1
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASEASSANITIZED m
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
LIMITED IHSTIURITION
tt yOft OF CUNT HAL INTELLIGENCE
The loltoteina intelligence organiiaHam participated in the preparation ot this etUmale: The Central Inlelllaenct Agency and the Intelligence organisation! of the Depa-tmeMi ol State, Defense, the Army, the navy, the Al' Force, and Thc Joint Stag.
Concurred tn by thc UNITED STATES lNTbLUGKNCK BOAKO
ctober mt. Concurring mere thr Direcior ofand Research, Department of State; the Director.Intelligence Agency: the Aulitant OMtJ of Stag for Intelligence, Department of the Army. Ihe Aalstant Chief ol Havel Operation, Unteihaencet. Deportment ol the Nosy; the AsHstant Chief Of Staff. Intelligence. VSAF; the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Rcptesenlelitc to the VSIB. and Ihe Dtrcctoe of the national Security Agency The Aulstant Director. Federal Bureau ofbstained, tha sutrfect being outside o] his
jurisdiction
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Copy
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
51
This estimate supersedes,0 ando,
This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy InteUigence Committee, whichm posed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, The Joint Staff, the National Security Agency, theto the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the Central Intelligence Agency. See appropriate footnotes, however, for theviews of the Navy and Air Force. The FBI abstained, the subject being ouLslde of its jurisdiction.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE 1
SUMMARY AND I
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY
II. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR
Research. . 7
Power
Marine Nuclear Propulsion
Nuclear Propulsion Systems for Aircraft. MissUes, and
Nuclear Electrical Propulsion Systems for Space Applications. 14
Nuclear Auxiliary (Non-Propulsion) Power
SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION
Soviet Uranium Ore
Uranium
Plutonium-Equivalent
Other Nuclear
SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON
Nuclear Weapon Research and Development Installations .
Weapon Development
Fabrication and
Control of Nuclear Weapons .
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TOP JfECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
V. POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OF FISSIONABLE MA-
TERIALS TO WEAPON
The Soviet Test
Availability oi Fissionable
Soviet Military Doctrine and
Long Range Striking
Air
Support oi Ground
Naval
ANNEX A RESEARCH LABORATORIES SUPPORTING THEATOMIC ENERGY
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'CRET ED DATA
CRET
LIST OF TABLES
Page
SSR Research Reactors and Reactor2 Soviet Nuclear Power Stations and Experimental
Centers.
Table 3 Estimated Soviet Bloc Recoverable EquivalentMetal Production8
Table 4 Estimated Soviet Fissionable Materials
valuation of Soviet Nuclear Preliminary Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear Tests* In
Table 6 Soviet Thermonuclear
Table 7 Soviet Fission
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to bic^KS
LIST OF FIGURES
I Figure 2
igure 8
m
"Figure S
Figure II
Figure 12
r_
Figure IS Figureigure 17
L
igure 2
page
"H- Cilia 8
Power
Materials*
Verkh-Hej-rtnak Oueoui Diffualon Plant
Tomsk Gaseous Diffusion
Tomsk Reactor
Weapon Research and Test Areas
1"
saiova Nuclear Research and Development 24
Semlpalatlnik Nuclear Weapon Proving 34
SemlpalaUnak Nuclear Weapon Proving 24
New Research Faculty at *
1:
Apparent 0round Zero at SemlpalaUnak 24
Apparent Oround Zero at BemlpaUunsk 24
Nizhnyaya Tut* Nuclear Energy. M
Kharkov Linear
Nuclear Research 48
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THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
THE PROBIEM
To estimate the current statu* and probable future course of tbe Soviet atomic energy program to6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITYeapon Capability. We believe
nuclear weapons are available for delivery systems which we know to be in thearsenal or which we estimate to be under development- However, many of these weapons probably are not ofdesign, and serious gaps in theknowledge of weapons effects formilitary applications may exist
F e estimate that these weapons range from fission warhead devices yield-
lo thermonuclear warheads yield-
^we have reuaoieshort range army support weaponsyield, some of which may welltested. We must consider alsothat there are largerIn stockpile although suchnot been tested, and therefore,would have reducedthe
,na T,
andI1B)
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION
2 Uranium Ore. Available evidenceto indicate that the Soviets are
expanding both their domestic andprocurement of uranium ore. We estimate that by the end0 theUnion hadumulative total ofetric tons ofuranium. As In previous years these amounts are considerably in excess of the recoverable equivalent uranium metal required to support our current estimate of fissionable materials (TablendO
S Two gaseous diffusion uranium isotope separation plants bare been identified In the USSR, one at Vorkh-Neyvlnsk and the other atrobable third plant ls located near Angarsk In the Lake Baykal region. However, we have been unable to confirmroduction in this area. Wethat no other largelant is currently inin the Soviet Union.
e estimate that the Soviets produced the equivalent0 kg ofynd that the cumulative total will have increased tog by.
lutoniumwo major Plutonium-equivalent production sites have been identified in the USSR. The earliest and largest Is located near Kyshtym in the Urals and the second is north of Tomsk in Central Siberia. The atomic energy site near Krasnoyarsk, and possibly the site at Angarsk, could also Include some plutonium-equivalentfacilities, but available evidence does not confirm the existence of such facilities at these sites )
he available evidence leads tovalues of Soviet plutonium-equivalent
See paneor the rlew of the Auliunt Chief or Harmlonsepartment of Uie Nan.
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3
* See page II for Um view of tbe AeUlnnt duet of Sural CrperatloruepexDneot ot the Navy.
POSSIBLE ALLOCATIONS OfMATERIALS TO WEAPON
e believe that the long-rangeforces have been given the largest allocation of fissionable materials, and that at present the Soviet weaponscan support massive nuclear attacks against targets In Eurasia and North America. In view of the large allocation estimated for the long range attack forces, and the size and nature of the overall materials stockpile; limitations are Imposed on tbe numbers ofavailable for other air, ground, and naval operations. These limitations necessarily affect military planning. However, we consider it unlikely that the availability of fissionable materials for nuclear weaponsactor which Insignificantly limits Soviet policy. We haveonsiderable growth in the Soviet fissionable materialswhich should keep pace with thegrowth In Soviet missilefor long-range attack, and also ease the limitations noted above. )
NUCLEAR WEAPON RESEARCH,FABRICATION AND STOCK-PIUNG
esearch and Development. Thenuclear weapon research andeffort has remained activei evidenced0 photography of the weapon research complex at Sarova and the Sernipalatinsk proving grounds, and the resumption of ontest program Inecent analysis9 photographythat Kasli is another important
ajy^ffRT
BESTBtmo DATA
and active Soviet nuclear weaponand development site. Other sites at which some research andis being conducted include Nizh-naya Tura and probably)
abrication and Stockpiling. We have identified nuclear weaponand national stockpile sites in the Urals at Nizhnaya Tura and Yuryuzan. Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia isengaged in fabrication operations and may alsotockpile site. least three, and probably five, nationaland stockpile sites sites for the Long RangetAJ at arctic staging bases, and moreozen airfield storage sites have been Identified. While we have no firmof operational nuclear weapon storage facilities except at LRAew naval airfields, wc continue to estimate that such facilities are available to thc Soviet tactical and naval aviation, to the naval surface forces, and to the ground forces. )
NUCLEAR REACTORower Reactors. The Soviets have fallen far short of their nuclear powerannounced6 and included in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Soviethave stated that they have reduced the nuclear power program since their reactors were not competitive withpower sources. Wc estimate that the Soviets will have0 megawatts of nuclear generating capac-
'For the Likelihood lhat the Sorleucon-dueled tests during the moratorium period, see
1
Uy installed byParas.
