AtPPC'VEiy TOP ffFLBAS! DATE: .IWIOOl
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:
The'Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence orgoniiatiom of the Deport-ment* ef State. Defense, the Army, (he Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint
Concurring:
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief ol Staff lor Intelligence, Department of tho Army Assinant Chief of Naval Operationsopartmenl of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff Director of the Notional Security Agency
Dissenting.-
Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of Siote Abstaining:
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative 'o the USIB, ond theFederal Bureau ol Investigation, lhe subject being outside of
CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN US COURSES IN LAOS
THE PROBLEM'
To estimate certain reactions if the US, in order to put pressure on General Phoumi and Premier Boun Oumoalition government, halted financial andaid to the Laotian Government.
' The Director ot Intelligence and Research, Department of State, dissents from this entire estimate. Tne reasons (or his dissent are set forth at the end of the estimate.
the estiaaate
members of the Hoynlhe armed forces, and the civil service, as well as moot of the people in urban areas, are uware that Laos has become heavily dependent upon US assistance andany of them liave come to take continued US atd for granted. Theof US economic and logistics support would cause considerable psychological shock among these key Laotian elements. Though some of the top government leaders would realize that the US action was designed solely to bring pressure upon Phouml, mostof Uie government and military sen-Ice would probably conclude tliat the US had abandoned Laos In either case, the effectotian self-confidence and morale wouldepressing one.
The financial Impact of the US move would not be Immediate. The government has enough foreign currency reserves inTokyo, and New York banks to meet Its basic ojwralloiial needs for perhaps six months or so. Moreover, the governmentillionequivalent ofillionunbackedin Savannakhet vaults which It would not be averse to Issuing If the need arose. Upon announcement of the termination of US financial support, the RIXJ would probably take additional steps to economize foreign currency reserves and Impose controls over the salaries of government and civil service employees. The reaction of these employees would no doubt be dismay and anger and there wouldhance of anti-USIn urban areas, especially Vientiane Although some might defect or return to the rural areas, the majority would probablyIn the cities, hopefulenewal of US aid to the present government orew regime under Souvanna. In the countryside.
the effect of the US denial of monetary aid on the predominantly barter economy would be negligible.
If at the same time the US were toits logistics support of the Royal Laotian Army, current stockpiles of arms, ammunition, POL, and other materiel would enable the FAR to maintain Its present positions and level of operationsaximum of aboutays, though exhaustion of individual unit stockpiles and difficulties of bringing upsupplies from central supply depots would in many cases severely shorten this period. Removal of the MAAG White Star teams wouldetrimental effect on the morale of the FAR and would impair theeffectiveness of units In front line areas. Believing that Phoumi's source of power was gone, the more opportunistic of the FARmight seek other arrangements, including accommodation with Souvanna Phouma's forces or with the Pathet Lao. If military assistance, to include withdrawal of MAAG, were withheld for moreew weeks, the combat capabilities of the FAR would so decline as to precludeubsequent resumption of aid.these conditions, if the Communist forces now in Laos should decide to take over the country by military means, they would meet with only token resistance. Phoumi's men in the field would almost certainly scatter and seek escape through surrender, defection,eturn to their native villages, and such Meo resistance as continued would be for the sole objective of survival.
ThePeiping,and the Pathetconsider that the US action had enhanced their chances of taking over Laos either by military action or by political means. Their choice of action
would be greatly influenced by whether Ihey believed thai the US action represented an abandonment of Laos, or an attempt to force Phoumi tooalition governmentSouvanna. Moscow would wish tothe appearance of seeking in good faith the establishmentoalition. Peiping and Hanoi would be more sympathetic to an armed takeover, since they would probably estimate that later US military intervention would be less likely than does the USSR. On balance, we believe that the Communists would not Immediatelyilitaryof Laos.
The Communist forces In Laos would, in any event, continue their recent buildup of military strength and equipment andmilitary pressure on the government forces. They would probably increase that pressure from time to time to improve their political leverage or local military positions. The more extensive the demoralization of the RLG and PAR proved to be, the more the Communists would use their opportunities to induce the defection or neutralization of RLG military and governmental figures. They would expect in this fashion to insure tliot the "coalition" government that eventually emerged wouldore leftist complexion.
The withdrawal of US financial andaid would probably not persuade Phoumi and Boun Oum to participateouvanna coalition government. Both of them regard Souvanna with suspicion and appear to think that any coalition headed by him wouldgive wayommunist-dominated government. Phoumi may believe that US pressure on him will not be carried to the point of seriously weakening his armedincere Thai eflort to persuade him toouvanna government might be successful, bul probably not. He would almost certainly not accept any role unless It gaveominant position with respect to the armed forces or police. If Phoumi were to acquiesce in oroalition government In anyIt is doubtful that he would do so with any serious intent of cooperating withRather he would seek to undercut Souvanna and his followers.
In past times of crisis the King hasto accept responsibility or to takeaction. The termination of US military and financial old would Increase the chances that the King might undertake to form ahimself. We believe, however, that he would remain passive, seeking to avoid compromising the Crown's position of being "above politics."
