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LBJandatory foWje
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIAAATE
The Situation and Prospects in British Guiana
director of central intelligence
Cortevrradfcy
united states intelligence board
as indicated ovsrltaf2
SEP7
The following intelligence' organizationsn the preparation of
this estimate/
The Centrol Intelligence Agency ond the intelligence orgoniiotioni ol thaol Slate, Defense, the Army, Ihe Navy, the Air Force, The Join)lha,
Concurring: .'.
Director of Intelligence and Research, Deportment of
efense Intelligence Agency
/
Assistant Chief ol Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army Assistant Chief of Naral Operationsepartment of the Navy Assistant Chiel of Staff, Intelligence, USAF Director for Intelligence, Joint StaffAssistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director of the Notional Security
The Atomic Energy Commission Repretenrotrv* to thehe subject being outside
of his jurisdiction.
'*V " .
Thlt moleriolip- motion^AffktmlQ the Notional Defense ol the United Slot**
within th* mcoT iB ot the* usc<fon*-miuion ora^gWkfi in ony manner tc op unauthorised pe**on ii prohibTted.
i
THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN BRITISH GUIANA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the short-term outlook for British Guiana, with particular reference to the political orientation of Jagan and his party, the likely outcome if new elections were to be held, and the nature of possible alternatives to the Jagan government.
CONCLUSIONS
Racial conflict is likely to continue to be the basic factor in the political situation in British Guiana. The two major political parties represent the nearly equal East Indian and Negro communities and party rivalry has increasingly takenacial character. The British, who havetabilizing influence, will almost certainly withdraw and grant independence not later thanince theyforesee strong adverse reactions with unpleasantconnotations if they try to extend the period of their authority in the colony. (Paras.)
Premier Cheddi Jagan and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) represent the East Indians, who are morethan the Negroes and who have been consolidated politically by the2 disturbances. Jagan and the PPP are likely to maintain control of the government, whether or not new elections are held. However, any oneumber of likely developments could precipitate another period of violence. S, IS)
PPP leadershiplear record ofand of Communist-line policies, but thenot show whether or to what extent they areCommunist control. We believe,ommunist, though the degree of Moscow'sis not yetagan government in theperiod would probablyolicy ofin international affairs, but would probably leanSoviet direction. Its associations with East andbe highly opportunistic and strongly influencedinterest in obtaining aid for British Guiana. Itswould be radically socialist and reformist. (Paras.
People's National Congresseds supportedarge proportion of thebut by almost no oneNC majoritylegislature, even with the support of the smallpartys unlikely under presentlyIf the PNC were to come to power itsprobably be leftist and neutralist, thoughradical and pro-Bloc than those of the
DISCUSSION
BACKGROUND
Forecade political life in British Guiana has been marked by the racial split between East Indians, who make up about half of the population, and Negroes,omewhat smaller proportion. The most powerful political force has been the People's Progressive Partyed by the government's East Indian Premier. Cheddi Jagan. The PPP derives its strength mainly from East Indians, most of whom live in the countryside, but also has found some support among the Negroes. In thehe PPP won aboutercent of the popular vote, therebyin theince the elections it has demonstrated considerable politicaland has failed to make headway againsi the enormous economic difficulties of the colony.
On the basis of available evidence, itbe determined whether or to what extent Jagan and other leading PPP figures arethe control of International communism. However, Jagan and many of his colleagues ln both the PPP and the government have long associated with and indeed shown afor persons and organizations identified with the Communist cause abroad. Aof them have traveled to the Sonet Bloc and to Cuba, where they haveariety of official and semiofficial contacts. Onthey have publicly espoused theline. Several of Jagan's associates In his party and cabinet have been more clearly identified as Communists than has he. For example. Ranjl Chandisingh the Minister of Labor, Health, and Housing, wasem-
ne constituency was setourt decisionesult of Irregularly and the PPP majority is.
ber of the British Communist Party, and Jagan's wife, Janet,ong record ofassociation. Jagan has shown himself to be highly susceptible to Influence by his advisers. In general, the pattern of behavior of the whole groupeep attraction to the Communist way.
Jagan's behavior can be Interpreted as thatational reformer of Marxistwho has been led by the assiduous efforts of Communists to see hope for his country In Communist programs and associations but who has not committed himself to thedisciplineigher CommunistAlternatively. It can be explained as thatonvinced Communist whorefrains from acknowledging his commitments and who seeks toeutralist posture in order to maximizefor Western aid, secure independence for British Guiana, and ward off WesternWe cannot read the evidence to give conclusive support for either of these two Interpretations. We believe, however, that Jaganommunist, though the degree of Moscow's control Is not yet clear.
The principal opposition party Is the People's National Congress (PNC) of L- Forbesegro whoadical reformer and who4 was one of Jagan'sin the PPP and an advocate ofmeasures ln government. The PNC Is supported by most of the colony's Negro population In the cities (including mostemployees) and Ln the bauxiteareas. Outside Negro ranks It hasno following, and among many middle class Negroes its support Is not firm. In1 election it polledercent of the vote and woneats ln the legislature. PNC policy has been largely that of opposing the PPP. What we can say of PNC policy If it
SECRE^KOFORN
toovernment must be based largely on Burnham's statements and on the content of his parly newspaper. The PNC in office would probablyorepolicy of domestic socialism than the PPP. Likewise, in the foreign field it would also be neutralist but somewhat less pro-Bloc than the PPP. Bumhameputation for opportunism and venality. His racist point of view, so evident In the past, forbodes instability and conflict during anyunder his leadership.
additional opposition party isForcehich seeks to beIt is based largely on the smallclass (including the Portuguesewhich fears that Jagan wouldthe countryommunistindependence. It won four seats Inelection. Had the UF not run. thehave won some of these seats butnot all. In any case It would nota majority.
