TITLE: Great Frusina Revisited: The Problem Of Priority Positive Intelligence
AUTHOR: Wallace E. Seidel
A eotloeilon ol articles on Ihc historical, operational, doctrinal, and Ihoototlcal aspects ol intelligence.
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The evolution of intelligence as knowledge demands aof intelligence as
GREAT FRUSINA REVISITED: The Problem of Priority Positive IntelligencecLdel
9 Sherman Kent referred to strategic Intelligence as "ihe intelligence of nationalnd elsewhere, more lexicographically, as "high-level foreign positivehis paper Is focused in its particulars on one aspect of the highest-priority positive Intelligence problem of today, that of the Soviet long-range ballistic missile, especially the ICBM.arger sense, however. Its subject Is the change that has taken place during the past decade in the kinds of knowledge that constitute strategic Intelligence and the meaning of this change in terms of what kind of organization and activity Is needed to produce the intelligence of national survival
The .Yew Knowledge
When we first visited Great Frusina with Mr Kent, the evaluation of her strategic stature was presented as requiring knowledge of "the situation, the non-mUitarythe force In being, and the war potential" of theow, little more than ten years later, the development ofweapons and missiles able to carry them half way across the earthatter of minutes hasifferent face on the last two of these concepts: the Soviet force in being has taken on overriding significanceonstant threat to our national survival; and the mobilization of war potential, on the other hand, is now largely bereft of meaning In the context of the general war. Tbe enemy's military research and development programs and his plans for making new
'Strategic Intimgtnct for America* WorU PoHey. p. Ill
Greof FrusirtQ Re-mied
weapon* operational have replaced hU mobilization polentlalactor In his strategic stature.
The effect of these changes on the nature of strategicactivity Is to elevate the strategic Importance of getting what used to be considered military departmentalofthe force in being, and toradically the time factor In all our Intelligence-policy equations, both for force In being and for weapons underIn "the long-range Intelligencerand strat-
laeK.. . een greatly compressed, both for
those who decide the policy and to an equal or even greater degree for the collectors and producers of the Intelligence.. decision makers are currently faced with the prospect of nuclear missile forces which can effect virtually Immediateof an almost annlhilative blow and for which there Is as yet no active defense.
Mr. Kent couldecade ago thateneralevery countryreat deal about all otherforces in beingreat deal about most of theirAs every Intelligence officer concerned with thetoday knows, the verity of this generalization withto Soviet guided missile systems leaves much to beThe critical thing is that the decline in the quality and quantity of our information on the enemy's weaponin being and under development, is occurring at Just this time,. policy makersore Immediate and greater fund of Information than ever before. This was the point of President Eisenhower's statement ofollowing the loss ofnd the collapse at the Summit:
Ourdemands] affective systems for gatheringabout the military capability of other powerful nations, especially tboaa thatetish of secrecy. This involves many techiuqaes and metlioda In uMt* tunes of vast mlatary machines and Doclear-Upped inlaaUaa, UM ferreting out of this UUormaUoo Is mdlspensabte to free world security.'
Another time compression In the new strategic intelligence, besides the prospective suddenness of attack and potential
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brevity of war, is the continuing acceleration of change in military technology. To the policy maker this brings arates of obsolescence and Increased costs for weapon systems.. Senate Subcommittee onPolicy Machinery has pointed out:
The statesmanentury ago vas given moreato adjust nauoaal policies, to the change from coal to oilworld's navies- But today such adjustment must occur, interms, overnight. Aa example: National securtlTscarcely begun to adapt policy to the fact o( fission weapons in
when thedesfc-KUv. fusion
weapon entered upon Uxhile the pace ofchange has quickened, the cost of failure to make appropriate policy adaptations has rtan-exponentlalh-.*
These "appropriate policy adaptations" are dependent upon ^formation which only the intelligence community canAn intelligence problem of such magnitude andcannot be solved with the order-of-battle apparatusecade ago.
A third point at which timeactor is in the process ofeapons system idea into the realityield capability. Here management control techniques and planning have succeeded, despite greatly increased complexity and an esoteric technology, ln compressing the development-production-operation cycle in varying degrees, according to the state of the art and the urgency of the requirements. The USSR, as well as the United States, has employed suchtechniques in its missile programs and thusshortened our lead time ln the strategic Intelligence problem.
Although we have been thinking here primarily aboutprospects In the ICBM field, it must be recognized that our new strategic intelligence problems are neither unique thereto nor likely to diminish. The ever accelerating rate of technological change has already thrust sjjnflarbefore us In such areas as anU-submarine warfare,weapons, and space systems for war and peace.
