Director of If rTi ft Centra! ft * Intelligence
flPPROKO FOR RE1EASE uATfjNAYZini
Fptir Years: The*
for Democratization
f
National S# '/ 4 , .
ational Intelligence^ Estimate;
rfle views of tha Director of Central
with the' advice andassistance ofthe ' A
*: i
Russia Over the Next Four Years: The Prospects for Democratization
and Marketization
Information available as of2 was used in ihe preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations panicipsted
m the preparation of this Estimate:
The CentralAgency
The Defense inicibganc* Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau ol lnte*genco and RHMnh.
Department ol State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of Energy
a/so participating;
The Deputy Chief of Siaff for Intelligence.
Department o' the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence.
Department o* the Navy
TheChief of Staff, intefcgence.
Department of the Air Force
The Dtrector of
Heackjoarters. Marine Corps
Ths Estimate was approved for pubbcaiion by the National Foreign tnicttigonce Board.
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estimative judgments about an epochal revolution in progress must be seen as an effort to discern what can be said with confidence; what alternative courses events may take and the implications of each; what signs to look for as to general directions; and, finally, what the best estimate is.
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the certainties. Over the next four years, Russia will remain very unstable. Under the best conditions, there will be serious crises and turmoil. In the next year or so, tensions arc bound to increase significantly as unemployment grows and privatization evokes bitter quarrels over social justice. Powerful pressures will be brought to bear on any Russian government to adopt inflationary policies and slow the process of economic restructuring. Nationalism of various stripes will gain momentum. The factors of chance, the sequencing of events, and personality will impact disproportionately upon Russia's evolution.|
Yel'tsin will be hard put to maintain power and authority in the face of the population's exhausting struggleormal existence. Russia will not be spared the psychological "post-totalitarian depression" still widely noted in Eastern Europe. The rule of law will come slowly. Institutionalization of progressiveonly codification, but routine acceptance by therequire
of food, fuel and other consumer necessities, risingdeclining real income, and anger over corruption and increasing
Idisparities are the main factors that will undermine public
support for steps needed to marketize the economy. While some of these conditions may stabilize or improve in the next year or so, some will get worse. Major strikes and public unrest are highly likely. Over the next year, unemployment will rise sharply, and in some regions it will reach dangerously high levels. In the best possible case, there are bound to be enormous inertia and resistance in each area of structural reform.
eversion to the previous order is not possible. The Communist
isull-blown command economy cannot be
restored. The need to move toward some kind of market economy is broadly accepted in principle. Restorationoscow-dominated empire of former Soviei Republics is beyond Russia's military or political
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i.KeMlYrs The oomplclion of Russia's economic resirucluring will take many years.
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t is almost certainarge monopoly.ridden state industrial sector and major remnants of the collective farming structure will still exist. The question is, what will be ihc trend of
in mv Ru5sia nas madc an important start toward democracyarketflS conducted two elections by secret ballot, voted in a
president, gained experience in pluralistic politics, and avoided violence. These are not transient bits of good news but developments rooted in genuine strivings of new elites and ihe general population. Bul this istart.
progress along ihc roadelatively stable pluralistic society will be determined by several key variables:
general sense of Russian nationrtood that fills the national identity void: statist and imperialist, or liberal dcrnocralic.
of an economic order that begins to fulfillleH1IYrs Mpcctauoos.
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by the military and security services of much diminished roles without rebellion.
Preservation of Russian territorial integrity and resolution of conflict with other former Sovietmajor violence.
A Western approach that provides support to reform and also to Russia's battered psyche, without inflating expects lionsM
ree political and economic order in Russia will lake decades. Looking forward over the next four years, we see three possible paths of development:
Democratization anduccessful continuation of present positive trends. Wclightly-betier-than-cvcn chance to this scenario, mainly because wc judge generally positive outcomes lo the variables just noted above to be more likely than not. We note, however, that even this promising path will be marked by recurring crises.
Stagnation and possible fragmentation: failure of efforts to resolve key constitutional and center-periphery issues, stabilize finances, or make progress on economic structural reform, eventually threateningof the country. We think the chances of this path arentheorrisome possibility.