Nuclear Propulsionreactor technologyas the earliest date that apropulsion reactor for ahave been available forreactors areinstalled in all nuclearunder construction and wethat the Soviets will continue totype of system for the next
Wo believe that the first Sovietsubmarine was completed at the Severodvinsk shipyard innd probably went into service with the Northern Fleethe Kom-somol'sk shipyard In the Far East Isto have completed its first nuclear submarine
Recent information on the new class of Northern Fleet submarineslass) indicates that some form ofpropulsion, probably nuclear, is employed. The size and operating characteristics of these submarines seem to bo more limited than those of USsubmarines.
Based on all available evidence, it is estimated that the Soviets hadlass submarines, probably nuclearin service in the Northern Fleet as ofndewsuch submarines may betrials and training. Currentsubmarine production is estimated to beate of about six submarines per year.
Reactor Systems for Aircraft. If the Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP)
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program was Initiatedp-ported continuouslyigh level, and progressed with no major setbacks, the Soviets could produce an aircraft nuclear power plant as early.rogram mightirst militarily useful nuclear powered aircraft toavailable6 However f_
^and the apparent general level of their reactor technology indicate that the effort may have encountered serious obstacles. Therefore, we believe it unlikely that the Soviets willilitarily useful nuclear powered aircraft dunng thc period of this estimate.at any time during the period of this estimate tlie Soviets, for propaganda purposes, might fly an aircraft obtaining part of its thrust from nuclear heat.)
eactor Systems for Rockets and Ramjets. We estimate that the Soviet Union Is working touclear rocket engine and will have the capability touclear rocket static test firingo date there Is noevidence to indicate that tbe Sovietsuclear ramjet under development, and we estimate that it Is unlikely that the Soviets will be able touclear ramjet engine)
uclear Electrical Propulsionfor Space Applications. The major Soviet effort in this field appears to be directed toward an ion propulsion system We estimate that the Soviets could flightrototype system operatingower of aboutilowatts possiblyf do major difficulties areIn developing the nuclear power source (or the engine)
DISCUSSION
ORGANIZATION OF THC SOVIET ATOMIC
ENERGYhe Soviet atomic energy program laprimarily by two organizations. The Ministry of Medium Machine Buildingeaded by B. P. SUvsfcty. bfor most of the atomic energyIn tbe USSR, including ricploratlon and exploitation of ore. producllon of fissionable material, and. with tbe Mlrdstry of Defense, development and tuxkpUing of nuclearThe State Committee of the USSR Council ot Minuter* for the UUlhaUon or Atomic Energy (ATOMKOM1TBT) Ufor the application of non-mllltary usesatomic energy within the USSR as well as Uie cooperation ot the USSR with countries
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other than European satellites In theseThe Academy of Sciences, USSR,s apparently used to adnse and conductresearch for both the Ministry and lhe Stale Committee. Some of the Institutesore prominent rale In the Soviet nuclear research effort are described in Annex A.
dentification of the organlxaUonalaffecting tbe rrsearcli, uranium mining, feed materials production, andmaterial! production aspects of thc Soriet atomic energy program has been based on relatively arm evidence. Newhas improved our understanding of the organisational relationships arTcclIng nu'
ED
weapon design, development, testing, and storage aspects of the program.
The nuclear weapon proving ground at Semlpalatlnsk and Installations supporting the test area on Novaya Zemlya are probably under lhe operational control of the military. Test activity Itself Isoint effort by both the military and the scientificinvolved, with the Ministry of Medium Machine Building exercising technical
We believe that the Ministry of Medium Machine Building Is responsible for theof national assembly and stockpile sites and that the weapons Immediately required to Implement military missions are controlled by the Ministry of Defense, probably by acentral element of that Ministry. (See)
reorganization within the areauses" of atomic energy occurredSoviet Union onhenChief Directorate for the UtilizationEnergy (QLAVATOM) attached toof Ministers was reorganized andto the ministerial level as thefor the USSR Council of thc Utilization of Atomic with V. S. Yemel'yanovchairman. This State Committeeacquired more authority andpriority in carrying out itsefforts. According to one source,organization has planned aln the use of nuclear andenergy and is expected to expandfield of nuclear research and This Increased emphasis on application of nucleartlie atomic energy Statethe effort by theCommittee of the USSR Council offor tlie Coordination of Scientificheaded by Konstantln Rudnev,established lo introduce thcand technical discoveries into To date, we have seen noRudnev's State Committee isthc Soviet atomic energy program.
ooperation amongsatellites In the Held ofof atomic energy has beentanding Committee for theUses of Atomic Energy created byfor Mutual Economic Aidlong range plan of the CEMAcommittee will divide the variousthe member nations and will resultsingle integrated Satellite atomicThis type of inter-countrywill probably delay, if not prevent,of an Independentby any of the participating
II. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM Introduction
The USSR has continued toiversified and comprehensive reactorbut the nuclear power program was further reduced during the past year. The USSR has done excellent work in thefields of heat transfer, the superheating of steam directly in reactors, and theof fast reactors.
The present Soviet reactor capacity isalmost exclusively to plutoniumThere ls reason to believe thatproduction reactor technology has been conventional and lias shown no outstanding advances. Both graphite-moderated and heavy-water moderated lypes are in use. In additfon, at least two dual-purpose reactors, apparently optimized for plutoniumare in operation at Tomsk.
While the Soviets arc constructing some large-scale power reactors of different types, they have indicated that they arepecific power reactor type butare exploring the advantages of various types in prototype reactors and reactorin an effort to obtain competitive nuclear power.
In the USSR, the greatest advances in power reactor technology appear lo have been made in pressurized-water systems. All large power reactors which tho Soviets plan to build
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the USSR In the near future employ normal water aa the coolant In either the pressure-vessel or pressure-tube configuration The Soviet* are definitely Interested in the bulk type bolllng-water reactor, but they appear to be awaiting further development of the technology of the pressurtad-water reactornd the prcasure-tube tolling water reactor with nuclear superheat before nthe developmentulk tolling-water reactor. Soviet work on organic moderation has been limited to the operation of critical assemblies. The Soviets have done little work on liquid-racial fueled rractora Theirfor reactor safety bare not been stringent by Western itaodards: however, there Is evidence of growing Soviet ooneem with reactor safety and control
Research Reacton
here are presently at leastesearch reactors available to the USSR.his number and variety of reactors give the Soviet* an excellent capability to aUidy and develop materials for more advancedarticularly Important new reactor Ls the Impulse fast reactor. 1BR (also called the "merry fu-round" reactor) which began to operate late0 at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research tneutron spectrometerlight pathilometer to be used with this reactor Is now underand &hould be completedhis research facility will permit the Soviets to advance their understanding of neutron physic*ide energy spectrum and could be valuable in the study of some effects of nuclear weapons on various components and Kys tern*.
Power Reocfori
he USSR has fallen far short of thepower objectives announced8 and included ln the Sixth rive-Year Plan This Plan called for the Installation0 electrical megawatts (MWc) of nuclearcapacity by the end The pro-
'Itrutirrrpt itului wiih non-tolling wateroolinL
gram has continued to slipnd Soviet officials have stated that they have reduced the nuclear power program for eeo-nocnle reasons since their nuclear reacton are
not yet competitive with oonvenUooal power
sources.
wo large reactor stations are beinga presuirised-water0 MWc) at Novo-Voronezh,ressure-tube.phi temoderated reactor wtth nuclear superheat at0 aCWe). Both arc expected to be completed The experimental boiling-water, and possibly the fast reactors at Ulyanovsk might add electrical megawatts. We estimate, therefore, that Including Ihe dual-purposeathe USSR will nave0 megawatts of nuclear generatinginstalled by (Seend rtoure 2)
Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems
he nuclear poweredNTN. completed its flrrt opcration! season In the Northern Sea Rout* in the faller propulsion system has sinceajor overhaul and numerous reports Indicate that problems were encountered with leakage of water from the primary loop and withThe Soviets may be encountering many of these problems in their nuclear submarine propulsion system.
oviet reactor technology Indicates that7 was the earliest datouclear propulsion reactorubmarine could have been available for uutallaUun. f*
3
oviet preference for PWR1 In marine propulsion systems ran be Inferred from their use on the LENIN and from statement* by Soviet atomic energy and shipbuilding authorities- Pressurlsed-water reactors are" probably being Installed in all nuclear sub-rnarines currently under construction and we believe that the Soviets will continue to use this type of system for the next five years.
R ESTIW
rRET
D DATA
HICJk^ETi DATA
a 3
c3 T
2
v 2
5
<
13
S 8
1 1
33 i a
Tabk 3
SOTUT NUCLfiAH POWER STATIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL CENTERS-
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13
believe that lhe Brit Sovietwas completed at theIn8 and probably wentwith the Northern FleetInformation on tbe new class ofsubmarineslaaa) Indicatesform of urteonventlonal propulsion,nuclear. Is employed. Thecharacteristics of theseto be more limited than those ofsubmarines.
the Far East the Komaomol'skestimated to have completed lishis submarine Isbeing outfitted and undergoing trialsIt li estimated that theyard can producenuclearper year.
ased on all availablesthat the Soviets hadlass submarines, probably nuclear powered, in service In the Northern Fleet as ofndew additional suchmay be undergoing trials andCurrent nuclear submarine production is estimated to beata of about atzper year.
Nuclear P'Opuliion Syslems fe* Aircroft, Miuilai, and Space Vehrdcs
Aircraft.stimatedovielnuclear propulsion (ANP) effort may have begun as early0 and that as9 the Soviets were engaged In an effort to develop some type of ANP system. However, no evidence has been received which permits determination of the exact type of system under development or the status of the effort. Furthermore, sincebe Soviets have given no optimistic expressionsthe progress of Iheir program.
The Soviet scientific literature reflects an extensive, but basic, research effort tomaterials suitable for high temperature reactors, including fuels, cladding, and. Other Soviet work applicable to ANP developments has been notedore limited scale in the fields of heal transfer.
shielding, instrumentation, and reactorThe development of fissionable fuels suitable for use at high temperatures bprogressingaster rate than cladding and reactor structural mate rials. There Is no specific evidence that Soviet efforts to produce high temperature nuclear mate-nab have progressed from the laboratory stage to the Industrial capacity formill forms In quantities required for an ANP program.
f the Soviet ANP program was Initiatedas supported continuouslyigh level, and progressed wtth no major setbacks, the Soviets could produceaircraft nuclearpower plant as early. This mightirst mill tartly useful nuclear powered aircraft to become available6 However
3 and the apparent general level of their reactor technology, Indicate that the effort may have encountered serious obstacles Therefore, we believe it unlikely that tbewillilitarily useful nuclear powered aircraft during the period of thb estimate. However, al any time during the period of thb estimate the Soviets, forpurposes, might fly an aircraftpart of Its thrust from nuclear best.
amjets. To dateo specificto Indicate that the Soviets hava* under development Analysis of the Soviet literature indicates an excellent conventional ramjet researchbut references to nuclear ramjets can be attributed to feasibility studies. Basednd the technicalofissile, we estimate that It is unlikely that the Soviets will be able touclear ramjet engine0
ocfcefi. Based on Soviet rtatemenla and their published research In the field, wethat the Soviet Union ls at this time working touclear rocket engine. Their research In high-temperature refractory compounds, high-pressure containment vea-
REST>9
TED DATA
.
sels for reactor cores and their success ina uranium-graphite fuel element for the "merry-go-round" pulsed reactor add to their development capability in this field. In view of the above, and of the availability of unclassified Western technical information, we believe that the USSR will have thctouclear rocket static test firing
Nuclear Electrical Propulsion Systems for Spaco Applications
lectric propulsion using nuclearources offers the possibility forow-thrust, high specific Impulse systemfor outer space and Inter-orbitalsuch systems would be useless for
the Soviets have shownall forms of electricheireffort appears to be directed towardpropulsion system. Soviet fastat Obninsk were conductingthrust-chamber experiments as earlySuch experiments have applicationsystems.
It has been reported that Soviet scientists at the State University imcni Shevchenko in Kiev arc developing in-flight Instrumentation for an Ion propulsion system to operateower range0 kw. and that this instrumentation contract ends inhis may indicate that an Ion engine wiih its associated power source is expected lo be available by that time.
It ls estimated that the Soviets could flightrototype ion-propulsion system operatingower of aboutilowatts, possiblyf no major difficulties are encountered in developing the nuclear power source for theystem operallng at this power level could change the original orbital inclination andatellite out to an orbit such lhat the satellite wouldfixed in positionven location on the earth's surface.
'This includes. Ionic, plasma. arc-Jet andpropulsion systems.
