1
MEMORANDUM FOB: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
MILITARY THOUGHT: "Questions! of the Control
of Missile Units in an Offensive Operation"
Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" (ftVoycnnayaublished hy the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.
FOR THS DEPUTY. DIRECTOR, PLANS:
RICHARD HELMS
APPROVED for release
UN
Original: Tho Director of Central Intelligence
cc: Military Representative of the President
Special Assistant to the President for Rational Security Affairs
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief ol Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U.ir Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
Director of Havel Intelligence Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Oulded Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
xen-R; : USSR
ct ' Questions of tho Control of Missilc
Units in an Offensive Operation'
DATE OP
OF CONTENT
reliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Questions of the Control of Missile-Units in an Offensive Operation^ written by MaJor-General S. Kuznetsov and Hajor-General A. Tdihocdror".
This article appeared in0 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Militaryhis Journal is published irregularly and le classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. 0 First Issue was the initial issue of thla publication.
Operation
Major-Generaluznetsov
Ma Jar-General A. Tikhccilrov
Tho organization of tho control of missile unite ecqploying nuclear warheads continues to remain the subject of special attention for ccmbined-omfl casmsnders aa well as for missile specialists (spetsiallat-rsketchik). umber of articles devoted to this question have already appeared in Colloctlotis of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought".
As is known, during the critique of the operational-strategic staff exercise which took place in the Ukraine Inarshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Grecbko noted the ehcortcomings uncovered during the exercise in the realm of control of weapons of mass destruction* In particular, lt was pointed out that because the most expedient forms and methods of control of these means have not yet been found, the coordination between intelligence organs, the operational command, and the commanders of the artillery and the air army on questions concerning the use of nuclear weapons. Involves an intolerable waste of time treasured in terms of manyoours. Similar defects were notedumber of other exercises. In connection with this, there is an Imperative necessity to find those methods for the control of weapons utilizing nuclear warheads which would require tbe least possible time for the destructionarget (from the moment of itB detection to the nuclear strike).
At the present time the organization of the control of missile units and tube art tilery employing nuclear armunits reflected as follows. For the fulfilment of missions in tho interests of the main grouping of army troops, the missile units and units of tube artillery employing nuclear ammunition are brought together ln an army special artillery group (ASAO). In an offensive operation the army may be reinforced with missile units allocated for solution of tasks of tactical (range of fire of not more thanm) as well as of operational significance (range of fire upm). Furthermore, it can receive anube artillery divisions employing nuclear aitznunition. Therefore, the composition of tbe ASAO, as regards its tactical and technical characteristicseliverer of nuclear warheads, will be exceptionally varied, and this will greatly impede tho achievement of control of this group during preparation
*
for and in the course of the operation. Objections to tbe creation of the ASAO, in connection with tbe above-mentioned situation, have been stated In detail in print. In addition to these, we would also point out the following.
It is recotanended that the ASAO utilize as its staff the staffs of the artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Coronandhlch are advancing as reinforcements for the army. the artillery division commander who is appointed as the commander of the ASAO Is not relieved of his responsibilities for the activities of his organic large units, which were transferred to reinforce tho.-large units of the army*
The commander of the RVGK artillery division and bis staff have organic means of control which permit the organization of control of only their own large units. When appointed as cotrnender of the ASAO, the commander of an RVGK artillery division is obliged to leave to his deputy part of the means of control, exercised by the division headquarters, for ensuring the control of organic large units of the flVGK artillery division allocated to reinforce the army. esult,AG commander and tbe deputy commander of the RVGK division will not have sufficient means of control; this will lead to unreliability of control and, in particular, to loss of time In the transmission of various orders snd commands and in the receipt of information from below. Therefore, the use of the RVGK artillery division staff in the capacity of the ASAO staff Is, obviously, inexpedient. It will In no way promote the speed of delivery of nuclear strikes.
We further consider that one of the causes of delay in the deliveryuclear strike on detected, unscheduled target* is the unnecessary centralization of the decision of the question of the allocation of nuclear warheads. Usually this is done in tbe following manner. Let us assume that the headquarters of artilleryront army) haseport from an aircraftetected target forCorporal" launcher). The commander of artillery of the frontot having the means to destroy the target withof conventional means, reports this to the troop commander and requests permission to use missiles with nuclear charges. The troop commander,ery limited reserve of nuclearwill first determine the possibility of the destruction of this target by
1. Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov. "Combat Employment of Artillery in Offensive Operations of an Army and Front. Collection of Artlcleo cf the Journal "Voyennayaage
conventional air weapons, and only after this will be give theinstructions to the artillery or air army cccraander.
Having received the troop commander's decision, the artillery commander gives Instructions to the commander of the missile unitAO commander) to preparetrike on the targetuclear warhead. Then he will have to be provided with the corrected target coordinates and the order for expenditureuclear warhead. All these conversations and transmissions of commands waste aamount of time which is quite sufficient for the "Corporal" launcher to have carried out the firinguclear warhead or tohave changed its location site.
The situation becomes even more complicated in the event one must decido an analogous task in the courseuccessfully developing offensive operation, with high tempos of movement, the absenceontinuousigh dynamic of operations, and unexpected and shsrp changes In the situation. Under these conditions, sn imperative need arises to impart the greatest possible autonomy to large units in conducting combat operations, which, of course, must be supported accordingly. The division commanders will not have time to await the army commander's decision regarding tbe question of destruction by nuclear weapons of targets presenting an immediate threat to the division's units.
On the basis of the above, the conclusion can be drawn that the existing rigid centralization in deciding the question of the use of nuclear warheads against unscheduled targetsactoregative order. In order to shorten decisively tbe time from the detection of the target to its destruction by nuclear warheads, partial decentralization of the use of these warheads is essential. It can be realized only if the division commanders obtain asmissile units (units of tube artillery eaploying nuclear ammunition) and receive the right to make decisions regarding destruction of targets with nuclear aninunltion within the Units of their expenditure established by the army commander.
Which missile units can be used for reinforcement of theirst of all, of course, units of tactical missilesiring range of upmange permits the missile support of division units with one shift of siting area during the courseay's In addition, it guarantees firepower maneuver not onlythe limits of tbe entire width of the division's zone of advance, but alsoonsiderable part of the zones of advance of neighboring divisions. This situation provides the ccerBcder of
items and repair equipment. Therefore, the headquarters of the missile regiment will he used during the preparation for and inourse of the operation in the same manner as the headquarters of the artillery breakthrough division of the RVOK.
For the fulfilment of tasks of army significance, the combined-arms army may be reinforced by several battalions of operational missilesiring rangem. These battalions will comprise that portion of long-range weapons which it is advisable to leave directly subordinate to the commander of army artillery. If the army is reinforced with two or three battalions, thenill be under the direction of the commander and staff of the missile regiment. If, however, the army is reinforced with only one battalion, then naturally it will be under the direction ofommander of the battalion and his staff.
The proposed distribution of missile units and subunits should -not be regardedategorical rejection of the centralization of their fire control by the commander of artillery of the army. During the period of artillery preparation of the offensive, it Is advisable to centralize at the army level the use of tbe subunits and units employing nuclear weapons, taking into account the tasks which -are fulfiled by divisions. However, for this there is no necessity to withdraw these missile units (subunits) -from the divisions and to createG. It will be sufficient if the army artillery coinmander will provide the commanders of artillery of divisions with tbe tasks which, according to army plan, must be fulfiled by missile units and subunits with nuclear sheila and shells vith conventional. the centralization of fire control of these units and subunits will be carried out on the same bases aa the centralization of firef tube and rocket artillery employing shells with conventional and chemical charges. The centralization of fire control of units and subunits employing nuclear weapons may also be requiredreakthrough of the enemy's defense zones in the course of an offensive operation, and in some other instances.
A proposal concerning the creation of front special artillery groups (FSAG) was expressed in print. We consider this proposal to be groundless. At the present time the headquartersrtilleryront does not have the possibility of choosing from among its personnel an artillery staff, with corresponding means of control, which could head the FSAO. And in this regard there la no necessity to createroup. It is doubtful that there can be more than one or two missile regiments subordinateront in the very near future. These regiments willery limited quantity (but very
powerful) of nuclear weapons In connection with which the eetting-up of tasks for regiments and tbe supervision of their fulfilment will not burden the staff of the front artillery.
In those cases where the frontissile regiments (which apparently, willare exception) the necessity for the creation of an FSAQ will arise. Butpecially created staff having the necessary means of control will be able to headront group. taff must arrive to reinforce the frontwith the arrival of the missile regiments.