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establishmentepressive regime under the banner of order and populist chauvinism. This regime would seek toighly controlled, corporativist marketization with strong elements of monopoly and property ownership by the old managerial elite. We think the chances of dictatorship in the short term are low, mainly because we judge society to be resistant to its peaceful imposition and the likelihood of military revolt to be low and declining. We believe the odds for dictatorial rule would increase considerably if political and economic stagnation set in.umber of nongovernmental experts judge the chances of unrestoup arc high right now because of widespread dissatisfaction with the general situation.)b
Russia to maintain itself on the path to reform, the Ycl'tsinmust address two brewing crises:
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it will have to assuage public unhappinessalling standard of living, corruption, and blatant income disparities. To do so, it will most likely have to give greater emphasis to the requirements of social stability over the pace ofat the risk of periodic disputes with the IMF.
Second, the government will have to break the stalemate over the adoption of workable constitutional arrangements and private property rights. The quickest path to these goalseferendum, but this isigh-risk tactic, as success is by no means ensured.^B
believe the maintenanceussian reform program wilt also require
strengthening of executive authority al all levels, which will be decried by
some inside and outside Russia as antidemocratic. The critical tests will be whether this strengthening occurs in the context of the continuedof the rule ofree market, and democratic institutions.
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at least the next six toonths, we see continued energetic butleadership by Ycl'tsin as critical. No other regime is likely to be as committed to rapid marketization as the present Yel'tsin/GaydarOver the longer term, however, the mark of success forwillecrease in Yd'tsin's role: the emergence of other national leaders committed to similar goals, the growth of political organizations that can mobilize support for such leaders, and developmentroperty-owning class that is the foundationluralistic
unprecedented nature of the revolution transforming Russia, the number and complexity of the variables involved, and Russia's ensuing special vulnerability to wildcard events reduces our estimative confidence.
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Yet lhe implications of the different paths for the UnitedcMIYri profound. If Russia movesositive direction, the United Statesgreatly in terms of our own security, Eurasian regional stability,
and global issues, althoughemocratic Russia may take actions toward iu ethnic minorities or neighbors that undermine regional stability and conflict sharply with US aims. Bul. if Russia moves toward stagnation or dictatorship, the costs to the United States in having to cope wilh new security problems, regional instability, enhanced ecological dangers, and potential economic catastrophe in Russia will be enormous.!
Discussion
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collapse of the Communist political oider, disin-legiation of the command economy, andof the Soviet empire confront Russia wiih social and psychological challenges unprecedented inThey alsoathiberal political and economic order never enjoyed by Russia in the past. Will it take this path?|
Where Russia Stands Today
The Russian people have decisively rejectedrule andesireree society. They have selected representatives in elections that were procedurally more or less fair and directly elected their president. The new officials have gained experience working in an increasingly free political environment, subjectree media. So far, political violence in Russia has been negligible. Advocates of authoritarianism fare poorly in opinion polls and elections. |
Nevertheless, Russiaong way to go before it attains stable democracyunctioning market economy. The strong control exercised by the old Communist political elite (thever the nomination of candidates0 damaged the legitimacy of the new parliament and elective local government organs. Tbe selection of leaders and the processes of government arc not yet anchoredeveloped system of competitive, broadly basedparlies. Administration at all levels is extremely weak. There is no agreed separation of powers or division of functions at any level. The allocation of power between the center and the regions is sharply contested, and local power is often concentrated in the hands of prcsidcntially appointed representatives. The style of decisionmaking often deviates fromideals. The entire process of government is not yet rootedeveloped civil society, not conslilu-lionalized, and not constrained by an effectiveEffective parliamentary, legal, and executive constraints on iniernaUecurily oreans have not yet been established. I
Defining Terms
"Democracy" combines the right of citizens to
limited
lions, and rule of law that limitsguarantees freedom of speech: and protects the person, properly, end civil lights of iheihrough an indepemieni judiciary and other protectivemaikeillows private ownership andreeprice mechanism,apredoriiinant."
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commercialized; il is still supported by subsidies. Commercialization and privatization in other sectors have been controlled and often stifled by localFraud and corruption arc widespread in this "nomenklaturaoreover, individual members of the police, security, and intelligence services are deeply involved in the process ofslate assets. Entrepreneurshipwith somelinked by the publiconvertible currency .si ill lies ahead. Numerous obstacles and exactions confront Western companies seeking business opportunities. Allface capricious and conflicting regulation of commerce. Hi^H
Some Klements of Certainty
's evolution.