Nuclear Auxiliary (non-propuliion) Power Supplies
e have no evidence that thc Soviets have utilized nuclear heat sources for auxiliary power supplies in their space program,their outstanding work in thcof thermoelectric materials has been well substantiated. Based on theirin reactor technology, the utilization of radio-isotopes, and thermoelectric materials development, we estimate that the Soviets can develop nuclear heat sources producing in the order of's of watts and suitable for use as auxiliary power supplies ln missiles and space vehicles as early
HE SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALSPROGRAM
Soviet Uranium Ore Procurement
We estimate that by the end0 the Soviet Union hadumulative total ofetric tons ofuranium (Table. As Lnyears, these amounts are considerably in excess of the recoverable equivalentmetal required to support our current estimate of fissionable materials production. Nevertheless, the available evidence continues to indicate that the Soviets arc expanding both their domestic and satellite procurement of uranium ore.
The most significant trend in theIs the continuing shift In East German mining operations from the largely depleted vein-type Saxony ores to the sedimer.iary-typc Thunngiaew concentration plant ls being built at Seellngstadt which will use modern Ion-exchange recovery methods to process up0 tons of ore dally. East German uranium production is thereforeto increase gradually in thc next five years Reportsew concentration plant being built near Porubka in eastern Czechoslovakia indicate an increase inuranium production ls planned. WhUg Poland discontinued shipment of ore
J,mi CTED DATA
CR BT
the USSRulgaria. Hungary and Rumania are estimated to have supplied tbe USSR with several thousand tons ofequivalent uranium metal0 and arc expected to continue to do tolightly expanding rat* during tbe next Ave years.
An Increasing amount of evidence on the Chinese Peoples Republic uraniumprogram suggestsair-sited uranium raw material! base has beenHowever, we believe that uranium mined In China Is meant to supply the Chinese nuclear energy program and win not be shipped to the USSR1
In the USSR, the Krivoy Rog district In the Ukraine Is estimated to be the leading' uranium producer. The Fergana Valley In Central Asia Is believed to be the second largest producing area followed by the Frnnxe-Lake Issyk-Kul' district and the Pyatlcorsk district Ln the northern Caucasus^
"]have suppliedindicating that yearly uraniumIs on the orderetric tons of equivalent uranium metal 68 ground photography7 aerial photography of the PyaUgorsk plant In the northern Caucasus leadsairly firmof production from this area. Information received on other uranium mining sites baa been moreul it demonstrates that the Soviets hare been able to extract uraniumariety of deposits Including veins, sandstones, oU-shalea,and sub-blluminous coals. The last type of depositignificantof uranium to theirond Its use demonstrates an ability toype of deposit largely Ignored in the western world. The Soviets have matched many mining and ore concen-
WEhe Chinese Communist atomic Energy Program.
tration methods used In the US; and their recovery of uranium from coals, as well as from Krivoy Rog Iron ore slags, indicates native developments requiring considerable engineering capability.
he Soviet Bloc Is estimated to haveof atons of recoverable equivalent uranium metal present In deposits similar In nature to those now mined. Of the known deposits being worked only thc Thuringta deposits ln East Oermany and the Krivoy Rog deposits have apparent largematching many uranium miningof the westernevertheless. Soviet exploitation of numerous email -reserve deposits has supplied, and can continue to supply sufficient uranium to meet all of tbe requirements of the Soviet nuclear energy Present mining and ore concentration costs are high, but this situation can bequickly by the discovery of one or more large-reserve deposits similar to the Ambrosia take deposit in Hew Mexico or the Blind River deposit Inm which tbe Bo-vie ts hare recently expressed considerable Theretrong likelihood otevelopment ln view of tbe geologicalof the USSR
estimate that uranium productionSoviet Bloc will expand at theoftons of recoverable equivalenta year. At this rate,metric tons of equivalentwill have been available tohis figure tsto large margins of error, however,production will depend uponand plans.
Uranium Metal
metal and other feedproducedarge scale at threein thc Soviet Union:Moscow, OIoxov, Just west of theNovosibirsk in central Siberia.at Elcktroital reportedly mcreased from
SJertBT RE3TKI/TKD DATA
I
ESTIMATED tOTIET BLOC BT.CO VEB ABLEr.KT ORANIPH METAL raoPUCTlOM
TBKOOOa IWk Tom. fcoMrfod)
TMri
Cuido-
Ll
EodoT Yur
ill; Ul.'
imtuoti
BOO
ICE
'
CCO
OOC
OX
Nul lododrd lo loU] anBtul or loul aumnliUrc prodiKdoo nix* Chioi ud Polud (iTUr IBIS) aan raulord
tons per year as uranium metal slugs la9 to0 Ions per year as metal or slugs0 tons per year aa uranium tetrafluortde inroduction values for oiaxoT are unknown after9ateons per year (as alugi) bad been attained. Oround and aerial photography shows that the Novosibirsk plant Istile larger than the Femald plant In tbe US. The estimated NorostNrik production rates0 tons of slugs per year3 have been derived from Elektreslal site and process data,easonablefor the economy of space resulting from the use of larger buildings and equipment. Thus there appears to be sufficient feedplant capacity In the USSR to process all the uranium ore concentrate Indicated by the uranium ore estimate. (See
TOP RES'
roouction
3T. Two gaseous diffusion uranium Isotope separation plants haVe definitely beenIn the USSR Photographs of the plant at VerUi-Neyvtnsk Is the Urals, and of tbe one located north of Tomsk In central Siberia, were obtained97robable third gaseous diffusion plant ts located near Angarsk In the Lake Bavkal(See Figure
RET D DATA
1
cumulativeroducuon by ultra-centrifuge or other methods ts unlikely.
edge of Soviet orodiiellon
he photography of Verkh-Neyvlnsk ln9 and Tomsk In7 (Seendas added much to our
Construction activity observed tn the photography hasood basis for estimating future additions to thecapacity oflants for periods up to about three years after the dates of photography.
i
. During the pastonsiderable amount of Information about the probable Angarsk gaseous diffusion plant has become available. T
ur estimate ofroduction' Is presented In Tablen terms of cumulative production of uranium enriched
IS
It includesquivalent of materials produced at lesser enrichments.
roduction
Maraim of Error
ml
Assistant Chiel of Naval OperaUonj (InUM-genetl. Deparuoeot Ot thc Navy, does not coDCur loU production estimate He considers it to ba bawd upon asxuinpUoni which art notby lhe aiallahle endenot
Anor lhe buk tecbnolof* tawn toeta used by the Soviets and supported by erldence a*hows that the correct valuta should be materially below Uiom alien by theestimate Tbe teehnolocT he believes to be eio-pJoyed Ii In prccUc aereeinent with tht available Information fj
3eenparteel costre in jooa accord withIn Hit floriel Encyclopedia ot Atomic Energy, withby Aleksandrov on the con of fneJ ele-meoU Ice pawn leaetor* asd with the aak print asked by Soviets for ccactoit The calculi Uoru also account for the vtry limited useS beforeMS.
The Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUoaiof Uie Navy, can Ond latum-cleat Information to Justify the existencefaacou dUtuBon plant near AnsaraX. He doesthai heavyeln| concentrated Id Utis acta
Pre^wcSon'*
wo major plutoolum-eqiilvalentsites have been identified in Lhe USSR. The earliest and largest to located near Kyshtym in the Urals and the second is co-located with'producudn complex at the atomic energy site north of Tomsk In central Siberia. The large atomic energy site near Krasnoyarsk, and perhaps that at Angarsk, could also include some pliltonkun:-equrralent production faraUUrs. but available evidence docs not confirm the existence of such facilities at these sites, ft Is believedthat other known atomic energy sites include large plutonium prod action faculties, and It la very unlikely that any sites large enough to have significant plutoniumcapacity would have remained wholly unassoclatcd by Intelligence with the Soviet atomic energy program. (Seeerial photography of Tomsk plutonium production faculties was obtained la (Seearge production-reactor building has been operating therend two dual-purpose reactor buildingsery large eheewtf Iplant were under constructionll three Tomsk reactor buildings are believed to be in operation by this time and others may be under construction there. The first of the dual-purpose reactor bunding* Is theNuclear Power Station" reactorby thc Soviets at8 Geneva
VERKH-NEYVINSK GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT, SECTION E
TOJp^rTECRBT
on Peaceful Uses of AtomicEnergy. At this tune they also announced
plans to build six such dual-purpose reactors
at this station.
w Is known about Uie earlier plulonJum production site near Kyshtym. Construction started at that site shortly after World War II.mall production reactor went Into operationthers have been added since, but their number, type, and sixes are not known-f*
J Tho Kyshtym site may also include one or more dual-purpose reactors In addition to those built only for ptutordumequlvalent produclion.
he large atomic energy site near Krasnoyarsk Is especially secret and secure and much of the early construction there was underground. While the complex functions of the site remain largely unidentified, wethat weapon developmenta (or ourDose of the enterbrise.
3 Available
evidence Is insufficient to Identify the existence of plutonium-equivalent production at the Krasnoyarsk site.
oviet ptutonlum-equivalent production can be estimated on the basis of Tomsk and Kyshtym information, assuming that these sites Include all Soviet production capacity. Because of uncertainties in these data,at Kyshtym. site-based estimates are subject to *ldc margins of errors.
he USSR normally maintains Large state reserveside variety of strategic maie-rtals. Such reserves areigh-priority necessity In thc CommunistA large warehouse area noted In thehotography of the Novosibirsk uranium metal plant and another reportedly adjacent to the Olazor uranium metal plant suggest that these reserves Includeormation Indicating the magnitude of uranium reserves, if any, or of the magnitude of reserves of comparable strategic materials.
ery largo reserve and pipeline would be required to account for the discrepancyour estimates of uranium procurement and f
reevidence Lhat more economical productioneeding reactor tails and utilization of higher MWD/T, were at least partially employed in78 periods. These practices. If generally adopted, wouldtill larger discrepancy between our estimates of uranium procurement and use.
he maintenancearge uraniummust be aasumed for any estimate of cumulative Soviet plulonium equivalent to date which lies within the limits imposed byormat ton even assuming that some production capacity has remained
71
4
ESTIMATED SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATERIALSCuProdccUoo Jn KDogruu, KoufidMi
Av.CUbi* for We hob Um
.
r io.aoo
0
0
*
Seen^7i[ cior lift utc^fWntk* urj
B r- .' r LI
* ProducUoo of kM hi-tlyo* eluded mqitutttfr*xaUrUL
1
* Set* page ii for thef the AssistantNaval OperatlonavtocEt
c
CRET
meet the requirement of the Soviet nuclear weapon program
Heavy Water. We estimate that the heavy water production of the nine known Soviet heavy water plants Isetric tons per year. (Seeor plantThis amount ts believed to be ample for thc needs of the Soviet nuclear. The Soviets showed moderateIn the procurement of thccium-hearlnr minerals between IMS and
ritium.^
Olher Nuclearithium.^
t is probable that the USSR has beenenriched lithium Isotopes In quanUty-slnce atlthough locations and capacities of Soviet lithium Isotope separation plants are unconfirmed. SubstantialIn the production of lithiumwithin the USSR have occurred inyears and we estimate that sufficient amounts of both natural and enriched lithium have been available to the USSR3
FV. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON PRC-GRAM
Nuclear Weapon Research and s
he Soviet nuclear weapon program has undoubtedly been supported byumber of institutes andin the USSR, probablye Institute of Atomic Energy of the Academy of Sciences (formerly Laboratoryoscow, the fast reactor Installation at Obninsk; and the Institute of Chemical Phial Moscow.
emlpalatintk The SeirihlauadJDafcground, located Iniles west of Semipal&Unsk, has remained active since the nuclear teststhere
omparison of two seta of photography obtained in7 and0 clearly shows this activity,eview of all tbe available evidence suggests that the Soviets haveechnical stag and appropriate support personnel In place at .the proving ground. Baalhtenahc* of such an In-place staff would also provide the Sovietsapability to perform research andwork related to military nuclearnot Involving testing, or to otherresearch and development activities
facilities were constructedfenced snot areaew research faculty locatedof the main shot test area, apatternilesiles Inof the shot area, and an apparentlocated north-northwest of the shotof an excavation surroundedrings of structure* (FiguresIIA0 photography).)
The new research facility (See Figuresnd0ost probably Is concerned with laboratory exped-mcnts relating to nuclear weajxmalthough other functions, such as nuclear propulsion development or controlled thermonuclear research, cannot be excluded.
Several explanations, such as agentstudies, have been advanced for the function of the large rectangular gridfj
grid structures north of thc shot area are believed to have been used* for studies in decontarnlnaUon methodology, probably utilizing the fallout from weapon tests.
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The apparent ground zero which wuconstructed north of the enclosed shot area In0 consists of numerous heavy concrete structures, revetments, bunkers, burled buildings, and above-surface structures arrangedemicircular pattern (See rig-urea IS and0he structures in the Inner0 foot radius) are beavtly constructed and willbe earth covered when completed. Tbe largeroot and laOO-foot radii) contain revetments and lighter structures. The area appears to be Intended for useni*.icg explosion, either HE or nuclear
Capobillliei Prior to Resumption of Testing. We believe that nuclear weapons are' available for all delivery systems which wc know to be In tbe Soviet arsenal or which we estimate to be under development. However, many of these weapons probably are not of optimum design, and serious gaps in theknowledge on weapons effect* for certain military applications may exist.
e estimate that at present tbe Soviets have tbe capability to produce thermonuclear (TN) weapons in the following yield and weight classes (See
C - -
r
Development Program
oviet Nuclear TestSS. The Soviets conducted nuclear tests at four separate locations In the USSR during the
QM rv.ri.v4 r-
2
e believe that the Soviets also have the capability to produce fission weaponsarietv of Ivoes and yields rSee Tahl* ?>
3Wc.__
mate mat at present thetbe
"The following estimates of present Soviet capa-for weapon development do not take Into eonHflcraUon the mi uu series. Only prelLnirjry data oa these tests are now available. (Sen Table SA on
RBSTJaw;
ET
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3ECMT"
r
capability to produce fission weapons Inollowing yield and weight classes (Sec Tabic L*
C
un-Aisembly Weapons.