A few words about reconnaissance. There is no necessity to rove the exceptional significance which reconnaissance of the enemy has for all units employing nuclear weapons. It is obvious. We wish only to note one circumstance which, to an intense degree, impedes the employment of nuclear weapons. Tho fact is that the missile units and units of tube artillery employing nuclear warheads, do not at the preaent time have the reconnaissance means which would permit them to conduct reconnaissance of targets for destruction by nuclear weapons and to maintain control over the results of nuclear strikes. Tbe front aviation conducts reconnaissance for the miaaile regiments of operational designation; this can ba considered normal. Reconnaissance for tactical missile regiments is conducted basically by those means which belong to the army artillery. These are principally the ground artillery reconnaissance means, helicopters,and individual artillery fire-adjusting planes from smong the artillery fire-adjusting planes assigned to the army for the operation.
m an overwhelming majority of cases, the enemy's atomic cannon and rocket launchers of the "Honest John"ype may be detected only by photography from the air. reat deal of time passes before the data regarding the enemy's atomic cannon (rochetfter Its processing and after the decision cf the army commander, arrive at the missile battalion (battery) which oust destroy this gun with a nuclear warhead.
The situation is no better as regards the detection of enemy forces and combat equipment in the course of an offensive. The basic causes of this situation appear to be the extremely inadequate number of artillery fire-adjusting planes which are usually assigned to'the army, snd the complete disparity of the tactical-technicalof existing artillery fire-adjusting planes with contemporary requirements, and finally, an exceptionally strict centraIllation of their use.
Tha strict centralisation of the use of axtlllary fire-adjusting planes was Justified to sens extent by the fact that aerialwas conducted basically ln the Interests of army artillery groups and army special artillery groups. However, when missile aubunits ers assigned to divisions, the previous procedure fox use of artillery fire-adjusting planes, in accordance with the general army plan, obviously becomes obsolete. Tbe time has come to provide the large units with the means of aerial reconnaissance which could also be used for adjustment of fire of tube artillery and for thaof the enemy's means of nuclear attack in the tactical depth of his defense. These means of reconnaissance must be aircraft with the appropriate tactical-technical characteristics. The presence of aerial reconnaissance means within the large units will provide for e more rapid reaction to detected targets on the pert of tho large unit comBander7and consequently, will shorten considerably tbe tine between tbe moment of the detection of the target and the deliveryuclear striae sgainst it.
Considerable significance for the rapid iinpleaentetlon of nuclear strikes with missiles on unscheduled tergete, la attributed to tbe correct organization of meteorological support of missile units.
Missiles (raketa) of tactical deelgnation,eas is known, hove solid fuel. Their readiness for launching is determined by tho time necessary for calculations in setting-up the sighting mechanisms, mounts, checkout, and heating (pogrev) of the explosive mechanism. With the possession of the most recent meteorological data, all the aforementioned nay require up tolnutei from tha moment the battery receives the cccmand to open fire to the launching of the missile. In the absence of tbe most recent meteorological data, twice aa much time will be required, since it will be necessary to gather information regarding atmospheric conditions and toeteoroloaical bulletin.
Vith theonalid meteorological bulletin and favorable conditions, not more thano kO minutes is required In order toissile of operational designation which laaunch pad (puskovoy stol). If the meteorological bulletin Is not current, however, enohours any be required far.the launching of the pilot belloonhe processing of the data obtained, and the compilation of the meteorological bulletin. Furthermore, approximately an additionalinutes will be required for the preparation of data for netting up the goniometer (uglomer) and accelerometer (integrator).
connection with this, it ie expedient to orgeniiesupport inay that the meteorological bulletins arrive at the missile units and subunits at not less than one-hour Intervals. In such circumstances, the launching of the missile after receipt of the command may. In tbe worst case, be carried out not later thanoinutes afterward, In tbe overwhelming majority of casssnot later theninutes afterward.
If there ie one field artillery meteorological station (pams)issile battalion, tbe existing organization mentioned above la Impossible to achieveAHS can process the launching data fromilot-balloons with radiosondes,V-hour period. Therefore, lt is necessary to increase the capability of tha PAMS of everyimes in order to permit the isaueeteorological bulletin every hour.
Original document.
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