In the next year or so, tensions are bound to increase significantly, as unemployment grows andevokes bitter Quarrels over social justice.pressures will be brought to bear on any Russian Government to adopt inflationary policies and slow the process of economic restructuring. Nationalism of various stripes will gain momentum. Factors of chance, the sequencing of events, and personality will impact disproportionately uponverall, the situation will remain unstat
Ycl'tsin will be hard put to maintain power and authority in the face of the population's exhausting struggleormal existence. Russia will noi be spared the psychological "post-totalitarianstill widely noted in Eastern Europe. The rule of law will come slowly. Institutionalization ofonly codification, but routineby therequire lime.|
Yet. reversion to the previous order is not possible. The Communist alternative is discredited. Acommand economy cannot be restored. The need to move toward some kind of market economy is broadly accepted in principle. Restoration of aempire of former Soviet republics is beyond Russia's miliiary or political capabilities, although restoration of control over subregions might be poss
Acceptance by the Russian population and most elites of the requirements of marketizatiorj is relatively weaker lhan their acceptance of the basic elements of democratization. As in Eastern Europe, politicalwill be under growing pressure to slow the pace of reform and sacrifice budgetary stringency to maintain production, sustain employment, and shore up the social safetyumber of Russian economists who arc committed to market reforms arehighly critical of the path specified by IMF guidelines. Overall, we believe no other regime is likely to be as committed to rapid marketization as the present Yel'tsin/Gaydar government. Mostdo not see the combination of dictatorship and literal marketizationive option: there is no visible replacement elite or leader with this position, and itase of social support. Theseunderpin our identification of the type and character of paths Russia might follow in this period: democratization and marketization; stagnation and possible fragmentation; and dictatorship j
Pu'h A: Democratization and Marketization. Even under the most favorable conditions, Russia will not achieve consolidated democracy and maturewithin the space of four years. The system that develops will have unique Russian characteristics. In the near term, at least, economic difficulties are going to get worse. But in this path we see more or less successful continuation of present positive trends, notwithstanding inevitable setbacks. Inflation, while high by current Western standards, will not be out of control. There will be real progress in democratically privatizing trade, services, and agriculture and at least some progress in privatizing industry. There will be no significant return to price, wage, and other forms of direct government management of theCommercial law will begin toeality. And Western investment will gradually increase. Maintenance of this path will most likely require the strengthening of executive authority. Civilian rule will persist, the principle of elected government will be observed, and ethno-regional centrifugal forces will largely be kept under control. I
Paths of Dcttlopmrnt
Over the next four years, lhe needs of democratization will conflict wilh tbe imperatives of maiketization.
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B: Stagnation and Possible Fragmentation. This path involves deadlock or failure in solving economic problems, which feeds back into and intensitiesproblems thai might otherwise move lowardBudget deficits return to1 level ofercent or more of GDP, threatening hyperinflation. The economic decline accelerates. There is littleprogress in com met cia tiring indusiry and agriculture or overcoming economic monopolies.cecum mostlyildcat fashion or ihrough nomenklatura iiggiandizemcni. Thesedeter all bul the matt inircpid foreign investors. Politically, no effectiveegotiated over conflict between parliament and president or between the center and the localities. The governments ability to implement policy is minimal. Law enforcement declines, and crime continues lo mount. Centralover the Russian provinces begins toSome ethnic units and regions assert outright indcpetidcnce. If this trend continues, it leads to frag mental ion of ihc couniry. Local rule thenlargely authoritarian, with strong elements of local warlordism Economic decisions arc madeby local political leaden, and interregional trade occurs essentiallyarter basis. Armed siruggle against ihc rump central stale, amonggroupings, and across republic borders is likely.
Path C: Dictatorship. Repressive rule Is instituted, from within or outside Ihe government, on Ihc grounds of combating anarchy and dismemberment of Russia. The new regime seeks Io legitimize itself under the banner of populist chauvinism. Under some conditions, it mayivilian face, but Ihe military itself could also Kite power outright. Under any conditions, support by the military and security forces is essential. The regime suppresses localliquidates independent trade unions, and outlaws other oppositional groups and political parties. In Iheir place, it tries lo build corporaiivisl structures "representing" different social sectors, lis aimightly controlled market economyarge state sector; strong monopoly domination; and much direct government control over prices, wages, allocation of supplies, and deliveries of goods j
A brief stalement of these alternatives obviously oversimplifies complex possibilities. We assume strong crosscurrents among (he impulses generating these paths. Transitions from one path to another are possible, even within our four-year time frame.invites dictatorship. And dictatorship could fail and girt way to renewed democratization)
Key Variables
our-year period, estimative judgments are very uncertain and musi be conditional; wc cannot simply extrapolate current trends The odds on the various possible paths Russia may lake dependumber of critical variables.!
