nuclear and missile activities underway which would facilitate the carrying oulrogram to develop an independent operational nuclear capability. Finally, with the continuing trend toward European cooperation andin various fields Europeanin the nuclear military fieldossibility.
I Nevertheless,
France is continuing io picas ahead with the development of an operational nuclearPresent plutonium productionIs sufficientissionear, depending upon the yield, and willIncreasen addition, the Frenchaseous di Must on plant under construction which could make weaponvailable. The French program alms firstomber deliveryta be followedissile systemange.
Ut will probably have an Initialnuclear capabilityaircraft,ewa supersonic jet lightGaulleby the end of the decade France willvaried nuclear strike capability usingIRBMs with either high-yieldthermonuclear warheads, and possiblymissile submarines.
o long as de Gaulle remains in power wc see little likelihood of any slackening in French determination to carry through the program. While de Gaulle would probably welcome some external assistance, provided it was made available without military orconditions, we believe that France Is capable of carrying through its presentwithout outsideuccessor regime, would probably be unable orto carry on the program as vigorously as
:Sce, "French Nuclear Weapons and Deliveryated IIECRET, for further detail.
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de Gaulle. As lime goes by. however. It will become increasingly unlikely that anygovernment,adical leftwould wish to abandon the elTort.
tench progress is heavily dependent on continued testing of both nuclear andcomponents. Loss of testing sites in the Sahara would create major problems for the French program, the resolution of which would be costly and time consumingevelopment could lead to basicIn the Frenchafter de Oaulle leaves -and could possiblyIn greater reliance on multilateral ar-ranKcments within NATO.
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Sweden
Sweden haa so far avoided making any clear-cut decision In regarduclearprogram. Military leaders and somepolitical elements, as wellew leaders of the governing Social Democratic Party (SDP) have agreed that an operational nuclear capability would discourage Sovieton Sweden, alone or In connection with hostilities between Soviet and NATO forces. Moreover, basic nuclear research of high quality is continuing, and there areacility for plutoniumis In the planning stage. However, the economic and financial costs, the strongwithin the bulk of Lhe SDP, and the fact that it will probably lie at least several years before enough domestically produced plutonium becomes available even tuest, have all combined tolear-cut decision in abeyance.
The present government ia likely to remain in power for several years more at least, and it has taken the position that no decision will be made3 on lhc question of whether or not to direct its nuclear program toward lhe production of weapons. If at that time the international climate appeared to be calm, especially if positive steps towardhad been agreed upon by the majorthere were reasonable hopes that one wouldis unlikely that the Swedes would decide touclear weapons program. In the absence of men reassuring factors and especially If otherhad already decided to produce nuclear weapons, the pressure touclear weapons program would probably grow sharply. In the eventapidof the international situation, the Swedes might prior3ecision toeapons program. However, evenrash basis wc believe they could not have enough domestically produced weapon grade material toest.
weden's basic aim In developing annuclear capability would be torespect for its traditional policy of ncutrahty. Sweden recognizes, however, that its only potential enemy Is the USSR and hence their delivery aystcnu would befor defensive, relatively short-range weapons. Given this aim, lhc considerable costs involved, and its geographic proximity to Soviet targets, Sweden would probablyimited program involving development and production of high performance jet aircraft and shorterissiles witli compatible fission warheads. ecision were made lo go aheadnd given Sweden's advanced nuclear research program, its nuclear power program and its industrial resources, we believe it couldenough weapon grade plutonium toH to start testingoeapon deliverable byear or so afterwards, and missile systems carrying compatible fission warheads
Indta
he psychological and political factorsany nuclear weapons programto be strong in India The cost andto divert resources from presentprograms also constitute significant barriers. On the other hand, there Isounting Indian concern with Communist China's foreign policy,rowingthat probable Communist Chinesein the nuclear weapons field endangers
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D
security, prestige, and ability toa neutral posture.
are indications that India isimproving its overall capabilitiesnuclear field, possibly in anticipationfuture decision to develop ancapability may be required.three nuclear reactors in operation,which0 MW type constructedcapable ofof plutonium sufficient foror twoear. While Indiato some restrictions regarding thethis reactor and the disposition of itshas indicated its desire to avoid such
rl i" : r. de
velopmcnl of uranium sources which would makendependent of suchlutonium separation plant is also beingigned and preliminary construction has been startedompletion date setlt is unlikely that it will be.
