CENTRAL XNTKLLX03NCK AGENCY It I
it Hovocbor
SUWKCT: FUR GHANA
To estimate ChanVa present situation and/prospectsstability and foreign policy orientation overyear or
COLLUSIONS
1. Nmsnh reoaint tho pivotal factor In Chonn. Considering himself tha nesslonlo deliverer of Ma country, he has usedaeons to reinforce Mb personal control at heco ecdpolitical adventures obrood to protot* Ma claim to bo Poc-Afrieo'a lavlln* figure. ) ;
However, challenges to Ms political losltloo havedeveloped niVl OhnM faces howbm economic probleos. ccult of dltisenatoo within tho ruling Convention rcoplea' Forty
(CFP) fOcruroh hoc roplacod tyjny of tho ncdorato figures Id the goverf^tit. The more rodtcal eleceot3 ore now in positions Of importance in goveraoent nod will continue to bo so io thoruture. Ifc lias nleo imprisoned largo nuabura of critics outside the party, Tlweolus unpopular atepe tho gowrn-cont has taken to allaviato Ghana's ccoaoraic troubles, havetho number but weakened the power of hie opposition,)
o bollovo Morucnb will bo successful in suppressing nny elc-cents vlthin or without tho CFP which night chailcngo bio pro-pnlnonca at least over tho noxt yonr Put the intornol etroino will rocnlnay erupt into sporadic disorders. Wo bolievo thot ha will retain tho support of tho oruy ond the poltca during tho ported, of this ostlrato. If ho should be cssossirtatcd, on all-out struggle for power would boortoin. )
haro'o ccononlo probleos oriee principally out. of the fall of the prlco of cocoa, coupled with thof ioconw and. reserves for developrtfnt projects, oxtrava-gnnccs at how ord oieablo expendituresdventures in other African countrlos. Nkruuah is not likely willingly to reduce
ony of theso notlvlttes butot-ably not bo eblo through hta forced savings #ml oualorlty tcasuroo to uobtltxo a'ifflclont Internal resources to finance- theo. Ib will look to foreign old to fill tho nap. (Paras. ftL^fc)
5. Vo do not K'llevw that President Norutnh has decided to align hiooolf couplotoly with the Bloc. Tbo flloo has been assiduous In cultivating Nkruruh, recognizing In Mo onlQStruoont for furthering its oribltlons in Africa. AiBiotonco In the wiy of credits, barter agroomnts, offers of training/os already been supplied. Nkrunah ond the ox-treno radicals onong his followers ore attracted by the apparent tuecesa of tbo Connunlsts in proootlng rapid econonlc dovolopticnt, oM their avowed antlcolonioHso. Ho alnost certainly bellovos that bo can uw tho Bloc to further Ms own objectives without boconlng Inextricably cr/nltled to the CveouniBtB. fcjvertholess, Ntrunah will probably try loestern prooonco in Ghana toset tho Bloc, ord lc-prove his prosrecto for old fron both aides. onaec.uonco of tho intorplny of theso ottltudoa, we believe that for tha irxndlabe futurn tbcra will bo both tho op-roarance and the factlose corieruenee between Bloc ord Ghanaiannd policioa.
6. Nkruinah'e leftist policies and positions will probably Increase- the difficulties of his obtaining private or goveriimoiil.il Investment and aid from the Wtil. If this trend is aggravated by tho West's refusal to honor what la In hisommitment to flnanco IheVolta River project, Nkrurnah will almost certainly react violently and turn even more to the Bloc. Even should the Volt* project be backed by tho US, we do not believe that Nkrurnah will significantly change the present policies of his regime. We believe that he will continue his attempt* to reduce the dominating Influence which private Western interests have la many sectors of tho Ghanaian economy and will continue to dove-lo close economic and political relations with the Bloc. (Para.
