SNIE 58-3-62/IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALL OF NAM THA

Created: 5/9/1962

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALL OF NAM THA

THE PROBIEM

To assess lhe implications of the Communist capture of Nam Tha.

THE ESTIMATE

ay, Communist forces attacked and quickly seized the provincial capital of Nam Tha in northern Laos, forcing the retreat of the garrison ofaotian Armyinfantryarachute battalions and supporting artillery units. Available evidence indicates that the attacking force consisted solely of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops and that itmaller force than that defending the town. There are indications that the "neutralist" or pro-Souvanna forces were not directly involved and were not under orders to act by Souvanna Phouma or Kong Le, both of whom were out of Laos.

There is no evidence that Chinese Communist troops participated in the attack, and we believe il unlikely that any were present. However, Communist China probablythe transit of Pathet Lao and/or North Vietnamese troopsalient of Chinese territory to participate inay attack on Muong Sing and the subsequent attack on Nam Tha. Logistic support for the attacking forces, as for other antigovernment forces in Laos, was almost certainly furnished by the Soviet/North Vietnamese airlift.

The withdrawal of Royal Laotian Government (RLG) forces from the Nam Tha area virtually eliminates RLG authority in all of northern Laos and opens western Luang Prabang Province and all of Nam Tha Province, which borders on Burma and Thailand, to Communist domination. The

combat effectiveness of the retreating RLG troops is probably nil, and in the absence of effective resistance the Communist forces will press their advance and render untenable any remaining outposts in the area, including the port of Ban Houei Sai on the Mekong, towards which the RLG forces are retreating.

The attack on Nam Thalagrant violation of the1 cease-fire agreementeparture from the past pattern of limited and small-scale military attacks. Whatever utility the cease-fire agreement had hi restraining hostilities may now be destroyed. The Communist iorces in Laos could defeat the RLG Army, piecemeal as nt Nam Tha or by seizing the major towns along the Mekong. We do not believe that the Nam Tha attack marks the openingeneral offensive throughout Faos; on the contrary, the Communists may await the impact of this move on the RLG and the US before initiating additional major breaches of the cease-fire. In the absence either of an effectiveresponse to the Nam Tha action or significant progressoalition government, there will be an increasing likelihood lhat the Communists will undertake offensiveon the scale of Nam Tha elsewhere in Laos.

General Phoumi reinforced the Nam Tha garrisontimes, despite MAAO and embassy advice, and he had just finished the transfer of an additional parachutea week before the attack. His efforts to strengthen the defenses, however, also offered the Communists atarget in both military and political terms. The Laotian garrison lost considerable amounts of equipment andThe Communist victory, moreover, will further weaken the Loatlon Army's remaining self-confidence andto fight. In view of the importance General Phoumi publicly attached to Nam Tha, and his investment of troops and equipment in its defense, the Communist victory may cause him considerable loss of prestige within the Iaotian Army and government.

On the other hand. Phoumi would like to bringeassessment of the US |jolicy ofoalition government under Souvanno or, failing that, to delay as

long as possible the implementation ofolicy. He can now point lo the Nam Tha attack as proof ofduplicity and disregard of the1 cease-fireHe will be able to cite the Nam Tha action asevidence of Souvanna's inability or unwillingness to influence Souphanouvong and the Pathet Lao. and reiterate his argument that Souvanna is under Communist control and that negotiationoalition government under Souvanna would be tantamount to giving Laos to the Communists.

he attack and the manner in which it was conducted provide further proof of the decreasing military role and .strength of the "neutralist" forces in Laos and the increasing tendency for the Communist troops to assume exclusiveThe attack underscores the weakness of Souvanna's political influence. It also reinforces the view previously expressed1 that Souvanna would be increasingly unlikely to be able to prevent Communist controloalitionHia announced intention to "disapprove completely" of the Nam Tha action will leave the door open to renewed

I. Thr Sinort-Hun outlookeptember UWl

"The In rector ot Intelligence and Research. Department g{ State,thai the proipectsoalition governmenl under Souvanna depend upnn too many variables to be dealt with In inashion In tha Ilritoalition government Immediately alter Ita inception would probably be presidingaos still divided. The PL and llie0 authorities probably would conUimf to controls|kt.Uvi> territories; whether und when Uiey allow the Suuvnnna government to exercise authority over their domains will piobitbly depend largely upon Uieli day to-day observations ol hi* actions and their dimi* ment at Uie direction ine wa* headed. Assumption of real authority over Ian*ouvanna government will mmt probably dependntenratlon ol the Ihree mililary forces Judging from part experience, this mayong time, during which the de farto situation would remain much as il ti now, out be dl&unituuned by the facadeoalition ftovemmerit governing in name only.

Amongariable* which will determineouvanna eoaJrUon government can prevent Conununift acquisition or control will be ine posture and stated ta ten Hons of tbe US Both Phomnl and Thai Prime Minister Sartt have pressed the US hardoaimltment on this matter drier Ihey reaOae Ita Importance lo the survival and rtrength of the anU-Communlst element*os Whether Uie US makes such commitments to the present RI.fi and what American deterrents are maintained In Uie nrea will afreet the chances for survivalruly neutralao*.

negotiations but almost certainly will have no influence on Communist military operations or plans.

Events of the past year have almost certainly convinced the Communist side that the risk of US intervention has lessened significantly and lhat they can increase the level of military operations in seeking to achieve theirnegotiated "neutralist" coalitionin Laos which they could soon dominate, or theof the Royal Laotian Government and Army. With rumorsouvanna-Phoumi rapprochement in the air, and aware of US pressures on Phoumi to negotiate, the Communists probably calculated that the seizure of Nam Tha would not of itself foreclose possible forthcoming talks on the formationoalition government, while it would at the same time enhance their political and militaryin such negotiations.

Although Bloc reaction has so far been extremelythere seems to be no clear distinction between the initial interpretation given the capture of Nam Tha byPeiping, and Hanoi. Almost certainly the Chineseand the North Vietnamese have actively encouraged the renewed military activityipe target ofand an area of direct security interest to the Chinese. While the Soviets may have had some reservations over the political implications for US-Soviet relationsiolation of the ccasc-firc, we believe that they concurred in theWe continue to believe, however, that the Soviets stillolitical settlement in lacs.

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