J These weapons would, however, require large amounts of fissionable materials."Therefore, we estimatftthe Soviet* would stockpile only small quantities of those weapons, r
Table 6 OVIET THERMONUCLEAR WEAPON'S
3
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Development Capabilities Prior to Resumption Ov.ToJlina"
C
he Soviet capability to improve their present weapons designs Is probably morethan that of the US because theirreliance on air drops and airborne diagnostic Instrumentation would necessarily result In less detailed diagnostic data on ^weapon performance-!!
US. We believe that there couM be onl, limited improvement In fission weapons to be stockpiled without further_ nuclear testing'
^The
Soviets would be hard pressed to Improve In the light-weight TW class without testsof their limited experience in this area.
section does not consider Improvements re-luiuoi fiom tests beituinlns- In September in
1
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wi'h Urueshicted Testing HS. With continued unrestricted testing, the Soviets could approach thc theoretical Limits of performance In all yield-to-weight classes.
lssUm Weapons/Primaries. Wethat the Soviets could developlow-yield flsston devices equalling our own capability.
he Soviets have recently stated that they "have worked out designs foreries of super-powerful nuclear bombsillion tons ofhe statejcents further assert a. capability' tosuch warheads to any point tn the world with rockets similar to existing space boosters.
heiets may also attempt to develop tacticalwith particularly enhanced radiation yields.
hrrmonuclfar.
36
Fabrication and Stockpiling (Sec figure. FOr somehere hadarge Industrial Installationiihny*jaS, sossej in the north central Urals was involved in some way In the Soviet atomic energy program.of photography of this Installationin9 confirmedajor nuclear weapon complex Involving facilities for the fabrication, assembly, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons existed at this location (See. Other significant faculties within tbe complexigh-explosive test areaossible lithium-isotope plant.
generally to duplicate parts of the HUhnvaTa
I
Iwe are uncertain as tolhe dale of initial operation of thisbut we believe it was constructedubstantially later date than tbe Klshnyaya Tura installation.
nother atomic energy site, part of which may be associated wtth the nuclear weapon program, ls located north of Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. This large, early site bby extend re tunnelling and many of "Its facilities-are'probably underground. The* probable weapons functions of this site Include research and development, fabrication, and possibly stockpiling.
National Assembly and Stockpile Sires
n addition to the national stockpile sites at Nlzhnyaya Tura and Yuryuxan, national assembly and stockpile sites have been oho-tograpbedk
uclear weapon stockpile site and Is probably the first Soviet naUonal stockpile. (See) We believe that the earliest series-produced weapons In the Soviet program wereand stored at the Nlshnyaya
econd Soviet nuclear weaponassembly, and ilockpUe complex. south of Nlshnyaya Tura In the vicinity of Yuryuxan. Unfortunately, the quality of the photography (obtained at the same lime as the NIthnyaya TuraIs poor. From what can be discerned, however, the installation at Yuryuxan appears
Storage Sitei al Arctic Staging Bases
weaPori storage fa-
cilities are oeueved to be located in theof probable major Long Ranp Aviation staging airfields In the ArcHc.r
ll of the abort airfield sites are home bases for Soviet Long Range .Aviation units except two which appear to serve NavalThere arc Indications that similarsites exist at other Soviet airfields and we estimate that all primary LRA basesuclear weapon storage capability.
Soviet Airfield Storage Sires
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e have photographic evidence thatstorage sites for nuclear weapons are associated wlthcertaln airfields in the Soviet Union.!*
Other Operational Storage focilmos
e hare cc firm evidence of the existence ol' operauonal storage facilities ipeedflcaEy' designed for nuclear weapons other than those at LRA and naval airfield altes. However, the Soviets may welluclearumber of tart leal and navalSoviet tactical doctrine and training, and nuclear testing specifically oriented to ground and naval requirements. Indicate that
nuclear weapon storage sites arc proba available to units of the Soviet ground lorces and to certain naval surface and submarine forces.
he Soviet guided missile program has clear requirements for nuclearn strategic attack and certain air defense applications. Although there Is to date no confirming evidence, we would expect to and special security arrangements andlor check-out and storage of nuclear warheads for all deployed surface-to-surface and airo missile units. range or greater.e estimate that the Soviets have tested at-least three nuclear warheads tn surface-to-air missiles, available photography on surface-to-air missile sites has not as yet revealed any characteristics associated with nuclearhandling and storage at operational sites.
hile there Is no direct evidence tothat thc Soviets have selected nuclear warheads for their Antl-Ballurtlc Missile (ABM) syitcrafj
uclear warhead would be particularly attractive to thc Soviets for use ln an ABM system because It would provide large lethal radii against light-weight re-entry vehicles. partleiilarly' at high
he Soviet nuclear weapon logisticsalthough it reveals effective planning for and Implementation of the dispersal concept, does not appear toapabilily for rapid movement or preparation of weapons foruseompressed time period.
Control of Nuclear Waapani
here are two distinct categories ofweapon storage In tbe USSR, each-adnitnlitered'ontrolled.consists of national storage facultiesnational assembly and stockpile site.that these sites an operated byBunding. The
second class of storage houses those weapons immediately required to implement military missions. These weapons an stored atbases In dies correspondingto Service Storagebe US program and include the arctic storage bases and thend TJ airfield sties. Wethese weapons an controlled by theof Defense, probablypecialisedclement ot that Ministry.
he authority to decide whether or not to employ nuclear weaponsiven situation is probably vested apeclncally In the Military High Command, which In peacetimethe Minister of Defense and hissubordinates. Major operationalIn the field are believed to have anumber of nuclear weapons, and tbe field commanders probably hare someIn determining how the weapons are to be employed, rrom thc standpoint of rapid and effective response to various militaryIt is quite logical for tbe Ministry of Defense to provide the command mecha- -nlsm for controlling the release of weapons In operational storage as well as for decldlne
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or not employment ot nuclearmight be militarily desirable In givenIl Is virtually certain, however, that any decision made within the Ministry ofto employ nuclear weapon* wouldraUflcation by the top poliucaland that the ultimate decision on whether or not touclear attack would be made by the Presidium of theCommittee of the Communist Party.
