central intelligence agency. g
7 DEC ibo'
memorandum for: the director, defense intelligence agency
thought: urning point ln the development of soviet militaryy colonel-general ye. ivanov
erbatim translation of an articleturning point ln the development of soviet military art" ye. ivanov, vhlch appearedpecial topjournal voyennaya my si (military
equeate for extra copies of this report or forof any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.
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SUBJECT
THOUGHT: urning Point In the Development of Soviet Militaryy Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov
OF INFO: 1 (Prior to May)
OF CONTENT
SOURCE
A reliable source (B)
Followingerbatim translation of an article titledurning Point in the Development of Soviet Militaryritten bye. Ivanov.
This article appeared in1 Second Issuepecial version of Military. Thounhi..which laTOP SECRET by the Soviets and -is 1 Third Issue went- to press. Ia
A TURNING POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY ART
Colonel-General Ye. IVANOV.
The discussion which has unfolded In the pages of the special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" concerning the most Importantof military theory,otable and. In Itsery important, event In the military-scientific life of the Armed Forces.
This article also intends to present certain considerations on the essenceeries ofthe examination of which, in our view, provides interesting topics for further broadening the discussion.
A CRISIS IN MILITARY ARTURNINGITS DEVELOPMENT?
In the recently published articles of certain authors, the question Is posed that there have been no serious changes whatsoever in Soviet military science since the end of World War II, and that In essence it Isrisis.
"Dropping curtsies in the direction of missiles and introducing some minor corrections In the theory of military art, we still hold In practice to the old positions existing at the end of World War II. Past experience, traditions, and habits taught to us for decades, tenaciously hold us back and prevent the same kind of revolution in military art which nuclearand missiles created In the sphere oftates Colonel-General Gastilovlch. He, like certain
lSpecial Collection of Articles of theirstage 6.
other authors of articles published in the Collection, adheres to the view that the question is no more than one of adapting old forms and methods to new
It is quite obvious thatresentation of the question Is far from an objective evaluation of the state of development of Soviet military art.
Military art,ategory of history. Is subject in its development to the general laws of Marxist dialectic. Therefore, it is subject in the fullest sense to the general dialectical law of development, expressedransfer from quantity to quality. It manifests itself in all the processes of nature, society, andverywhere, where the change from old to new Is under way. Including the development of military affairs.
With the appearance of nuclear weapons, it has been, of course, more or less clear to everyone that theyew and extremely powerful weapon, heralding the beginningevolution in the means of armed combat and the ways of conducting it. This revolution is going on gradually and ln accordance with the development of the means of combat. It la impossible to accomplish It In a limited period of time.
Therefore, there is nothing surprising In the fact that five or six years ago, when ouron the conduct of operations were based on two or three dozen nuclear weapons which could be delivered to their objectives only by aircraft, the discussion obviously could realistically concernartial "modernization" of certain aspects of military art, because many facts which only became known later were lacking for another approach.
The appearance of new means of combat, as the experience of military history testifies, only brings
about radical changesevolution) in military art when these means are introduced into the armament of troopsass scale, and when by these means It proves possible toajority of the tasks arising during military operations, but this always required time. Fundamental changes in military affairs have never been accomplished with lightning
In this regard it should not be forgotton that throughout the entire history of class society, the equipping of armies with new types of armament and combat equipment has, in all countries, come up against the definite limits of their economicand therefore, notwithstanding the great desire of certain military figures, the process offrom old means of combat to new has been accomplished graduallyefinite period of time whose duration depended primarily on the productive potential of the country concerned.
In this connection, along with new means of combat, the old means continued to be used as well,ecessity dictated not only by combat but also by economic factors.
Therefore, one should not be surprised by the fact that along with newly formulated views of military theory, the old naturally also continue to existefinite period. In the postwaronstant process of perfection of conventional types of armament, aa they have now come to be called, was carried on in our armed forces. The advent of nuclear weapons and the improvement In their combat characteristics, together with the yearly increase In their scale ofonstant process of accumulation of qualitative and quantitative changes In the means of armed combat and consequently In the methods of waging it.