Filling the National Identity Void. The collapse of Communism has profoundly disoriented the Russian public, raising Ihe question of how ils nationhood will be defined. The Yel'Uin team's initial attempt atew sense of nationalhas stressed common human values, individualism, and fusion with the civilized world almost totally ignores the ami-Western strain in Russian thinking. It is already under sharp attack. Engagement of Russia ia ihe rough-and-tumble of international affairs, conflict with other former Soviet republics, and its ownrestructuring are certain toominant new synthesis thai blends seme measure of Russianore collcc-tmst ethic, and defense of perceived national interestsange of possibilities is open here, runningiberal Russian nationalism that is fully compatible with democracyess likely xenophobic, messianic chauvinism ihat is not.j
Public Opposition to tke Social Costt of Marketizm.
lion. Shortages of food, fuel, and other consumer necessities, rising unemployment, declining realand anger over corruption and increasingdisparities arc (he main factors ihat willpublic support for ihe steps needed to markelize ihe economy. While some of these conditions may stabilize or improve in the nexi year or so, some will
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worse. Major strikes and public unrest are highly likely. If local elections are held in2r national elections arc heldublicmay well be translatedurtherof parliamentary support for rapid reform.public anger may lead to prolonged industrial paralysis and social violence, which would directly threaten the emerging democratic order and continuation of liberal marketization.
Pursuit of an Effectire Economic Policy. We believe the Russian Government's macroeconomk policies are laying Ihe groundwork for necessary structural changes. But care must be taken toecline in production and employment in some sectors so sharp and rapid thai its destabilizing effects spin out of control. (Some outside specialists charge lhat Gay-dar's policies areecline in produeiion lhat is imposing dangerously heavy hardships on theFurther, price liberalization by itself will not automatically generate the structuralas the privatizationransitionarket
ertain range of discretion, the government has no choice but to balance social quiescence and lower unemployment against higher rates of inflation and weigh long-term stability of restructuring against the speed of current reformertainis possible and may prove to be necessary. These adjustments will almost certainly provoke disputes with ihe IMF and possibly private lc
There nevertheless are certain "red lines" beyond which tactical maneuvering will be self defeating: onion of controls on prices that have already been freed; on resourcereversal of the commitment to sharply cut military spending; onbudget deficit and money or credit expansion so great that they lead to runaway inflation; onfailure lothe privatization program; onerious retraction of freedoms alreadyand imposition of confiscatory taxation; and on foreign economicdisrupting raw material exports and Western collaboration required toinimal necessary level of food and other critical imports. These dimensions of economic
le]<ilVrs (Ul policy arc all highly interdependent. We believe, however, that tbe single greatest threat to pursuitiable economic policy will lie in pressures on the government from all quarters to increase deficit spending and credit expansion to the point ofthe government's capacity to maintainfinancial stabilityj
Implementation af Economic Restructuring. Tbe
phase of economic reform Russia is now entering requires legally enshrining tbe right lo privateextending private ownership of the means of productionajor scale; reconfiguring theindustrial and agricultural capitalwith this the entire pattern of employment; separating the social support apparatus from the workplace;ew system of wholesale trade within Russia and between Russia and the other former Soviet republics; and opening the economy to the world. Over the next year, unemployment will rise sharply, and in some regions it will reach dangerously high levels. In the best possible case, there arc bound to be enormous inertia and resistance in each area of structural reform. The conversion to civilianof defenseconstitutesarge proportion of Russia's manufacturinghuge economic and social problems. Dilemmas of an equal or greater magnitude exist in creating an economically effective agricultural sector. Disputes over equity and social justice will delay change. The prerequisites for market operation at the microlevcl are aot all infrom it,rightly fear the social consequences of rapid restructuring. And there are powerful vested interests in the status quo on lhe part of state sector managers, local officials, and tbe middle and older generations of the population at
The completion of Russia's economic restructuring will take many years.t is almost certainarge monopoly-ridden state industrial sector and major remnants of the collective farmingwill slill exist. The question is: what will be the trend of restructuring? Depending on how theproblem is handled, how privatization lakes
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place, how broadly the private sector begins lo develop in manufacturing, and other factors, wc sec rcslruc-turing moving in three possible directions: (I)ew sialism, with widcscale "nomenklaturamajor continuing subsidization of heavy and defense industry, and link increase inoward no coherent pattern;ore liberal mixed economy beginning lo show signs of competitiveness and genuine autonomy from Ibe state.
Maintaining Poliiieal Moderation. The struggle of organized political forces will greatly affect Russia's path of development. In general, we are not impressed by lhe current capacity of extremist forces on cither the "right" or "left" to overthrow the present political order. Elections, polls, and turnouts forhave shown that the public does not support radical extremism and is highly unlikely to voteascist regime. The still omnipresent formereliterake on changeource of policy sabotage that can significantly retard reform at the center and the regional level. Nonetheless, it is not homogeneous in its concerns, and many of itsare interested less in reversing the1 changes than in exploiting them to their own benefit
In our judgment, the most serious threat to successful pursuit of democratization and marketization lies not among extremists bul within the parliamentaryand some quarters of the government itself, in tendencies toward "populism" and nationalThe former represents an inclination todeficit spending and credit expansion. Tbe lattertriving io resolve differences with non-Russian communities in Russia or attempts to support Russian minorities in other former republics in ways that would violate the sovereignty of these republics and could be sustained only through force. To some cxtcnl both tendencies reflect pressures that elected officials feel from their constituents and their effort to adjust correspondingly. If populism gains lhe upper hand. Russia will move toward hyperinflation and political crisis. If national chauvinism becomes more pronounced, it is likely to prompt iheof threats or coercion against non-Russianregions In the Russian Republic and
against former republics of the USSR in ways that are likely to shift the balance of power in favor of groups hostile to liberal reform, distort the political agenda and distract tbe country's leadership (or evenhange innleash new inflation,Russia's external economic ties, and increase the danger of direct military intervention in Russian politics.^
Possible Military Revolt. Prevention of both military disintegration and military intervention in politics is an essential condition of democratization andin Russia. New civilian control mechanisms are still embryonic. Tbe Russian officer corps is frustrated and angry. It has become politicized to an unprecedented degree. The military could act in ways harmful to democratization and marketization. If their situation worsens, district-level military leaders could take unilateral action in sensitive areas like the Baltic states, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, or other borderland regions that couldrisis between Russia and other former Soviet republics. If the military's material welfare deteriorates further, individual units may increasingly ignore orders, seize supplies, form alliances with local leaders, or even take power locally. Most analysis believe that, under conditions of greater political and economic stress than exist today, elements of the military highmight overcome their internal divisions and fear of precipitating civil war and eitherivilian-led coup or try to seize power themselves. Some analysts think that erosion of military cohesion has already progressed too far totraightcoup. I
Presidential Leadership. Despite some decline in his popularity rating, Yel'tsin stillegitimacy that is unlikely to be matched by any other leader in the near future. His forceful leadership has been essential to progress so far in both democratization and economic reform. His willingness to compromise has alsoey ingredient of his success.1
Mosl analysis believe (hat, if Yel'tsin did leave Ihe scene, his successor- whether Ruiskoy or someone ebe- -would certainly have trouble ai ihc outset in pursuing asolicy on markeiiraiion as his and would be less able or willing lo effect ihe compromises required lo keep relations with ethnic minorities and the former republics on an even keel (sectartup period and somea successor might depending on when heoffice and ihestature and be able then io exercise strong presidential authority,
Yel'tsin is likely to be the President of Russia Ihrough ihe end of his icrmut ihe possibility that his tin-in could be cui shortealth crisis, assassination,oup cannoi be discounted.he stays in office, the question is: will he continue lo provide Ihe presidential leadership that is required for Russia io stay on ihc path of democratization and
n the event of Yel'lsin's departure from office,"ihrough illness or assassination. Russian lawto takeUnder ihe current"Constitution, if theie'sinoffice, aheKtlectionis to be.hree months. Currently, the only visiblefigure whomnecar iden d' aschance of succeeding Yel'tsinational election is the VicePresident. Aleksandr Rutskoy. Others suchAnaloliyr the leader of the Democratic Party of Rut-.Nikolay Traykin- might aspire to the Job and, under changed circumstances, win it. Otherwill arise over the per' fEstlmt
' There aie different views amongommitment to democracy, histo retort to coercion againstfttical opposition, and howine he ake toward autonomies or indeedan regions. All analysis etpecl thai he would subsidize unprintable enterprises lo limitreimpose some price controls,the interests of ihe military, and position himselflounch defender of the iitre>Mf$tjf ^former Soviei repub^7%
ear-term political crisis is brewing and will probably confront Yel'tsin. as resistance to his economic reform policies intensifies and attempts continue to narrow his presidential authority through passageew consiiluiion ihat would entrench parliamentary power. Hepresidential pany"abetter organized faction in parliament, but so far he is not moving seriously to create either. If he survives this crisis, which is probable, ii is likely nonetheless that,4 or so, rising unemployment, strikes, corruption, and crime
