1
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER1
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
THE SOVIET THREAT TO IRAN AND THE CENTO AREA
S*bmttU4 b* the DIRECTOR OP CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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THE SOVIET THREAT TO IRAN AND THE CENTO AREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet Intentions toward Iran and the CENTO area generally,of the Middle Eastern CENTO members lo Soviet threats, and likelyto certain possible developments in that area.
THE ESTIMATE
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE CENTO AREA
During the past month or so. coincident with rising East-West tensions over Berlin, the USSR has stepped up its campaign of intimidation against the Middle Easternof the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) The increase In propaganda and diplomatic pressure has been greatest against Iran and least against Turkey. Although in different contexts. Iran and Pakistan have each been threatened with Soviet militaryThc Sovicl campaign has not succeeded In disrupting the alliance, but has led to heightened concern In these countries, particularly in Iran.
The USSR has sought to weaken or destroy CENTO (and Its predecessor, the Baghdad Pact) since its formation, and Soviethas consistently charged the alliance with hostile intent. The present Soviethas centered on the exploitation of Baghdad Pact papers which, according to Moscow, document CENTOs aggressivetoward the USSR and ils disregard for the life and welfare of the inhabitants of the regional CENTO countries. These papers are alleged to prove, among olher things, that Baghdad Pact plans for nuclear attacks on the USSR would Involve an "atomic death zone" in Iran. Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The Soviets have also charged that CENTO
plans call for the partition of AfghanistanIran and Pakistan, an accusationmainly to aggravate already tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and lo reinforce Afghan suspicions of the US.
Soviet pressure has been most severeIran. Thc USSR has consistentlythat certain provisions of thc Soviet-Iranian Treatynitially designednable Russia to lake action against any counterrevolutionary forces which might establish themselves In Iran, gives it the right to Intervene againsi any "foreign aggressive forces" in Iran. The Soviets have,told influential Iranians that the USSR might intervene in Iran unless Tehranfrom tho CENTO Alliance, and have come close to threatening the government itself with military Intervention.
We believe that lhe Soviet threats against CENTO should be considered primarily as parteneral Soviet policy of Intimidationthe present period of heightened East-West tension, the primary pressure point of which is Berlin. It should be noted
certain of the documents which the Soviets arc now exploiting are authentic and have almost certainly been in their possession for several years. The current level of world tension enables Moscow to Increaseumber ol target countries withoul
y
s
SECRET
lo resort to special provocation. We do not believe thc Soviets want theonclude that an ultimate worldwideIs at hand Therefore, while themay feci that application olroader front would be useful inthe will and ability of the West and the regional CENTO members to resist we do not believe that the currently intensifiedpressure against CENTO portends anlo open another area of criticalat this lime.
USSR'S longstandingCENTO arises essentially fromambitions In the Middle East,from concern over the allegedof CENTO. Thc Soviets believedissolution of CENTO would facilitateof Soviet influence byin Western commitments,encouraging the replacementgovernments withleftist regimes. We believe that theconsider that their chances are bestand will attempt to exploit thethe Shah's regime regardless of theof other crisis situations.
II. SITUATION IN THE CENTO NATIONS
There are limitations on Soviet ability to intlmidale the Middle Eastern members of CENTO short of using outright force. These limitations are greatest In Turkey and least In Iran. In all three countries thc localparties are presently weak, but in Iran anduch lesser extent In Pakistan there is some discontent that the USSR can exploit. Economic relations between thc USSR and thc CENTO members are not extensive enough to provide the Soviets with significantThe leaders of the countries are con-vinced^that yielding to Soviet threats would at best bringemporary respite,the Shah ofcountry is the most exposed to the USSR and whose government is theIs less resolute than the Turkish or Pakistani leaders.
Turkey, protected by NATO and strongly anti-Russian by tradition, is unlikely to be affected by the Soviet Intimidation campaign.
The people as well as thc government leaders are convinced from centuries of experience that the only way to deal with threats from their northern neighbor is to stand firm. Despite this consensus, Turkey is presently passingifficult period as theregime prepares to hold national elections and lo return the government to civilian hands. This transition may not take place smoothly, and political stability may sufferesult.evelopment would not weaken appreciably Turkish resolve to resist direct Soviet pressures. However, It probably would lessen Turkey's ability to provide strong and active support for Western positions in other areas.
Pakistan's pro-Western posture is alsoto be abandoned in the face of Soviet threats. Pakistan has potentially seriousweaknesses and neutralism appeals to many Pakistanis. Nevertheless, the Ayubfirm control of the country limits the present Soviet ability to stimulate and exploit whatever discontent exists.
