NARCO-INSURGENT LINKS IN THE ANDES

Created: 7/29/1992

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

APPROVED FGfr PRI.KA-SR DATE: 6

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Directorate of Intelligence

Intelligence Memorandum DCI Countemarcotics Center2

Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes

Summary

Relations between traffickers and insurgents in Colombia and Peru will continue to be characterized by both cooperation and friction. In general, the insurgents are seeking larger profits from narcotics and diversifying their roles in the drug trade. Besides extorting money for protecting trafficker infrastructure and drug shipments, many insurgents directly participate in coca growing and processing. Moreover, Colombian guerrilla groups have become increasingly involved in that country's emerging opium and heroin trade. Although traffickers occasionally benefit from guerrilla protection, they resent the insurgents and sometimes have used force to resist their encroachment. Andean government assertions that increased attacks against the insurgents would affect the drug trade are primarily an attempt to convince the US to allow the use of countemarcotics aid for counter insurgency operations; in fact, many traffickers would support government counter insurgency operations.

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Cooperation Yields Gains for Traffickers

colombian and peruvian insurgents help facilitate the drug trade ia areas they control by protecting key trafficking infrastructure and engaging in trafficking activities. guerrillas guard coca fields and processing laboratories and protect drug transshipment operations by providing security at clandestine airstrips. they have also become more directly involved in the transportation of drugs.

in addition, traffickers occasionally use the insurgents to attack theirgovernment and rival traffickers. this activity is particularly pronounced

although such cooperation has been less discernible in peru, scndero luminoso

overnment outpos; a: the behest of traffickers. i

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colombian guerrilla groups have increased their involvement in ihe region's emerging opium and heroin trade. fakc and eln

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groups, however, arc too small, poorly organlrco, ma tacit popular support toignificant hand in drug trafficking.

Financial Gains for Guerrillas

Guerrillas arc involved with the narcotics industry primarily to raise funds.

Assess menu of drug revenues collected by Colombian insurgents are mote uncertain, but because of their more extensive involvement in the drug trade we believe that the drug earnings of Colombian insurgents exceeds that of their Peruvian counterparts. |

Colombian insurgents pronamy

continue tcTraisc much ol Incir funding tnrougn extortion and kidnapping. (

Andean insurgents first became involved in the drug trade by imposing 'war taxes" on coca growers and traffickers in their operationalethod lhal continues to be their primary means of collecting drug revenues. In the, FARC fronts in Colombia charged growers and traffickers for safe passage through areas under the group's control; this activity was officially sanctioned by FARC's National Directorateinceront in Peru's primary coca growing region-the Upper Huallaga Valley-in the, ihe Scndero Luminoso has been taxing drug enterprises and exacting contributions in kind from coca growers there.

Direct revenues from cultivation and processing appear to be increasing among some groups as theyroader role in the trade.

since at least the. FARC and ELN units in Colombia have cultivated.rocessed cocaine pastec.

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Colombian guerrillas have long used their drug ties to obtain arms and ammunition, either buying them directly from traffickers-who have extensive tics to private dealers--or receiving them in payment for protection of coca processing, storage, and transshipment sites.

Narco-Iiuurgent Frktlon

Despite benefits that traffickers derive from their links with guerrillas,in the drug trade has adversely affected the narcotics industry andbetween the two groups. In addition to losses incurred through suchas 'revolutionary taxes,"

traffickers have had their once smoothly running drug operations disrupted. weir efforts to develop processing and transshipping capabilities impeded, and their control of coca prices threatened.or example. Sendero's self-appointed role to protect

peasant coca-growers from exploitation led it to set prices for coca products. Several

traffickers who tried to circumvent SL price controls reportedly were killed.

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In addition, some drug groups in Peru and Colombia have retaliated with violence and have turned to corrupt military and police forces for protection against guerrillas, j

Involvement in the drug trade also has caused problems for the guerrillas, although financial and other benefits probably outweigh any liabilities. Their focus on raising revenues and obtaining weapons from drug sources hasisproportionate number of their combat personnel to static, vulnerable positions near drug-producing regions. *"

pjMgea mat me lnsiirgems-woura eliminate tne drug but hinted that their role in the drug trade would continue for now.

Implications

Despite the volatility of trafficker-insurgent relations, even sporadic cooperation will continue to pose problems for government antidrug efforts. In areas of guerrilla control, traffickers in Colombia and Peru will continue to tolerate low levels of guerrilla involvement to protect their drug trade, accepting moderate "war taxes"ecessary cost of business. Their lies to insurgents will providereater retaliatory capability against government antidrug efforts, although Colombian

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traffickers in particular have demonstrated an ability and willingness to use their own paramilitaries against government targets during periods of heightened countemarcotics activity. I-

Andean governments are likely to continue to stress the links betweenand the drug trade in hopes of convincing the US thatoperations with countemarcotics aid would lead to majortraffickers. However, we do not believe that the drug industry woulddisrupted in the short term by attacks against guerrillas. Indeed,would probably welcome, and even assist, increased operationsMoreover, wc believe officials in Lima and Bogota, if given antidrugcounterinsurgency purposes, would turn it to pure antigucrrilla operations withagainst trafficking.

To the extent thai insurgents in Colombia and Peru can be contained, however, long term improvements in rural security could lead to more effective antidrugore secure environment would extend the reach of police countcrnarcou'cs forces by allowing them to use forward basing in areas formerly controlled by guerrillas. Significant diminution of the insurgent threat would enable antidrug police units to rely on vehicle transport, which is cheaper and generally more available than helicopter support, and conduct some enforcement operations with fewer personnel. Nevertheless, lacking effective government anticomiption efforts, operational security would continue to be compromised by suborned dvilian and military officials.^

Even if no longer preoccupied by counterinsurgency requirements, the militaries in Peru and Colombia would see their primary role as national defense and would be reluctant lo fullycHiniernarcotics mission. They have consistently expressed concerns over the legality, and potential public backlash, of armed forces participation in antidrug operations. Should their resources be diminished by budget stringencies, however, the Peruvian and Colombian militaries might overcome their misgivings about countemarcotics operations in the hopes that by enlarging their efforts they would gain increased US military aid. [

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Original document.

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