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Proliferation Watch
2
Summary
is lhe fiftheries of monthly reports that summarize Chinese proliferation behavior. In addition to keeping track of Chinese negotiations, contracts, and deliveries of equipment and technologies of
proliferation concern, the series will discuss internal Chinese debate on proliferation issues and Beijing's
response loVS and international pressure to moderate
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Officers of the Chinese National Defenseofficer think taruV-criuciied US arms
March, claitning thatTO'ting
Washington's dominant position in the world arms market. The Chinese objected to their treatment under the MTCR, alleging that countries that joined the regime after its establishment were "not on the same footing" as original members. The officers' remarks echo past public statements that China-which was not invited to participate in the formulation of the regime-should not be expected to abide by MTCR guidelines.
Isrsel-whichhina Great Wall Industrial Corporation (CGW1C) Vice President-discussed launching Israeli sstellites on Chinese rockets and offered to cooperate with Tel Aviv on space and satellite technologies. Israel's indigenous launch vehicle development efforts suggest Tel Aviv is committed to launching Israeli satellites aboard its own vehicles, although the Chinese launch vehicles can carry larger and heavier payloads. The Chinese also may have discussed transferring launch vehicle technology to supplement
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erman offer lo send an inspection team
to assess safety standards at China's recently inaugurated Qinshan nuclear power plant, according io Hong Kong press accounts. The refusal came one day after China and Germanyuclear cooperation and safety agreement whichegal framework for ihe exchange of nuclear technical information, according to press reports. Beijing may have feared safety measures in place at Qinshan would not measure up to Germany's scrutiny, resulting In bad publicity for China's nuclear program ^HJ
April
indicates that Philippe Thictaud, frffll^WSiistry of Foreign Affairs Director for Nuclear. Space, and Non-Proliferation Affairs, suggested that suppliers of nuclear equipment for Chinese reactor projects exchange information and coordinate their actions to monitor Chinese orders, and noted the importance of checking with all potential suppliers. Tbiebaud's remarks were promptedhinese order from France of equipment for the Pakistani reactor project, which the French noteduplicate of the Qinshan reactor in China for which Fianceomponent supplier. Paris refused to approve the export of the components for the Pakistani reactor because Islamabad does not accept full-scope safeguards on its nuclear programj
TOP SBCRETB
China, along with Pakistan, Algeria, andthree primary clients for sensitive technology purchases-tried to create an internationalized verification system at shaip variance from mainstream views. In what appears to be an effort to allow accused slates to hide evidencehemical weapons production activities that violate the challenge inspection regime, the four states argued challenging states ptovide evidence and full information, including the location of the site of inquiry, to tbehallenged state as soon ai the challenge is made. |
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