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is angry with the President for negotiating with the insurgents and agreeing to their participationew policepossible schisms within the ruling ARENA party as its dying patriarch Roberto D'Aubuisson passes from the scene, will make it especially tough for Cristianl toational strategy for reconstruction and reform during his last two years in office, in this regard, he will rely heavily on international assistance to ensure the success of the peace process.
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Prelude to Peace
Wo believe the guerrillas' dialogue strategy evolved bypproach to an earnest guest for peace because the political context for continuing the military struggle had shifted dramatically. Apart from the failure of9 "finalhichundamental setback.to FKLN plans to break tho military stalemate and regain the strategic momentum, othor factors beyond the control of the guerrillas hastened their decision to and the war. Principal among these factors were:
o The unexpected ouster of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua via free elections in0 and increasing involvement by the United states, the UN, key Latin American governments, and the European Community in supporting efforts by all five democratically elected governments in Central America to end regional strife.
o The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the increasing
isolation of Cuba, resultingoss to the guerrillas of important material, financial, and political assistance from foreign organizations and governments.
o The inability of the guerrillas seriously to disrupt any of the seven national elections of the past decade, resulting in both the current mandate of the right-wing ARENA party and the success of Democraticoalition of three leftist parties loosely allied with the FMLN that now controlsercent of the seats in the National Assemblyice presidential slot, j
Preparing for "Armed Peace1'
As hostilities wind down, the guerrillas are attempting to implement what they refer to as an "armed peace" by reserving war
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Potential obstacles to fhlm strategy
International supervision of the recent peaceproperlycomplicate the FMLW's plan toow mass movementhadow army of veteran combatants with access to weapons stockpiles. Many hundreds of UN and other international observers are charged with overseeing the peace process and uncovering violations by either side. The agreement callsomplete inventory of insurgent arms and personnel and their total destruction and demobilization, respectively, by the end of October. FMLN forces during the ceasefire are obligated to assemble in specific zones, which should limit the movement of insurgents within the country until they are disarmed and demobilized. Moreover, guerrilla storage sites habitually offer poor protection against moisture and corrosion, suggesting that many hidden weapons, munitions, and explosives likely will become degraded during the Hay to November rainy season. ia^1al_
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politically, the fmln's goals may also be out of reach. to the degree that guerrilla senior commanders overestimated for so many years their ability toeneral insurrection, so too might they be overconfident of their ability to rally the masses
ecade of survivalilitary alliance, its highest profile leaders can maintain political unity among their five disparate factions and assorted front groups. although insurgent spokesmen insist their movement will continue to function in mainstream politicsonolithic party, the fmln may find it difficult to accommodate the long-held ambitions of notorious revolutionaries who espouse diverse ideologies and
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implications for tho Govornmunt
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By guaranteeing the guerrillas their peacetime security and unfettered participation in elections, Cristiani now faces the dilemma of how to protect the constitutional rights of theeft without undermining the interests of his own party or losing control over national events. The President is under fire from elements in the armed forces and ultra-rightist groups for having agreedole for "terrorists" in the new police force and for letting much of the oversight for dismantling insurgent forces fall to outside observers. He probably calculates that such pressure will increase if any portion of theesists full compliance with the disarmament and demobilization timetables, if renegade elements continue fighting or resort to banditry. Although UN monitors can be expected to help control the level residual violence as the peace process is implemented, their presence is unlikely to satisfy many of the President's detractors on the right.
Public reaction to poTWTceTTviolence and sabotage, whether initiated by the right or left, probably will press cristiani to move more decisively against suspects than he might have when war conditions prevailed. At the same time, however, he probably also is mindful that official use of force in maintaining law and order risks being construed by some observers as violations of human rights and civil liberties.
In our view, Cristiani will depend heavily on foreign governments and groupsafety net for the peace process and, ultimately, the success of his administration. In this regard, the President probably will work closely with outside observers investigating compliance by the government in the hope that they will reciprocate by fully investigating reported violations on the part of the guerrillas. The administration also might benefit from current moves by Honduras to secure international monitors along its mountainous border with El Salvador, where some FMIW troops and weapons arsenals might be positioned to ride out the demobilization period. San Salvador, however, would look unfavorably on any attempts by Honduras to force repatriation of additional Salvadoran emigres.
We doubt that disarmed and demobilized insurgents can long maintain exclusive control over their former territorial enclaves
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should the government move appropriately to secure its administrative authority over outlying towns and villages, particularly in the eastern portion of the country. Rapid implementation of general amnesty for guerrillaat alleviating fear and distrust of theestablishmentivilian police force in conflictive zones, for example, would help reintegrate once isolated and embattled communities into the political and economic mainstream. Moreover, programs carried out in former guerrilla zones by domestic and international developmental and humanitarian agencies, combined with local campaigning by rival political parties, likely would open up the FMLN's "strategic rearguard" to new people and ideas, which would include competing socialconomic interests, and political pluralism, flllllll^
Cristiani apparently believes his government and ruling arena party can meet the challenges likely to be raised by the far left as it seeks new advantages and leverage in the peacetime environment. While Cristiani supporters may be confident they can check the political ambitions of the FKLN, they probably are concerned that tensions within the ARENA party could rise as patriarchal leader Roberto D'Aubuisson nears death and hardline traditionalists complicate the President's efforts at reconstruction and reform, J
speculative Outlook for the fmlm
Preliminary indications are that FMLM leaders remain divided over the implications of their failed insurgency. According to Embassy and other reporting, some leftists view theears of civil war as partontinuing struggle, first launched in2 by Communist martyr Parabundo Marti. They see opportunities for promoting their left-wing agendaeacetime environment, unhindered by repressive controls once exercised by military authoritarians and civilian oligarchs. ignificant number of surviving cadre in thehundred, in ourveteran activists who entered guerrilla ranks duringfter having participated in radical student, religious, labor, and peasant groups organized against the Establishment. Trained in revolutionary doctrine and tactics in Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Libya, and the former Soviet Bloc, at least some of these individuals will attempt to rebuild militant urban and rural front groups reminiscentecade ago.
Other FMLN leaders,to capitalize on their newly won legitimacy under the terms of the peacelikely toore pragmatic approach to politics. They probably will shy away from confrontationalleast in the nearan effort to persuade mainstream opposition parties to work in tandem with leftist efforts to dethrone the ruling ARENA government. Longstanding ideological discord
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between moderates and hardliners in the pmln, both within and among the various factions, likely will be exacerbated by disputes over tactics and porsonalist rivalries over control of fhln resources. should fhln unity fail as the electoral contest heats up, leftist prospects for securing renewed international funding, spurring domestic recruitment, andiable coalition with other mainstream parties will be greatly diminished.
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