This process of development is not only as yet Incomplete, but on the contrary, embraces an ever
growing field end continues to bring about ever-newer situations ln military art. Nevertheless, this does not mean that certain views have not already been formulated on specific problems. It should be not,ed that ln recent times, on the basis of theoretical research and general conclusions from the practical experience of troops, we have developed and put Into effect new field service regulations, combatlons for tha various arms of troops, and Instructions on the combat utilization of special troops. reat deal of work, which has on the wholeositive contribution, has been done in examining questions of the conduct of combat and operations, especially during the lnltlal'perlod, employing new means of combat. During this time, our industry, on the basis of principles developed scientifically and confirmed by the Party and the Government regarding the future structure of the armed forces, and in accordance with these principles, was given the means to undertakeass scale the equipping of troops with missile/ nuclear weapons. To ignore all this and to writecrisis" Is to ignore all those progressive changes which have taken place and are taking place In the development of Soviet military art.
All that has been said, of course, does not mean that our military theory has already fully resolved all questions and that we have avoided all
Marshal of the Soviet Union Mallnovskly,peech at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, said: "We must say directly, thathole series of questions we have not shown the necessary creative power, scientific daring and boldness. If you will, but have long been marking time".
Therefore, In the Interests of the work Itself we must talk notrisis in military art, which we absolutely do not and cannot have, but of those weak
points In military theory which are in fact at the turning point in their development.
FOR WHAT TYPE OF WAR MUST WE BE PREPARED?
One of the most important questions raised In the pages of the Collection, Is the question of Soviet ml IItary doctrine. The Increased interest In its development Is completely understandable. At the present time our .armed forces find themselves at the turning point of their development;urther intensive analysis of military doctrine naturally assumes paramount significance.
M.V. Frunze, defining the concept ofnitary military doctrine" pointed out that Itsyllabus adopted In the armyiven state, whichthe nature of the structure of the armed forces of that country, the methods of combat training of troops, their leadership on the basis of theviews In the state on the nature of the military problems facing them and the means for solving them, and which emanates from the class nature of the state and the computed level of development of the productive forces'of the country",*
From the definition it Is apparent that M. V. Frunze places prime Importance on the question of the nature of the structure of the armed forces, which depends above all on the level of development of the productive forces of the country, on Its economic potential. The question of the economic potential of our country arouses no doubts'In any of us. Our
M.V. Frunze. Collected Works. Vol. XI. Military Publishingage 6.
What conclusions, for example, are to be drawn from the Ideas of Colonel-General Gastllovlch on the natureuture war. Its duration In general, and Its Initial period in particular, "There Is no need to fear the term 'blitzkrieg' . Under the conditions of nuclear war only 'blitzkrieg' operations can promise victory." "Under present conditions the possibility of victory must be assured by theess, the capacity, and the capability of concluding' the war In the shortest possible time. The theoryrolonged war is more acceptable at present to the monopolistic circles of the "Taking over the border zones and the zones of total destruction and radiationill not at all necessitate multi-million man armies". So writes Colonel-General Gastllovlch.1
In almost the same spirit General Goryainov writes: "The missile/nuclear weapon has become (or canass weapon and its destructive and ln particular Its radiologicaleference to megatone. Ivanov) are actually capable of creating conditions In which the fundamental object ofhe destruction of thean betechnicallyhort period of time andover-taxing the economy of powerful Industrialew hundred powerful nuclear bursts will ba the primary and decisive factors affecting the outcome of the war the Initial periodar becomes its decisive period."2
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Special Collection of Articles of tha Journal "Militaryecond
If one were to summarize briefly all thementioned above, having cast aside certain reservations which the authors occasionally make with regard to ground troops and other types of armed forces, they could be said to be, essentially, exponents of an "atomic blitzkrieg". They consideruture war willapid, blitzkrieg character; Its outcome will be decided by the first missile/nuclear operations for which only some few hundred thermonuclear warheads need be expended; that it Is not necessary toult!-ml Ulon man army for waging war, and the basic function of the small number of ground troopsar should be confined to the occupation of enemy territory.
