APPROVED !VKATE:5
2
TFJ.:
special
national intelligence estimate
Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia
by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by Ihe UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
At indicated overleaf2
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The following inlclligonco organizations participated in Ihe preparationestimate: '
The Central. Intelligence Agency and 'hoorganization* af State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and. NSA.
. Direcior of Intelligence and Research, Department ofefense Inlelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for.Intelligence, Department ofof Naval Operationsepartment.of.,theChief of Staff, Intelligence,'
tomic Energy Commission Rc pre so nfatij^tc^s^to nt - Director, Federal Bureau-ofhe subject berg, puftide.of their
COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES, CAPABILITIES, ANDIN SOUTHEAST ASIA
the problem
To estimate Communist objectives, military andcapabilities, and short-term intentions in continental Southeast Asia.'
conclusions
The long-range Communist Bloc objectives inAsia are to eliminate US influence and presence and to establish Communist regimes throughout the area. Although the Communist powers have some differences of view as to tactics and priorities and the risks to be run in pursuing their objectives, they have thus farasic unity of ultimate objectivesigh degree of policy coordination with respect to Southeast Asia. If the current differences between Moscow and Peiping continue toajor split on Southeast Asia policy could ensue. In this event, Peiping and Hanoi, which have specialin Southeast Asia, might resort to more militant tactics. )
Communist China, with the largest land army in the world, has the capability to overrun Southeast Asia and defeat the combined indigenous armed forces of the area. The North Vietnamese forces are superior to those of any other mainland Southeast Asia state. We do not believe,
' The following estimates also boar upon the problem:ommunist Capabilities and Intentions in the Farated, "Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention In Mainland Southeastated
however, that the Communist powers intend to attempt to achieve their objectives in Southeast Asia by large-scale military aggression. We believe that they intend toto pursue these objectives primarily throughpolitical action, and support of "national liberation" struggles, so as to minimize the risks of Western,US, military intervention. Over the past several years there haslear pattern of increasing Communist military, paramilitary, and political capabilities for pursuing Communist objectives in Southeast Asia. The development of these capabilities is particularly advanced in Laos and South Vietnam.
We do not believe that Communist efforts insiaredetennined timetable or priorityaos and South Vietnam are now their priority targets. We continue to believe that the Communists do not intend to initiate an all-out military effort to seize Laos. If,ilitary showdown between the Laotian Government forces and the Communists does develop, we believe that theside would win out, bringing additional forces from North Vietnam if necessary. Nevertheless, the Communists are unlikely to pursue actions involving substantial risk of cUrccTUS military involvement so long as they continue to believe that theyood chance of achieving theirin Laos by legal, political means.
In South Vietnam, we believe that there will be no significant change over the short run in the current pattern of Viet Cong activity, although the scope and tempo of the Communist military and political campaigns will probably be increased. The Viet Cong will probably again resort to large-scale attacks, seeking to dramatize the weakness of the Diem forces and to reduce both civilian and military morale, in an effort to bring about Diem's downfall under circumstances which could be exploited to Communist
In Thailand, the initial effort of Communist China and North Vietnam will probably be to increase their subversive potential, particularly in the northeastern frontier area.
Concurrently, the Soviets will continue to employ aof political pressures, military threats, and economic inducements to persuade the Thai Government to seekwith the Bloc andore neutral policy. The Communists almost certainly believe that by sapping the independence of Laos they will be advancing theirin Thailand as well. The neutralist positions ofand Burma are acceptable to the Communists for the time being. Communist activity in both countries will, therefore, probably be kept at low key. )
DISCUSSION
COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
The Communist Bloc long-rangeiu Southeast Asia are to remove all vestiges of US Influence and presence and to establish Communist regimes throughout the area. As an Intermediate step, thearc seeking to move Laostrongly Communist Influenced, if nominallyposition. In South Vietnam, the struggle is probably so sharply drawn that thelook forrief neutralist stage, If any, in the progression toward communism. In Thailand, the Communist effort has not yet reached major proportions, and emphasis is upon pressures at the government level to move Thailand away from Its ties with the Westeutralist position. However, there are differences of view among thepowers ImmediatelyUSSR, Communist China, and Northto tactics and priorities and the lisks to be run in seeking their long-range objectives In the area. There are alsobetween Moscow and Peiping overfundamental matters of ideology and policy.1
The national interests of the USSR,China, and North Vietnam in South-cast Asia differ. The Soviets arc not linked with the area in terms of geography, history, or economics, and they feel no threat to their national security emanating from the area. Moscow's interests in Southeast Asia appear to be mainly political and strategic, and its tactics tend to be less militant than desired by Peiping and Hanoi. Thus, the Soviets, while supporting "wars of national liberation,"
'For (in analysis of the differences between the USSR and Communist China secevelopments In the USSR andateds In Laos, arc more cautious than theand more concerned with the risk of local wars in the Far East spreading into general war.
Communist China and North Vietnam, on the other hand, have special interests in Southeast Asia derived from their geographic position, historical associations, and economic needs. Peiping considers continentalAsia to be part of Its sphere of influence. Hanoi regards Laos and South Vietnam as within Its special purview. Both have been involved In ambitious economic development plans and would stand to gain economically from domination of Southeast Asia. Inthey are, at present, more milltantly revolutionary than the Soviets and lessto risk local war In order to achieve lhc early establishment of Communist regimes in the area.
Despite these differing interests and viewpoints, the Communist powers appear to haveasic unity ofigh degree of policywith respect to Southeast Asia. Laosthe only apparent exception to thisbut as yet the Communist powers do not appear to be seriously at cross purposes. If, however, the differences between Moscow and Peiping continue toajor split on Southeast Asia policy could ensue. In this case, Peiping and Hanoi might resort to more militant tactics.
II. COMMUNIST CAPABlllTIES
country in continentalIs vulnerable in some degree tosubversion, political and economicand military aggression. Theof the area all feel threatened andMost have tended to overemphasize
the threat of military aggression byChina and/or Communist North Vietnam and to undcrcmphaslze the threat fromsubversion and Communist "national liberation" tactics. Whether neutralist or pro-Western in orientation, the governments of Southeast Asia gear their policies to their assessment of the balance of force between the Communist and non-Communist powers in the Far East and of the willingness of the West to Intervene militarily.
ommunist China, with the largest land army in the world, has the capability to overrun mainland Southeast Asia and defeat the combined indigenous armed forces of the area. The armed forces of Communist North Vietnam are superior to those of any other mainland Southeast Asia state. We do not believe, however, that the Communist powers intend to attempt to achieve their objectives In Southeast Asia by large-scale militaryWe believe that they intend toto pursue these objectives primarily through subversion, political action, andof "national liberation" struggles, so as to minimize the risks of Western, particularly US, military intervention. Over the pastyears there haslear pattern of increasing Communist military, paramilitary, and political capabilities for pursuingobjectives in Southeast Asia. Theof these capabilities is particularly advanced in Laos and South Vietnam.*
III. communist short-term intentions
e do not believe that the Communists haveirm timetable for achieving their objectives in Southeast Asia, or that their effortsrecise priority listing. It is clear that Laos and South Vietnam are now receiving priority attention. We believe that the neutralist positions of Cambodia and
'For details concerning Communist activity and strength In Laos and South Vietnam see Annex and maps.
Burma are acceptable to the Communists for the time being, and that Thailand is likely to become an increasingly active arena for Communist political pressures, Infiltration, and subversion.
A. Loos*
The minimum short-term Communist objectives in Laos had probably been satisfied, in general, at the time of the cease-fire inommunist-held territory in Laosthe overland movement of personnel and supplies into South Vietnam by way of the secure, If difficult, maze of connectingtrails in Laos. Moreover, the Lao Army was disorganized, disheartened, andMovement by Communist personnel into and across Laos was virtuallyeven where nominal governmentremained in effect. Hence it wasfor the Communists to risk theof armed intervention by the US, by seeking to achieve the complete domination of Laos by military means. At the same time, developments of the past few months have probably caused the Communists to revise downward their estimate of the chances of US military intervention in Laos.
The delays in negotiations fora coalition government in Laos, thebuildup of the Laotian armed forces during the ceasc-flrc, and the pattern of limited Lao Army offensive action,sincerobably caused considerable annoyance and someto the Communist Pathet Lao and to the North Vietnamese leaders who control and direct the Communist effort in Laos. These considerations probably account for the limited Communist counterattacks oi recent
' See also, "Relative Militaryof Opposing Forces Inatednd, "Relative Militaryof Opposing Forces Inatedanuary
weeks. We do not believe thnt the pattern of military activity thus far indicatesfor an offensive designed to take the major Mekong cities by assault.
We continue to believe that thepowers do not wish to become deeply involved militarily in Laos, and that to tbe extent possible they prefer to keep theirinvolvement clandestine. Thus, so long as theyeasonable chance toolitical settlement which would not inpreclude continued use of southern Laosase for operations againsl Souththe Communists are unlikely toourse of action which would Involverisk of direct US military involvement. Moreover, the Communist side probablythat their chances of winning control of Laos by legal, political means arc good.
However, If the Laotian Governmentthe scale of its military activity, the Communists will respond with counteraction,eneral military showdown between the two sides could ensue.howdown might also develop from continued Communist military pressures designed to force the government to return toIn caseest of mililary strength, we believe that the Communist side would win out, bringing additional forces from North Vietnam, if necessary.
b. South Vietnam 1
primary Communist objectiveVietnam is its reunification withunder Communist domination. The
alsoTro&pecU for North and SouthatedugustProbable Communist Reactions to Certain SEATO Undertakings in Southated. "Bloc Support of theEffort Against tbe Government ofctober IMI; and, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions in South
tactics being usedombination ofand guerrilla warfare which have been developedigh degree of proficiency by the Vietnamese Communistsongof time. The Communists operating in South Vietnam (the Viet Cong) are directly controlled and provided with political and strategic guidance by the Communist Party of North Vietnam (the Laohe North Vietnamese regular army providesguidance, and some cadres, technicians, and logistical support.
The major strengths of the Viet Cong include their superior intelligence service, the extent of their control of the countryside and the peasantry, their thorough knowledge of the local terrain, and their mobility and their ability to achieve surprise, all of which are characteristicell organized guerrilla force. The Viet Cong are not capable ofthe South Vietnamese armed forces in conventional type warfare. On the other hand, the government forces are able totheir effortsiven area only by exposing other areas to Vict Cong attack.
The Viet Cong's progression fromto conventional warfare tactics, if itwill probably vary in different areas and will dependumber of factors, including their success achieved in lowering the South Vietnamese Army's morale, the consolidation of their control in the countryside, and their introduction of new weapons and materiel. In the meantime, they will probably continue their current campaign of concentrating upon the government's paramilitary forces andregular army units only when they have sufficient numerical superiority todecisive defeats. Isolated outposts, patrols, and vehicle convoys will be themilitary targets,oncurrentpolitical and economic effort in the rural areas to reduce governmental authority and further disrupt the Vietnamese economy.
Further attacks can be expected against the capitals of provinces, particularly those in areas under considerable Communist control.
The North Vietnamese leaders may still hope to achieve the reunification of North and South Vietnam through the medium of tlie countrywide elections stipulated in4 Geneva Accords. North Vietnam seeks to remove President Diem and eliminate US influence in South Vietnam through military and political pressures. Thereontinuing possibility that Hanoi may attempt toa "rival government" in South Vietnam. Statements by Radio Hanoi on the internal and external activities of its "National Front for the Liberation of Souths well as the Fronts recent initiation of its own broadcasting operations, suggest that Hanoi may be preparing forove.
For the short run, however, we believe that there will be no significant change in the current pattern of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, although the scope and tempo of the military and political campaigns will probably be increased. The Vict Cong will probably again resort to large-scale attacks, seeking to dramatize the weakness of the Diem forces and to reduce both civilian and military morale, in an effort to bring about Diem's downfall under circumstances which could be exploited to Communist advantage.
C. Thailand *
has never beenthe Thai people. However, neutralismhistorical roots in Thailand andimmediate appeal to the ThaiThe USSR has been pressing thelo disengage from SEATO,relations with the Soviet Union,toward neutrality. At the same lime,
' See also, "Ttiailand's Securityandated
the Thai leaders feel increasingly exposed to attack and infiltration from Communist China and North Vietnamesult of developments in Laos.
In the northeast Thai provinces, which historically have been economically depressed, the people arc ethnically close to the Laotians. The area alsopecial vulnerability to Communist pcnetralionesult of the presence of more0 Vietnamese refugees of the Indochina War. most of whom frankly admit their allegiance to Ho Chi Minh. North Vietnamese and Lao Communists are probably maintaining liaison with cadreamong this Vietnamese refugeeand providing them with small arms and guerrilla warfare training. Thailand's long, poorly-defended border with LaosCommunist infiltration.
The Communists are unlikely to initiate an overt attack against Thailand In thefuture. The Asian Communist states probably believe that their base of subversive activities in Thailand must be substantially strengthenedajornational liberation movement could be attempted. At present, no widespreadCommunist movement exists inand the small, illegal Thai and Chinese Communist parties are relatively ineffective. Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese tactics, therefore, probably will be employed initially to increase the subversive potential in Thailand, particularly in the northeastern frontier area. Concurrently, the USSR will continue toombination of political pressures, military threats, and economicto persuade tlie Thai Government to seek accommodation with the Bloc andore neutral policy. Thealmost certainly believe that by sapping the independence of Laos they will betheir interests in Thailand as well.
The objectives of the USSR andChina in Burma appear to be directed toward achieving gradual control over that country under the guise of friendlyCommunist China has madeprogress during the last year inthe good will created by the Sino-Burmese border settlement and generally has increased Its influence among key Burmese political and military leaders. Burmese military leadersccepted Chineseoffers of troop assistance in operations against the anti-Communist Chinesebased In Burma, and additional Chinese military assistance may be utilized against other dissident groups along the Sino-Burmese border.
In view of the foregoing successes, the Chinese Communists probably see littleforakeover of Burma by force or even byro-Communist revolutionary movement among Indigenous Communist political and insurgent groups.
tactics In Cambodiahave dc-cmphusized any appearanceor intimidation. Cambodia'sVietnamese minorities, each numbering. are targets for Communistand North Vietnamese subversive efforts andotential insurgent factor. The expanding student and teacher groups in Cambodia have shown considerableto Communist propaganda and appear to be speclol Communist targets,
owever, the Communists will probably continue to display friendship and generosity toward Cambodia, and especially toward Prince Sihanouk, to demonstrate theof "peaceful coexislence" and continue to take advantage of Cambodia's friendlyto increase their Influence In Cambodia by peaceful means. Communist Chinato lead the Communist Bloc countries in overtures to Cambodia; the Soviet Union haselatively minor role.Communist front party, known as the Pracheachon Group, wields little overtIt numbersctive members and possibly as many0 sympathizers. It is tolerated by Prince Sihanouk, probablyesture of neutrality, but its activities are stringently curtailed. There has beenbetween the Communist embassies in Cambodia and the Pracheachon, but noof Communist control.
annex
Laos
The combat effectiveness or the Pathet Lao and other antigovernment forces islower than that of the Northunits. The combat capability of the North Vietnam troops is high. Many of them arc regulars and combat-proven veterans who participated in the decisive defeat of the French forces in the Indochina War. The use of North Vietnamese cadres and technicians, and more recently units, in critical tactical situations has been an important factor in the success of Communist military operations in Laos.
Antigovernment military forces in Laos are now estimated to totalofongham0 Pathet Lao,orth Vietnamese regular armed forces (the latterinimum ofnder/strengthbattalions and support troops ofartillery, antiaircraft artillery, and armor).
Although outnumbered by the Lao armed forces, the antigovernment forces now in Laosuperiority in artillery and armor. They are generally capable of maintaining their main forward positions and oflocal operations to counter aggressive actions by the government forces. Without further external reinforcements, they could, by concentrating their forces, seize and hold certain key positions now held by government troops. If reinforced by additional combat units from North Vietnam, they could quickly overrun the remainder of Laos.
b. South Vietnam
The territory currently controlled by the Viet Cong gives them access to at leastercent ofillion militarily fit males between the ages ofhere are now estimated to be on full-timeoperations at0 Viet Cong organized intoeparate companies,eparate platoons, ofstrengths. Supporting these forces are anart-time, partially armed, trained local militia who serve as village self-defense forces. Some of these arc as well armed and trained as the full-time forces. In addition to providing replacements for the full-time regular units, the militiaother support functions, such asintelligence, providing guides forunits, and supply services.
The Viet Cong receive coordinatedfrom high level political and military headquarters in North Vietnam and operate from political bases in South Vietnam under their control. They have divided Southinto two operational regions. Eachis further divided into interprovincial commands, provincial commands, districts, and villages. Each command has troop units available to it, generally on the basis ofin the region and interprovlnclaland companies in the provinces.
The Viet Cong are equipped with an assortment of US, French, andweapons. Generally, the "regular" units are armed with US weapons up to and including medium mortars. The principal source of these weapons in the past has been the South Vietnamese military and paramili-
tary units, but reports indicate- thatweapons are being infiltrated to the Viet Cong from North Vietnam. Northundoubtedlyonsiderable stockpile of US weajwns captured from the French during the Indochina War and, more recently, from the government forces in Laos.
everal divisions of the NorthArmy (PAVN) located in theportion of North Vietnam have been linked with the support and training of Viet Cong personnel. These divisions arefrom former South Vietnamese who fought against the French and withdrew to North Vietnam.ombat-experienced personneleady pool of trained PAVN soldiers, and they generally provide the commanders, cadres, technicians, and specialists for the Viet Cong forces. If needed, personnel from these divisions could be made available for guerrilla operations in South Vietnam.
The number of PAVN personnel with the Viet Cong in South Vietnam is believed to be at. These officers and NCO's serve as cadres for the various Viet Congand companies. In addition, they probably also act as instructors or technicians to operate communications systems and the more complex equipment in the Viet Cong arsenal.
The Viet Cong utilize both land and sea routes to Infiltrate cadres and limitedinto South Vietnam. The sea route is used primarily to transport couriers andequipment while the longer and more difficult overland route is used for personnel and other supplies.
Original document.
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