V.OVIET ALLOCATIONSM>TERIALS TO
ufficient Information ls available tothe major characteristics, te, weights, yields and materials composition, of nuclear weapons 'available to the Soviet arsenal 'In addition, broad judgments can be made as to Soviet plan* for the employment of nuclear weapons, the relative emphasis on types of weapons for various missions, and general Soviet nuclear capabilities. Those Judgment* are derivedumber of considerations the Soviet nuclear test program8 estimated availability of fissionable materials, evidence on stockpiling practices; Sovieton the use of nuclear weapons; Soviet strategy and military policy; and estimated Soviet development and deployment ofsystems Our information is sufficient to delineate, within broad limits tbe general size and composition of the Soviet nuclearbut it l* not of sufficient quality to per-mlt detailed allocation*.
uture projections of the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile are highly tentative. Our estimates of the present materials stockpile are subject to margins of error whichre.aler over the next few years, No meaningful margin of error can be slated1 for the estimate of ptutonium equivalent, or3 for the estimate ofroduction Therefore, this section Is addressed primarilyonsideration of the Soviet nuclear weap on stockp'Je In the current period
The Soviel Tart Prog com
e estimate that the present Soviet stockpile consists primarily of weaponsfrom nuclear tests conducted prior to New weapon designs being tested in the current aeries which began1 probably would not enter the stockpile for about one to two years. Row-ever, the current tests may also bare theof proving some previously untested weapons from the present stockpile. If the Soviets engaged In clandestine testing, some of the current tests would be designed tothe.results achloved- Further analysis will be required to determine the design of recently tested device* and to establish the objectives of the current test series.
he Soviet test program over the'years ha* reflected the development of nuclear weapons toide variety of military
require.ii.-[
3&orae of the low- and medium-yield test* probably related to theof thermonuclear weapons. Likewise, some of the high-yield shots may haveto the Improvement of the lower yield
resent weapon designs" which we estimate to be available to the
List:
nesc tables, however. Is probably not complete. Q
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RCRKT
thc^ciocs not contain ao^tSta stctu^ Wh,Ch USSR
Even with tnese amissions, however. Itide spectrum of fission andweapon designs Is no* available
to the Soviets.
AvoilobJlrry ot Fissionable. We estimate that the total amount of ftsslonable materials available 'for fabrication Into weapons Increased considerably during the past year. We estimate that production In this period has Increased total soviet stocksy aboutercent, and of oluto-nlum-equivalent bv aboutercent.
nuclear weapons, if they considered itnecessary H
14ft. Wo believe that the Soviets will continue to maintain substantial forces In being and that. Insofar as Is appropriate to theirthese forces will be dual purpose,of employing nuclear or nonnuctear weapons. If as we esUmate, the Soviets have not yettate of "nuclearhe various missions necessarily have tofor allocations of fissionable material. Considering our ratlmates of Soviet strategy, we believe thatSSR has given thellocation ofmaterial to Us long-range attack forces. Usingasis thecharacteristics and numbers ofdelivery vehicles, we believe It possible toough lodgment concerning the amount of material involved In this allocation. There ore so many possible fAmMwatirie of requirements and allocations for Soviet air defense forces, theater field forces, and naval forces that we have not attempted to assess thc amount of material allotted to each of these forces.
Soviel Military Doctrine ond. Although the Soviets cannot be certain as to the nature and durationeneral war, they appear to assume that It would commence with massive nuclear attacks upon the homelands of the opponents. Nuclear weapons would also be employed ln thestruggle which wouldotal commitment of remaining forces and weapons. In any future conflict short of general war we have estimated that the Soviets probably would seek toho use of nuclear weapons because of their superiority In conventional forces. At theofonflict they would probablyonsiderable effort to avoid being the first to use nuclear westpons, but wouldrespond. In kind, to Western use of
"Foe Um view of the Assistant Chief ot Haval Operationsepartment of the
long Bongo SfriVing forces
Long Range Aviation
lis. There ts ample evidence that tbe ffortata. early In their nuclear weapons program,upon the extensive deployment ofweapons to Long Range Avialion. Tbe Soviets probably began construction of the nuclear storage sites which have beenat numerous Long Range Aviation basesnd wc estimate that all primary LRA bases have nuclear weapon storage. In their test programs, tbe Soviets clearly stressed the rapid development of thermonuclear weapons suitable for delivery as bombs and selected weapons for ulr-to-aurface missiles. We be-Ueve that tbe Soviets have provided nuclear wcapons for lhc bombers of Long RangeIntended for weapons delivery In the event of generalhey-may have pro-
a roll dttruoioo of this rablect, seeTrend* In Soviet CapaHHUu and
ares. Bl-ftt. TS.ecember IW0.
41
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e estimate that the Soviet long range attack forces new haveedium range missiles available far launching In an Initial salvo." Tbeoviet missile submarine* estimated to be tn service probablyotal of about0resent ICBM Inventory cf about two ml'ltl" per launcher and an MRBM Inventory of about three missiles per launcher, the Soviets would have anInventoryissiles In all these categories. We believe that nuclear warheads would be provided for all.these missiles! "
e estimate that maximum yield war-.head* would be used la ICBM'a,ilssiTes, and MBBMs for ahalvo, and that the remaining MRBM'* would be equipped with nuclear warhead* of varying
oviet missile strength will continue to grow over the next few years We havethat Inhe Soviets will have5 ICBMs andRBMs/IRSM* onn the same period, we hare estimatedodest In-
vpreaccUUvt ofhief of Staf.eoce. USA* believes that Soviet leaf ranee attack force* now tiaveCBMs on launcher. (See Mi* Assistant Chief of frUUI,ootnote UNIIof Borirt. Ijjetuuuk rttui- forws oo UU. rcbterU "Seeor tba view of tbe AaesUat Chief of Naval operation* ClnUllljence).
"The representative of tba Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. UBar* balhrrta that iaotmu wm haw about rsa iCWe oo taeawaafi CSee the AaaUtaat Chief of BUUT. Intentenet, USar footaoU to NDEi: "SUenflb of Soviet long Ranee MlssUe Forcea" tor hit rlcwa on tbii rubloet)
^BjavajfET RESTJUa?*TKD DATA*
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42
v
he number of missile submarinesradual decline In Lone Range Artation strength. Thus wc be lie re that the future nuclear material requirements of Soviet long-range attack forces will beunction of the Soviet ballistic missile buildup.