What would happen If these views were to be legitimised and raised to the status ofrinciples of our military doctrine? First, our armed forces would be subject to one-sided orientation in their development, with all the consequences resulting from this, and secondly. In essence, we would be forced to abandon that versatile training of the troops which we now conduct, countingierce and relatively extended armed conflict with the powerful coalition of the imperialist countries. Such an approach to the organization of the armed forces and their military training would be one-sided.
A future war in Its political essence willecisive armed conflict between twoapitalist and socialist. truggle between them will Involve two of the most powerful military coalitions, armed as never before and possessing colossal material and manpower resources. Therefore, no matter what losses single governments would suffer In the beginning of the war, seriousmust be given to the factoalition of nationshole can prove capable of waging armed combatonsiderably protracted period.
oubt, massive missile/nuclear strikestrategic nature In the very beginning of the war
will create conditions for the accompllshment,ln the Initial period, of results that bear no comparison with the results achieved during the Initial periods of previous wars. Naturally, this willery great Influence on the conduct and the generalof the war.
However, to orient oneself In building the armed forces and preparing the countryar ln which the initial period will be decisive for the achievement of the ultimate goals of the war, would be completely unfounded.
Indeed, Comrade Goryainov admits to theand with this one cannot disagree, thatar has begun, the situation could arise where the strategic missile troops of both sides,umber of reasons, might be only partially successful ln their aims and notecisive effect. For myill add: One cannot base one's estimates in war only on tha availability of one's own means of destruction and not consider the means of destruction andopen to the enemy, particularly the means of antimissile defense which are now being developed rapidly. We may guess at the enemy's plans, but It is he who carries them out, and his actions, as the experience of all wars can testify, usually introduce substantial changes ln our plans. Therefore, ln the evaluation of the initial periodar andof the direction of organization of the armed forces, we should not In principle base our Ideas only on the possible decisive role of this period, but must be prepared for the continued conduct of numerousith all types cf armed forces even ln the ensuing periods of the war.
At the same time we certainly must not under- stimate the definite role, in the light of known X. conditions, of the first operations of the initial period of the war and the possibility of destroying the aggressorhort time.
To deny this would be to stand outully comprehensive approach to the preparation of our armed forces. In these questions there should be no extreme.
The Minister of Defense points out: the security of our Motherland, we mustperfect the means and methods of armed combatvictory' over the aggressor above. '
all In the shortest possibleut" at the same tine we must seriously prepare for an extended wa'rj' 'and this determines the direction of our military organization'.-Such is the only kind of1 approach to this question that we too can consider legitimate.
The basic content of the Initial period of war can consist of: the disruption and repelling ofirst blow of the aggressor on the ground. In the air, and on the sea; the Inflicting upon himhattering blow designed to disorganize theand military leadership and also theof the most vital economic targets, especially industrial enterprises connected with the production of means for nuclear attack; conducting Initial operations with all types of armed forces In close coordination In order to accomplish the mostmilitary-strategic tasks and the early seizure of the strategic initiative.
The fulfillment of these tasks will doubtless create the necessary prerequisites for the swift conduct of the war and the achievement of final victory. But the -prerequisites are not victory itself. Military history indicates that armed forces which have successfullyar can In tht final analysis end up vanquished, and the first blows suffered by an army at the beginningar still do not signify final defeat.
Consequently, It behooves us to take as our starting point the fact that for the successfulof, and final victoryar, colossal efforts of the armed forces and the entire state as a
whole may be required. Massive armies and the mobilization of all the moral and physical strength of the people and of the economy of the country will be essentia 1.
A position ln which the decisive role for the achievement of the primary objectives of the war Is delegated to missile troops of strategic designation certainly does noteduction ln the utlllza- tlon of ground troops, but on the contraryore Important need for them on the basis of their potentapabilities.
It Is incorrect to count on their being, asof the extensive utilization ofon the field ofompletelyand that there will be nothing left forto do but to move effortlessly Into thethe enemy countries to carry out occupation
For the final defeat of an enemy and the seizure of his territory following nuclear strikes by missile Troops of strategic deslgnation. regardless ofpowerful the strikes might be. It will always be necessary to bringufficiently large number of ground troops': Without this, it would be difficult to predict Ihe possibility of concluding any kind of war.
ery Important role will belong to the ground troops In the attainment of the final almsar. They have all that Is necessary .to carry out this role. Their firepower and striking force, together with their supply of missile weapons with nuclear warheads, the full motorization of troops, and the growth In the relative Importance of the tank troops have Increased sharply and In consequence their significance in the light of the new conditions of armed combat has not diminished.