A recognition of the fundamental change In the character. Increase in the importance, and decrease In the availability of the positive Intelligence necessary for the strategicleads us to revisit the analysis of Intelligence asIn doing so we may profit by using Mr. Kent's criteria to ask ourselves some pertinent questions. Have we beenlo undertake heartbreaking reorganization when thesheet soave we permitted units orforms to achievevested' Interest" In what'is no longer pertinent to our priority problems? Have we achieved the "fluidity of structure" and "the ability to shifts unforeseen [or even foreseen] peak loads develop"?'
The organizational history of intelligence researchunder the Impact of the Soviet missile problem doesan effort to adjust to the new situation. In CIA. forthe question of Soviet technical developments in the missiles field was attacked ten years ago byuided Missile Branch within one of the divisions of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and before the decade was half over that branch had Itselfivision. Outside the field of technical development, in order to meet the more pressing need for knowledge of the Soviet missile force Ln being or In immediate prospect, there was meanwhilemall Qulded Missile Staff Ln one of the economic research divisions of the Office of Research and Reports to study Soviet production of the weapons for Issue to the armed forces, and by the end of the decade this staff had become one of the largest branches in that Office. It managed to harness enough experience to supply some of the information of broad scope required for national estimates on the Soviet missile program. And most recently there has been an effort to pool both scientific and economic intelligence resourcesask Force devoted to the Soviet LRBM program, particularly the ICBM threat
Helpful as these adjustmentsubmit that theyhalf-way measures, an ad hoc response of vestedrather than the heartbreaking reorganization for aweapons system approach to the whole strategic problem that would demonstrate fluidity of structure. Even the 'Task
Gtea' Frusina Revisited
eallyoordinating mechanism, isevice that can weave together the scientific and technical research done by one component and the study of weapons system programming, costing, production, and operationaldone by another. The continued division of line control and supervision still prevents any Integrated approach to the research problem.
To conceive the kind of organizational measures that could, and In my view should, be taken, we might draw by analogy from outside of intelligence, from the typical developmentfor the missile system Itself. This, like the missileproblem, has all the attributes of complexity,knowledge, high priority, and unmatched urgency. Here specialists organized according to their component of the problem work on assigned tasks with no certainty whether and how soon they will be accomplished. Nevertheless the requirements for each task are so organized and thefor each component product so calculated that ail will be compatible in the final assembly, the finished system. It Is therefore necessary, as the program proceeds, continuously to modify the design of the overall system as the originalfor individual components cannot be met or on the other hand are modified by favorable findings that hadeen foreseen. To carry outrogram requiresplanning and line control of contributing components working as an integrated team, so supervised as to assure that all elements being developed at any given time will be compatible in the system as then conceived.
The missile intelligence problem, indeed the entire Soviet strategic intelligence problem,imilar set ofcontrols. The endless adjustment of Its interwoven elements can be achieved only by central definition of the objectives of individual intelligence components engaged tn research, support, and collectiononstant evaluation of their progress toward these objectives. The Integration of the complex and specialized tasks Involved cannot be relegatedpecial assistant,gadfly" with any hope of carrying out an effective program. It can beonlyorking organisation composed ofata from the several componentsanagement center with the power ot direct control.
Great Frutino Ptmiled
The House Divided
We have seen that the nature of strategic Intelligence knowledge has changed considerably, particularly in its time component, and that the compression of time has beenby an Increase In substantive complexity andwhich our research organizations have failed to counterlanned and Integrated program. We have alsoecline Ln the quality and quantity ofonthe enemy's strategic capaMlUes Lntheecline for wruehThere has beerTVtendency forihoseen" gaged in intelligence research to blame those engaged lnactivities, and vice versa. The fault lies rather in an Imperfect understanding of the nature of the problem.
At the heart of this problem, as far as the CIA effort Islies the fact that the Agencyouse dividedIntelligence collection and intelligence research. Mr. Kentecade ago that the segregation of covertactivities was dictated by the need for secrecy, and he pointed out that "unless this clandestine force watches sharply It can become Its own worst enemy. For If It allows theof security to cut It oft from some of the mostlines of guidance. It destroys its own reason forIn today's highest-priority Intelligenceuggest, the segregation of Intelligence collectionuxury we can no longer afford.
