1
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN KATANGA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR Or CENTRAL INTEL LIOENCE
Th* moving influence OfaanUatton* participated In tha preparation of this titlmate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organisation* of the Department* of State.h* Amy, (Ac Navg. th* Airnd Th* Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIOENCE BOARD
ecember 1HI. Concurring aere Th* Director e/ Intet-Oaene* and Reeeareh, Department ofh* Director. Detent* InttlllgtncB Agency; th* AttUtant Chief of Staff for Intelligent; Department of th* Army; th* Assistant Chlet of Naval Operation*epartment of the Wavy; th* AUUtant Chltf Of Staff, intelligence, VSAT; th* Director lor tnttntgenci, Joint Staff; and th* Director ot the National Security Agency. The Atomic energy CommUrton neprt-lentativ* to the VSIB and, th* AirliUnt Director, Federal Bureau ot Investigation, abstained, th* tubltct bring outilde Of their jurisdiction.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1.estimate ruby the Central Intelligence Agency. Thle copy is for the Inform*Uon and uie of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essential oUssemlnalion may be authorlied by the following officials within their respective departments.
of Intelligence end Research, for the Department of State
Defense Intelligence Agency
Chief of SUA for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, for tbe Department of
of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the AirDirector for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff
of Intelligence, ABC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau ofDirector of NSA, for the National Security Agency
J. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, lor any other Department or Agency.
copy may be retained or destroyed by burning in accordance withregulations, or returned to the Centrtl Intelligence Agency by arrangementOffice of Central Reference, CIA.
J. When an estimate Is disarm Inn ted overseas, tha crterseas redpieote may retain Iteriod not In excess of one year. At the end of this period, tbe estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of tho forwarding agency to retain It In accordance with
title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should beOFFICIAL USE ONLY
This material contains iDrorn^aMnarteetlng tba National Defense QL-ene United Bteti wltnin theTLhe eip-anaea lawa. Title IL. TS3 and TM, tbe trena-nUatlonoe-rfvplaUon el which In any manner to^aarllnauUiortied panon la prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION: WnlW Howe
National Security Council Department of Slate Department of Defense Atomic Energy ConunlMlon Federal Bnreau of InvestJgaUcn
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN KATANGA
the problem
to assess (a) the possibilities for negotiation between the central government and katanga; (b) the consequences of tshombe's departure or ouster from katanga; (c) the coriaequencesontinued impasse between the central government and katanga.1
the estimate
introduction
he remt*gr*tion of Katanga province Into the Congo Republic Is now becomingritical issue as to threaten theof Prime Minister Cyrtlle Adoula. At tbe moment, negotiations between Adoula and Katanga President Moiae Tshombe areby the inability ot either to bringpressure to bear on the other. The essential Issue is the form of politicalfor the Congo: confederation as de-mandM by Tshombeairly strong centralas held by Adoula and the moder-atefc. However, the strict limitations on their bargainingimposed by condition*theireach reluctant and Indeed unable to offer concessions lo the other. Moreover, the fighting which has broken out during the past several days In the Elisabethvllle area probably will affect the possibility of initiating systematic discussions of the constitutional issue. Exactly bow, tt Is as yet too early to tell.
' Thu rMlmat* was prfpervd In theoruna between UN and Kstantan forcei. Aceordlntly,osuole that aweeernenU (al and le) may ba overtaken by events.
ii. sources of tshombe's strength
Tshombe receives strong backingmuch of the province from his own Lunda tribal groups, and. In association with his chief lieutenants. Interior Minister Munongo and Foreign Minister Kim be, enjoys tribal support throughout southern and easternamong the predominant non-Baluba peoples. Tshombe also obtains Important financial resource! from Katanga's mineral properties, which account forf the Congo's budgetary income and which are still largely owned and operated by Belgian interests. Katangaldion annually in taxand dividends from the Union Miniere and related companies. These contributions are paid to Katanga, via Brussels, and are used for Tshombe's military and otherTshombe also receivesadvice and guidance from the Union Mlnlire managers In Katanga; they. In turn, are to some extent dependent upon him for protection and for the right to continue to operate.