THE USE OF MISSILE TROOPS OF STRATEGIC DESIGNATION
Prior to the placing of missile/nuclear weapons in the hands of the strategic leadership, there existed, In fact, no means by which the progressar could be quickly and decisively affected. Even in World War II, although our bomber aircraft could already deliver bombs of rather significant force, these could not be sufficiently powerful towift and direct influence on the outcome of the war. Therefore, strategy achieved Its goals through the successive waging of many battles, engagements, and operations, all leading, In the aggregate,pecific strategic result.
An entirely new factor under presentthat such powerful means as various formsamong them Intercontinental oneswarheads, are in the hands of the With the assistance of such means,command has the capability toand Independently (and not only byand battles between ground troops asthe case In the past) In the veryexceptionally Important missions, evenumber of countries of our probable along with their armed forces, in any part the'
Consequently, under present donditlons, in order to decide, correctly questions about the nature-of operations and to determine the methods of combat operations of the troops In an operational element, it Is necessary to clarifylesthe use of the- the mlsslle troops of the VGK (Supreme High Command).
Missile troops of strategic designation are the decisive striking force and the wlelders of the strategic power of our armed forces. They will carry out the most important tasks in the disruption of the
enemy rear, his economy, and systems of governmental control by destroying his strategic means ofmba t.
Given these capabilities, it may be assumed that they can be used suddenly, in mass, against the main enemies, with the intention oftrategic resulthort period. In this sense, the most Important objectives for strikes of the strategic missile troops will be the enemy's means of nuclear attack, against which it Is primarily necessary to launch mlsslles of:Intercontinental and Intermediate (srednyaya) range types, and also his strategic aviation, centers of governmental and military control, the most important economic objectives, especially those connected with the production of nuclear weapons, and other important aspects of his war potential.
The decision regarding the question of objectives, the timing and force of the strikes of the missile troops of strategic designation. Is entirely andthe prerogative of the Headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme High Command, and will depend on the capabilities of the country to adopt missile/nuclear strategic weapons and also on tht concrete conditions of the situation, of which the political factor wilt bt the decisive element.
It Is not the Intention of this article to analyze tbe possible role of the High Command with missile troops In the organization and execution of the strikes which havt been decided, but we would nevertheless like to emphaslzt that this role, in our view, should be kept within firmly defined limits, since every such strikeost Important factor of policy and strategy, and accordingly should be carried out in all Its details on direct orders of the Supreme High Command.
In our theory, the question frequently arises of the participation of ground troops or their missile large units with the advent of war In "missileof the strategic missile troops and, conversely.
of the participation of the missile troops of strategic designation In the operations of ground troops. The posing of such questions has no sound basis.
Indeed, military-industrial objectives, the largest administrative-political centers, and the strategic means of nuclear attack of the Imperialist governments, all of which are designated for destruction by the missile troops of strategicare deployedreat expanse of the globe. They are located In Europe, Africa, Asia and America.
In turn, our missile troops of strategicare also deployed over an enormous area. Therefore, under these conditions there Is hardly any sense In speaking of the concept of direct coordination and execution of Joint strikes by the strategic missile troops and missile large units (units) of the ground troops. We can only say that the successfulof their basic missions by the strategic missile troops will create favorable conditions for igorous and decisive operations by all the other types of the armed forces, including the ground troops.
It is true that observations have been made to the effect that together with the execution of the missions enumerated above, missile troops of strategic designation will also be used for the accomplishment of such missions as tbe defeat of groupings of ground troopsheater of military operations, theof theperational means-of nuclear attack, and other objectives. And In light of this, an attempt is made to analyze the bases of coordination between missile troops of strategic designation and missile large units of ground troops. It appears to us thatresentation of the question Is also devoidealistic base.