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have drainedood deal of his popularew analysts believe thai, ut some point in this process, Yel'uin might go beyond strongrule and embark on the pjih uf dictatorship. Most believe that the evidence concerning Yd'tsin'sis to the contrary and that, in any event, he would be highly unlikely to attempt to destroy the electoral foundation on which his own authority isplacing himself in the same untenable position once occupied by Gorbachev.^
Tke Capacity Tourrently, Russia is poorly governed. Improving this situation and creatingfor the rule of law depend, first of all. upon resolving conflict over whether Ihe country should adoptrrule and over what sort of regional devolution of power should occur. Mosl analysts believe lhat -under conditions of continued nomenklatura control of many localities, divisive ethnic and regional tendencies, andof economic progress on adoption andof extremely painfulpursuit of an effective markcii/aiion strategy will require, for the present at least, the adoptionystem of government embodying sirring executive authority at all levels HHH
So far, settlement of this conflict has been frustratedarliamentary battle over competing draftsewower struggle between lheand the presidency, and efforts by ethnic autonomous regions to expand their jurisdiction. Ycl'tsin has been attempting lo deal with thisby seeking compromise in the existingarena, but be now appears to be moving toward bypassing the parliamenteferendum oapower and thehigh-riskof directailed attempteferendum could well be lhe beginning of the end for the Yel'uin government Should Yel'uin win,hb tactics, it will remain unclear how- rapidly many other obstacles lo effective government can be""ajajajj
Centrifugal Forces. Developments as diverse as Ihe imposition of provincial and even ciiy "export"efforts to promote regional autonomy in Siberia and the Far Hast, and serious ethnic separatism in the
North Caucasus and Tatarstan pose an immediate problem of the govcrnabitity of Russiaotential ihreal to the territorial integrily of lhe country. There has been an important shift of taxing power to the localities. Moscow has made deals with individual provinces, granting various privileges andto pacify local discontent with the center, panly to relieve the central budget ofspending obligations, but alsoyproducteliberate effort to dismantle tbe highly centralized Soviet state economic apparatus. The net result has been weakened central
Will this trend continue? Regional separatisma threat io Russian stability over ihe next few years. There are indeed similarities between tbe USSR's disintegration and patterns now evidentRussia: tbe ethnic diversity, economic grievances, the escalating "sovereignty" demands, the removal of the glue provided by lhe Communist Party, lhe breakdown of central power levers, the successful defiance of the center by the localities, and Ihe problematic effectiveness of either negotiation orin stabilizing the situation. In some cases, concessions have simply whetted the appetite of tbe ethnic and other regions for more and more autonomy up to independence. Nevertheless, tbe Russianhas key political advantages that the old Soviet leadership lacked: the weight of ethnic Russians in the population and Ibeir close identification with the Russian state; the limited aims of most non-Russian groups; possible solution to the struggles overjurisdiction; and the physical, economic, anddependency of almost all regions on Russia. So long as stagnation at the center can be avoided, die problem of ccnirifugalism can be effectivelyif perhaps never fullyapse into stagnation at the center, however, could open the door
Relations With Former Soviet Republics. Theof large Russian minority populations in the other former Soviet republics, the Russian military presence in the Baltic slates and elsewhere, emerging territorial claims, the dividing up of military and
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assets, lhe formation of national armies,of economic interest, and the weight of past ethnic grievances nose the problem oferious worsening of relations between Russia and the other newssssssssS
Although many permutations in relations between Russia and the other former Soviet republics are possible, we believe the key factor impacting on Russia's prospects for dcmociati/ation andover the next four years will be the degree and severity of armed confrontation and violence-provoked by Russia or by another republic The character of what is likely to be continuing conflict with Ukraine is central in this respect.
Thereossibility of problems wilh Russianin Central Asia, lhe Caucasus, the Baltic states, and Moldova degcnerutlng tooint as to invite Russian intervention as well as an accelerated flow of refugees to Russia. Similarly, economic relations among members of the Commonwealth ofStates (CIS) could break down further. But we do not think cither process would be so pronounced as to undermine reform in Russia or the authority of the current
Wc think therereater risk of relations between Russia and Ukraine deteriorating sharply over key issues such as the Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet and other military assets, and the division of old Union properties. However, wc doubt thai an initial skirmish between Ukrainian and Russian forces over, say, the Black Sea Fleet or Crimea would growarge-scale armed conflict: lhe lenders hips of both counlries recognize this would jeopardize their domestic reform programs; neither side's militaries are positioned or eager to conduct hostilities against the other; and the lack of deep-'ciled religious or ethnic animosities between Russians and Ukrainians make it doubtful that popular supportonflict could be sustained. Consequently, wc believe lhat Russian-Ukrainiancan be keptevel that docs aot doom reform.