However, Pakistan's disputeery acutethe USSR the opportunity toore active role in the area. The closure of the Pakistan-Afghan border and the increased prospect of fighting between the two countries, which offer the USSR the chance to makealmost completely dependent on it, haveajor factor in the reversal of the trend toward an improvement of Soviet-Pakistani relations which took place earlier this year. The Soviet threat to providesupport for Afghanistan is unlikely to cause Pakistan to yield on the Pushtoonlstan issue, although it probably will Inhibit the Ayub regime from taking serious military action against Afghanistan. However, facedeteriorating situation in its relations with Afghanistan and with India, Pakistan would at this time hardly be likely lo loosen its ties with the west which, although not always effective from the Pakistan point of view, save it from complete isolationostile regional environment.
is the most vulnerable target forSoviet attempt to undermine CENTO. The Shah's regime is faced wtth discontented minorities and growing opposition from nationalist reform groups. Although some possibility ot subverting such discontented minorities as the Kurds, Azerbaljanls, and the Arabs still exists, the power of these groups relative to the central government hasin recent years and we believe that they do not presentlyerious threat to the central government's control.
The Iranian Government Is moreto opposition from nationalist reform elements. Thc moderately-reformtst Aminl government, Installed in1 In anto reduce Lhc growing opposition of these elements, has made only modestto date In carrying out Its reformNevertheless, while Soviet propaganda activities against the Shah's regime may cause some Increase ln nationalist opposition, they are not likely to be decisive. Inthe Tudeh (Iranian Communist) Party has been hard hit by the Iranian security organs, and with almost all of Its leaders in jail or exile It can playinor role in Iran. (However, in the event of aupheaval. Tudeh capabilities might be speedilyn balance, the Shah's regime does not appear to be threatened in the near future.'
In any case, the Shah will And ittoirm position In the face of continued Soviet threats. He Is underpressure from conservatives as well as nationalists to revert to the traditional Iranian policy of neutrality. Soviet charges that the regime's present course will lead to Iran's destruction probably will Increase such pressures on the Shah Any conviction on theWShah's part that the US was reducing its support for Iran would, of course, increase the chances that he would seek anwith the USSR. He is convinced
that alignment with the West otters the best hope for maintaining Iranianus well as assuring his domlnuncc within Iran. Nevertheless, he has periods ofdoubt as lo whether the West in general and the US in particular will provide what he regards as adequate support to counter Soviet pressures. As long as the Shahessential Western support ishe will remain aligned with the West, though he will continuously seek additional military aid and new assurances of US
III. REACTIONS TO US MOVES CONCERNING CENTO
ny significant strengthening of the US commitment to CENTO, such as agreeing to the establishmentommand structure and the designationS officer as military commander, stationing US combat forces In the CENTO area, or joining CENTO would encourage the Shah and his government toSoviet pressures. However, such activities would probably increase the vigor of the radical nationalisttrengthened US commitment would also remove doubts on Lhc part of other regional members of CENTO as to US willingness to maintain the alliance.
oscow's reaction to any such extension of USof stationing US troops inalmost certainlyan intensification of Its threats and propaganda attacks on the alliancehole and on its individualhe Soviets probably would step up their efforts to bring down the Iranian regime and might provide increased covert support to left-wing and radical nationalist opposition elements. However, we do not think the USSB would go so far as to take military action against Iran.
oviel reactions would be moro serious if Lhe US should station combat forces on Iranian soil, or if the Soviets came to believe
asic assessment of Iranian prospects sec. "Tlie OutlOOX toratediscussion of the prospects of thc Amini government Is available in. "Short-Term Outlook forateday l'JSi.
SEj
We do not believe that the Soviet reaction would be substantially different if thc commanding officer were British raUier than American, as the Soviets would regard such actionesultS-UK
RET
Action was imminent. Historically, the Russians have been alarmed by thc presence or any "hostile outsiders" in Iran; In thesituation, the Soviets have apparently been confident for some time that they couldeslern attempt to "occupy" Iran. Moreover, the Soviet leaders would probably seeS militaryin view of the Berlina blow to Soviet prestige, and alsootentially serious threat lo the security of the USSRew front. They would almost certainly feelto respond by some action in the same area. Their specific reactions would depend on thc Soviet assessment of thc strength and nature of US forces involved and might even include an occupationortion ofIran.
n Iran itself, the stationing of US combat forces would be opposedide range of nationalist opinion as constituting "foreign occupation" and as being designed tothe Shah's rule. In addition, many Iranians would fear thatove would provoke USSR military action. However, these attitudes would be modified If thefelt lhat there was an Imminent threat of Soviet Invasion and lhat the US had moved solely to forestallhreat.
he reactions of other Middle Eastern and Asian statestrengthening of CENTO would follow two general lines. US allies and other pro*Weslcrn governmentsevelopment as an indlculion of US determination to resist Communistand that the US was not downgrading its friends in favor o( the neutrals. The neutrals, on the other hand, probaoly would react unfavorably, arguing that anyof CENTO was provocative and would further increase thc danger of warime when tension was already high. Afghanistan particularly would be disturbed ond would probably seeoveurtherof US support for Pakistan. Similarly, India would look at any militaryof CENTO as an unfriendly act If they felt thai it strengthened Pakistan for aconflict with India over Kashmir.
ny move which the Soviets Interpretedecrease in US support of CENTO,clearly counterbalanced by other actions demonstrating US determination toosition tn the area, would at this juncture be regarded by the USSRign ofand the Soviets would probably press any advantages which they considered flowed fromituation.
Original document.
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