White settlers in Northern Rhodesia and Angola fear an extension of the Congo'sinto their areas. To prevent this, they are,willing to give some political support and
to countenance the passage of somesupplies, mercenaries, and advisers to Tshombe. They are also willing to grant Katanga continued access to the sea for its exports. In Katanga, the remaining Belgianofto the comparatively healthy economy and provide badly-needed technical and administrativeMoreover,elgian colon "minutemen"an Europeanforce constitute an effective core of military strength and In addition provide leadership to Katangan troops. Theup to the present at least, have proved superior to tbe Central Government's unruly army.
III. TSMCWBe'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOTIATION
Tshombe harbors grave doubts about the wisdom of negotiating with Adoula. In his eyes, Leopoldville lacks sufficient political strength and administrative ability to govern effectively. He is afraid that tbe radicals holding important positions Ui the present administration will soon prevail over Adoula. In these circumstances, and recallingfate and his own earlierat the hands of Congolese politicians. Tshombe fears for his personal safely should he go to Leopoldville, He feirs for hisfuture should he accept any offer for high office In the present Central Oovcmment He Is also suspicious that any am ngement he might make with the Central Government concerning Katanga's revenues would fall to survive for very long once he gave up his
In Elisabethvllle. Tshombe Is theleader, but he is dependent upon thesupport of his aides. It would befor him to go far to meet Adoula'swithout incurring strong opposition from Munongo, Kimba, and their followers, tho Lunda tribes, and the Europeans. Neither Munongo nor Kimba, the moreof the Katanga separatists, would be acceptable to the strong radical elements In the Central Government on whom Adoula
SE
must depend, even If he personally couldTihornbe.
& In these circumstances, it Is unlikely that Tshombe will undertake serious negotiation with the Central Government unlessnew pressures can be brought to bear on him. We explore below the variouswhich might be employed, including diplomatic and economic measures, mores by the Central Government, and actions by the UN.
IV KATANGAN VULNERABILITY TO PRESSURE
Diplomatic pressure on Tshombe has been notably unsuccessful. The BelgianItself can exercise only limitedover the many private Belgians andInterests Involved. There is probably little more that Premier Spaak canIn view of his own political problems in Belgium. Because large sectors of public opinion in Europe are favorable to Tshombe. and because some moderates within African colonial and ex-colonlru areas feel likewise, most of the European colonial and ex-colonlnl powers are unenthuslastlc about applying pressure on him. In any case, we do notthat mere persuasion. In the absence of strong military or economic pressure, will have any decisive effect upon Tshombe>
Presumably, economic pressure on Tshombe could be exercised through attempts to force the Union Miniere, for example, to pay taxes to the Central Government Instead of to Katanga, and to permit the Central Government to acquire dividends paid by commercial Interests operating In Katanga. However, we believe these measures would take many months to prepare, and 'Jieirwould depend heavily on theof the Belgian Government and other European commercial interests to cooperate fully In their execution. While theseeffectivelyreduce the financial resources available to Tshombe, tbey probably would noi in themselves force him to accept Adoula's
6
ET
Moreover. Tihornbe could take eoun-termeaaurea in Katanga iteeU* which might blunt their effect,
la weak In tha northern halflargely populated by theThe Central Oovernment Utoaluba state there, andIn stirring up some sentimentend. It has been assisted by somefrom Stanleyville, whose entry intohas been facilitated by the UN.even if such efforts al.ould achievethey would not get at tbeof Tshombe's strength, wouldOlzenglst Influence inwould open up the prospect oftribal warfare.