DISCUSSION
7. Tha pivotal factor In Ghana fa Kwarae NkTumafe^^Saaea Dally vain and egocentric, Nkrumah sees himselfneaaianlc leadere HVoa to be known a* the Osagyefo, .ornd Is intolerant of any opposition. He was the pre-eminent
leader vhon Clona bccouo lirloporrient? onl lostwn novcd vigorously ond vlth increasingly Authoritarian noons to consolidate Ma political control. Ife has tried to rako Muaolf tto loadern-Afrlconl wi, tho principal spokesmen of cutl-colonlnllera and of opposition to European efforts to rotolnin Africa, efforto vMch Ma brand of radical natlomltat colla "roo-colonlalloo." In odd it ton to being ouch tho noot iiiportont fnetor in Ghana, hoowerful figuro In tho African notionalisto Increasingly close rolntlcna with tho Canonist Bloctho counting political ond oconoiiic dlfficultlca In Ghana- nov rolso serious questions cbout Ma fuluro oid that of Chom itsolf.
a. Kurieeh'a Ounernl Cool* ond Policlca
8. Mcruunh constantly oleics thnt Ms basic nlna nro tho inoopordei.ee crd ur.Hy of oil Africa. Lifco rjest Africans, ho cor.-aldors colonialist) lo bo peculiar to Western Europoe.ii crd Ar<ertoan policy. Nkrumh bollovoa thnt tho African stotes shouldolicy of nonalierjx'nt in tho Boat-West struggle and that tho Cola War orford* Africa on opportnnlty to cotain support crd assistance from both |UM vlthout cwdltnont to either.
relationship to Uq Bloc ami cotnunlsnoe. Tho Cham tin IVeeldont hai chnractorlxodLfChristina Kirxist" vho beliovos ll.-il etototha best mans of ropldiy overconlng Africa'ssocial backwnrJnets. On tha ether hand, he hasthat no Ideologyestern or Cciiunlstnto Afrloa without rollitorprotatton and substantial Wo bcllevo that NVromhloser eons* cfwith tbo sc .riing OynnulBfi and revolutionary spirit ofthan with what ho hoUs to be the essential consorvatlsa
of tho Woet. Furthcruore, ha feels thnt.bloc objectives In Africa era at tho ooocnt ooco in turw with Ms cwno thoso of tbo West. Be believes that ho con uoo tho Bloc, ond tho support tha Bloc gives Mo, for bis own purposes without conpronlGtns Ma liberty of action ard without bocudryr Inextricably tied to tho world Cofiinuilot rjovcoent.
beliovo that tho Coawnist Bloc, cognizant of his pro-
m
ponsItleo aod cooing hlaolucblo instruront for furthering
Its own designs in Africa, Istrong effort to flatter and
andhlo/ to glvo hlrj diplomatic and tutorial support. Many of Me short-toro objectives parallelheof eot* African governronts, the ouolcr of tha ronalns of
Western colonial puwr. ofaoquorico of tho Interplay of theso attitudes, vo boliovo that for the inuodlato future thero will bo both the uppooranco ond the factlose congruence between Bloc ond Ghanaian actions aid policies.
Wo do not fool, however, that Muruiah wishes to oUnlnato all Western presence in Africa. While vague In defining the typo of relationship which ehouM exist, ho apparently fools the Wait ecu continue to noko valuable contributions In euch fields os education onfi technical osfdstanco. Ifa feelst tho Vest twst loarn to treat Africans oa equals and to accept African Judoxints of their own needs. *hus, whllo tbo Coccunlsts willexploit Kxrumh'o vanity and arfcltlono, wo believe that, pcrauint to Ms policy of trying to play off opposing forces against each other, ho vill oeox loestern prooence in Cram. Tho aaln danger is *Jiat ha endillso dopcrdCDt on the Bloe os to be virtually under ltfl control.
At tho boort of Kkrunoh'e pan-African bopoa amiIs the fortntlonUnited States ofolitical union of oil thestates. In which he would bo tho leader and guiding spirit, he has found Me pretensions to be thofor Africa Increasinglyonged by other lecdor*
-t-
os Devar notions hava *rnrgod. Furthernoro, his plana for Van-African political union howith ouch response Inr nations which tend Instead to cuphoslie cconcuic nod social cooperation between politically In! orient states. His hopesrol relationship botwecn Ghaaa and tha Congo foundered with tha death of LuiAirba. Within the Casablanca creep, ho has found rival ospirations Instead of ootty of purposo. Evca the vaunted Chora-Guinea-Mill Union has railed tony firu political ecbstancoj Chnna's pnrtrers, vliile quick to acceptarurxih's financial aid, havehary of relinquishing ocy olonont of their 8owsrolKnlf^S',1]
B. Political Situation in China
13- Sinceho ruling Coooo People'sr Jarty (CPP) ard Its cffiliated labor ond youth organisations have boonby uany African leaders as providing tbo very rxdoionolithie political eyston in Africa. However,proup of radical leftists pronlnont in tho Trcdos UnionC) nrd in youth groupo and other organltations linked with tho CPP
Sou, "Ihe ftobnbl* Interrelationships of the . Irdopondont AfricanatedSCRCT. _
his beeouor.iV aosortivu. It has denounced oW guard leaders llko Gbodctnh ond Botslo for thofr alleged lack of coo-corn for tbo welfare of tho Ghanaian poopla and domnded closer ties with tho Bloo and tho rapid creationruly soolallst state In Ghana. WhllQ caroful to exoDpt Nfcrurnh hiiiaalf froo consuro, tho radicals have been critical of the old lino leaders'accutwlation of veolth while in public office, The" lattereacted vigorously to these charges and, while not opposing socialist goals for Ghana, have countcrattacltod by unking clear thoir opposition to rapid notionalitatlon of private enterprise, to the deslro of tho oxtrcrje radicals to brook oxtoMng tics with Wont, and to the devaloprjent of too heavy reliance upon tho Bloc for financial and othor forus of assistance. I
lit. In the face of this throat to CPP unity, Nkruiehhis Cabinet, abolishing stce cdnlstcrlalpersonnel and reducing tho power bftiodemtcs in Tho oore radical oloneuts aro now lo positions ofin governcont ondcontinue to bo so in tho At thenoro responsibility has been given toor civil servants wh> will probably servo as ala tho govorownt. However, wo bollovo thntmintoln hlo policy of juggling various
within tbo CPP to iocuro that no figure or ecgneirt of opinion enorcoa capable of couponing with hio for popularity or for power. lbs vill continue to insist upon unhesitating support for his ovn policiesoweverontradictory they my oujxiar at tiresnd vill force critics out of position of authority, no natter whether, oxtrcoa radicals or ncdorntoa.
lor tbo first tltto sinco loading his country to inaepen-flenca Nkru>-ah is also experiencing eooe drop In publio popularity.continued efforts to proiioto tho cult of MautjahlBO, under vhleh the race and face of tho Oaagyofo ore kept constantly fcotor* the nasses,V) proatdontinl balloting showed that KKruncVe level of euppoct in urban centers, where political oophistication ord activity is greatest, wa3 tuch lower than in rural oroao. Wo bollovo that his populorlty even vithln the latter sector has boon adversely affected by the recout decline lit .inccoo ncxmc cocoa faroors and thO'Strlngunt tax ord coupuloory oavlngs coa-euras introduced to itw-roaso govcrncwnt rovenoas. Tho short-lived ontigovomnont strike3 which broko out inI hlgh-lirhtod tho general discontent. Marunoh'o popularity has also boon nonaged by the recent avreot of abouteading toifcere of tho opposition united forty (UP) and labor oeitatcro.
Other elements In Ghana which have reasona for opposing Nkrurnaharticularly tribal and ethnicppear to be politically neutral It ad at present. The Ashantl confederationtrong political spokesman and Krobo Kdusl, the only CPP stalwart whoair number of Ashantl supporters, Is likely to remain loyal to Nkrurnah solong as tho President finds an advantageous place for him in tho government or In the party. We believe, however, that the Osagyefo may find the half million Ewes of southeastern Ghana increasingly troublesome. Many fcwes wouldovement to unify the Ewes in Ghana with those in Togo.
Tn general, however, we believe that Nkrumah's critics and opponents are too weak and internally divided to unseat him at the preaent time. In Chanaiwhere, as In most of Africa, personal leadership Is so Important, wo percoive no Individual with the popular support needed to challenge Nkrurnah successfully. Opponents have also been cowed by tho threat of preventive detention and police suppression. Nevertheless, we believe that opposition to Nkrurnah will continue, and that from time to time the Osagyefo may feel compelled to resort to stern and repressive measures. Should Nkrurnah be assassinated,
an all out struggle for control of.
tho CPP vould co almost certain, and oppositionhe UP, tho EWcs, olght novo to advance their ova aspirations.
C. loyalty of tho /my and Police Services
In Septcobor, Wkrunah abruptly decided to taitilnate the appointment of British Ccnoral Alexander aa Chief of Staff and to requestilitary Mission replace the moreritish officers sooendod to theCfwr-ilan Amy. So long as British officers ocoupled senior coonand positions, tbo array was essentiallyonpolHlcAl Instrument of the civil government. The Prostdent, by recoving tho Brlt'shecoming Cbalrcan of tho General Staff, andappointing all senior conmandera has brought the errryoro political context,
There have been indications of antl-Nkrumh ssnti-toeot anong Ghanaian offleers orloing out of dlsagreeoent vith his doraestio policies, hie costly adventures elsewhere Inuinea, and his Increasing closeness to tho Bloo.
In tho flurawrkrumah decided to accept Soviet offers
t
toubstantialof officers ond technicians In the USSR. This rove provoked soma strong crlUols'n, .liieludlpg
oppositionuabcr of Ghanaian officers. Tho ovidtnee la on fused but it appears that,esult of tho opposition tho Soviet offers provoked, they havo accepted only In part. Tho nunber of cadets and techniciansthus far Israction of tho Soviet offor and the tern of training vill bo foryear Instead of three. Vhllo theray iculd probably volcono artillery and othor ceuipffont as rccooncododoviet survey rdsslea list spring,fficers vould oppose the importation of Soviet advisers cr training olsslorsong tem basis. Ve believo that Ghanaian cadets and officers will continue to be sent to tho UK for training. Tbo Minister of Defense has recently mde inquiries abcut they of sending trainees to tho US.
20. Vc believe lint tttvmk vill rotnln tho nupport of the amy and policeha period of this eatlr-ate and, thus, Mve the means to carry out repressive notionsst his olvlllan opposition, if he decides that such noasures are required. Over the longerowever, the responsiveness of tho amy to Nkruoah ray be loss sure. ld be ptr* tieularly true if tho amy was called upon to take sovere notion egslnst internal dissidents, or tribes, or If fcVrurah
were to try to lnorooso Soviet i'.fluorce in the "
D. Eoonoatc Dif fiujHiM end Prospoota
21, Kkrumfth'a doaeatlo worries ore further coopc-nded by loosing cconoalo problems. The world price, Ghana's principal foreign exchange earner. Is at Ihe 2owest level to ycure. esult, Ghana's forolgohaveharp decline. At tho sazsIncreased laport demnd* for cnsuitptlon, and heavy foreign exchongoby tho government for coononio development, have produced an adverse balance of payewnts. Ghana had an official sterling reserves account of0 nillicn at tho tine of Independence, lessUion remlns, of which all butillion has been eanvirkcd for spcoifio purpoios, ch of thlo reserve has been sp<nt during tho past two yoars in do-velopw-it oehencs, scooof which hive been ill-advised, the construction of casslve govenvtent buildings, and foreign commitments. Current Indications are that Ghana'a uoesrcarkod sterling reserves will run out byf they continue to be used at the present rote.
- m
geteries of precoa'cnt-breaking ceasuro* hive been'enacted vhlch vill wldon the country's tax base, augment revenue through increased oustc-as and excise duties, sad require Ghanaian workers to Joinational oecpulsorj saving3 program. However, the Chanalan public has been totally unprepared for this now austerity progrnn,ubstantial number of labor unions have etpresoed their discontenteries of spontaneous and economically disruptive strikes.
2>. Wo beltovoNkrunah will probably try to press Mahe workers and to insist that all cectora of the cconosy accopt lower living otanoarda over the next few years. Hcwovtr, he cay be faced with slowdowns or work stoppages by primry producers, especially among cocoa farcers who Insistrop in ieeono below certain levels rakes crop harvesting unprofitable. In such oirenmatances, Kkruraah might attenpt to ennloy totalitarian police methods to restore produotion thus further woakoning his popular base of support
We believe he would find such an effort unrewarding nndnoek greater external assistance so as to let himthe austerity
* . ; Althnugh NkrunAb could alleviate his problena somewhat by curtailing hlo expensive forelgein support of his African goals, we believo ha will31. Tho Ghanaian Covcrfut't-nt probably vill continueO0VQ ?n reialnlng sterling reserves and, at theseek'to'finance its ceoneinlo dovelopoeot programsfrom abroad. Should Ghana's econoralo woes uount,
llkrusah could use funds of the Cocoa Marketing Board, unlock -sterling oroa currency reserves, print unbacked currencies, end soek de-fomoot of payments on debts. In addition, Ghana will expand its barter trading with the Bloc, exchanging
. creed,and other products for Bloo goods, services,
economic
and credits. At present, Chanaian/tles with the Bloo ivmln llnltedj the country's economy is Western.oriented andercent of Ghana's external trade is with tho free
Nkrunah is counting heavily upon US aid to carry
through In ceostruction of thoiller* Vblbt hydroelectric and aluminum shelter complex. After mre than
four year* of negotiation and several autvayt, hethat the US has committed itielf to go throughproject. We believe he Is almost certain toshould the US withdraw at this stage, and willmore to the Dloc. He might take actlona againstin Ghana, such as USIA, the Peace Corps, modest US technical assistance program. EvenVolta project be backed by the US, we do notNkrurnah will significantly changeresenthis regime. We believe that he will continue hisreduce Ihe dominating Influence which privatehave In many sectors of the Ghanaianwill continue lo develop close economic andwith the
E. Probable Foreign Policy Oriontatton
26. Nkrurnah will continue his agitationree, unified, and socialist Africa which is able increasingly to exercise an influence in worldo this end, he will almost certainly continue to extend financial aid to African allies, to extremist nationalist movements In the dependent territories, and to groups seeking to overthrow moderate African leaders, Nkrumah's greatest strength outside Ghana
has been acong these groups although he has had considerable difficulty In working out ormngfjionts for cooperation with thorn. Hkrurah probably will sook to rnke recently acquired stocks of Moo area available to nationalist covenants such as those la Angola sad South Afrloe. In addition, he la likely to offer aros and other assistance to oipoocnto of Togo's President Olyoplo and the Ivory Coast's President Houihouat-Bolgny, He will olnoat oertainly continue to ned-dle in Congolese polltlos, as well as in other trcuble spots In Africa.
We believe that econoolo difficulties and political dissension wllhln Ghana vlH not deflect Nkrunah iron those endcavora. Indeed, they nay Impel hlo to intensify his efforts to secure African followum. Nkrurvih is likely to cooporntee olosoly with the Coeronlst Bloc to achieve Mepolicy Mr*.
In general, it is unlikely that the Ohnnalan President will most with substantial success in broadening his Influence arong th* loaders of newly inoepend^at African states. Not do wo believe that he will succeed inederation out of the loose arrangement which Is theInlon.
Tho leaders of both Hall end Guinea already aro stronglyKkruE/th'o prod-lings to strengthen their tloscroatlonoint Parliament And tho Issuance of acurrency. Cultuml And llngulstlo factors,eilrivalries, ore all major obstacles. Nkrunnh probably vill centostates to sock moabershlp la the Onion or otherwise themselves vlth
29. Vo believe that the Chonaiao President topes that neither his growing econonic ties vlth tho Comriunlst Bloo nor his recent pro-Bloc ststenutts willeriousin Ghana's already troubled relations with the West. Nkrurah is likely to mice Additional efforts to reassure tho US end the UK that ho bis not altered Ghana's neutralist foreign policy in favor of nli^nrsent with the Bloe. Nevertheless, vo believe that Nkrurah's relations with the Vest will be subject to even raare severe strains over the next several years, largelyesult of his flamboyant ond unpredictable behavior,la the affairs of ether African states, ond willingness te support tho Ceoinunlst Blocariety of Issues, seme of which are of great sensitivity tfi tho US and the UK,
Original document.
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