The efforts of missile troops of strategic designation should not be dissipated over numerousJust as In the years of World War II It was
considered irrational to useagainst operational objectives. If we did so
at times, then ltaseront's lack of aircraft.
To plan beforehand for the execution ofmissions by the strategic missile troops is not expedient. For this reason, the missile troops of the ground troops, continually being supplied with more highly perfected types of missiles, will be able to destroy enemy objectivesreater depth than Is now possible, and this will ensure the successful execution'of front operations without the Involvement of strategic missile troops.
The strikes of the strategic missile troops must. In the final analysis, predetermine the attainment of the principal goals of the warin this lies their fundamental purpose. Their basic efforts must be focused on the attainment of these goals.
ARE THS DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OFFENSE ANDOBLITERATED"?
If one were to analyze carefully the Judgements of General Gastllovlch, then lt would not be difficult to come to the conclusion that defenseorm of armed combat has disappeared or Is on the threshold of disappearing because it has somehow lost Its inherent characteristicto hold designated lines or areas with the object of Inflicting maximum losses upon the advancing enemy and, in doing so, to create the necessary conditionsransitionecisive offensive. He sees the distinction between defense and offense only In the number of nuclear weapons, of divisions, and the composition of echelons. As to the means of conducting combat operations, they are, in his way of thinking, the same in offense as In defense.
"In offensive as In defensive operations of ground troops, the basis of their operations Is nuclear strikes, swift maneuvers and short assaults with tanks and manpower".1
If one Is guided by the materialistic dialectic and also proceeds from the actual relationship of the strength of the opposing military groupings, then it Is obviously impossible to agree fully with these assertions.
We all acknowledge that offense will be the basic form of combat operations of our troopsuture war. But In acknowledging offense, we cannot deny the necessity for defense as one of the possible forms of armed combat, because if there Is no defense then there is no offense. Offense Is so called because It is wagedefending enemy. Without the presenceefending enemy the troops wouldormal march. Offense and defense are two inter-related and Interdependent forms of armed combat, and one cannot exist without the other. Such Is the dialectic' of this question.
In the Judgements expressed above, it appears that consideration has not been given to theof our potential enemies.
Actually, the countries of the Socialist Camp are militarily, politically, and economically strong as never before. However, in preparing for war and exploring new methods of armed combat, we cannot assume that our probable enemies are not technically armed, as they say, to the teeth. They haven man armies, they possess enormous stocks of nuclear weapons and modern means of delivering them to their targets. Therefore, to consider that we will not encounter serious counteraction from their sideallacy.ew world war can only be unleashed by the Imperialist aggressors, primarily by the Anglo-American
Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryirst Issue,
imperialists and the West German revanchists. they will be the first to try to carryassive missile-nuclear attack which will be followed by an invasion of ground troops. The effects of astrike can be very tangible not only for our country but for the entire Socialist Camp as well. The enemy can take the Initiative In his hands In specific sectorstrategic front and compel ur troops to resort temporarily to defensive Not to consider this and to reject completely the possibility ofevelopment In specific directions means to close one's eyes to reality, to Indulge In "counting one's chickens before they are hatched" (shepkozakldatelstvo),
We maintainuture war will have not only an all-embracing,any-sided character, with varied forms of armed combat. Consequently, our task does not consist of artificially simplifying them but of thoroughly studying currently existing methods of combat, of evaluating them objectively and correctly, and of devising new ones.
The more versatile the preparation of our armed forces from the; point of view of their mastery of all possible forms and methods of armed combat, the higher will be their combat readiness and the greater will be our guarantee against any type of surprise or incident In the coursear. Such Is ourof this .question of the plan for waging war.
But how does this question fare within the framework of an operation? Under modern conditions, defenders who are launching massive missile-nuclear attacks on an advancing force canumber of cases change decisively the correlation of forces to their own advantage and force It to turn to defensive operations, and sometimes to retreat.
In this connection one of the characteristic features of an offensive operation In depth under conditions of mass use of missile/nuclear weapons is
the variety of forms arid methods of waging It and alsothe dynamic nature of their change: swift pursuit and solid, vigorous defense, meeting engagements, and retreats, combat under encirclement and disengagement from combatsuch Is the possible general picture of developmentodern offensive operation. Every form and method of armed combat has characteristics, peculiarities, and modes of conduct which are Inherent to lt alone. Therefore, the mission of military art* Is not confined to the artificial elimination ofamong them, nor to the forcible abolition or coalescence of methods but toheory for their organization and conduct under conditionsissile-nuclear war.
