CENTRAL INTKUJCENCE AGENCY
1
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
MILITARY THOUGHT; The Theory of Military
Art Needsy Colonel-General A. Gaetilovlch
It appeared Journal^ Mir. le try Aray Comaandar.
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RICHARD HEWS
approved for release
Orlgitiali The Director, Defease Intelligence Agency
coi Military Assistant to the President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affaire
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Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U. S. Air force
[ssistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
Director of Havel Intelligence Departeent of the Kavy
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.j The Director of Intelligence sndof .
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Atomic Energy Ccmmissioa
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COUNTRY
SUBJECT Tbe Theory of Military Art
fleediColonel-General A. Gastllovlch
date ori960
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT
reliable source
ollowingerbatim translation of sa articleTheory of Military Art Reeds Review^ written by
; This article appeared ln0 First Issuepecial version of the SovietJournal Voygnr-aya Hysl (Military
This Journal is published irregularly and Is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The First Issue0 was tbe initial, issue of this special collection, snd this article by Colonel-General Gaatllovich hasubject of controversy lnubseonent articles* ':
)
4>
A. Gastilovlch
Wo all admit tbat nuclear weapons and adssllea change tha ccekUtlcoa of war, but bavins aaldo aro afraid to soy "V. to urtsies in tba direction of alaollea ond Introducing scea minor corrections intheory of military art, we ttUl hold In practlee to the old position* existing at the end of World var n. Paat experience, traditions, and habits, taught to us for decades, tcrjciouoly hold us back and prevent tbe ssae kind of rerolutloe in military ert which nuclear weapons and mlssllea created in the sphere of arraceot.
Us strive unsuccessfully to squeeze Blssile^Wleer weapons Into the frarouork of tbe old habitual postulates of cur nllltary dc<trloea only allc^iyrnl.lng" theandfce-eenha1^bS^Sin. was founded on tho basis of using weapons of nllltary combat funda^nteily dlfforeot from contemporary ones snd not ocnparable with them.
Speaking of pest world warseport to the Session of the gypreca Soviet in Januaryff.S. Ehruoheher noted tbat they rorr?rly begin on the borders of the warring countries, where the troops wore ccceentreted. Concerning eoBte&porery coodltlcea be saldt
"rovadays. If war starts, sdlltsry actions will develop differently, sloes countries will bnvo at their dlaposal the means of delivering weapons over thousands of kilometers. Var will start first of all in tbo depths of the warring countries, and every single capital, every slnal* large Industrial or sdninistrotlve center, Tvery single strategic arcs, win be subject to attack not just during tbe^ riret cnys, but durlc3 the first minutes of the var. In this tanner, var will both begin differently, if It le begun,and develop differently."
In another part of his. KhrushchevIcrjhaolae, that we already have so many nuclear weapons tncrncnuclcar, and appropriate Elssllca for delivery .ofto tbo territoryossible aggressor, tbat If seasorder an attack against ourordswe would be able to wipeountry, or countries, tne race cf the .
*
e ? tboc3bt concretely, rarshal of the Soviet Colon *la bis; speech at tha same Session, soldi "About
i
I.
ithin.hart period of tine o. an industrially developed country wboao territory lo approximtolr 3CO-5CO thouooDd equaro ktloroters, will be aufflcient to eouverV ell of its lnduotrial arcai and adrdniatrstive-polltical center,eap of rubble, and thelfeleaa deaext contaminated with deadly radloactlre substances.-
_.J1 fff*that such rtateasnt. are notsubstantiated frcei the stand.
* *"
^Dndor contecporary conditions, the formations of aliens troens of the VEt (Cuprcne ,Elehthoirction snd coloscal force of fire striae, have beccco tbe pricary' and doci.ive foro of arced forces. They, rather than sny other i
conflict -pare tbef one say uss tba expression, for sU other fores of arned forces, radically chansiog It* I tratesic situationbole snd tbe operational situation in the thesters of adUtary operations.
other* forcaa,re
equipped with nuclear/missile weapons, oust be directedrapid snd effective exploitation of theofof the VOX. In thia connoctioo, the baola forof each of the type, of force, agsln become, athe use of their own nuelear/ni.elle weapons, snd not ofof divisions, vessels, slrcrsft,
itlready completely apparent
hole aeries of established view, of our Slitary doctrine must bexaminod, beginning with que.tions of .tratesr end operational art snd ending with tactic, and troop crsnalsetiS.
Questions of Strategy
Let us examine .cme questions concerning the initial cerlod of war. Let us imagine HAW without two-three countries wSch hare been taken out of the war by neansowerful nuclear/
nicTtST. Ten ceiaaa
theays of tbe war. This is, afterc^latelj realistic perspectivei let us reamataar incidentally,
la significantly lea.
DdOsrge nuclear mlssllea
are sufflclsiit for its dsstructlon. naturally, such operation, by^
) M
VOX nl.ille troop. eorpletoly chao-aoaturo of operation,troops, tha mvy, .ador
Vvoul? Jj Miv*that tha enemy will ba incapablesimilar povcrful nuclear strikes agalnjt the territoryof tba Socialist Corp aodod fce^ootof the Son at Union. But auch strike, vlll not be ablethose countrlea cut of thew
with Its -concede
potentialities and political unity of peoples.will enable countries of tho Socialist Corp to withstand the first nuclear strikes of the encny. Thi.urther favored by the enormous territory, thel0,hU^Lna relatively great dispersion of industrial end administrative centers. The Irpcrialist bloc doe. not tav. cuch pocsibllitles. for this reason. In preparing tha
fT. utall utilize toe edvantaee. of our socialist systea so a. notto. encry the possibility of recovering .fter our
Of course we aust take Into account tha consequences ofpovcrful enery nuclears lt appears to us,eke themselves felt, first of all, by the fact that Inoperation of tbe initial period of theubstantialof troops In toesters of solitary operations cannotby bringing up forces and equipment from the depth of
a*it sppeers ab.olutely aecessary to us to review seriously certain tenets cf our solitary strategytoe lenstoontemporary ear and toe number of armed
forces participating in It.
The exarplo of tbe capltaliit oouatrlee annihilated in the riret days of the war will hardly evoke entouslesn in the resalnlne countries for its prolca^tloo. Va mat take Into eceount the oaornoua torsi .hock toot to speak of the base saterlsl
Ir^Lly^ l!^' eoSre fiourse
or man losses In previous wars with expected losses durHrj tha
JLTJl'Jk!beday. or even tho first hourscoterpcrary war for tbo picture to becoas clear.
ma%ountries during the four years of Worldotaledillico persons killed anddllion persons
n average ofillion pot bom per tS^tIoIo^oTarlM the six years of Worldotaled aboutillion persona killed andillion pcraona mined, or an areracc also ofillion pcroona per year. According to tbo datapeclal atudy by the Office of CItU Eofcnoe ofonductedJ, the lcooea In the course of several heer* from the first aerial attack carried out chiefly by atonic andweapons totaledillioo persons dead and aboutillion persona sick and wounded, altogether up toillion lo the OS* alone. In addition, aboutoercent of tbe country, industry was destroyed. It lo well to note, tbat in tbe above-mentioned study onlyities wero subjected to the pre-arranged attack and that thermonuclear bombs were dropped onf these cities. The coral fatigue of peoples, which becaee evident toward the end of World tor III well a. of World War II, is well known. It la easy to inclae bow great this fatigue and depression will be after the first nuclear strikesuture war.
XX appears to us that after the first nuclearAdas lie strikes, ths basin for all operationstrategic scale mustecisive offensive against the as yet unrecovored enemyi the more quickly and energetically that this is accccpUshed, tbe more pro^bletbst the enemy will be unable to cope with the disruption brought about by tha first attack, snd to organise stubborn reslateoGo.
f
Whoever withstands the first enemy attack must conclude theapidly.
At present we slresdy consider it possible for the tempo of
.rectal operation to bseriods. If this is so. for how many days sre we preparing to wags war to achieve decisive strategic reaultat
resent there iseop-seated contradiction between
derands to conduct operationsarge ecale, ateepee, without pauses, snd tbe still extant sod accepted position regarding
to the end of full mobilization of force, and the beginning erfof material resources aod arms from mobilixedfa hardly realistic and spperertly one must calculate 00 which will b. th. decisive period
There is no need to fear the term "blitzkrieg- Just because
this concept wag conpramlsad by ths experience of past vorld vers Under tho cooditiono of nuclear war only "blitx" operationa can pro-dee victory. If victory la not achievedhort tine, then peoples will hardly be able to continue Itlow, drawn-out faohloo, eopecisuy the peoples of capitalist countries, vhooverolitical potential than countries of tbe Socialist Casp. Be who baa withstood the first strikes cost snd ess conclude tha war rapidly If he prepares bis amed forces properly la peaca-
Strategic art cannot be replaced by urgent defends co the coral fiber of pooples, and neither can one plan strategy on tbe basis of fear of calculated risk ao^.the sacrifices connected with-it.
Tho encolea of blitzkrieg habitually argue that our worldoosesf ell nllitary industry, half of the steel and coal production, ko percent of potroleun production and output of electric power, nore than half of all the roil lines end several tens of millions of the population in territory occupied by tbe eneay, not counting etcbat leases, not only did not bring shout cessation of prolonged resistance but even permitted the crushing of the Garten fascist blitzkrieg plan and subsequently tbe achievementrilliant victory.
Thoy forget the fact that the above-noted losses were spread outeriod of almost two years. They vera inflicted only alona tto lino of the front and within its limits; in 'the zona interior tbey were alnoat ncn-exiatent. Human looses at the front and innecessary nodical aod other eld available to nillione of tbe wounded snd sick of the local populace. The inhabitant, situated behind tbe Use of tbe front were physically almost unaware of these losses, since life In tbe rear continued to flew more orormally. The picture will be entirely different
now
Under present conditions, the possibility of victory must be eocuxod byho capacity and capability of concluding the war in the short eat possible tiro, ihe theoryrolonged war i. core acceptable at preoent to the ccccpollatlc circles of the Vest, .ince-the preparation forar costs core and consequently precise, the manufacturers of arm Greater profits. And in tha tansT or profits they cay not even consider the expediency of tba theory.
The postulates of our nllitary strategy concerning the ilza of tee armed force, are also still based on the experience of pant world war. and arise from the necoe.lty of conducting war with sass,
.
AdvocQten of isulti-mlllica-man amies allude to thaall tyentleth-century wars, which shoved that tha grov^crforce of weapons ln amod combat with an Sony ofnever broughtecrease In the -modbut rather caused thoir Increase. They forget thatH tflSe? 2oft and
tots"sndT
oT^ conditionsoperations unfold In the old tanner? Can they, having begunelotlvely email number of regular
roaden by dint of thTarrlval-of fully mobilized largo units, and finally change Into engagc-eatif^.i^ acd illion-S. ornlfst r^urreS conditions tbi. U. firstly impossible, and .ocendly, unnecessary? '
arrive, it Is unnece3Bary
cr-v * nUC^ar ,tPlkw Plains forces ortal eneay In the border zones also cannot be inrnttrouajit is necessary
raIn'and^
country and,for this, operationsompletely different nature^ will be required fron those which we are now .tudytng
ttae, of tbeivisions within the composition
Teons, .
M1Jer0tln6u"lio formations of tha TOT can be directed against the enemy Inanoer that only
thf liters (Stce
SlT/cf^M rf6^^ The
takingof this strip will then become tha primary mission of the
complisSed
S&Jonf " 0
order zone, the mission confronting the troon. be chiefly tha speedy taking over of .zonesreater^^
iati'on resulting frcmsationel build-up of tbe enemy or the spprcech of his large
mm
or even etrateglc, reserves eaa hardly ha expected. Zt Is sore Ukaly that It will be nectaaary to overeooa the resistance of enemy trocpa retreating from tha border xone.
To exploit tbe flrat powerful mlaalle atrlka it will be completely luuieceaaary toarge number of divisions, aa was done In peat
Taking crer the border xone and tbe xonea of total deatruction and radiation will necessitate special organisation and preparation of troops, but will ao%!at all, necessitate multl-nlllloa-SBa armies. Tho execution of tiiia type of mission la tbe European theater ofilitary operationsrontm, for example. Is possiblerimarily tank, rushing ahead along separate axes and In separate heated battles, pouadlng tbe large unite and units of toe encry which offer resistance la thetlonod zones. Ofignificant portion of these troops! will suffer from enemy nuclear strikes! relatively frequentof entire lirga unite which have sustained heavy losses will be necessary. For this reason there shouldore reeerre divisions behind them; laivisions, well equipped with tactical nuclear (weapons, snd which will rake up the first operational echelon, will be required.
Organizations Hy, tbe atrlka of the first operational echelononem may be represented by two frontsivisions each,ertain number of divisions cf airborne forces,or a front).ront may consistrnleaivisions, each actingonem,ertain nu&ber of divisions of tbe front reserve.
Forces, mobilized la the Interior cf the country, can arrive gradually la tbe theater of military operations, probably after the completion of the first operations at tbe front, and their prlaclpel role will consist of occupation of captured territory.
If, after taking over tha territoryountry subjected to the first massive nuclear attack, tha enemy docs not capitulatesimilar astrike may ba repeated on the aoxt country.
From the afceemcntloned, it does not follow of course, that those divisions which will be la action In the first operational eckelae of ground troops will bs sufficient for the warhole. It is apparent that in accordance with tho forwarda slcnlfi-cant number of troops which have boon designated for carrylcs cut
occupational function* la tho occupied territory will baignificant number of forcea will also bo needed In tbo zone of Interior chiefly for various formations such as local antiaircraftTO). or the conduct of tbeufficiently larCe nnrber of ground troops Is needed, but their. over-all size, dOQigxatica and nature of use will of courss be different than In past wars.
The amber of ground troops encased directly in combat operations nay be, as it appears to us, many times smaller than it was In previous wars. *
Ha haveoncept for Initial operations under European Theater condition* which Is convenient for the activities of ell arm of troops. To the snce decree, with certain oorrections for geographical conditions, it can also be applied In othern this concept, tba principal leading role boloncs to the operations of tbe VGS missile formations, but not with tho alms vhlch we nov have under general review. Thla is not combat against enemy mi clear weapons, not the weakening of his economic potential, not combat againot his reserves,ut the full annihilation cf the enemy .ith nuclear warheads of megaton yieldast" territory with the ain of knocking entire countries cut of the war.
Briefly, if thereossibility for holding out,ossibility of victoryhort period of time, direct combat operations at tbe front such numerous groundas in previous wars will ba needed neither la tbe beginning tbe war nor during Its
Certain Qjueatlon* of Operational Art
It Is necessary to examine the current operations of ground troops in close connection vith the operations cf VGS missile formations. It appears to us that among the ranks of the latter, in addition to foration* carrying out the missions of knocking entire countries out of the var, there must be formations designated for activities in tbe interest of several fronts conducting operation* on oneaxis. Such formations, remaining undor the Jurisdiction and ecnnnd of General Eeadquartcr*ould establish favorable condition* for the development of ground troop operations by means of annihilation of enemy nuclear weapons, his reserves, airfields, transportation centers,nd other installation* located beyond the range of action of front sdaslla veaponsj by their strikes they could also reinforce the fire capability of the fronts in those
instances when the lattor, fear one reason ex another, foundwithout sufficientie weapons. Strike, in the intcreats of separate fronts could he carried out either on command
Hf tho fronts within tho range of prcacribed limitations.
At tho same time, this VGK rdeoile formation can carry out
afl9lenedtto SW'ka which are not directly connected vith the activities of tho fronts.
anatoaceBVCX operational aioollo formation cuat have at ita aisposol Its own long-rango moans of reconnaisBance. (aviation, rodiotochnical, andn order to he able to reapoad rapidlyhanco In the situation and to avoidordis tion. of reconnaiosanco tasks.
It appears expedient to uo to plan the VOX missile operations as special operations for the deotruction of eneay nuclear weapons for undexninina his economic potential, for cc=bat erainst supply, otc. AH this cuatonstituent part of two types of ntsslle operational those operations carried out by the VGX missile troop formations with the aim of cccplcte annihilation of an enemy countryKTOr' OT operations in support of ground troops, fissile operations of the firat type usually cust precede operations of the second type and, subsequently, ere slao carried out oirultanoouoly. It is obvious that the nature of tho targets under attack will be different ln each type of operation.
It is absolutely unnecessary to deploy VOX missile formations, in coordinated action with ground troops, direotly in the theater of nllitary activities or close to it. Oa the contrary, their placement in tho zone of interior is even preferable, since this rakes thef enemy intelligence mora difficult and negates the need toeparate antiaircraft defenao of these formations! thoir PVO can bo combined with the entialrcraft defense of certain areas of xne country.
The execution of VGS missile operations, the possibility of similar strikea by tho enemy, tho repletion of ground trocjB with
he possibility of using
bicb-yield nuclear warheads, not only in the zone of interior, but
Z^^tu ?Ddttcfl8ldattle, demanda thorough
cmQa
epudiate th* very concept and expression
".trite group" (udomaya erupplrovka) antiquated .oi hSS formed with the pcroocnol .nd material oftoood target forneay nuclear .trSTIndextra, unwarrantedto
In place of thy creation of "striken .uofIs neccasary to Instill the concept of "concentration
ouclear/ndsailo weapons". Th^rtlrlties;
SU, of ground troop, both In the offenslTe sod In defense ruotover broad sonoa, approximately tho sane for large unitsas in defense. This, lnoldentsUy, vs. recently takenby our probable
lLbaiC8 ?oparstlODs are rapid maneuver snd attacks by small grouping, (of dlrlslonroanot shoulder to shculder, end making use of theirstrike. Even these tttla grouplnss ars dlapersod afterattack. trike group ln contemporary meaningsince itompact snd good target for a, *
Ccntcnpcrery offenslTe snd defensive operations east differ from one another by tbe quantity of nuclear warhead, .llcted to thalr Irplcacntatlon snd not by the number of division.. Both In offnd defensive ground troop operations the primary sctivltles ars nuclear atrikes, owlrt maneuver, snd short assaults with tanka and poroonnel. The difference rests ln the fact that ln offenolve operations there musttrong first echelon which permits awlft dentruction of the opposing enemy;efensive operation It la expedient toeaker first echelon and to deslxaote lt for
mportant area, or position sectors behind large natural barriers, with tbe aU of .lowing the tempo of tha eneay offensive; "defensehole .hould be baaed en maneuver and strike, with forces located in the .on. of Interior, even with the loss of territory. In order to win tine snd concert trata oesentlsl nuclear/missile weapons.
It appears to us that under currentt Isto have second echelons. In ths preriou. meaning of this tern, either in defease or In offense. They were always thoughtotential strike group which could be brought Into battleew direction. At present It Is much more expedient to conoldor everything located behind the first echalon,which lain battle, a. reserve, dispersed over the entire field of
Tha taking of radloactlvely contaminated zones created by theacquires great Importance. It oust be carried out by lar*e
U ths meteorological
situation, and the degree of permissible dossge of radiationthe period of aetlon. Depending upononditions,zones ore token eitherapid forvsxd push oror in the final analysis, the troop* continue totheirIn th. contaminated zone without regard to All discussions regarding the creation of passages
contaminated zones, the surmounting of toes In helicopters and'others are Utopian at the preesnt tine.
fc planning contemporary offensive operations on the scaleront and armies, lt Is Impossible to proceed from en single "D" day). In terms of time, operations vlU flow In different direction.different tempos end It i. acre advisable to plan then byays (except, cf course, the Initial retaliatory nlsslle strike) Horecver,ecocrete any and large unit tasks csn be established forays sndonger period It is sufficient to indicate tbe Reneral direction, tbe nature or the activities end final goal of the operation. Mora detailed planning Is highly problematical since sharp changes in tbe situation ore unavoidableesult of enemy nuclear strikes.
The tempos or contemporary operations isay be planned, as already mentioned, up tond mare kilometersh-hr. period but lt mist be kept In mind tbat,esult oT eneio- nuclear strikes on oar deep rear, the rront will not be able to rely on systematic delivery from the rear of tbe country. Everything which s essential east already be stored In the theaters in peacetime andsupplies as POL east,ignificant degree, be sought out rroe war trophies in the course of the advene.
It Is also essential to take Into account the cumulative physical tension on tank and truok drivers (It will be necessary to have tvo relief, for interchange of crew members) and tha large number of vehicles which will go out of commission.
Vigorous maneuver and nuclear strikes aust become the basis of ccntaaporary defense. He who sits In place, even in prepared positions, wiii,ocxed out by nuclear weapons or bypassed. elatively small part of the force, cut hold separate areas or positions with the ala of slowing the teapo or tbe enemy advance along exes which
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convenient far hla and, ccncequontly, cluster hla battle array and operational formtion. In this connection an Irportant role ln defense li played by broad utilization of obstacles aod torralna presenting natural obotructlona for alevins tha tcapo of tha enecy Cover er, the fate of codcrn dofenae la doolded ln the final snalyale by tho reinsurer of oloollea, chiefly tbe shifting of their trajectories, and the availability of nuclear warheads/ ln conjunction with counterattacks end counterblow* of the reaervee.
It eppcare to na that under contcrpcrery condition, defense. In tbe past ctanina of thla term, can take place onlyactical scale. Amy and front operational dofenae, deliberately subordinated to the Intcroota of offenslTe operatlcns In other dlrectlone or dictated byharp chance In tbe situation in the eccay'a favor, will, of course,1hare Its place. Eut lt_ cuat be based on the sacs cothods of operation as la offenslTea heated acetlng battle* and Tor this, the amy and front cayumbernitseals of tones of action equal to those of an amy and front carrying out offenslTe operations. The difference will be In the presenceailer quantity of nuclear warheads, which will coceooltate lossert 'of -the forces snd territory in order to win tics.
CafcnalTe operations of the front and erey, differing fromoperations In sins of action and quantity ofwill reaecfele ths latter In net hods of largs unit tactical i 1
Tn defensive operations, certain amies of the front sod certain larca units of srrdes, taking advantagecavenlent local situation which baa arisenesult of swift action* or nuclear strikes, will frequently carry out an offensive with United seal*.
ooterporary operational dofenae, the fcreation ofIs not sdrloablo becauoe thoy do not Justify thoirlorflo unit defending Itself In place will be annihilated bystrlhcs of the energr or slrply bypoeoed. On tbetho tern "atable defense" should be relegated to tbsunder aedorn condlticn* it caa be neither solid northe tecpo of the advonetnj eacay by scans of defecae Iscounterattacks sod countcrotrlhea carried cut frcalens, on skilful snd swift dlssnrpcc==nts frca the encay,broad uae of barrlcede* sad utlllxstlon of natural terrainthsoaelbillty prasscts itaslf to das troyuclear
-It-
In connection with this it la necessary, evidently, tonine our views on tba naturecunterprepsration (kontrpodsotovka) In dofcnao and on organization of counterstrikes. In these questions vc continue to proceed froo tho concept of tha solid and relatively stable front.
It appears to uoimited quantity of nuclear weapons In the defense will notreakup of the eneay offenslTe with one or two massive nuclear strikes, especially since he will not form corpact groupings for his Offensive. Apparently, instead of counterpreparation, it will bo necessary to restrict oneself to daily and rapid annihilation of disclosed enemy moans of nuclear attack and to Individual (to the extent possible) nuclear strikes at various times on the most dangerous of his'tank divisions which have broken through. If, howover, the availability of nuclear wcapona permits the deliveryassive strike capable of breaking up tho eneay offenslTe completely, then this is elready not ccunter-preparation but going over tdj the offensive.
It is SEOra expedient to carry out counterstrikes inefense, by means of meeting engagements notompact groupinx especially created for this purpose and deployedefinite lino? but with several divisions operating'slmultaneously. though from different directions.
Anti-debarkation defense along the coast by ground troops can also have no defensive sones either on the coast or In ths zone of - Interior. In ports snd in vulnerable landing sectors along tho coast there can be separate tank subunita and units designated basically for combat againat airborne landings and for initial repulsion of debarkations of the enemy in landing-debarkation craft.
The basis of anti-debarkation defense must be tbe maneuvering actlvitiea of large units which move up from the interior of coastal zones and, in meeting engageaonts, pound the eneay utilising nuclear weapons.
Of tha now generally accepted means of anti-debarkation defense, only the construction of obstacles, both In the water ss veil as on ths land, can achieve much significance.
Enemy amphibious landing operations, while enroute at see, do not merit expensive and cumbersome operations against then by ths navy and lOng-jange aviation. The basis of their annihilation can
bo aisitle strikes lo embarkation end debarkation areas; while oarcutesea, tt la again oaro expedient to annihilate lonling forces by strikes with missiles having nuclear charges of several sweatees. After tho discovery of the landing forces at see, these attacks can be calculated oo the basis of their passagsefinite point (area).
Pertain Questions of tbe Davelorr-tnt and Orr^nirition of the
Types cf Arced forces
The changing of certain strategic and oporatlooal points of view is unavoidably bound up In the review of tha progrora for development and oroniMtion of the different types of armed forces. This development cuet, first of all, evolve only froa tbe needs of tbe initial ported of tho war,ong, drown-out miclear/alsalle struggle ia irposslblaj secondly, it must develop under the banner of the indubitable priority of nuclear/sdssHe troops. Ia thla respect lt is expedient to develop primarily nlsslle troops of the VOX, capable of using missiles cf negates yields.
nestle troops of all typesTOS, operational, snd tacticalmust develop in tbe directions of j
increasing their firing rate a this respect the introduction of solid missile fuels has decisive significance; missiles must beeady projectiles, fully essembled and requiring only the establishment of the flight program;
perfection and automation of tha process of tying la ths launching mounts (carriers) to the'terra in j
perfection cf dssils guidance systems, not subject to Jamming;
perfection of nlsslle carriers capable of changing the launch area Quickly; in this respect an important role must be played principally by "air-surface" type nleailes oa seaplenead os He -carrying submarines, and missile trains (poyeid)trategic missiles);
perfection of the system cf centralised command of launching missiles from widely separated cerzand points.
It must be acknowledged directly that In their present state, missiles of tactical snd operational designation ore still notsuitable for the nlsslcns assigned to toes because cf their
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ground troopshole Bust developorm tranoportablo by air. Perfoctlon and Introduction of lighter type tonka (since any oraor la penetrable) sultebls for trancport by air Is essential. Ths great Inportanco which Is attached to the ability of ground troops o toko ruined and ccffitamlnated zonee and water barriers requiresignificant dovolopcont of engincoring troops; however]the moat Important mission of tho engineering troops oust not ben tho existing ccaning of thisot the construction of poaltlona and of anti-atomic shelters but the rapid preparation of missile launch sites, estobliehaent of obstacles, road construction, and provisions for the surmounting of large water obataclea.
The air forces. It appears to us, have not yet lost thoir significance to the degree that they should bs Ignored. Discus8ion should concern only the change ln thoir role In warfare and, hange In their coapoeitlon and organisation.
Long-rouge aviation, armed with missiles of theclass, is (In conjunction withood means of cccbat with mobile carriers of nuclear weapons at sea and one that ie difficult to replace. In view of this. It Is apparently advisable to include it in the composition of the navy.
Front air forcesoo needed, thoughype other than those now available. Certainly, front bomber evlatlon Is departing the scene, since Its missions can,ignificant degree, be carried out by missiles. Nevertheless, on the field of modem battle and engagements there will be many Important small and mobile targets whose annihilation by -Ussilea is still improbable. Anof the fighter-bomber type la needed which, on its own, could find the target and annihilate it; such en aircraft must be capable of great acceleration, permitting it to appear and depart rapidly (thia nay be eebleved with the aid of rocket boosters Ji at the soao time it must be capable of carrying out combat missions at relatively low speeds as well. An elrcraft flyingpeed equal tos poorly suited to seek out small and mobile targets, even with too use of radar equipment.
Fighter aviation within the composition of the WSront Is essential,ore maneuverable component of the PVO, ss long as aviation remains one of tbe principal carriers of nuclear weapons
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addition, tho frontanifold troop (amy) aviation for obccrvutlon and roconnnlocanco, including radiation, for liaison, ecr-nd, and transport. Such aviation must undoubtedly develop as noa airfield-based. It cay consist of helicopters and other flying na chinos, for example the type veil known In foreign literaturehe torn "flying saucers" (ground effect machine-turbolet).
The TVS of tho front mustuch greater number of reconnaissance aircraft than they have at present.
Finally, greater-capacity^nsport aviation Is needed as a
resource of tha Supremo High Canrand.
The WS of the front (air army) Is not designated underonditions for the execution of any Independent air operations, and Is tho means for dlractly coordinated action with combined-ores arnica. For this reason, their composition must Include several aircraft divisions of fighter-bombers because only tbe latter are favorable for combat against cob He carriers of nuclear weapons and tho advancing re carves of tho enemy. In this connection, however, it is inadvisable to distribute the TVS forces of the front for support of definite armies or divisions; It Is better to utilise them centrally, under the Jurisdiction of the WS commander.
The Tavy. The future at sea belongs to submarines and to nlsBiia-carrying seaplanes which are not bound to airfields aad which aro capable of long-range operations. These, It would appear, should now be developed.
Tho basic mission of the fleetto annihilate carriers of nuclear/nigoile weapons at sea 'whichonsequence of their cobllity, have greater survival chances. Such carriers will be niflallo-carrying aircraft and clcolle-eorrylng ataala submarines.esult of their high rodar'-lcago contrast and, consequently, their vulnerability sircraft carriers and other surface vessels apparently will soon depart from the scene*
Under contemporary conditions It Is hardly possible to imagine large anphlbious landing operations of an operational, and even less, of strategic significance.anding force is elways, at sons.stage of itsompaot group or It does not make sense; but this
condition opells destruction for tba landing force. Toe possibilities are all In favor of ita annihilation by nuclcar/misBile weapons while It la atlll at Its bases or while it Is at sea.
Eurfaco vessels of tbe fleet will not be able tolgnlfi-cant role In ercod conflict. Their utility vlll probably be United to coastal areas under heavy PVO cover for execution of support Biosions. As for as protection of ocean supply transport is concerned, even now they ere of little use for carryiag out this boss loo.
Antiaircraft defence of troops sod the country, ss It appears to us, Is on tbo correct ceuros of development, chiefly ofroaources In the fern of the creation cf fully automatic system* of antiaircraft missiles.
The age of tube antiaircraft artillery Is Irrevocably receding Into tho past and lt la only In the antiaircraft defense of troops that snail-caliber tube antiaircraft artillery may still bare seas significance for the protection of small subunits fron low-flying aircraft.
The principal antiaircraft defense of troops snd the country must be en automatic system cf antiaircraft missile Installations of various ranges vhlch could cover, not Installations, but separate large areas, and could resolve the task of protecting both the troopa ond the territorial lnotallntions of the country (in these areas). Separate antiaircraft defense of troopa, except for the self-defense of snail subunits snrtloned above, appears to us to be an antiquated tradition, fighter aircraft aviation within tbe system of antiaircraft defense will also become archaic la tbe near future. It Is needed only until antiaircraft missiles have achieved the necessary technical perfection.
A nev type cf forces. Ia addition to existing types cf armed forces the necessity has sprung up, in our opinion, for tbe creationev type of force which Is not designated.for direct conduct of combat operations, but which Is extremely important, nonetheless, under conditions of nuclearils war. We have* troopa, possibly called rascue-rehabilltloD, (spssatelno-vosstanovitelnyy) which are designated for operations in the country's Interior,reas subjected to enemy nuclear attack. Their basis should consist of nodical sarvico end rehabllatlon units and large units.
In contrast to other types of forces, these troop* must be
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pec lollyorgnnixed sceardiEg to territorialand trained without being pulled out of production. seaathlng oiallir now In tbe fern of civilian formationsV0). But these formations existpaper, are not supportedaterlnl-technicalccal-voluntary organizations, snd are not properly directed In addition, organs of thsre concerned with anumber of problems which, ln easenee, are tbe prsrogstivesauthority, such ss ccccuaicatlona. supplying thewith food, evacuation,
It appears to us that such very Inportant undertakings as Bedleal aasictanco to tho suffering populace and rehabilitativecacuroa permitting theo wlthatand enemy nuclear attack, must be irplemanted by special troops. Their cadres sndeouiprant must be maintained ln peacetime end thoy must be esaursd fcobilizaticcal buildup under tha leadorahtp of organs of military control with tho Initiation of military activities.
Questions cf Control.From the standpoint of tho nature of control of operations, the new forms of armed conflict do not Introduce any basic changes. As in the past there will be need for intelligence snd collation of its information, an appraisal of theecision, end its transmittal to executors, supervision of execution, influence on the course of eventsglrvi tbe tesxs of subordinate troops, or through the influence of the .enior cceaander's acans exerted on the enemy, the Infondng of the coaaaader and of adjacent units. Bovavsr, the methods of control and tha oaans by which they are Implcmonted experience significant changes.
. The method of direct personal contact In operations is of little value today. It can lead onlyaste of ths aonlor ccemnnder's ties end promote Incorrect dec la lens based upon Impressions of one center of combat operations. This netted is admissible ncv only lo occbatubunlt level, but not in operatlona.
The need to see tbe field of eombet elong tbe decisive direction also has little admissibility now. This need arose from crushing tha eneay with masses of troops which were In direct contact with bin. This will not usually happen, now.
The most important thing ln control la quick reactionhange in thaopid tempo of control, and, consequently, the well-known Dead for Its mechanisation, autcsatlon, and reduction of
on* telephone ccccunicstions shouldto obsolescent means of control as they will not ba ablepace vith the operating tempo of
Apparently even such an attribute of control as the preparation of isrgounit and army ccnnnnd post, with all typeo of ehSterT y the forces and equipment of engineer troops, is becoming obsolete. The rapid tempos of buttles sod operations require
cover (cellar"
buildings, tunnels, quarries,
The recording of meteorological conditions end their predictionery important factor In operational planning end in dally control. In this connection, the creation of specialnits in all staffs frees division to front is absolutely essanSlT
Until automatic systems permlttlag rapid and accurateof coordinates for missile launchers are vorlted out. it is essential to hove la the staffs of armies aadeparate
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e
" . article vo have only touched upon some of the most topical questions of military art. In connection vith the development of nuclear/missile weapons, the total number of postulates in needndc^tedly auch greater. Many of tha questions touched upon by us are set forth only by way of posing then and bringing then to the attention of nllitary-thaoreticsl thought. TberefcxeTthe
aal"ccnpletene.s
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Original document.
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