wouldtrong Incentiveto accommodate to tbe Centralterms If real strength andIn the areas now onlyCentral Oovernment control.ever came to realise that heIsolated because the Centralhad effective armed forces, aeconomy, and strongthen he would find It veryhold out against negotiating some kindsatisfactory to the CentralHowever, the problemsthe Central Oovernment are solt would be many months before ltso strong an Image.
he greatest threat to the Katangais that posed by UN military opera* tlons now going on In the province.may have been the immediate cause for the collapse of the cease-fire, the UN now appears to be attemptinghow of military force to convince Tshombe and his lieutenants that tbe die Is cast and that be hod best come to terms while be can stillOlven their present strength andUN forces will probably have great difficulty in accomplishing this, and may be able to do little more than maintain their present positions. With some reinforcement, which now seems to be taking place from within the Congo, they may be able tollrnlbK control In certain areas.the withdrawal of forces from other pane of the Congo is leaving those areasexposed to new disorders arising from army indiscipline, tribal enmities, and political Intrigues,
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF TSHOMBE'S
DEPARTURE ORt appears that pressure upon theOovernmentegotiatedwith Leopoldville will be very difficult to apply effectively. It Is, of course,that Tshombe and his lieutenants might be removed by more forceful and directaccident, or full-scale UN intervention. In such an event, there wouldirtually complete politicalIn the area. There is no obvious local leader who would be generally acceptable throughout Katanga. There would befor leadership, including some in the present Katanga Oovernment.umber of tribal enclaves might be established,
IS, The most serious problem which would be posed by the destruction of the Katangawould be the danger of large-scale tribal warfare, eitheratural consequence of confusion in the wake of Tsbombe's removal, or as the result of an attempt by theOovernment to Impose an administration unacceptable, on tribal or ether grounds, in considerable portions of Katanga, if it were to avoid complete chaos, the UN wouldcertainly be forced to exercise extensive. If not virtually complete, governing authority in Katanga for an Indefiniten the event that Tshombe should be eliminated through ajsasslnatlon or anwhich left his principal lieutenantsthe latter would attempt to continue the Katanga regime and to carry outthe same policies which Tshombe has pursued. However, they would be moreand extreme, and would probably be confronted with more Internal dissension and conflict, partly of their own making.
rr-r
S^etfET
CONSEQUENCESONTINUED IMPASSE
doula has been under great pressure to solve the Katanga problem ever since hePrime Minister. He has always been vulnerable because he lacks strong political or tribal support In his own right, and he has been dependentariety offorces, extremist, moderate, and tribal, whose support might be withdrawn at any time. If he falls to reintegrate Katanga soon he may be ousted by the extremists;heimilar risk should he lower his sights and come to an accommodation with Tshombe on essentially the latter's terms. His political position would obviously be greatly strengthened, not only against his peliLtcal enemlrs In the Leopoldvlllebut against Tshombe as well, if he could demonstrate that he had access tofunds, military supplies, and foreign assistance not available to other Congolese politicians.
t the moment, Adoula Is probably hoping that tne UN will rescue him from hisIf the UN should fall to resolve the Katanga problem In the present context, he himself may feel compelled to undertakeoperations against Katanga, end tomilitary assistance from non-UN sources In order to do so. If he cannot get this from the West, he will probably accept offersmade by the Soviet Bloc. Ironically, even if the Katanga problem were settled on Adoula's terms, his political future would still be In Jeopardy. Opposition to Tshombe hasnifying force; It has brought mod-crates and extremists alike together under Adoula. Once this force is removed thewould be disposed to try to overturn Adoula.
IT. Whatever may be done to resolveseparatism, the Congohole seems likely to remain in turmoil for many months to come, with UN presence required for an Indefinite periodinimum degree of order Is to be maintained. Aside from the problems of Katanga and the Gizenglste, the Congo seems likely to remain plagued with the problems of lack of army discipline,unemployment, lack of nationaltribal rivalries, and lack ofand training at all levels ofand In the economyhole.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: