NARCO-INSURGENT LINKS IN THE ANDES

Created: 7/29/1992

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes

Summary

Relations between traffickers and insurgents in Colombia and Peru will continue to be characterized by both cooperation and friction. In general, the insurgents are seeking larger profits from narcolics and diversifying their roles in the drug trade. Besides extorting money for protecting trafficker infrastructure and drug shipments, many insurgents directly participate in coca growing and processing. Moreover, Colombian guerrilla groups have become increasingly involved in that country's emerging opium and heroin trade. Although traffickers occasionally benefit from guerrilla protection, they resent ihe insurgents and sometimes have used force to resist their encroachment. Andean government assertions that increased attacks against the insurgents would affect the drug trade are primarily an attempt to convince the US to allow the use of counternarcotics aid for counterinsurgency operations; in fact, many traffickers wouk^upport government counterinsurgency operations.

APfWrtDFOR

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memorandum was prepared byj

Center, with contributions from

Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments andelcome and may be directed to the Director. DCI Countemarcotici Center, f

Cooperation Yields Gains for Traffickers

Colombian and Peruviancip facilitate theJe fen arcaa Elk* control by protecting key rrafr.clcng inr'rasu-icture and enga'trtg in trafficking activities. Guerrillas guard :cca fie;ds andabcratcres and pre tec: drag transshipment operations by providing security at cJxndesune airstrips. They nave also become more dirccilv involved in the 'jansconauon of druas.

In addition, traffickers occasionally use die insurgentsnack tiieir enemies-both government and rival traffickers. This activity is particularly pronounced in Colombia,

Although such cooperation has been less discernible in Peru. Sendero Luminoso (SLj-the most powerful Peruvian insurgenton at icast one occasion,overnment outpest at the behest of traffickers.

| some Colombian guerrilia groups have increased their involvement in the region's emerging opium and heroin trade. FARC and ELN* units reportedly have been providing protection to poppy fields since the,

Although some far-left groups inworld's second largest coca producer!

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groups, however, are loo small, poorly organized, and lack popular support to have significant hand ir.fficking. "

Hnancial Gains for Guerrillas

insurgents firs: became involved in the drug trade by imposing "war taxes" on coca grow-rs and tra/fickers inperations;ethed tha: continues to be their primary means of collecting drug revenues. In the. FARC fronts in Colombia charged growers and traffickers for safe passage through areas under the group's control; this activity was officially sanctioned by FARC's National Directorateinceront in Peru's primary coca growing region-the Upper Huallaga Valley-in the, the Sendero Luminoso has been taxing drug enterprises and exacting contributions in kind from coca growers there.

Direct revenues from cultivation and processing appear to be increasing among some groups as theyroader role in the trade. LHHHHLnVHHHks

since at least the, FARC and ELN units in Colombia have cultivated coca

What Dm; Revenues Buy

Colombian guerrillas have long used their drug ties to obtain arms and ammunition, either buying them direcily fromhave extensive ties to private dealcn-of receiving them in payment tor protection of coca processing.

Narcc-Insurgent Friction

Despite benefits that traffickers derive from their links with guerrillas, insurgent participation in the drug trade has adversely affected the narcotics industry and raised tension between the two groups. In addition to losses incurred through such forced

payments as 'revolutionary

traffickers have had their once smoothly running drug operations disrupted, their efforts to develop processing and transshipping capabilities impeded, and their control of coca prices threatened.or example, Sendero's self-appointed role to protect peasant coca-growers from exploitation led it to set pnees for coca products. Several traffickers who tried to circumvent SL price controls reponedly were killed.

traffickers in particular have demonstrated an ability and willingness to use their own paramiUtanesagainst government targets during periods of heightened countentaicotics activity.

Andean governments are likely to continue to stress ihe links between local insurgencies and the drug trade in hopes of convincing the US that funding counterinsurgency operations with countemarcoLics aid would lead to major gains against tra/fickers. However, we do not believe that the drug industry would be substantially disrupted in the short term by attacks against guerrillas. Indeed, many traffickers would probably welcome, and even assist, increased operations against insurgents. Moreover, we believe officials in Lima and Bogota, if given antidrug aid for counterinsurgency purposes, would turn it to pure antigueurilla operations with little payoff against trafficking. HH

To the extent that insurgents in Colombia and Peru can be contained, however, long term improvements in rural security could lead to more effective antidrugore secure environment would extend the reach of police counternarcotics forces by allowing them to use forward basing in areas formerly controlled by guerrillas. Significant diminution of the insurgent threat would enable antidrug police units to rdy on vehicle transport, which is cheaper and generally more available than helicopter support, and conduct some enforcement operations with fewer personnel. Nevertheless, lacking effective government anticorruption efforts, operational security would continue to be compromised by suborned civilian and military officials. |

Even if no longer preoccupied by counterinsurgency requirements, the militaries in Peru and Colombia would see their primary role as national defense and would be reluctant to fullyounternarcotics mission. They have consistently expressed concerns over the legality, and potential public backlash, of armed forces participation in antidrug operations. Should their resources be diminished by budget stringencies, however, the Peruvian and Colombian militaries might overcome their misgivings about counternarcotics operations in the hopes that by enlarging their efforts they would gain increased US military aid. I H

Original document.

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