Much attention is devoted by certain authors to an examination of the methods of conducting defense. They consider that to defend oneself now Is senseless. Nuclear weapons overwhelm and destroy everyoneIt Is unnecessary to hold areas and positions, Just as It is impossible to maintain their stability.
In our opinion, defense on an operational as wellactical scale must be able to withstand enemy missile/nuclear strikes and the subsequent tank assaults to preserve to the maximum possible degree one's own personnel and equipment, to inflict the greatest destruction upon the enemy, and to create the necessary conditions for going over to the offensive and the final destruction of the enemy, evenituation where the defending troops employ limited forces and weapons. ission for defense under modern conditions is typical, the more so because the attacker will not always and everywhere have the capability to overcome the defense by massive nuclear strikes.
Can one, under current conditions, argue stronglyefense based only on maneuver and strikes by forces located In the 2one of the Interior? Our reply to this is In the negative.
Defense, with Its inherent peculiarities and methods of conduct under modern conditions, must be buiItkillful combination of firm holding of definite areas of terrain together with maneuver and strikes by troops from the zone of the interior. Maneuver must be utilized mainly for the preservation of one's own limited forces and weapons, the creationiring line which is invincible to the enemy In the primary directions of his offensive and also for" the launching of fire strikes and the execution of counterattacks and counterstrlkes.
To relegate "stability of defense to the archives" as General Gastllovlch proposesmeans to deny that premise on which is based the modes and methods of operations by troops in defense.
Such an assertion Is all the more untrue if one keeps In mind that stability of defense is not exhausted by the creation of defensive positions and zones by the organization of terrain by engineer work. This is Just one of the factors upon which stability depends. Stability of defense must be achieved by other factors as well, foremost by missile-nuclear strikes, strikes by troops and an extensive system of obstacles. Even formerly one could not talk about any sort of stability of defense without maneuver, fire strikes, and strikes by troops.
Missile/nuclear weapons In the hands fit defensive troops affords them the possibility of? completely frustrating /The enemy's offensive^1 But thisIn no way denies the necessity for.the formation of defense accordingefinite system. The deployment of troops in tactical as well as inelements must be subject to definite requirements and must guarantee not only the accomplishment of maneuver, but also the holding of basic areas In tha probable directions of the enemy's offensive.
Headquarter's Comment: Portion In brackets missing from the original and reconstructed by translator.
Today thereeries of "weak spots" In our defense. Basing its organization on defensive zones and positions,arge extent ltinear The deployment of forces and weapons along solid frontal positions and zones gives riseumber of cases, as experience in exercises demonstrates, to the desire to close the gaps and breaches which leads to the linear deployment of forces and the establishmentontinuous front.
esult of the radical changes which have taken place In the means of armed combat and also in the methods of our probable enemies in conducting an offensive, the necessityeappraisal of the orms of organizationodern defense has obviously arisen.
A' defense strip (zone) of an army must obviouslyystem of organized areas capable ofmassive enemy tank attacks, of disrupting the efforts of his ground troops, and of creating favorable conditions for inflicting on them not only nuclear strikes but also counterstrikes by our own forces from the zone of the interior.
efense strip (zone) of an army, which - canms and more along the frontms In depth, it Is expedient to assign to divisions defense areas which embrace the basicof the probable offensive of the enemy.
In the defense strip (zone) of an army the following must be prepared,.siting areas for missile large units, areas of defense for divisions; siting areas for units of PVO troops, areas of disposition and lines of deployment of large units of the second echelon and reserves; controload network,ystem of obstacles set up by the engineers.
The area of defenseivision must alsoystem of organized areas of defense for units deployed along the front and in depth along the most Important directions. The size of the area of defenseivision can vary.
Within the area of defenseivision there must be organized siting areas for missile andmissile units, areas of defense for regiments and battalions, artillery fire positions, control points, and areas of disposition and lines ofof second echelons and reserves.