Air Defense
ew Soviet nuclear testa appear to have been related to the development of nuclear warheads for employment In air defense. This evidence does not Indicate that thehaveuclear warheadble for useir
Jwcto estimate that-the-Soviets hava avail--able nuclear warheads suitable for use lnmissiles, althcaigh there Is noof their deployrnent to SAM sites
he rapid and extensive deployment of surface-to-air missile sites In the USSR Isof the high priority accorded the air defense mission. Of the three SAM systems now believed to be operational, deployment of thes by far tbe most widespread. Wc estimateites are nowat aboutrban-Industrial areas In the USSR, others have been deployed forof military Installations and field forces. We believe that within th* next few year* the Soviets will have deployedites atrban-Industrialnits for defense of field forces, and an unknown additional number for defense of such military Installations as ballistic missiles sites.
lthough Soviet SAM systems areto be effective with HE warheads against aerodynamic targets, nuclear war-beads would be required toignificant probability for destruction of tbe nuclear weapons themselves Such warheads would also Increase the kill probability for tbeof the delivery vehkles, -We believo these considerations would Impel the Soviets to pro*.de some portion of theirmissiles with nuclear warheads. Q
aome nuclear warheads have prooaDiy uceh provided for tbe defense of Moscow andfor other major urban-IndustrialAllocation of nuclear warheads forto-air missiles will probably Increase over the next few years, but we geasjssMggunlikely that the Soviets will seek to provide suchfor all missile units or sites.
e have est una ted, that the Soviets win probably' begin at least limited deptoyment of" on antimissile system Ln the. Several of the thermonuclear devices tested8 might lend themsehtesuch anpllca-
^There Is'
some evioence tnat tne Soviets intend to use nuclear warheads within the atmosphere and fragmentation warheads outside of theC
have no estimate as to thea projected Soviet antimissileHowever. Ifystem werewidely deployed. It might place newdemands upon Soviet stocks ofmaterials which would be felt evendeployment.
Supper of Ground Operations
ls ample evidence In currentmilitary doctrine and training thatcontemplate tlie use of nuclearon the battlefield in support ofThis doctrine envisionsnuclear weaponsariety ofrifled artillery, free rockets,and aircraft.^
DATA
L
J The larger medium- aridweapon" could be delivered by aircraftthe types of iuxf acc-to-surtace missilesavailable for ground support. estimated that the Soviets couldlarge numbers of shorta) but we be Here that onlyportion of tbe total Inventorybe equipped with nuclearsubstantial numbers of0 rue. missiles actually deployedhave nuclear warheads available. toaJly all medium-rang*vailable for support of nek!be equipped with nuclear
e believe that the present Sovietstockpile does not permit the allocation of very large numbers of low-yield nuclear weapons for tactical uses. Within tbe next few years, the limitations Imposed by the availability of fissionable materials wiU have eased considerably, and Soviet nuclear ground support capabilities will be greatly improved.
Novel Operations
here Is firm evidence supporting the development of nuclear weapons for naval missions. Of the weapons tested by theumber of medium- and low-yield weapon types would be suitable for use against naval targets. There have been nuclear tests in the Ne-vaya Zemlya area which almost certainly relate to naval effects or to the development of naval weapons. We have evidence of nu-etenr weapon storage facilities at navaland believe that nuclear weapon storage sites are probably also available to certainsurface, and submarine-punched missiles
he allocation to Soviet naval forcescertainly Is being Increased with the growth In the numbers of guided mltsfles available to naval units. Wo have estimated that all submarine-launched ballistic missiles probably will be equipped with thermonuclear warheads. Nuclear warhead* probably have also been provided for soma portion of the alr-to-aurface missiles employed by Navaland for some of the cruise-type missiles now employedew surface vessels. numbers of nuclear bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, and mine* are probablyor direct support of naval operations. rowing 'requirement for mora effectiveweapons to meet the threat posed by US missile submarines probably wfllncreased allocations to nsrral forces.
Summary
e believe that the long-range striking forces hare been given the largest allocation of fissionable materials, and that at present the Soviet weapons stockpile can supportnuclear attacks against target* in Eurasia and North America. In view of the largoestimated for the long range attack forces, and the sire and nature of the overall materials stockpile, limitations are Imposed on the number* of weapon* available for other air, ground, and navalhesenecessarily affect military planning However, we consider It unlikely that the availability of fissionable materials forweaponsactor which In Itself aig-nlflcantiy limit* Soviet policy. We harta considerable growth in the Sovietmaterial* stockpile which should keep pace with the estimated growth In Soviet missile capabilities for long-range attack, and also ease the limitations noted above. .
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ANNEX A
RESEARCH LABORATORIES SUPPORTING THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
many' laboratories throughout the Soviet Union are engaged In theof various aspects of the atomic energy program,ew. aside from those directlyunder the Ministry of Mediumave borne the main weight of the basic nuclear research effort. Theof Atomic Energyof the Academy, ofin Moscow (formerly Laboratory IT) is' undoubtedly the leading institute in this field, and isenter for heavy-Isotopereactor development, and controlled thermonuclear research. (See
The Institute of Chemical Physics (ICP) in Moscow was, and probably still Is, closely associated with the development of nuclear weapons. This association Ls not unexpected In view of this Institute's long history ofin the various phases of chemical explosives and chemical chain reactions.of its scientists have been directlywith nuclear weapon developments. Moreover, according to repatriated German scientists, the responsibility for Implosionof nuclear weapons during thes was assignedommittee made up of ICP personnel and headed by N. N. Seme-nov, the director of ICP.
Tlie Physics Institute located In Obninsk, which Is believed to be under theof the Slate Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Utilization of Atomic Energysfor the development of fastower reactor employing nuclear superheat! The institute has recentlyresearch which could lead to theof an ion propulsion engine and pos-
uclear power source for space
The Leningrad Radium Institute of the Academy-of Sciences Lsa leading institute for basic research pertaining to reactor fueland has contributed to other Important phases of the program, such as theof neutron'cross sections.-
The Moscow Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics of the Academy of(previously called Laboratory III and the Thermo technical Laboratory) hasthe development of heavy waterin the USSR and has obtained much of the fundamental nuclear physics databy the Soviet atomic energy program.
The Moscow Metallurgical Institute imenlppears to be the center for theof metals resistant to highwhile the development of ceramics and cermets for high temperature reactors Is being conducted-in Kiev at the Institute of Metallic Ceramics and Special Alloys of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.
The State Institute of Rare Metals (OIREDMET) in Moscow and the Moscowof Non-ferrous Metals and Gold imerd Kalinin are active Ln the study of theof thorium,.berylUum, zirconium,'molybdenum and other non-ferrous metals necessary to the atomic energyRecently an affiliate of the latterhas been established at Krasnoyarsk where It appears to be conducting the same type of research, but probably with moreon the classified aspects of the Soviet atomic energy effort.
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46
The Joint institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna Is partially manned and financed by Satellite countries and Communist China. Though It ls concerned primarily with basic research In high-energy nuclearast pulsedhich could be Important to future atomic energy programs, was put into operation in ita Laboratory of Neutron Physics In
esides these Institutes, the USSRof Sciences and Its affiliatesast network of research irurututes andwhich are engaged In the broad field of science and technology. At these Institutes, such- as the Tomsk PcjlytecnhJcal Instilute'
Jscene basic researchto nuclear energy la conducted, generallypeclallted field.
he leading educational Institutes under the Ministry of Education perform contract research for ATOMKOMTTET and the USM and are used to train the technicians for the operation of such insns as atomicstations. The deretopment of these large research and training centen are now be-ginning to strengthen the Soviel capability In tbe field of atomic energy. (Seeir. urel.)
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Original document.
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