There wouldumber of other courses of action open to Phoumi and Boun Oum, but It is difficult to estimate with confidence the odds on any one of them. The most likely would seem to be for Phoumi and Boun Oum to preserve the existing government andthe loyalty and level of effectiveness of its armed forces as long as possible, hoping that the US would in time renew its support and aid. Recent indications ore that thealtitude of Phoumi has gainedsupport among lhe more vocalof the RLG and probably encouraged him to oppose any compromise with
Another possibility would be for Phoumi and Boun Oum to leave Laos for Thailand or Europe In self-imposed exile. If either or both were to retire from theewand military figures with strong antl-Souvanna sentiments would be likely to follow suit. However, most of the RLG wouldstay behind and seek accommodation with Souvanna. The FAR commander In chief would seek to assert control over and maintain discipline in the army, bul units In the field would become increasinglyand ineffective. The King, In spite of his dlstrusl of Souvanna, would probablyin Laos and in due course accept agovernment.
t is also possible that Phouml and Boun Oum might decide upon some form of drastic military action ns the only way to dramatize their position and shock the USenewal of support. For example. Phouml might seek to gather Ills forces at Savannakhet andthe partition of the country Phoumi might also move wliatevcr forces he could muster to the Sayaboury and Paksc regions on the west side of the Mekong River and seek to create safe havens from which to launch some later military action. In the caseartition attempt, thereharp military reaction byforces, and Phoumi's forces would almost certainly be defeated and scattered or captured. The enemy's reactionove across the Mekong to the Sayaboury and Paksc regions would probably be lessbut eventual action against these and any other "rebel pockets" would be almost certain.ast resort, Phouml and Boun Oum might go to the hills and try to carryuerrilla war against any Laotianwhich might be set up. but we believe this to be quite unlikely.
1 The following is the dissent of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State:
Tbe Director o( Intelligence and Research. De ;of State. btlievea tbat lb* statement of Ce problem has molted In an oTcrly-sunpuned coo-narration ot the effects on Oeneral Phouml and Premier Boun Oum of eeasaUon of US financial and military aid He dorm not believe that the actual eomplrxlUes of tho total context In which Phouml and Boun Oum must art permit ua to have any aa iurance in tne sort of net Judgment expressed Inf Una estimate where It Is staled tbat the "withdrawal of Ufl financial and military aid would probably not persuade Phouml and Boun Oum to parllpleaUtouvanna coallUon
The esUmate apparenUy addresses Itself only to an abrupt and total termination of US economic and mililary support rwithout noting that BOof US financial aid has been withheld since
February or assessing the impact thereon. The Uming, sequence, and correlaUon of various moves the US might make in the course ot withdrawing support, a* well as the bearing of pressures from other sources, should be taken Into account.
The estimate fails to assess Phoumi's IntcnUons, but Implies that he Is governed solely by Uie view lhat llie coalition government as presentlywould necessarily mean an earlytakeover. However. It Is entirely possible that he has deliberately overstatedouvanna Government in order to affect US policy. Thus bis stubbornness to dale might be attributedonviction that If heto hold out. the US would not dare to with, draw military assistance. On this point it hasincreasingly evident that the degree ofdetermination may be an Important if not critical factor, Phouml himself apparenUy believes that If he can hold out untU Souvanna retires from the field, he can then force the US to support him.atthana said as much to former President Auriol; Phoumi himself has made elear to USthat his objective ia to get rid of Souvanna.)
Other factors might also weigh onerious Thai effort to persuademost likely if the Thais believe the US Is determinedwould have considerable influence on Phouml. If the Pathet Lao remain relatively quiet for the next few months (as the Soviets have implied that they will, In private conversationsigh level) Phoumi's hopes for renewal of large-scale hostilities and for consequent US support of him would beIf on the other hand hostilities should re-sume at the InsUgauon either of Phouml or the Pathet Lao, the probability of further militaryfor the FAR must alsoactor for Phouml to weigh. This is particularly true since thehas personally warned Phouml through the Lao Ambassador that the Lao must not labor under tbe delusion that Uie US would send In forces to help the FAR if hostilities break out.
Phoumi's stubbornness might also be eroded by the cumulative effect of gradually worseningconditions in the clOes. and by concern that an alternate to him acceptable to both the US and the RLQ might step forward.
The Director of Intelligence and Research,of Slate, believes Uiat the complexities of the Laotian situation similarly roililalc against tho confident Judgment expressed Int the estimate: "If military assistance, to include withdrawal of MAAG, were withheld for moreew weeks, the combat capabillUes of the FAR
would so decline as to preclude their restorationubsequent resumption ofhis conclusionossibility which must be weighed in the light of another possibility: that Phouml's con-tinuod in Imminence may ItselfL-Kong Lc attack. The President has already warned Phoumi, through the Lao Ambassador, that the PL are stronger than the RLO force? and it hostilities are resumed Laos will be finished.
m summary, the Director of Intelligence andDepartment of State, feels that an estimate of Phouml's position, to be useful, should take fully Into account not merely the fact ot withdrawing financial and military aid, but the various possl-blliUes of collateral pressures, timing, and sequence, the correlation of moves which the US ought make; as well as the realistic and diminishing range of choices which Phoumi actually faces.
Original document.
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