ki-libcd of Dritcrrat Paths
Our review of critical variables reveals several areas in which we can lean towardajority in
Points of Controversy
The gapoptimistic andssessments of Russia's future over four years is much broaderpecialists than it is within the tplelli. Community. 1S0 observers believe. Rut. have an easy time of it. Some academicsmore.confident than we are that'pluralism has already developed strong roots in Russia. But ther academics think that:
therapy in Russiaecipe forer and the Russian Governmentchancesreventing economic chaos are low.
' Tke Russian population has reached its Unit of deprivationeady to revolt
The ihwu.es of elhno-territorial frjgrnenla-Item af tke Russian Republic are high
chancesilitary coup are also high. These tier's art not shared by the Intelligence Community. During discussions of thisby the Community, few Issues arose that polarizedandful of analysts; Uevcd'hat Yel'tiin might eventually feelelted by adverse circumstances to try to exert dictatorial power. There was. also disagreement over whether the Russian Government would under some conditions Intervene with physical
force to stop secession by minority regions or
territories.
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same lime to prevent further sitwp declines in production and cushion the effects of unemployment and other forms of social dislocation We believe that, if the Russian government manages its policywisely and is not suddenly burdened with tbe sort of major economic costs that could spring from new Chernobyl'-type disasters, the problems in achieving these objectives are not insuperable. The government will constantly face the quandary or how much it can deviate fiorn IMF standards and yet get support, but its policies should still allow the country to move
Politically, the government needs to
Workistribution of institutional power that preserves democratic processes while strengthening executive authority to carry through painful reforms.
Keep strikes and social violenceinimum.
Prevent military disintegration or revolt.
Avoid the political temptations of extreme populism or chauvinism.
Contain peacefully pressures for regional aad ethnic separatism.
Present relations wiihothcr former Soviet republics from turning violent |
Russian society must also conlinue to developiberal democratic direction. Entreprcncurship must grow, democratic institutions must be strengthened, and the end of the empire must be|
These are formidable but not irnprwsibkPiblK endurance of adversity so faropefulonstitutional consensus may emerge, stabilizing the separation of powers and allocation of government functions, whileignificant devolution of power to the localities and probable side deals between Russia and several recalcitrant autonomous republics. Mostbelieve the chances are good lhat the creationussian ministry of defense and Russian army and steps by ihe government to improve military welfare will gradually strengthen civilian control and reduce ibe likelihood of ciuacoosutitiorial action by ihe military. Whether chauvinistic tendencies become stronger in Ruwun policy ij problematic, wc think the
dominant trend will be the consolidation of anoflimpcralistic sense of Russian nationalism,currents could be stimulated bythe activities ofconflicts between lhe latter and theirA majority of analysts think thatand the interests of roost incumbent n tip* in itabiln. " icr.-
opmcnt of peaceful rcliijoos between Russia and other republics, but the conflicts tbat do exist arouse intense passions and con escape coniiol by thegovern men Is.
Western polky canignificant role indemocratization and mnrkctifalton. Economic and technicalentral; but ihe West can help in many other ways by recognizing that the liberal, democratic ethos that can develop in Russia will be different from our own, being sensitive to the potential for misinterpretation or misuse of Western military, intelligence, political, or economic actions by national lit extremists, strengthening the hand of mod-crates in the military and the pursuit of military reform; encouraging ibe observance of human rights inside thetk discouraging outside support of secessionist elements: and fostering conciliation in conflicts between Russia and other former Soviet republics, first of all Ukraine.l
Of all the factors that can increase the chances of Russian pursuit of democratization and maikciizatkm over the near term, noneroader range of variables lhan lhe provision of strong bul conciliatory leadership by the Russian President. This factor il especially important over the next six toonths, when Russia'1 future political system will still be jelling and social instability will be deepening.ood ckaocc lhat, even though hb authority may wane. Ycl'tsin will be able to meet the political challenges tlut confront him and offer suchin this period. Over the longer term, however, tbe mark of success for democratization willecrease in his or any leader's personal role, reflected in the insiiiulionali/.nion of Ihe presidency, the emergence
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of other national leaders committed lo tbe same goals, the development of political organizations that can mobilize support for such leaders, and the growthroperty-owning class that is the foundationluralistic system. If Yel'tsin continues to provide strong presidential leadership, most analysts think the chances are slightly better than even tbat Russia will stick to this path. Absent suchhey believe the chances would decline sharply.
The Likelihood af Slag nation and Fragmentation.
Most analysts believe that stagnation ia likely to be the outcome if the Russian political process rejects strong executive authority and populism undercuts the Gaydar line in economic policy. They think tbe chances of these developments occurring are about
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Most analysts agreereakup of the Russian Republic could occur if the downward economic spiral produces sudden and massive unemploymenturther sharp drop in living standards, if the political struggle between reformers and traditionalistsstill more closely aligned with the pattern of ethno-tcrritorial conflict, and if the militaryalong regionalhighly possible under stagnation. Analysts disagree over whether, before these conditions permit fragmentation, Moscow would attempt to save the day by intervening with force. Provided it did so and only isolated regions were involved, democracy in the countryhole would probably survive in some form or other. But terrorism and guerilla warfare would become highlycomplicating Russian politics, further impedingand economic reform, and probably impacting negatively on Russia's foreign policy and relations with the southern-tier CIS states.
The Likelihood of Dictatorship. We thinkof the present orderictatorship today would most likely occuroup and judge the chances for this in the short term to be low. If Russia were beset by mass violence, anarchy, actualor war, however, dictatorship could come about with popular acceptance. Civilianled, say. by Rutskoy and drawing on the military-industrialmost likely initiateeizure of power. Any dictatorship could
exist only on the sufferance of the militarya lesserthe security forces. As we have argued above, most analysts believe the chances of military revolt arc currently low and declining. They therefore think that the oddsilitary-driven switch to dictatorship are low. If the presidency ceased to provide strong leadership and stagnation set in, the chances for dictatorship would increase
Indicators of Progress. Key indicators of progress will be consolidationealthy, nonextremist Russian patriotism; persistenceecree of popular political patience and absence of paralyzing strikes ormass unrest; cessation, or dramatic slowing, of the decline in economic production and the standard of living; avoidance by the government of finandal dcstabilizatktn and achievement of at least gradual success in effecting commercialization, privatization, and competition; achievement of consensus on new constitutional arrangements that regulate conflict over the form of rule and federalism; success in institutionalizing civilian control structures over the military and in addressing their social and material concerns; and the exercise by Russian elites of self-control in conflicts with the former Soviet republics that could undermine Russia's own capacity to pursue reform, If. on tbe other hand, Russia begins to slide toward stagnation or worse, we would expect to sec an inability by the government to pushevere aggravation of the economic crisis and an attendant rise in social unrest, and the growth of centrifugal forces. |
Implications for the United States
Over the next four years, Russia will remain my unstable, presenting the United States with great uncertainties. Under tbe best conditions, there will be serious crises and turmoil between now
If Russia remainsemocratic track, this will be highly beneficial for the United States. It will strongly reinforce the gains we have already achieved in our own security, increase the likelihood of positive changes in other CIS countries, and enhance the
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Tot progress on Eurasian regional and global issues. Bul Yel'tsin and his foreign policy team are already being accused of slavishly following Western dictates.kinoctatk future Russian |ov-crn-ment mil increasingly define its national interestsore independent manner and bargain harder in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Russianare noi identical with those of the United Slates, andemocratic Russia may take actions toward ils ethnic minoriticsor neighbors that conflict sharply with US |
If Russia stagnates, there will be more likelihood of violations of human rights, greater vulnerability to chauvinist demagogy,igher probability of intensified conflict with neighbors. Russia will be much less able tooherent foreign policy. Its capacity io deal with nuclear weapon problems and potential sources of ecological catastrophe willIls demands for Western assistance willincrease, while its capacity to work out its own problems will decline sharply. If stagnation leads in turn to fragmentation, Moscow could lose control over some nuclear weapons. The threat of new ecological disasters- especially at nuclear powerrise significantly. Possible civil svir. cross-bordereconomic catastrophe, and widespread hunger will confront the United States witha broad array of difficult, no-win policy options.|
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Russia will not regain its statuslobal power under dictatorship. Becauseegime is unlikely to sahe its underlying economic problems, it will remain basically unstable and willimited life expectancy. Nevertheless, it will probably pose regico-al threats andore menacing strategic nuclear posture toward tbe United Slates.isxfy ihat it will be more inclined lo resort to shows of force or subversion against its neighbors, such as Ukraine. It may seize territory that it considers to beits own. such as norihern Kazakhstan. And it may engage in oiher military activities along iu periphery that would generate major regional instability and
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Original document.
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