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SUBJECT: SNIEl: SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS "
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet tactics In the Berlin.crisis over the next fev months, with particular reference to reported Soviet intentions to take radical unilateral action during this period.
BACKGROUND
A recent reportource, judged at this tlsae to be reliable. States that Soviet and Satellite forces will be broughtigh state of combat readiness ln exercises "of unprecedented scope" beginning in early October and lasting for one nonth. This source supplies many details supporting this theme, citing personal observation and the remarks of senior officials, mostly military officers. He reports learningenior commander that Khrushchev's present policy is to hold back, putting the brakes on international tensions until the Party Congress, at which time he will abruptly go overighly
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militant line. According to thiseparate peace treaty with East Germany will then be signed innedlately after the Congress. Without specifically ao stating, the report implieshallenge to Allied access will follow promptly upon the signing of tbe treaty. It ls thought that perhaps the West will "swallow the seeond pill" (the first having been the border closure inf not. Bloc forces, alreadyigh state of readiness, will "strike first if the situation warrants."*
THE KSTIKATE
1. The fourth quarter is normally the peak of the annual military training cycle in the USSR and Eastern Europe. In addition, there la an unusual stress on readiness at tbe present time, and theeptember announceoent of exercises by the Warsaw Pact forces suggests that these will bearger scale than on any previous occasion. Such preparations are clearly Intended to convince the West of Communist militaryeadlncBS, and determination in the Berlin crisis and to increase pressure on the Weot either to make concessions or to acquiesce
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* We have examined closely the possibility that the source could be, wittingly orhannel for deception anterial-Our present judgment, based mainly on the sensitivity and volume of tbe material he is providing, is that this is unlikely.
in Camunist eiicroechnenta. They axe also aimed atthe USSR's Military posture for the period of crisis and uncertainty which the Sovleta foresee. But the preparations of which we are at present aware fron all sources ofare not ofcope and nature as toonclusion that the USSR Is "peaking" all its forces for general war in the near future.
2. On the basis ofrevious reporting and Independent confirmation of portions of this report, we accept tbe source's statements concerning measures of military preparedness aa correct In many although not in all respects. He is notosition, however, to report reliably or completely onand decisions of tbe highest military and political bodies in Moscow. His statementsecision toeparate treaty In October and, if conditions warrant, to strike an Initial military blow, appear to us to fall into the category of speculation arising from knowledge he hoe acquired about contingency military planning.
3- It is evident that the Soviets must have contingency plans for the next phases of the Berlin crisis, but we doubt strongly that the USSR has made any Irrevocable decisions
concerning the timing ofseparate treaty and of unilateral steps thereafter against the status quo In Berlin. Ue continue to believe that the USSR regards negotiations aa the least risky method of advancing toward its objectives, and also that Khrushchev still hopes that the threat of unilateral action
will force the Allies to make at least some concessions to hla demands. And, if theae hopes fall to materialize, he bae at hiside range of unilateral actions, each of which, be believes, le limited enough to createinimal risk of forceful Western response, yet each of which can bring thetep closer to ita alas.
h. Currently the USSR la seeking toore positive attitude toward negotiations; it bas ceased to reiterate deadlineseparate treaty and baa indicated some flexibility in its approach to negotiations. These maneuvers are designed ln part to appear responsive to the calls for peaceful compromise emanating from the Belgrade Conference and the General Assembly. They are also Intended to encourage thoae sectors of opinion which are urging the Allies to consider concessions to Soviet demands. Perhaps moot important, they are intended to probe the Allied position ln order to determine whether negotiations are
likely to bring same progress toward their objectives. Veto believe that the Sovlete prefer to enter negotiations before undertaking major unilateral steps oreparate treaty with the GDR.
Along with this, however, Khrushchev hat several times voiced concern that the Allies would use negotiations merelyevice for stalling. He recognizes that, once formal talks are under way, any move on his part to break them off and turn to unilateral measures might, solidify NATO unity and forfeit the support for his Berlin policy which he has tried to develop among the non-aligned nations. However, he would feel it ncceoaary to respond positivelyormal Allied tender of negotiations. But he would also attempt to assure himself in preliminary discussions that some advance toward his objectives would resujt fromonference. If he felt that the prospects for this were poor, be would probably proceed at some pointeparate peace treaty, in parteans of bringing tbo Allies under greater pressure to talk on Soviet terms
If the Soviets decide toajor unilateral move against Allied rights in Berlin, they would clearly wish to betate of maximum military readiness at the time, both to
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deter the Alliesorceful reaction and to be prepared for any eventuality should deterrence fail. They recognize the dangeroituation in vhlch the West would feel itself confronted with the alternatives of deep humiliation or ashowdown, because they realize thatituation might escape their control. They have deliberately left unclear the question of whether they would, immediatelyeace treaty back up with force their demands for new access procedures. The source's references to "striking first" are ambiguous and could mean any level of military action, possibly undertaken onlyudgment was reached that the West was about to resort to force locally. We think it very unlikely, however, that the Soviets would "strike first" in the sense ofajor military offensive, unless they were convincedarge-scale Western attack was inevitable and imminent.
7- In conclusion, we believe that the course of action outlined in the present reportsignatureeparate peace treaty in late October followedrompt challenge to Allied accesshas been construed by the source and others from their knowledge of military preparations. We do not believe that firm
decisions of this kind have been taken by the top Soviet
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leadership. But the considerations outlined above do suggest that the higher state of military readiness to be achieved in October/November will makeavorable period, from the Soviet standpoint, for limited unilateral moves against Western rights ln Berlin, If their prospects for advancing toward their objectives at that time via negotiations appear dim-
Original document.
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