MEMORANDUM FOS: Tha Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
MILITARY THOUGHT: o the Level
of Modemy Major-General Ya. Malakhov
Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SEQEET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryoycn.-iayaublished by the inistry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form' should be addressed to the originating office.
FOR THS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
RICHARD HELMS
Enclosure
Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
cc: Military Assistant to the President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U.ir Force
Director of Special Investigation Inspector General, U.ir Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Chairmen, Guided Missiles snd Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director .for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
COUNTRY
aena MILITARY THOUGHT: o the
Level of Moderny Major-Qeneral Ya. Malaxhov
OF CONTENT
DATE OF INFO: 1 Documentary
eliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titledo Ihe Level of Modernritten by Major-General Ya. Malakhov.
This article appeared in1 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Myal (Military Thought). This Journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. This issue was consigned to tbe printer on
Cocment: Until eome timeperational and tactical intelligence operations and training reportedly were coordinated by the'Operations Directorate of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Ministry ofHeadquartersn page
-1-
In actual fact, tho Chief Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye BazvedyvatelnoyeBD) of the General Staff has no such organ, and its guidance is limited to agent and radiotechnlcal intelligence in border districts and in groups of forces.
The intelligence department of the Main Staff (Glavnyy Shtab) of the Ground Troops does not direct operational intelligence in the districtsaily basis, but at operational-strategic command-staff xercises and maneuvers the reconnaissance detachment (razvedyvatelnyyO) of the Main Staff of the Ground Troops prepares the appropriate materials for critiques and dravs conclusions on its state.
This all results in the fact that the supervision of the training of personnel and of the activity of operational and tactical intelligence are carried out at the center by several chiefs, and are in essence uncoordinated by anyone. Thus, for instance, the chiefs of intelligence of border districts receive directives from several chiefs of directorates and departments of the Chief Intelligence Directorate, from the chief of intelligence of the Main Staff of the Ground Troops, from the Chief Directorate of Combat Training and sometimes also from the headquarters of troops of the Antiaircraft Defense (Protivo-YozdushnayaVO) of the Country. Each is interested, not in the state of intelligence in the districthole, but only in individual questions which concern their department (vedomstvo). This seems to be the only way in which one canituation in which the problematical questions of Intelligence are not resolved. Moreover, we still have no manual of militaryr technical means for reconnaissance against nuclear/missile weapons, or appropriate means of communication, while the methods of intelligence employed by the troops are extremely primitive and do not ensure the solution of this complicated problem.
The absenceingle organ for the supervision of operational and tactical Intelligence ln districts results ln the fact that the resolution of even alaple problems takes years. For example, combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles (boyevo-razvedochnaya dozornayaBDM) began to reach the troopsut the problem ofachine gun and optical observation Instruments in them haa not been decided to this day.
It is known that no new technical means of Intelligence will give good results if there are not well-trained personnel to use them.
The Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov, at the critique of the command-staff exercisexplained: "Equipment in Itself, no matter how perfect, will not ensure the radical improvement of the state of intelligence. Commanders and staffs at all levels must learn the correct way of organizing intelligence practically and of directing it continuously**.
Meanwhile, Intelligence officers, who would know intelligence equipment well and who would know how to organize and carry out Intelligence ln modern operations, are not being; trained properly in ths military-educational institutions.
The higher intelligence courses for intelligence officers, the intelligence faculty of theJ.V. Frunze, the intelligence sections of the Academy of Armored Troops and of the Air Forces Academy, as well aa the Military Institute of foreign Languages, have been disbanded. It seems that ln tha existing higher military-educational institutions very little attention is devoted to the training of officers in tha intelligence field. There are, therefore, frequent cases of officers who return to the troops after graduating at these institutions without even elementary knowledge, not to mention ability, ln the organization of intelligence.
All of this has resulted in the fact thatimited number of Intelligence officers with specialized academy education remains with the troops. The situation with regard to intelligence officer personnel can bo illustrated by the example of the Byelorussian Militaryf all the Intelligence officers in the district, starting with the intelligence chiefnit and higher, onlyercent have graduated from higher educational institutions. At the same time, in the last three years only one officer has come from an Academy for Intelligence duty with the troops of the district. All of this makes lt necessary to select for engagement in intelligence duties officers who have neither theoretical training nor practical ability In this work, which in -turn affects the quality of the intelligence training of the troops and the combat training of intelligence subunits.
In our view, there is an urgent need for the serious reorganization of the training and advanced training of the intelligence officers of all types of armed forces and of all arms of troops.
In the training of intelligence officers, in our opinion, attention should be given,first of all, to the study of tho technical means of intelligence and to their potentialities, to modes and methods ofand executing reconnaissance against nuclear/missile weapons, and to knowledge of the organization, armament, tactics, and operational art of the probable enemy. Taking into account the fact that there are almost no well-trained interpreters with the troops, and that the military-educational institutions are not training officers who know foreign languages, it is advisable that the training of officers who are proficient in foreign languages should be organized.
We share completely the opinion of the author of the article on the revival of intelligence in the arms of troops, but the solution of this problem in the sequence of the headquartersront-army-division must lie not through the channel of chiefs
of intelligence of the appropriate commanders of arms of troops, but in the inclusion of such specialists in the intelligence sections, departments, and directorates of the combined-arms headquarters. Ve consider this method more expedient, firstly, because in the conditions of modern combat time- (not id hours but in seconds and minutes) acquires primary significance, and this demands the shortening to the minimum of the channels (instantslya) along which tasks for, and information from, Intelligence organs pass; secondly, because, in order to evaluate the situation properly, all information must flowingle organ, which would collate, accumulate, and analyze it and draw the appropriate conclusions and thirdly, because, 'as Marshal of the Soviet. Chuykov pointed out at the critique of the exercise "DON" "Only the combined-arms headquarters can plan intelligence activity purposefully and can utilize, for its execution, the various forces and means, taking into account their capabilities and the conditions of the situation".
It is most necessary to review and to strengthen technical equipmenteans of obtaining intelligence data, as well as the organs concerned with their processing. Let us take, for example, radiotechnlcal intelligence units (OSKAZ). These are of low mobility because of the bulk of the intelligence equipment which they carry and, perhaps, are simply not suitable for operations under field conditions.
As is known, the commanding officers of motorized-rifle and tank divisions, and the commanders of combined-arms and tank armies, have received and have at their disposal long-range missile means of destruction, but so far they possess absolutely no forces or means capable of carrying out Intelligence to the possible depth of fire-destruction of targets.
Ve consider that each commanding officer (commander) must have at his disposal the forces and means necessary to assure continuous and vigorous conduct of intelligence, at least to the depth of the range of fire of the means available in the compositioniven unit, large unit, or formation.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: