POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD (NIE 11-5-62)

Created: 2/21/1962

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Supersedesf; Supplements)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

Political Developments in the USSR and the Communist World

SubmiTiedDIRECTOR OF CENTRA! INTEUIGENCE

Concurred In by Iht UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD As Indicolad ovNleal2

N?

Tho following inielligence organizations participated in Ihe preparation of this estimate!

The Central Intelligence Agency ond the intelligence orgonlioh'ooi of tho Deport-menu oi Stole, Defenie, tho Army. Iho Novy. tho Air Force, ond The Joint Stoft.

Concurring:

Direcior of Intelligence ond Reieoreh, Department ol Stoic Director, Do fen Mt Intelligence Agency

Atiiitonr Chiel ol Staff for Intelligence, Oeparlmen* ol 'he Aimy

Aiiiuanr Ouoi of Naval Operation!eportmenl of the Navy

Aiiiitanl Chiel ol StatT, Intelligence, USAF

Director for Intelligence. Joint StoH

Ditoctor of the Nationo! Security Agency

Abstaining;

Ihe Atomic Energy Commotion Representative loB. ond the Attiitant Director, Federal Bureau of Inveitigoilon, theeing outiido of their fjrildkticn.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE

PRINCIPAL

L DEVELOPMENTS LN THE

The Leadership

Trends in Soviet

LT. DEVELOPMENTS IN WORIJ>

Sino-Soviet

The Dispute's Impact on Other

The European

Thc Asian

The Non-Bloc

Outlook for the Non-Bloc

fhis cV-cuSant has baan-or relaasa through eta HISTORICAL REVIEW FROWN Ot Uif Cahtral IntalUgtoca lcjetcy.

Mm.JLL

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD

THE PROBLEM

To examine the political situation in the USSR and the world Communist movement, particularly in the light of the XXLT Party Congress and developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and to estimate major trends.

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PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

the USSR, Khrushchev remains the mostsingle leader, and we believe that his leadership isdanger at present His control over policy, however, isto restraints; conservative resistance has forced himor postpone his proposals on such matterspolicy, military force structure, and thein Soviet society.

trends suggest that, over the long term,aspirations are likely toarger influencedomestic politics. There are some prospects forof totalitarian controls; however, such anot only on social forces but also on externaldevelopments in top level politics.

relations areritical phase justan acknowledged and definitive split There is nochanceundamental resolution of differences.view, the chances thatplit can be avoidedare no better than even.'

Sino-Soviet rivalry will continue to have,effects upon the international Communistand these will greatly intensifyefinitiveWhatever the outcome of the presentwe believe that the pressures for nationalthe International Communist movement willSoviet leaders with increasing difficulties, and thatover it is likely to be further diminished.

' The Assistant Chief of Staff. Inielligence, USAP, believes that the chanceseflnlUve spilt2 are much less than even.

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SUMMARY

Thc politics of the Communist world have continued in thc past year to grow more complicated and moreThc intensity with which issues of policy andwere posed at the XXII Congress has highlighted the contradictions which are emerging as Soviet internalbecomes more complex and as the world Communist movement becomes larger and more diverse. Adjustment to these changing conditions is made more difficult by theof doctrinal rigidity in Communist theory and practice and by the legacy of Stalinism. )

These problems do not weaken the growing material base of economic strength, scientific development, andpower which underlies the Soviet threat Nor have theyignificant effect upon the Soviet view that the East-West conflictundamental clash of systems, or upon their determination to press their aims in this conflictSoviet movesetente in East-West relations may owe something to Moscow's desire to contain tensions in this arearisis impends in its relations withWhile we perceive no indication that the Soviets are abandoning their basic hostility toward the West, there hashift in their tactics toward relatively greater subtlety and flexibility in pursuing their foreign policy objectives.'

While basic attitudes toward the West are not inamong the Soviet leaders, Khrushchev's sponsorship of successive reforms in internal policy has generated conflict with various elements which resist his changes. In tho past year, differences of opinion have become evident over thc important question of the relative priority of welfareas against the traditionally favored sectors of heavy industry and defense. Some contention has also beenover otherproper structure of the armed

'Soviet policies toward ihe rlon Communist world will be examinedorthcoming esUmate due inhinese pollclea will beInCommunistow scheduled for completion In AptU.

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the role of the party apparatus in Soviet society, and the final disposition of the "antipartyven theonslaught against Stalin at the Congress, whichconceivedeans of weakening the opposition to his views, failed to resolve these problems.)

We continue to believe that Khrushchev remains the most powerful single leader in Soviet politics. Most top party leaders share his general outlook, and those who resist various of his innovations do not appear tooherent faction which is seeking his downfall. Indeed, the lineup among bis colleagues probably changes from issue to issue. In addition to the difficulties of securing agreement at the top, Khrushchev in implementing his policies must rely primarilyarty bureaucracy schooled in conservatism and jealous of its traditions and privileges. In all these ways, he is subject to restraints which have the effect of slowing down the pace of his reforms.)

The attitudes of the Soviet people, on the other hand,orm of largely silent pressure on the regime to proceed in the direction of further reforms of the system. The traditionally compliant attitude of the population has to some extent been upset in recent months by heightened anxiety over the possibility of war over Berlinelated concern over the effects of international tensions on the already sagging rate of improvement in living standards. In addition, the revelations of the XXII Congress about the Stalin period and subsequent confusion within the party have led to openly expressed skepticism and to considerable ferment among intellectual circles.)

We do not, however, foresee any sharp turning of the public mind toward radical solutions. Not only is the regime ahle to capitalize upon the strong sense of pride in national accomplishment, but the Soviet people are accustomed to authoritarian rule. Current trends suggest that, over the long term, popular aspirations are* likely toarger influence, and we believe that there are some prospects for further moderation of totalitarian controls. But this will de-

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pend on external events and developments in top level politics as well as on the identifiable forces for change which are clearly now at work within Soviet society. )

A far more critical question has been posed by the moves launched at the Congress against Communist China's challenge to Soviet policies and international authority. While the condemnations of Stalin and the "antiparty group" were also conceived as part of the rebuttal to China, the main vehicle is the unremitting campaign against Albania. This Soviet attack, and the unyielding Chinese response, have moved the Sino-Soviet disputeritical phasc just short of an acknowledged break. While substantialon Communist strategy divide the two, these have now been transcended by the even more fundamental question of authority, in which the USSR's traditional leadership of the international Communist movement is at stake.

Considering the conflicting views and interests of the two parties, the record of attack and counterattack, thealready incurred, and the uncompromising attitude of both, we believe that there is no longer much chanceundamental resolution of Sino-Soviet differences. Indeed, the question now is whether Moscow and Peiping willin maintaining formal unity, or whether they will take those remainingaccusations of heresy and the formation of separate internationalwhich wouldefinitive split.)

The considerations of self-interest which argue against such an outcome must be fully evident to bothOn the Chinese side, however, there are important contrary factors, particularly the belief that the USSR is turning away from revolutionary aims and that Soviet policy is running counter lo Chinese ir. teres ts and ambitions. These considerations,ertain xenophobic righteousness which persuades Peiping that its policies could best carry the Bloc to victory, have already led the Chinese to sacrifice many of the advantages of the former relationship. For the

part, remaining in partnership with China involves the possibility of being drawn into riskier situations than they wish to contemplate, and the probability of astruggle within the movement which could lay restraints on Soviet policy and enable China to acquire an increasing authority in that movement. Thus thc Soviet leaders may now be considering whether, from the standpoint of their nationalmaller movement in which they enjoyed undiluted predominance would not be preferablearger movement which they could not control.)

Predictions cannot be confident, particularly since, with tensions so high, the likelihood is increased that either the USSR or China could miscalculate the other's moves and reactions. In our view, however, the chancesefinitive split can be avoided during the current year are no better thanfplit should occur, diplomatic and economic ties between Uie USSR and China would be further reduced, though not necessarily severed. Thealliance, whether openly renounced or not, would be of doubtful value to either signatory, although each would stillery heavy stake in the preservation ofpower in the other. The international Communistwouldirtual battleground as both theand the Chinese competed for the allegiance of other parties, fostered splits in those non-Bloc parties not firmly committed to one side or the other, and used all the weapons of pressure and persuasion available to them lo isolate their rival. )

If no definitive split occurs, we believe that the Sino-Soviet relationship will continue to be marked by tension and instability, increasing and declining as events may occasion. In these circumstances, the disruptive consequences for the international movement will continue to be felt, althoughess intense and more manageable form than under conditions of avowed rivalry. The present lineup findsand the minor parties of Asia in the Chinese camp, important elements in the Indian,Indonesian, and Japanese

'See the AultUnt Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAP. footnote tof Principal Conclusloiu.

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Parties sympathetic to Peiping, and the North Koreans and North Vietnamese seeking to maintain neutrality but edging closer to Chinese positions. Outside Asia, Soviet authority generally prevails, so far with little difficulty, againstpro-Chinese elements.)

The Chinese challenge, however, tends to undermine Soviet authority even among parties which are totally out of sympathy with Chinese views, Just as Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin tend to becloud tho legitimacy of Soviet leadership even among Communists who are not themselves Stalinists, As the international movement grows in size and diversity, as the Satellite regimes become preoccupied with national problems, as other parties acquire real prospects for sharing or even seizing state power under circumstances which have no parallel in Soviet experience, the virtue and necessity of following Soviet guidance is being increasingly questioned. In these circumstances, the Soviets are under considerable pressure to make concessions to national autonomy and to take increasing account of diverse national views in framing the general Communist line.

Gradual adjustments in this direction mightfor some time to come the essentials of Sovietwere it not that China is simultaneously pressing rival policies and gaining adherents among other parties. China's defiance dramatizes the inability of the professedlyCommunist ideology to preserve the unityovement embracing powerful nationalist forces, once the traditional sources of Soviet authority had been weakened. No clear solution to this problem is in sight, and we believe that thc management of thc international Communistwill present the Soviet leaders with increasingwhich are likely, in one way or another, to resulturther diminution of their control over it.

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politics of the Communistcontinued In the past year locomplicated and moreconflicts which are arising withinCommunist parties center aroundsets of issues. The first of thesegroup of policy innovations authoredand covering the entiredomestic, Bloc, and externalsum total of these innovations is abreak with the past, especiallyand practices associated withtheir success is. to date, unproven tobody of Communist opinion.Communists wish to limitothers to undo them, and yetelement to carry them even further.

second set of problems concernsrelations among Communistonly those holding state power butoutside the Bloc. With thcStalin's overwhelming ideologicaland subsequent changes in thepolicies, scope was given toof those who, like China,Yugoslavia, iiave been for variousless subject to direct Sovietmany other parlies, like the PolishItalian, began totrongernational identity. Thc positions takenissues have therefore increasinglyreflect the special interests ofand policy differences haveresulted In challenges to theauthority of the Soviet Party.this question of authority nowthe policy differences from whichnnd has become today the crucialuf Communist politics.

In all these matters the Communist movement Isundamental Inner contradiction, one likely to become more acute with time.octrinalcommunism has always been marked intellectually by extreme rigidity andby authoritarian centralism. These qualitiestrength when the Soviet Party alone held state power, when its Internal task was the Impositionrastic revolution upon the people, and when the mission of revolutionary agitation abroad was uncomplicated by the expediencies of world power status and the dangers ofwar. But as Soviet society entered the modem Industrial age. as the USSR's power and Influence grew, and as other Communist parties became factors of power in their own right, with some of them achieving state control, all the issues of doctrine, policy, and organizational control became very much more complicated. Communism's rigidto old doctrinal formulations and Its monolithic tradition have madettcd to adjust readily to such changedItystem whose history wars with Its current need to adapt Itself to cliange. New ideas and new methods, even though they masquerade under thc title of "creative" Marxism-Leninism, clash with old doctrines which were held in their time to be absolute and universal truths, and In the name of which the party repeatedly killed heretics in Its ranks.

Nothing illustrates this historicalbetter than the persistent warfare of the present Soviet leadership with the ap-parsnUy indestructible ghost of Stalin. He and the system he nurtured remain too awesome an Influence to be Ignored;In forming their opinions, are

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influenced by formulations sanctlflcd by Stalin's authority and by their own drives and responses formed In the Stalin era. They thus are continually forced lo make judgments, and frequently deviousabout the man and therefore about thc entire history of the CommunistThe Stalin Image can be used In many ways, even opposing ones; Khrushchev, despite his own involvement in Stalin's crimes, can bid for support as their ex-poser and rectifier, while Mao. ignoring his own disregard for Stalin's advice while the dictator yet lived, can pose as the protector of his truths.olitical position, if It ls to have force In modern Communist politics, must somehow come to grips with the complex of contradictory emotions and beliefs which still surround the name of Stalin.

I. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR

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hrushchev's policy concepts, andalso the expediencies of the post-Stalin struggle for personal power, have carried him to the pole of anti-Stalinism. The fundamental factor in Ills outlook has been his conviction of the superiority of thosystem. He evidently believes, as Stalin apparently did not. that its virtues are strong enough to draw the Sovietinto genuine cooperation with the party, just as he believes that Soviet achievements canowerfully attractive anddecisive Influence In the world at large His reforms are based on the premise that Stalin's obsession with absolute control had prevented the development of thesehad bred divisions where identities of Interest could have been cultivated, and hud alienated those who should have been natural allies

he fact that Khrushchev haseformist course is evidence of the strength of forces pressing for change in the USSR; he Is responding to social and economic forces as well as leading them. These forces arc in the main unorganised and inarticulate, although their views undoubtedly findat the top through Intellectual and professional if not through party channels. Khrushchev took the leadership of those at the highest level of the party who were willing to attack the problems of the post-Stalin period ln an Imaginative way. HU reforms have inevitably whetted appetites for further change and have led to sporadic though persistent conflict with such groups as creative intellectuals, scientists, andThese problems have in turncounterpressures on Khrushchev from those in Uie leadership who regard some of his Innovations as dubious and are concerned Uiat social discipline is being jeopardized. At present, since Khrushchev continues to moveeformist course, the sharpest point of political conflict Is with thoseof the party resisting change

hrushchev has for some timeto rouse and recast the Soviet Party to assure its survival as Uie leading force in an Increasingly complex andsociety no longer ruled by terror. At thc same time, he has tried to Invigorate andariety of domestic policies In order to guarantee rapid economic progress and to gain the firm support of Uie Soviet people, and has contrived to amend and ex-lend doctrine so as to Justify his initiatives. He bus worked to Insure and strengthen his own political and doctrinal pre-eminence within the CPSU, in part throughomentum sustained by con-Unual change and innovation. And. finally, he has sought in all these ways to alter permanently the image and the direction of Soviet communism so lhat his mark will

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a decisive one long after his own departure from the Soviet scene.

uch beliefs and efforts have madeadical in the eyes of some Soviet Communists. While the party has almost certainly been universally relieved at the commitment to abstain from physical terror, some have retained strong doubts about Khrushchev's leadership in otherHis vigorous anti-Stalin line has deeply troubled those ln the party who fear the consequences of such exposures and who remain emotionally attached to the Stalin era. His effort to bring the party and thc people closer together has been viewed by some as an infringement on the party's special and privileged role in society andhreat to the party's militancy and esprit. Further, some Communists fear that hison welfare programs will lead to tho neglect of the traditional priorities accorded to heavy industry and defense. His avowed intention0 to emphasize advanced weapons and to reduce the traditionally large standing forces has also apparentlyconsiderable professional concern among the military. Similarly, aspects of his "peaceful coexistence" policies, including aid to such leaders as Nasser and Nehru who strongly oppose domestic communism,o the Western capitalist countries, and the occasional attribution of goodto certain "Imperialist" leaders, have been regarded with some suspicion. Finally, the very style of Khrushchev's leadership probably seems unnecessarily impetuous,and undignified to some elements in the party.

n seekhig to cope with resistance of this nature, Khrushchev has imaginativelyhis political tactics to the new political ground rules which emerged in the period after Stalin's death. He has stressed that party opponents will no longer be exposed loand physical retaliation. He does not ex-

crcise, and apparently does not choose tothc absolute authority wielded by Stalin. He has relied Instead on the force and vigor of his own personality, his powers of persuasion and his demagogic appeal, his ability to out-maneuver and anticipate the moves of his opponents, and the sheer momentum and force of his policy Innovations. In addition to his own skills, Khrushchev relies on hisof thc top posts of both party andthus his Influence over theof leading administrators andmaintain his pre-eminent position. Further, while he is faced with resistance from those who disapprove of the pace of his programs or dislike aome of his specific proposals, most lop party leaders share his generol views and value his political talents and vigorousThey also probably doubt the feasibility of an attempt to oust him and fear the possible consequences shouldove succeed. Nevertheless, this method of leadershiphis exerciseompletelyauthority and compels him to seek visible successes In order lo maintain support.

hrushchev's political vulnerability may have increased since abouts aof what must have appeared to many Communists to haveeries ot policy setbacks. Byt the lime of the Party Congress, for example, it probably seemed that his peaceful coexistence policiesis the US had neither produced the promised detente nor achieved notableespecially on the crucial Issue of Berlin. His program to reduce military manpower had to be suspended In the face of growingtensions. His efforts to preserve the unity of the Bloc had also faltered. Finally,economic development ln the two fields most closely Identified withaad the standard offallen far short of fulfillment. Indeed, estimated grain production1 totaled onlyillion tons (compared toillion

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, and housing construction for tho year fell someercent short of goals. The harvest in the Virgin Lands was poor and his heavily publicized promise to surpass the US in the per capita production of meat and milk, or earlier, had to be

Khrushchev's moves at the XXII Party Congress directed toward the domestic scene (many of which were also of great significance for the Bloc) suggested some concern over thc possible effects of these problems on his political position. Thus he attacked theunderpinnings of the "dogmatists" who oppose his "creative" programs and resorted to shock tactics in order to stigmatize all those who had resisted him ln the past or might be tempted to do so in the future. He sought to break the lingering attachment ln the party to Stalin and to destroy any prestige still en-Joyed by the antlparty group. In addition,ew set of partyew party program (thc first. andpractical and doctrinal formulationsin these documents, he labored lo bring thc party into harmony with thc changing times. The party program's edict, forthat the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is no longer necessary in the USSR because all internal "class enemies" have been eliminated, sanctified Khrushchev's belief that thc old methods of dealing with the peopleace apart must give wayew system ofand party-public alignment.

When viewed in the light of theseKhrushchev's actions at the Congress appear to have met withualifiedDespite evident failures of policy, he was able in this way to place his stamp on the presen^era and, largely by tearing down the image of Stalin, to assert his own claims to be in the true line of Lenin's succession.he again revealed bis hold on policyby maintaining his general emphasis on reform. At the same time, however, he

seemed to pitch his approach toomewhat more cautious key,lost some ground on thc vital question of welfare policy, and appeared unable tothe prompt expulsion from the party of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich.

More specifically,01 to channel greater resources Into the consumption sector of the Soviet economy evidently ran into stifffrom "conservative" elements in the party and the military establishment. These elements apparently saw In hisrevisionist" deviation from establishedconcerning the primacy of heavyand feared the international implicationsolicy which might weaken the Soviet power position. Opposition to Khrushchev's policies was frequently expressed in the press, particularly during the spring and summer monthshinly veiledbattle, he denounced "comrades" who had an "excessive appetite for metal" and attacked "dogmatists" who could not perceive that since the Imperialist threat had been blunted by Soviet strength, lc was no longer necessary to deny thereater share of the naUonal wealth.

But it was evident that by July hishadumber of seriousproblems at home, coupled with an apparently unanticipated crisis abroad,both the feasibility and the desirability of proceeding with Khrushchev's shift In the internal line. Speeches at the Party Congress in October suggestedompromisecontending forces had been reached; Khrushchev appeared to have given In to some extent concerning doctrine and planning but kept the way open for an eventual return to more consumer-oriented policies.

Controversy within the top leadership lias also been suggested by the failure of the regime to resolve thc question of tlic anti-party group. Despite the vigor of the attacks

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the members of tlie group at the XXII Congress, the charges of criminality levied against them by Khrushchev, and the many demands for their expulsion from the party, the current status of these men remains in doubt. The equivocal statement of theconcerning their status and, morethc enigmatic handling of Molotov's case have compounded the confusion.opposition to thc group's expulsion,in the speeches ot several of the top leaders at the Congress, and continuedon this issue since the Congresshigh-level political disagreement andappearances and reactions the regime would prefer to avoid; lt fosters uncertainty and probably debate among Communistsunsettled by dc-Stallnizatlon and Bloc discord. Those who appear,inimum, to be urging caution in this matter areconcerned about the Ill-effects of ain the party and are reluctant to see Khrushchev's power further aggrandized; some may also fear formal proceedings against the antlparty group because they themselves arc vulnerable to charges ofacts performed In the service of Stalin.

lille there were thus signs during the past year or so that Khrushchev hadsome resistance to his policies, while personal power politics are always at work in the Soviet Party, and while there were extensive changes made ln the top party organs at thc Party Congress, there were no clear indications during this period that particular factional interests were being served. The career of Fro! Kozlov, however, seemed toarticular boost when he was designated de facto number two man on thc Secretariat. The fortunes of Kozlov's presumed followers, the so-called "Leningradlso appeared lo be prospering. Strengthenhc heir-apparent could ease the succession problem after Khrushchev's disappearance, but It could also stimulate countering moves by rival aspirants to power.

Further, It could make Kozlov more of apower In Ills own right than would be compatible with Khrushchev's view of his own interests.

Generally within the party,in seeking to remold the system in his image may be facedore amorphous, though in some ways more formidable,than he encounters at the top. The organization chiefly responsible for carrying out hispartya far from satisfactory instrument for this purpose. Thc great majority of professional party functionaries were trained in the Stalinist period to excute mechanically orders from above and to regard the population at large as recalcitrant and untrustworthyNow they are being called upon to display initiative, elicit It from others, and draw the peopleositive Identification with thc regime and active support of its policies. Further. Khrushchev demands that local party bossesreater voice to the rank and file, submit to criticism fromand to pressures from the public, permit the dilution of their elite corps through the use of unsalaried officials, and relax standards for admission to the party. Under these circumstances, we think that thereeneral reluctance to implement Khrushchev's policies wholeheartedly.

Despite these signs of disagreement and discontent, lt Is our belief thatremains the most powerful singleof both party and state and that major policy changes arc either initiated by him or require his approval. We do not believe that thereoherent political opposition to him and we do not think that his colleagues arc actively seeking his downfall.limits are imposed on him by his own methods of leadership, thc ability of other men,Jo influence the course of policy, and thc bureaucratic conservatism of the institution responsible for the Implementation of Ills

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Developments during the past year or so seemed to demonstrate with particular force that Khrushchev Is. In fact, subject to restraints which have the effect of slowing down the pace of his reforms and perhaps of scaling down the magnitude of bis goals as welL

we thus think, on balance,posiUon is secure, even ifhis policies are not, wc make thiswithout complete confidence. Wcto assess the full play ofsimply because there arc noand few norms for theand we must view it from theour estimates cannot take Intothe effects on the internal scenecrucial events as the de-Stalinthe Berlin crisis, and thestruggle. Each of these mattersexpected lo generate controversyUSSR about tactics and perhapsstrategy as well. It thus mny beIs greater instability than wc haveto Identify and that the explanationsigns of disagreement andIn the period since theIs more portentous than we

Trends in Soviat Society

the bulk of the Sovietremains politically compliant,on both the internationalscenes may have unsettledthe traditional pattern of generalIn party policies andTne foreign policy tactics oflast summer and fall, forfor the first time3 anthat Lhe world was perilously closethe brink of war. The public was for such an admission. Anxiety,

sharpened by the USSR's resumption oftesting and concern over possiblehazards, was not translated Into any direct pressures on the regime, but almost certainlyactor In policyWhile Soviet citizens for the most part seemed to accept the official view that the West was responsible for the increase In tensions, few could understand why the Berlin Issuerucial one for eitherecline In popular morale has also been evident because of thc regime's failure to conUnue the high rate of increase instandards promised repeatedly in the last fewevelopment associated In the popular mind with the increasedin Soviet-Western relations. Thereaction to President Kennedy'swith Adzhubei suggested thatelatively open mind about the US and is anxious to see an improvement in relations.

mong the moro educated segments of the Soviet population, the revelations of the XXII Party Congress evidently stimulated new doubts about the party's traditional claims of unity and Infallibility. Discussion of topics normally shunned, such as the question of Khrushchev's own personality cult and his complicity in the crimes of the Stalin era. was widespread and appeared to place party spokesmen on the ideologicalThe Congress was also responsible for the renewal of efforts ln intellectual circles to gain greater freedom of artisticThough such "revisionist tendencies" have been censured by official spokesmen, some thaw and ferment remains apparent. These reactions, compounded by confusion within party ranks, seem to have created uncertainty at the highest levels as to how best to cope with the consequences of de* Stalinization,

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already evident In the party's policies and in the public mood suggest that, over the long term, popular aspirations arc likely toarger role ln theof Soviet society. Pressures for personal security and material improvement, whetted by the progress made so far, will probably grow and find expressionress which no longer avoids all controversy and which is now able on occasion to suggest changes in the status quo. The regime's own efforts to gain greater publicin the handling of local affairs, to ease tight controls over all forms of social and cultural activities, and to make the party more responsive to the people's aspirations in general will probably generate additional pressures on policy.

Finally, the present leadership's efforts to destroy the image of Stalin is likely toasting effect on the populartoward the ruling group. We would expect increasing skepticism and the growth of sentiments favoring the reducUon of the powers and prerogatives of the partywhich the nonparty public viewself-serving clique rather than as an essential Instrument of public policy. If antiparty attitudes should In the view of the leadership show any serious signs of getting out of hand, firm measures of repression would, of course, be taken,ullto Stalinist oppression is highlyAt the same time, however, we do not foresee any sharp turning of the public mind toward radical solutions or overt moves against thc regime; patriotism and even chauvinism will almost certainlyotent cohesive" force among all levels of Soviet society.

These longer run trends in theof public attitudes and Soviet party politics depend very greatly upon thc course of external events and the tensions they

evoke. In recent months the relatively high degree of tension arising from the unresolved Berlin crisis and thc Soviet resumption or testing contributed to the decline in public morale stemming from internal economicThe Sino-Soviet dispute has added to thc appearance of strain and Indecision in the party. Should these critical problems be eased, Soviet internal policy wouldmove in the direction of greaterfor consumer welfare andurther moderaUon of controls over theHowever, the conservative forces in the Soviet Party which oppose sucb aof policy always gain strength fromwhich heighten tensions. Nor Is it clear howater stage, the succession problem will be resolved; public opinion mightarger influence in Soviet politics at this Juncture, particularly if the top leaders engagedrotracted struggle, or conservative leaders might use thetoreater discipline. We believe, however, that over the long runfor further moderation of Sovietare fairly good, but that this will depend upon external events andIn top level politics as well as upon forces for change which are clearly now at work in Soviet society.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD COMMUNISM

Sino-Soviet Refo'iom

mportant as it was for Sovietpolitics, the political line developed at the XXII Congress probably has even greater significance for relations within the world Communist movement. For some years now Sino-Soviet relations have been beset by fundamental differencesange ofand policy questions including theof war, tactics by which to extend communism, and even the wisdom of certain

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Internalarticularly sharpened8 by Khrushchev'sto deal personally with tho Western capitalist leaders, the dispute broke into the opent then focused on theof authority in the world Communist movement. At the0 Moscow conference the disputed points were notbut were merely papered over In an agreed statement of the Communist parlies. Though the dispute simmered in subsequent months, it did not again become intensethe Soviet Party Congress In October.

Khrushchev's attack on Albania ai the embodiment of latter day Stalinism was intended lo lend force to the offensive against Communist China. In dishonoring Stalin and enshrining Soviet policiesarty program which pretends to universal validity. Khrushchev was asserting thc right of the present Soviet leadership to define both the past and the future for Communists everywhere. Even more directly, In seeking to force tho Chinese to Join in the anathema against the Albanian Party or face Isolation, he was insisting that Peiping renounce its efforts to compete with Moscow forof the international movement.response to date has been to make clear ita complete support for Hoxha. to resume its thinly veiled public criticisms of Soviet policy, and to oppose Soviet positions vigorously at International front meetings.

We believe that the dispute hasoint where there is no longer much chanceundamental resolution of Sino-Soviet differences. The record of the past two years reveals virtually no inclination on either side

hich ted to the SIno-Bo*letof i'.-Mi are discussed ln NIEMain Trend* In Soviet Capabilities and"uller account of the evolution of the all In (Iceland the basic sources of conflict within It was presented In NIESino-Soviet

to compromise; the Soviets contend that they are the final authority in matters of genera! Communist policy, while, the Chinese. In the face of severe pressures, continue to insist that world Communist policies be conducted according to their version of orthodoxy and to agitate for support among other parties.

Communist politics ls. both ln Ideology and practice, exceptionally intolerant ofand therefore Ill-suited to containof this magnitude. Historically, when differences among Communists become asas have those between the USSR and China, they normally have culminated In purge or open split, in which unity is publicly disavowed, party relations broken, andof heresy exchanged. In following the worsening of Slno-Sovlet relations over the last two years, we have generally felt it unlikely, however, that matters would reachoint. Wc have considered that China wouldull rupture as enormously damaging to Its military posture andprospects, and that both sides would regard an open split as an historic setback to their political aspirations.

The dispute, however, has already moved beyond the limit which theserationally valid as they continue to be, would seem to dictate. Thepositions now occupied by both sides suggest that each is prepared to contemplate an open break, although it calculates, perhaps mistakenly, that the other will ln the last analysis make the concessions necessary to avoid this. For the Soviet part, remaining in partnership with China involves thcof being drawn into rlsklor situations than they wish to contemplate. Theseare compounded by fears that, unless Chinese pretensions can be defeated now, the continuing struggle might lay restraints on Soviet policy and enable Peiping to acquire an increasing authority In the Communist movement. Thus the Soviets may now be

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whether, from thc standpoint of their nationalmaller movement In which they enjoyed undilutedwould not be preforablearger movement which they could not control.

The Chinese, as the weaker partner, have perhaps even more to loseplit. They have already proven willing, however, to forfeit valuable Soviet military and economic support, and thoir parlous Internal situation has not diminished the vigor with which they prosecute their anti-Soviet offensive. China's deepest suspicion is that thc USSR is in fact turning away from revolutionary alms, ovolv-lng internallyourgeois direction, and working externallyenuinewith the capitalist states which will frustrate Chinese ambitions, both national and revolutionary. Peiping mayplit, painful as it would be, would be preferable to meeting Soviet terms.

The sense of doctrinal righteousness is another factor propelling both parties, and particularly the Chinese, In this direction. Each believes that history ls working ln Its favor and that. In an outright struggle for supremacy, it could not only hold Its present adherents in the world movement but even bring other parties across to its side. Each parly regards the other's leadership as grossly misguided, and probably hopes that Itsrivals will eventually give way to men who will correct their predecessors' errors. It Is even possible that Moscow and Peiping mighl conclude that an open split would generate the Internal pressures in the opposing camp necessary to accomplish Ibis change of

n the light of these considerations, we believe that the chances of an openbreak during the next year or so havevery substantially. Should this occur, thc dynamics of Communist politics would impel each sMe to lay exclusive claim totruth, to launch undisguised polemics

against the other, and to call upon the party ranks of the other side to overthrow itsleadership. State relations could notunaffected; diplomatic contacts would be considerably reduced, although notsevered, and economic ties would be further curtailed. The military alliance, whether openly renounced or not, would be of doubtful value to either signatory, although each would stillery heavy stake In thc preservation of Communist power In the other. Military cooperation, already greatly reduced, would probably cease. Wtth each side viewing Its neighbor as at least potentially hostile, defenses would probably bealong the common border, which Is In dispute at several points, thus raising theof military incidents.

plit already exists ln Slno-Sovlet relations. Party relations are at the point when neither side appears willing to initiate discussion of differences with the other. During the dispute, each party has made clear its disapproval of the present leaders of the other. Trade continues, butubstantial decrease in volumeilitary and scientific aid have beenow level sincehen Soviet technicians wero recalled. Although these developments reveal that there isadicalin relations, two further steps could be expectedefinitive break should occur. These would be for each side to name the other directly In its accusations, and for both sides to undertake an organizationalThis would mean refusing totogether In international Communist bodies, followed by attempts by both parlies to create groupings under their own influence internationally and in various countries.

hould these steps be taken. It would mean an open schism between the twopowers in the Communist world, each of which would regard the other openlyeretic outside the Communbtnd

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wouldevelopment of the greatest importance for the Communist world.the consequences of such an open break would be so far-reaching for thc prospects of the Communist movement, we believe there is still an even chance that both parties will draw back from this dangerous brink.

the dispute continues more orIts present form, short of eitherfrom one side or an openparty will probably tend to expandof argument and to carry it Intoforums. The Albanians andcontinue to serve as proxy targetsof "dogmatism" andUSSR will maintain heavy pressuresgreat majority of parties which Itto subscribe to Its positions, whilewill urge the traditionallyto endorse their views or at leastThe struggle for influence willsharp in North Koreahoice of alignment Isdifficult for the local parties to make.

these circumstances.organizations will acquire greateras arenas of Slno-Sovlettendency is already evident in theof thc World Federation of Tradethe World Peace Council since theThe Chinese will probablyan official meeting of all the partieseans of demonstratingdefiance and the hope ofadherents. They would expecta conference to face the Soviets withbetweennanimouslyand thus in effecteto over internationallytaking the onuspilt.for their part, will probablyupon the front organizations andof delegates at congresses ofnaUonal parties, where they canmajorities but avoid thc necessity

to produce official documents requiringassent.

t seems likely, although we have little direct evidence, that the strains of the Sino-Soviet dispute are reflected within theof both the Soviet and Chinese Parties. We cannot exclude the possibility that these strains might produce changes In theof these leading groups, or shifts in the balance of political forces within them, which would mitigate the present conflict. For the present, there ls no evidence offactions In either party onadical turn In thesituation, which raised an acute clanger of war or resulted In majorsuccesses or failures, could have anbearing on the course of Sino-Soviet relations, ln general, however, wc believe that the present difficulties reflect national divergences too deep for permanentand that the Sino-Sovietrestsoundation which Lsunstable. Therefore, even If nosplit occurs, it will continue to be marked by tension and Instability of varying degrees of intensity as events may occasion.

The Dispute's Impact on Other Parties

n the competition for leadership of the Communist movement, the Soviet Partyvery great initial advantages. ForCommunists everywhere have seen the USSR as thc homeland of the revolution, and the CPSU as its "vanguard" and unique fount of doctrinal authority. The achievement by the USSRosition as one of two world states possessing all the means of modern power Is seenure guarantee ofeventual world triumph. The USSR's success In rising to the pinnacle of power gives thcrestige which the Chinese, now beset with Internal difficulties, lack, and bolsters Soviet claims to remain the proper interpreter of Marxism-Leninism.

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thc Bloc, most party leaders have long and close lies with Moscow, arid many owe their very positions to Soviet sponsorship; in France, for example. Thorez cannot seriously question Soviet authority without at the same time undermining his own. Many Western Communist leaders, schooled as they are in the Western rational-pragmatic tradition,their doctrinaire philosophy, areand alarmed by the semircliglousof the Chinese. Lastly, Soviet positions on the major issues In dispute, such as the need to give highest priority to avoidingwar, find much support among

hina, however, is not withoutand onsets. It Is able to pose as the champion of the independence of national parties, and thus to play upon the oldagainst Soviet dictation felt In many quarters. In this connection. Peiping has been careful not to demand slavish obedience from the parties where its influence is strong. At the same time, the Chinese use otherof Stalinism for their own ends. As Khrushchev undertakes successive revisions of the dead dictator's policies and furtherhis image, Peiping seeks to capitalize on the doubts and distresses felt by Communists the world over who were trained to regard Stalinemigod. Chinese propositions on the proper International strategy findsupport among parties which see their only prospect In violent revolution or which find their internal position complicated by the expediencies of Soviet foreign policies. By and large, however, China's successes inupon Soviet authority have thus far been confined lo the Far East, where its physical poweronsiderable factor.

Albania

lbania's dramatic switch from Soviet to Chinese allegiance wasargeonsequence of Soviet policy toward Yugo-

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slavia. The Hoxha leadership is obsessed with thc fear that Its neighbor, whicharge Albanian minority and under whosethe Albanian Communist Party was founded, will seek to re-establish its former tutelage. There ls probably much truth in the current Albanian claims that both Tito and Khrushchev, partly Incident to theirattempts at reconciliationave actively Intrigued within the Albanian Partyay which threatened the position of the present leadership. Albanian politics areife-and-death matter, and Hoxha was therefore disposed to align himself with China when Peiping showed itself willing to press the attack on Yugoslav revisionism more violently than the Soviets.

Soviets have committedprestige to thc campaign to bringSuccess in this endeavor would beobject lesson in demonstratingof Chinese support. Wehowever, that Moscow's prospects areat present. Economic pressuresIndustrial development, but theylikely to starve the Albanians Intoand Chinese aid will be anAlbania is presently seeking toIts trade and other contacts outsideand if necessary it would almostapply for credits as well. Aof purges appears to have eliminatedSoviet and Yugoslav politicaland therefore their potential forclandestine aciion within the country.

leaves only military action, butagainst an Invasion of AlbaniaThe Bloc has no commonAlbania, andampaign wouldto launch and probably evenlo conclude. It would gravelythe USSR's allegedly peacefulthe fiction that Bloc membership Isand would probably entail aof relations with China It

El

greatly alarm Albania's neighbors, and the USSR could not be certain that NATO forces might not somehow become Involved. We consider that Soviet-Yugoslav militaryto bring down the AlbanianIs also very unlikely. Since neither country desires the other to establishover Albania, we do not believe thattrust or mutual Interest exists between Moscow and Belgrade to permit Jointagainst Albania.

Thm European Sofe'/ifei

he XXII Soviet Party Congress once again revealed diverse trends among the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as the currents of contention which lie beneath the surface In the Satellite Communist Parties. In Poland and Hungary, where Stalinistwere routedhe leaders have responded by reaffirming and extending their own moderate, Khrushchev-oriented, internal programs. Thus, Gomulka used the Congress to reinforce his unique, gradualist approach In Polish agriculture by going beyond thecriticism of Stalin to Identify forcible collectivization as the root cause of Stalinism. In Hungary, Kadar's response has been to reassert Hungarian autonomy in internal matters and to deny that thc decisions of Soviet Congresses are mandatory for all parties. With increased confidence in his strength against the Stalinists In his parly, he has expanded his moderate Internaland encouraged the participation of non-Communists.

omewhat different effect wasIn Bulgaria and Rumania. In Lhe latter, lhe old Stalinist Ghcorghlu-DeJ used the Congress as an excuse to rewriteParty history, attempting to divest his regime of Stalinist taint and make the present party leadership morehe populace by tying It to Rumanian na-

tionalism, with anti-Soviet overtones. Thus, he claimed that he had repulsed attempts by foreign (Soviet) agents in the party toourse against RumanianIn Bulgaria, party leader Zhlvkov used the Soviet Congress to expel hisrival, Chervenkov, from top echelons of party and government, and to take other actions to curb the strength of the stillStalinist faction in the Bulgarian Party.

5B. Still another effect was felt by those parties to which the Soviet Congress wasoon,roblem. In East Oermany and Czechoslovakia, where the top party leaders were most vulnerable to charges of Stalinism, some uneasiness has been evident since thein confusion ln top party circles and clumsy attempts by these leaders to cleanse their past records. The mostexample was in East Oermany, where Ulbricht claimed not only to have been one of the original anti-Stalinists, but evento harness the Congress in support of his milltantly Stalinist Internal program by implying that local opponents ofourse had been in league with Beria into liquidate Communist power in East Germany. In Czechoslovakia, an initialat Imitation of Moscow, by charging the late Klement Ootlwald with Stalinist errors, was ill-considered and causedbitterness ln the party cadres.

n most of Eastern Europe, andin Poland and Hungary, the XXII Party Congress has given riseevival of ferment in intellectual circles. Literary and scholarly publications are again producing articles openly critical of various aspects ofdevelopment, and calling for greater internal liberalization. Moreover, the party leaders have given some cautious support to this trend, though they are now clearlynot to let it get out of hand. In Hungary, Kadar's call for national reconcllla-

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and cooperation with non-Communists has encouraged liberal Intellectual circles to be more outspoken In their publications. The ferment Ls most notable in Poland, where not only nonparty intellectuals but party activists ln good standing have posed In acuteterms thc problem of an Inherent conflict between communism and freedom.we believe that the Satellite leaders are firmly In control of internal events, and that they will be able to keep disruptiveto the XXII Congress, which are far less than those produced by thc XX Congressithin tolerable limits. The one possible exception is East Germany, where the mood of the populace, related to the Berlin crisis and Internal shortages, could produce internal disorders despite the presence of strong Soviet forces.

c believe that thc European Satellite regimes will continue to give strong support to the USSR In intra-Bloc disputes. some of the Satellito leaders have begun toendency to be lessto Moscow than in the past, and to be more assertive in internal policy and intra-Bloc matters. Thus, Gomulka, Kadar, and Gheorghiu-Dej, each in his own wayto the Soviet Congress by forthright, almost audacious behavior. Though their actions cannot be regarded as challenging Moscow's authority, and probably even have the approval or Khrushchev and the Soviet Party, they neverthelessrend toward greater national self-assertiveness which is likely increasingly to mark relations among the Bloc states. Moreover, thebyirect challenge to Moscow's traditional claims of authority over other parties, have provided an important precedent In the evolution ol^Ine USSR's relations with other Bloc states. Nationalist-mindedIn the Communist parties of Eastern Europe will probably find occasion to turn this precedent to account in future conflicts of interest with the USSR.

fll An open split between Moscow andwouldery great impact on the East European parties In counteringopposition, these regimes rely onthe belief that liberationain hope because communism's world triumph is They would fearino-Soviet split would rob this argument of much of Its force, and might oven reverse the spread of resignation and accommodation among the peoples of Eastern Europe. Apprehension on this score would produce, at leastlosing of party ranksightening of Internal controls and draw the Satellite parties even closer to Moscow. Over the longer run, an open Sino-Soviet split would tend to complicate Soviet efforts to contain those basic divisive forces which work against Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

The Ation Satellite*

The Soviet success in getting thc East European Satellites and Outer Mongolia to join In condernnlng Albania has not beenin the cases of North Korea and North Vietnam. These two tried to avoidthemselves ln0 phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute, though by traditionaltheir very refusal to give full support to Moscowerious breach In discipline. Since tho XXIT Congress they have generally avoided actions openlylo Moscow. However, they havecorrect, if not cordial, state and party relations with Albania and have treated Itull-fledged member of the socialist camp.

Since the Congress, there has been some shift In the behavior of North Korea towards more open support of thc Chinese position. Kim Il-sung. in his report on the Congress, expressed his strong disagreement withtreatment of Albania and attitude toward intra-Bloc relations. Other than"North Korea was thc only Bloc country to express public approval of the Chinese

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stand in the latest border dispute with India, and it was also the only Bloc country to join Albania and China in opposing the Soviet stand at the recent meeting of thc World Peace Council, one oi the more importantfront groups.

North Vietnam continues toore cautious line. Ho Chi Minh apparently tried to mediate the Sino-Soviet-Albanlanin early November, in visits first toand then to Peiping. North Vietnam has been careful to maintain correct relations with both sides, though the party centralstatement on the Soviet Congress was effusive in the letter's praise, hailing theParty Program as an example for thedevelopment of North Vietnam. The Chinese, for their part, have been makingefforts to improve their position in North Vietnam,igh-level military mission to Hanoi at the end of December,to discuss an increase In Chinese military aid.

We believe that both North Korea and North Vietnam will continue their efforts to avoid committing themselves in the intra-Bloc dispute, and that Moscow and Peiping will continue their strenuous efforts to Induce them to commit themselves. Both North Korea and North Vietnam, as dividedvery desirous of taking in their southern halves, are inclined to sympathize with Pei-ping's more aggressive line. At the same time, however, both regimes are fearful of falling under Chinese domination and are there/ore anxious to preserve good relations with Moscow and tooviet presence. This feeling is probably especially strong in North Vietnam because of Its geographical Isolation from the USSR, and this mayhas not gone as far asin following the Chinese ideological line. North Vietnam may even find opportunities in this situation to increase the measure ofependence it already enjoys.

the event of an Open break inrelations, Soviet and Chinesethese countries would sooner or lateraccentuated, making ltfor them to stand aloof. In thisbelieve that neither country would belong to avoidirmthat Chinese influence wouldout to be decisive. Mongolia, as atwould probably stay firmly in the

The Non-Bloc Parlies

open Soviet attacks on AlbaniaStalin cameurprisehocknon-Bloc Communist parties.of the tactics employed againstand the transfer of Stalin'sreflected, not only in the failure ofof parties to endorse these moves,in some public expressions ofThe Belgian Party sent greetingsAlbanians on their party anniversay,Scandinavian parties were noticeablyto join the Soviet assault onthc Italian Party, the Congresshave ledrisis of majorIn the months following thethe Soviets were able to obtainof support from most ofof Western Europe, the MiddleLatin America, including those whichwavered. Such expressions ofhowever, were not completethe situation Inside the parties,developments hava causedferment and are being debatedin party meetings.

s in the case of the Far Easternthe Soviets were unable to getof their course by the non-Bloc Asian parties. The latter had already given some support to Chinese positions at the critical conference of parties in Moscow in Novemberttandoff In the dispute oc-

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Since Lhc Soviet Partyumber of these parties, especially those of Burma, Malaya, and Thailand, havethemselves openly In support ofIn the largest Asianof India, Indonesia, andSoviet Party Congress and conflicting pressures from the USSR and China have considerablyfactional divisions.

Italy and Prance. In thc ItalianPartyhc XXIX Congress hastrong reaasertlon by Its leaders of tendencies toward greater autonomy andopen, acrimonious debate within the party- Party leader Togllattl has revived the Issue of polycentrlsm in thc Communistwhich he had raisednd other party leaders have raised searching questions concerning the origins of Stalin's errors,among Communist parties, and freedom of debate within theove for closer relations with the Yugoslav Party on grounds of doctrinal sympathy was undertaken. These calls for greater internal andautonomy have caused displeasure in Moscow, but thc Soviets have reactedapparently wishing to avoid an open dispute at this time. This was not thc case with the French Communist Party, which is engaged ln open polemics with the Italian Party over these Issues, The dispute points up the different tendencies ln Uio two largest West EuropeanFrench: loyal to Moscow, but doctrinaire In outlook; the Italians: more forthright and pragmatic by tradition, and increasingly disposed to believe that the experience of the USSR In building "socialism" is not applicable to thc parties of Western Europe, especially their own.

India. The Indian Communist Party has been deeply dividedumber of years over the issues raised Ui the Sino-SovietSoviet tactics at the Congress on the issues of Albania and Stalin angered all fac-

tions of the party. Party leader Ghoshfrom attacking Albania at theand only committed himself on thebelatedly, two months later. Sovietat the Congress aroused much greater disapproval from the leftist, Chinese-oriented facUon, and one provincial party organizationesolution openly condemning the actions of the CPSU. The troubles of theParty Iiave been further compounded by the recent death of Ghosh, who hadey figure in holding the factions together, and thc revival of thc Slno-Indlan borderon which the party ls seriously divided. These problems raise the possibility that, when discussions are reopened after the February national elections, the pro-Chinese leftists will succeed in turning thc partyore revolutionaryoor Communist showing in the elections would strengthen thc arguments of those who believe, as do the Chinese, that the policy of restraint toward Nehru better serves the Interests or Sovietpolicy than those of Indian communism.

ndonesia. Moscow hai reasonhe effects of thc XXII Congress on the Indonesian Communist Party. Itswho gave some support to Chinese efforts to dilute Soviet authority at theave now openly committed themselves on the Albanian Issue on theside Party leader Aidit.oviet adherent, made no secret after theof his anger about unilateral Soviet handling of Albania and Stalin. After aCentral Committee session, heublic statement that such matters as the Albanian affair should be settled throughconsultations between parties and that Stalin would continue to be appreciated In the Indonesian Party. Aldlt's stand raises the question whether the Indonesian Party may fall under the predominant Influence ofandourse contrary to present Soviet objectives In Indonesia.

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Japan. Since thc Soviet PartySoviet and Chinese efforts to Increase their respective Influence on the Japanese Communist Party have been intense. Party leader Miyamoto, after attending the Congress in Moscow, stopped over In Peiping, as did the Indian and Indonesian Communist The Japanese Party, which until recently has been closely allied with Moscow,ro-Chinese faction and many sympathizers with Chinese views, even among the top leaders. It is also harassedplinter group which charges lt with subservience to Peiping. The behavior of the party since the Congressa gradual drift into closer alignment with thc Chinese. entralplenum In December, the official party newspaperosition on the Albanian Issue similar to that of the Indonesian Party, recommending that disputes between parties be handled privately through bilateral and multilateral meetings, and upholding theview that the will of the majoritybe imposed on the minority.

if in America. The Chinese have long been active in Becking contacts with theparties in Latin America, and haveLatin Americans In China forand guerrilla training. Theybelieve that their own doctrines of revolutionary struggle are better suited to the area than the more indirect and cautiousfavored by the Soviets. Although they have followers In the Latin American parties, and in one party, theactional spilt has occurred over revolutionary tactics, the Soviets retain predominant Influence. The Latin American parties generallyUie SovieU In Uie controversy at Uie Moscow conference ofhe CaslroW'cgime, now thc principal instrument of Communist action in Latin America, is strongly dependent on Moscow for economic-strategic support, and Uie Cuban Communists have behaved accordingly. Chinese efforts toresence in Havana do not appear

to have given them any special Influence there despite the fact that Uie Chinese and Cuban regimes have in commonuerrillaIradlUontrong hatred of the US.

Ouffoofc for lhe Non-Bloc Patliet

t seems certain that the CPSU willincreasing difficulties ln attempting to maintain its leadership of Uie Communist parties outside the Bloc. The Chinesehas not been Uie only reason for Uie erosion of Soviet authority. As Uiemovement grew in size and diversity, as Individual parties acquired real prospects for sharing state power or even seizing It under circumstances which had no parallel Inexperience. Uie virtue and necessity of following Soviet guidance was bound to be questioned. We believe that Uie recent signs of Independence In several of these parUes are symptomaticong-run general trend in thc movement and that Uie Soviets, Into retain the support of these parties, will have to relax further their disciplinaryand to take increasing account ofnational views in framing Uie general Communist lino.

lie non-Bloc parties are. of course,weaker than lhe CPSU. and these problems could probably be met by gradual adjustments which preserved the essentials of Soviet leadership were lt not for Communist China. The competition from Peiping,increases the dangers, as seenradual loosening of Uiemovement; many deviations which might be tolerable if Soviet primacy werenow threaten to strengthen thcchallenge to Uiat primacy. While the non-Bloc parties will need and seek external support, they will have two sources from which to obtain It. Appeals to them to give loyalty lo one or thc other seat of worldwill provide them with leverage over both. Many parties may use this opportunity

to exercise greater autonomy and to cast their policies ulong more national lines.

n the event of an open Sino-Soviet split, the non-Bloc parties would quickly beto Intense pressures lo declare their loyalty. We believee facto division of the international movement into two camps would follow fairly soon thereafter, although these camps might not take on clearforms. This split might be repeated within several national parties; such anwould be highly likely in, for example, the Indian Parly. Thereafter, both Moscow and Peiping would pursue all opportunities for bringing additional parties across to their side or for organizing, in countries where the party was aligned with the rival grouping, compeling Communist parties intended to capture the rank and file membership.

plit would, at the outset, find the Chinese with little support outside the Asian parties. Tlte subsequent course of the competition would depend greaUy upon the successes which each side could claim for its policies and the failures which it could charge to Its opponent. The Chinese line, stressing thc use of violence, the early Initiation of revo-luUonory struggle, and the expendablllty of non-Communist allies, would probablyappeal to the Communists ofareas If the Soviet strategy of "peaceful coexistence" produced few concrete successes. Peiping might acquire newas the older generation of Soviet-trained party leaders, many of whom regard opposition to Moscow as unthinkable, areby younger men. Chinese internal success or failure would greatly affectpotential for inuking further inroads upon Soviet domains.

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