DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL EISENHOWER: MR. MCCONE AND MR. FORRESTAL PRESENT

Created: 5/10/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with General Eisenhower: Mr. McCone and Mr. Forrestal present

Essential points were as follows:

McCone and Forrestal described the current military situation which has grown out of the fall of Nam Tha and thef the Phoumi forces someiles southwest and across the Thailand border, pointing out that Phoumi forces did not offer resistance though they had numerical superiority and that this situation had occurred previously in the Plalne den Jarres and elsewhere.

Phoumi's intransigence politically had foreclosedovernment of national union in which those same political elements would be present as were represented in the last Souvanna Phouma government during the Eisenhower administration. The effort wasoalition, buteutral governmentirm commitment to keep Laos free from Communist intrusion.

political and military situation which hasus with only two alternatives:

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Eisenhower's views might be summarized as follows:

He questioned McCone closely as to whether Souvannaommunist, stating that he was convinced when Souvanna fled Laos and resided in Cambodia that he had turned Communist. McCone stated every check indicated Souvanna wasommunist though heeak man.

Eisenhower staled that every government irrespective of what it was called, which incorporated Communists and others, eventually was taken over by the Communists. For that reason he was opposed to the proposed Souvanna government but he did not refer to that governmentcoalition government."

Eisenhower dwelt at length on the danger to South Vietnam and Thailand as both will be outflanked if Laos is in Communist hands and concluded thatituation would be so critical to Southeast Asia and so important to the U. S. that most extreme measures, including the commitment of U. S. forces to combat in Laos, were justified.

Eisenhowerartitioning of Laos into Northern and

Southern sectors with the line as far north as possible and that to accomplish this we should support General Phoumi and his forces. When McCone pointed out Phoumi's demonstrated inadequacies, Eisenhower stated he named Phoumi because he thought hetrong leader but recognized some alternate might be desirable.

McCone and Forrestal pointed out that this wouldommitment of U. S. troops, very possibly with no assistance from other countries. Eisenhower replied that this would be proper, defensible, that he would support it and ho felt the Congress would support it. At this point he urged that the President go before the Congress andesolution authorizing him to act in Southeast Asia, the resolution being simitar to those passed by the Congress at Eisenhower's request in connection with Formosa and the Middle East. McCone stated that he seriously questioned Congressional approval, citing Russell's statement. Eisenhower responded that he was sure that Congress and the people would supportesolution and he personally would use his influence with his Party and the Congress to assist Us passage.

Throughout the conversation. General Eisenhower expressed concernompromise position. He frequently compared the

Souvanna arrangement with earlier compromises In China and staled that his sampling of public opinionesire for the U. S. to demonstrate strength rather than compromise. He expressed great confidence in Thailand and also in President Diem of South Vietnam.

7. Finally Eisenhower warned of the consequences of losing Southeast Asia, pointing out that if it is lost, nothing would stop the southward movement of Communism through Indonesia and this would have the effect of cutting the world in half.

John A. McCone

Dictated but not read.

Original document.

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