II. FEBRUARY RIOTS
A tremendous Increase in the racial tension In British Oulana and in thefor conflict cameesulteek of strikes and riots which shook the capital city of Oeorgetown inhe immediate cause of the strikes was Premier Jagan's budget bill, but the riots were also rooted In the longstanding racial antagonism and In the dissatisfaction of many urban groups, notably public service employees and businessmen, with the policies of the PPP government. As the disturbances spread, they took on the charactertrugglethe Negro urban community and the East Indian Government and its rural
ParadoxicaJy, the February crisis strengthened Jagan by consolidating theof his East Indian followers. At the same time, It reduced his stature andhis prestigeational leader, His economic and financial problems are more acute now than before the riots. Hisis hard pressed to meet currentWhereas before the riots almostercent of the labor force was out of work, an even larger number are now unemployedesult of the destruction in Georgetown Jagan's plans for economic development have been set back, partly because he has been forced to trim his tax measures and partly because uncertainties about his country'sstability are inhibiting the flow ofpublic assistance, on which development is heavily dependent. The February events have discouraged foreign Investment."capital flight is in progress and foreign investors are doing no more than attending to existingood many city merchants. East Indians among them, areto cut and run rather than to stay and rebuild.
the other hand, the crisis alsoopposition with reduced prestige.leaders acted recklessly and in theto neutralize each other. Thosewhich are predominantly Negrowith the opposition parties,rank and file of the largest singleEast Indians, did not. Thererumors of dissension in the PPP andthat the opposition might try toof Jagan's legislators away fromsufficient defections to cause thedefeat of the Jagan government areprobable in the near futurecircumstances.
III. PROSPECTS
Bntish presenceheck onpolitical forces that seethe near the
'Brltlih foreign Investment In Oulana amounts to between MOOO million and Is mainly In sugar producuon. Canadian investment (about JW million) and US Investmentillion) Is mainly In bauxite and sugar.
surface In British Ouiana. British departure will be the preludeeriod of uncertainty and possibly of violence during which the country will be establishing its international orientation. Nevertheless, the British appear determined to get out. They are not anxious to continue to put money into British Ouiana, and they calculate that the present cost to them ofear would be Increasedillion per annum if they reLmposed direct government They assert Ln private that British Guiana is in the US. not the UK. sphere of interest and they probably consider that its future is not properly their problem, but one for the US. At the same tune,Is less inclined than ls the US to believe that communism will achieve dominance in the colony. Finally, it fears that to delayvery long would arouseIn many parts of the worldensitive issue.
The British may see fit to hold onime by postponing the2 conference, which was to have discussed plans and timing of independence Even if the conference is held on schedule, independence may beJagan has agreed to an investigation of the recent riotsommonwealthbut the the scope of the Inquiry is such that it is not likely to necessitate much delay. Independence might also be delayed by the failure of Jagan and opposition leaders to get togetherewote of no-confidence in the government could also hold up proceedings, but we believe that Jagan will move cautiously on matters of domestic policy to assure control of hisIn the legislature. In anyhowever, we do not anticipate that the British will delay much beyond the end
For any of the above reasons, the UK may find it desirable to hold new elections. New elections held on the same basis as were those In Augustthe same parties and same electoralprobablyagan government again, even in the faceNC-UF electoral coalition. The PNC isroportional representation system, under which it believes it could turn the PPP out, but the latter is unlikely toany form of proportional representation that would seriously prejudice its electoral chances.
After Independence Jagan is unlikely to be over tender about guarantees ofrights for the opposition. With the British mediator gone, he will probably seek to move toward consolidation of his control over the country. No subsequent election is likely to be as free as those that were held under the watchful eye of the British.
Nevertheless, Jagan will be under some restraints not to ride roughshod over the wishes of theas well as East Indian The size and potential strength of the Negro community were well demonstrated by the February riots, and Jagan wlU fear to bring the Negroes into the streets against him again. He is also aware that the rank and file of hisIndeed the East Indian community as anot Communist and may react against unpalatable Communist or socialist measures. Furthermore, he has the problem of developing and controllinge has apparently beena largely East Indian security force of some kind, but roust be aware of theimplict inove, especially since the existing police force ls principally made up of Negroes. Jagan's impetuousfor his own reform programs and the temptation to work through and for the East
'In addition toaan local police, the secuilty forces In the colony now Include aOuartJ of,ritish troops normally stationed near Ocorf eiown. andf those brought In at the Cme of the disorders Jagan hai threatened lo recruit his own police or toational army and In response Ihe British are proposing to enlarge the local police
forn
community may be moderated by the realization that, if the country is to be held together, important concessions must be made to the Negroes. Still, his recklessness and impulsiveness are notorious and could at any time overrule his judgment
IB. We do not believe that we can project our estimate very far beyond the period of independence. Jagan will almost certainly maintain his predominant position in the PPP, and can probably prevent an opposition government from taking over. However, any oneumber of likely developments could precipitate another period of disturbance like that of last February. We see no prospectoalition of moderates of both parties and both races.
e believeagan government in the post independence period would be likely to Identifyit has in theantlcolonlallst and independence movements. It would probablyolicy of nonalign-ment and seek to benefit from relations with both the West and the Communist countries, but would probably lean In the SovietFor some time Jagan has been seeking trade and aid from the West and he hasinterest in Joining the Organization of American States and in participating in the Alliance for Progress. He has also been seeking trade and aid from the Bloc. He has Justrade contract with Eastand other deals with Bloc countries are likely to follow.
-ecre^o'foks
; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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