The area of defenseegiment under theseconditions canms along the front andms in depth, andattalion,ras along the frontms In depth. All areas of defense must be adaptable to perimeter defense.
The basis of organization of areas by engineer work should be primarily construction for fire means, cover for personnel and combat equipment, preparation in the antiatomlc sense in combination with obstacles and roads in order toroop maneuver, and not the constructionolid trench system. of trenches and connecting trenches can be established only In the areas of defense of subunits, and even there only if time Is available. Thebetween areas of defense must be covered by fire, obstacles, and, on the most important directions, also by missile/nuclear strikes.
The organization of the defense must be begun with the organizationystem of fire which must guarantee: the destruction of the enemy's means for nuclear attack as they are discovered! the destruction of his troops and-areas of deployment at -the time -of advance, deployment and, transition to the offensive; the repelling of massed attacks by enemy tanks and infantry; destruction of scattered enemy groupings; destruction of control points and his radiotechnlcal equipment; covering with fire thend areas of chemical contamination, breaches, open flanks, and areas subjected to nuclear strikes; the support of troops launching counterattacks and counterstrikes; the capability of concentrating firehort time In any threatened direction.
A
Thus,reakthrough in the prepared defense of the enemy, with the objectives of achieving the maximum destruction of defensive Installations, the destruction of combat equipment and personnel, the creation of high levels ofto impede the establishment of defense and the Introduction of fresh forces. It can bemore.advantageous to employ surface or low altitude bursts. Under these conditions, the main efforts of the advancing troops will be more advantageously concentrated by bypassing the areas which haveassive nuclear strike.
The concentration of the main efforts of troops in the direction of nuclear strikes can also prove Inexpedient during an offensive through heavily wooded areas. Fires, log obstacles, the retention /two or three words missing^ of the /one word missing/ time of choosing /part of line mlssing7 of troops in the areas of nuclear bursts. In these cases. If only the possibility'ofexists, it is essential to use it decisively, and to effect the destruction of the enemy ln the forest with powerful nuclear strikes.
A somewhat similar situation can take place If the attack comes through areas with large cities where the operations of troops after nuclear strikes could prove very difficult.
direction of the efforts of combined-arms nuclear weapons can also tion of the line ofion has been taken up ln grouping. It willrate the main efforts of directly on this enemy gr strike by troops in an en flank and rear.
concentration of the main large units and of missile-differ owing to the dellnea-ront. lanking posi-
relation to the mainore expedient to concen-
the missile/nuclear weapons buplng and to launch the veloplng movementn the
can be other conditions of the situation when the direction of the concentration of the main
efforts of the troops will not pass through areas of employment of the main bulk of missile/nuclear weapo
Consequently In this question we are facedew law In military art, the essence of whichfac^ that modern means of combat not only allow but very often obligate the separation, in relation to
f
i.ee,he strikes launched by nuclear weapons and troop
This necessarily applies to considerations of the antiatomic protect-icn *of -all -forces -and-weapons designated for an offensive, as well as toof the most effective use of all the destructivefactors of nuclear weapons.
In determining the timing of launching nuclear strikes, we shall alsoew situation which cannot be ignored. As Is known, In World War II, we did not usually begin artillery and air preparation If the troops were not completely prepared to advance. And how must we resolve this problem under present conditions?
In principle. It Is desirable that the time for the launching of missile/nuclear strikes be determinedonsideration of the operational situation and of the readiness of the troops for the most effective utilization of the results of these strikes. This, however. Is only In jrinclple. If there Is reason to assume that the enemy canreventive strike, then it Is essential to launch one's own nuclear strikes against him without delay, not waiting for the compltete readiness of all the troops predeslgnated for the offensive, because every delay In the missile/nuclear strike In the beginning of the operation Is fraught -with the danger of its frustrating the offensive.
In conclusion, we consider it essential toonce again that at the present time It is our deep
conviction that Soviet military theory Is passing noteriod of crisis, buturning point In Its development.
In the light of this situation, as lt appears it Is also necessary tourtherof military doctrine, of the theory ofand of other questions of military
Original document.
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