The explosionuclear device byChina would greatly strengthen the view in India, particularly in conservative and military circles, that thereressing need for ar. Indian nuclear capability if India is to avoid either bending to Communist Chinese pressure or being forcedosition ofdependence on Western external support. Even so, we believe India would not decide to devote its nuclear facilitieseaponsiy convinced that no broad disarmament agreements were possible, or that Communist Chinese foreign policy was clearly growing more truculent.ecision would probably be more likely if. at the time, Nehru had left the political scene and had been succeededight-wing Congress Party Government. If such awere launched, the antinuclear voices would continue Strong, and if the programto encounter significant snags orexcessive casts, the program might be cut back, if not actually abandoned.
in viewie considerable economic costs, and India's limited technological capabilities in the missile field, any independent Indian effort would be likclv to concentrate on the creationodest stockpile of plutonium weapons and an aircraft delivery capability. Providedecision were made in the next year or two, India could haveapability sometime. While India now has the Utltlsh Canberra bomberapability toombloadoundsistance ofho Canberra could not canya bombarge diameter and it would take India several more years te develop its own nuclear weapon compatible with theHowever. India would probably expect to be able to procure foreign aircraft withnuclear carrying capabilities.
Japan
Qlren the state of Japan's scientific and technical advancement and lis industrialwe believe that Japan could probably have its first nuclear device in five or six years, if i'. decided in the next year or so to embarkuclear weapons program, and that It could have its first weapon deliverable byear or so later. It could also probablymissiles with ranges up. in about tho same time and compatible fission warheads for such missiles
It Is highly unlikely, however, thnt Japan at this time has any serious intentions ofuclear weapons program of Its own. Antlmllltary, particularly antinuclear, attitudes remain extremely strong among the populace and susceptible to exploitation by socialists and Communists. The diversion of resources from development and welfarewould not be politically feasible. There is. moreover, considerable support for continued reliance on US military support, and doubts in the minds of manyuclear capability would promote Japanese security, given Japan's highly concentrated population and exposed geographical posiUon.
hese attitudes and views could change in the coming years withf It became Increasingly clear that progress on International disarmament was unlikely. If Communist Chinauclear device, if other countries, notably India, decided to develop nuclear weapons, or
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confidence in the US alliance decreased. In such cases, pressures for an independentwould probably increase. Nevertheless, barring the unlikely return to poweright-wing authoritarian government, wethat Japan will notuclear weapons program of its own in the next few years.
'ii'esi Germany
'Ml. We do not believe lhat the West Germans now have any definite plans for developing an independent nuclear capability. The foreign and military policy of West Germanylo rest on the principle that the country's security against the Soviet Bloc dependstrong and cohesive NATO in which US power and leadership play the cen-Lral role. Moreover, the obstacles Lo initialingrogram are considerable. Treatyand lack of space for testinghurdles lo an independent effort. Furthermore, touclear weapons program in the near future would probably Involve serious political dissension bothwest Germany, and hi the Westernand actrovocation to the USSRime when the overall West Germanstrength is still limited.
On the other hand, West German interest In improving the strength of Wests. and sensitivity lo any indications lhat West Germanyecond-class military status in lhe Western Alliance, eonlinue lo increase. Moreover, as West Germany continues to grow in strength and importance, such feelings are likely to mount, especially if followingdeparture present Defense Minister Strauss moves into greater political
7 West Germany hasuclear power and research program as well as research in missiles. Of particular interest is Lhe work which the West Germans have done on isotope separation including the gas centrifuge process. If this latter process hears fruit, the separationrom uranium ore would be greatly facilitated. West German participationcgram will also give Westiiiiy p. boost in the missile field and help remove what gaps may still exisl betweeni oilier major European countries on this score.
e believe that West Germanyyears
if itecision torude weapon suitable for delivery by large aircraft and could also develop in that period missiles with causes up. Weapons suitable for missile warheads, or for delivery by suchaircraft as. would probably take several additional years to develop and would require considerable testing.
or not Wesl Germanya decision will depend less upon Itscapabilities than upon broadermen Is, and the degree ofsecurity which iL derives from itsAlliances. For the present weGermany will continue to seek tlieof nuclear capability throughits allies. Initially, and so long asdoctrine remains responsive toWest Germans believe to be their security
V K NATO -r'-
ultilateral nuclear capability under arrangements which would give the West Germans as much voice as other NATOin the use, If nol lhe direct control, of nuclear warheads. If frustrated on these matters. West Germans might look to some form of European cooperative effort Inan ojiei alional nuclear capability.al! these, the West Germans might bo then tempted to initiate an independent nuclear program, or even to consider some political accommodation with Ihe Bloc. Such ahowever, is unlikely lo develop unless there are fundamental alterations in lhcand nature oi the NATO Alliance which are seemingly sr. conflict with what the West
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needs.