The difficulties of integration are undoubtedly manifold and great, but they cannot be more cogent than those ofto stumble along our separate ways. First among these Is that of compensating for the time compression we have noted, of meeting the urgency of the key problems. Segregationthe Interpositionuplicative Liaison structure, with an Inevitable loss of precious time and In many Instances an attenuation of the specialized substantive data required for the intelligence product. Second, collection resources cannot be brought Into full play on the esoteric, complex, andrequirements for data without interaction between the progress of the research effort and the peculiarities oftradecraft. Finally, the insulation of research specialist from collection specialist prevents the comparative analysis of
collection resources essential to an Integrated, centralized, problem-oriented effort and to coordinated planning research for such an effort.
ord, the segregation of the collection activity can butruly Integrated approach to the priorityintelligence problem. Its need for secrecy must be weighed against the urgency of this problem. In theresearch and collection effort with the best-knownthe reeen^ast,. pnagrarrj^he risk to our national security waVconslderably greater than In any ordinary covert collection operation one might conceive. Yet secrecy was forced to yield to need, and relatively largeof both research and collection personnel workedon the centrally directed task.
Agency and Community
The change In tbe character of strategic intelligence hasarked effect on departmental intelligenceactivities, and policies, and these would be fruitfulfor separate discussion In detail. After moreecade of central intelligence, however, CIA Is legally and by established precedent the only organization whose prunary business is intelligence coordination and integration. It is therefore the proper one to take the lead In solving theIntelligence problems of today, which, howeverto the order of battleygone era, transcend In their impllcatlons and complexity the responsibilities of any single departmental Intelligence organization. If tbe Director of Central Intelligence is to advise the National Securityon these topmost questions of national security, he must have an organization capable of providing him with theof Integrated collection and research. Tbe matter has become too Large and complex for post facto Integration through the intuitive applications of staff officers and the ad hoc considerations of joint committees. As the Director of Naval Intelligence wrote recently, "Thisritical level of Intelligencehere Intelligence usuallythe broad changes ln defense policy that can sethole series of national programs."
-laurence H- Frost, "InteJBgeneeupport to sad aofSl Review,.
In our quite proper concern In recent years with the threat of Soviet economic and political offensives, we should not lose sight of the ultimate fulcrum of strategic power, as pointed outecent study prepared for the Foreign Relationsof the United States Senate:
As long as the cold war continues, American foreign policy must be basedefense policy designed to ward off Soviet threats against tbe free countries ofyhlle military defense needs to be supplemented by economic, psychological, and other policies, the provision of adequate appropriate military strength Is the precondition of free world security.'1
The provision of adequate military strength Is In large part dependent upon adequate Intelligence about Soviet weapons systems, present and prospective; and the provision of this intelligence, we have suggested,roblem-oriented program bringing together existing research and collection resourcesentrally con trailed unit
There is still one further requirement This unifiedmust contain, as an integralorking-level group concerned with problem analysis and planning. This type of unit, analogous tond "Advanced Projects" units in the creation of weapon systems, has been conspicuous in tbe intelligence community by Its absence. There hasendency to put the planning function on the policylevel, in Isolation from the detailed substantive realities. The planning group here contemplated Is one of experts,In detail with the problems of today and of tomorrow. It must be not only substantively qualified but at the same time cognisant of the comparative capabiUtlcs of the resources It can call upon to accomplish its objectives. Its work must beempo corresponding to the urgency of the problems it has to deal with, and its solutions must be given force byin policy management
US Congress, Senate Committee oa Foreign Relations. Winlit Session, United stares roriign Policy. "Developments InTechnology and Their Impact oa United States Strategytudy Prepared at tbe Beqvest of the CoramltUse. on Foreign Relations by Tha Washington Center of Foreign PolicyThe Johns Hopkins University,Waahlngton: Oovernmeat Printing;. L
Such an Integration of Intelligence planning, production, and collection should provide for the definition ofapid response to requirements, the constant evaluation of progress, and adequate controlynamic process. It should makeore economical and thoroughof our finite resources. It would not, of course,success; but with current organizational forms clearly an impediment toefusal to reorganize wouldthe possibility of failure, along with the prospect of higher expenditures and greater risks.
It is time for us to give new meaning to the production of "high-level foreign positive intelligence" and bring all our resources to bear on the first-priority national intelligencethrough positive action. Soviet security Is only half our enemy; the other half Is the flight of time, our mostcommodity. Whether we shall waste It or use it wisely seems in large part to depend upon our ability to recognize the deficiencies in our current efforts and overcome ourUpon our success or failure could ultimately hinge the survival of the nation.Original document.