Western European Groupings
cooperation between France and
thin the 'i'aM'v-
work Of a larger continental European
rJ
arrangement, would reduce both the time and economic burden Involved ln developingnuclear capabilities. Moreover, such cooperation would remove or mitigate substantially the major political, legal, and technical obstacles te an independent West German effort. European cooperative action on many levels, especially within Ihc Common
Market grouping but also extending outside this group In matters of defense production, and probably space activities, tends tothe climate for cooperation in this field. Nevertheless, we believe it unlikely that any significant cooperation ln the nuclear fieldcontinental European countries willduring the next several years.
FCRET
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SE T
annex a
estimated costs of developing an operational nuclear capability
GENERAL
cost of attaining any given leveloperational nuclear capability hicountry is subject to so manyIt cannot be estimated with any realHowever, It is possible to estimateorder of magnitude ofa prudent planner at the presentthe art would probably have to befund, assuming reasonable success Indevelopment, and production.that over the next several yearsbe no technological breakthroughsignificantly alter the complexityof this task.
2 As indicated below, the initiation fee for the nuclear club would probably vary considerably depending upon the class of membershipinimum program,xplosionevice, productionew crude weapons and the acquisition of aircraft able to deliver the weapons, could be pursuedotal expenditure of0uch more ambitious program, such as that of the French would probably Involve expenditures of at least several billions of dollars.
MINIMUMNuclear Weapons
inimumow-yield all-plutonium fissionear to beby aircraftombers or modified commercial aircraft) could be obtained in as little as six years with an Initial investment ofillion. The breakdown of coats lorrogram would be roughly asillion for research andillion for the operation of research and test establishments;illion for the acquisition of materials and theof the plutonium production and separation facilities. Additional outlaysillion would be required for each ofeapons which could be produced annually.
B. Delivery Vehictoi
4 The actual costs involved in developing or modifying available aircraft would depend upon the sophistication of the deliverydesired. However, If the requirement were only to obtain from others an aircraft big enough torude weapon, the costs would be small. The cost ofsuch an aircraft from scratch would, of course, be large.
ODERATE PROGRAM: THE FRENCH EXAMPLE
A. Nuclear Weapon* and Warheadsccording to official French figures, France spent in the0 the rough equivalent1 billion on its whole nuclear program, including peaceful uses. Wcthat of this sum0 million has been allocated to such initial Investments as research and development test facilities, uranium mines and processing equipment, the construction of reactors and separation plants; the remainder has been used for operating the uranium mines, ore processing facilities,and the chemical separation plants asso-
12
elated with plutonium production. From this program. France haslutonium production capability sufficientear, the beginnings of separation facilities. and the ability to produce plutonium weaponsostillion each. At the same time, France hasignificant step toward the level of capability necessary toide variety ofIncluding thermonuclear types.rovided the French continue to press aheadrogram intended to giveonsiderable quantity and variety ofsizes and yields, the annual costs willcontinue to rise substantially over the next decade, especially if testing is pursued under restricted conditions.
fl. Delivory Capabilities
he French effort In the delivery field has been focused on the MIRAGE IV light jet bomber which is now In production.5 France will probably haveuch bombers operationalost of somewhere between 0 and 0 million. In the meantime, however, the main focus of French effort in the delivery field will shift to missiles. The actual outlays for missiles will obviously depend upon the types, sophistication, and numbers sought. Given the indicated French interest lnhort-range mlullc, an IRBM,Polaris" type system, thecosts of such programs could run into the billions of dollars- For example,the Intent toimited number ofmissiles tn each class, and using US programs as rough analogues, the cost. missile could be0 million for an IftMB,0Polaris" system, comprising severalsubmarines and underwater launched missiles, could costillion.
Original document.
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