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THE OUTLOOK IN EAST GERAAANY
THE PROBLEM
To assess the outlook in East Germany in the short run, with particular reference to the likelihood of serious Internal disorders and the effect on internal stability of certain
SCOPE NOTE
Tins paper supplements other SNIE's on East Germany, "The Slabuity of East Germany in the Berlinated1 and, "Theand Prospects in East, which deal in some detail with certain aspects of the East German situation and outlook not treated here, or treated only briefly. The main intent of this estimate is to assess the outlook for internal stability, with emphasis on resistance potential, especially as affected by the erection of the Berlin wall.
CONCLUSIONS
SI
opular discontent in East Germany, enhanced bygrievances and disappointments, has increased since the closing of the Berlin sector border last August. However, there Is no evidence of significant organized opposition. It is possibleajor revolt could develop from localespecially if the regime's authority appeared to the populace to be breaking down. On balance, however, we believe that the presence of Soviet military forces and the memories of their use in past repressions will deter the people from rising up in revolt unless they have reason to expect decisive help from the West In any case, we believe that the Ulbricht regime could suppress any disturbancesidespread uprising, in which case the Soviets wouldactive assistance.
THE ESTIMATE
GENERAL SITUATION
East Germany, despite the abruptof its critical refugee problem by the closing of the Berlin sector border, continues to constitute Moscow's prime headache in Eastern Europe. Estranged from the people and unable to marshal their nationalistbehind Its programs, the regimeto rule and to reconstruct society hi East Germany along Communist lines bymethods. Moreover, the fact that vital Soviet Interests are here In openwith those of the West Impel*to maintainivisions of Soviet troops in the country. For the Soviets, stability In East Germany is of great Importance, both because of the struggle with the Weat over Germany and because Moscow Is aware that an uprising in East Germany could spread eastward to threaten the entire SovietIn Eastern Europe.
To manage their East German Satellite, the Soviets have for many years relied on the capabilities of the redoubtable Walter Ulbncht The Soviets are aware that he is an object of revulsion to the German people, and as sucherious political liability. Nevertheless, his skill in coping with factions and rivals in the Socialist Unity Partynd his agility tn adapting himself to the changing winds of policy and doctrine coming from Moscow have made him virtuallyas boss of the East German regime. No individual or group in the SED at present is capable of effectively opposing him, even Ifto do so. His presence Is of greatto the stability of the regime. While the Soviets may at some point wish to replace himerson less unattractive to Germans, both East and West, we believe that they are unlikely at this juncture to risk his removal.
Ulbrlcht's party apparatus Is not an altogether reliable Instrument, especially at the local level, where functionaries areloath to Inflict the regime'spolicies upon the people. On the whole, however, it is adequate, and we see no evidence at present of the kind of party disunity that existed in Poland and Hungary prior to the upheavalshe regime has felt better able to enforce harsh discipline upon the populace since the closing of the Berlin sector border made large-scale emigration impossible. However, the closing of the border, by denying escape to the more disaffected and rebellious elements of the population, has alsothe regime's control problems.
We believe that the East German security forces could suppress almost any disturbances shortidespread popular uprising of major scale. Since the closing of the sector border the frontier and alert police have been augmented in strength, and efforts have been made to improve their reliability andIn addition, the six well-equipped army divisions wouldactor in any serious internal crisis, but the regime would probably be reluctant to employ them against thebecause of doubts as to their reliability The Ministry of State Security, through its informer network,areful watch on all these forces, and could detect at an early stage any attempts to organize significant dissident action against the government. However, the regime's control of the country rests in the last analysis almost entirely on the population's awareness of the presence of Soviet force.arge-scale uprising should occur. Ulbricht would almost certainly have to call on the Soviets for active assistance
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Economic grievancesubstantial reinforcement to the basically political disaffection of the Eastpopulation. To be sure, the general standard of living in East Germany Is still the highest in the Bloc. Duringsincreased steadily, and workers'were maintained not only by the actual Improvement In living conditions but also by expectations of further Improvements. During the last two years, however. Increases ln consumption have slowed down, thefor quality foods has Increased faster than the supply, and the distribution of food has become more irregular and moreAt the same time the supply of other consumer goods, especially better quality clothing and consumer durables, has lagged far behind demand. Moreover, there is little prospect of improvement In the near future. The regime itself has finally had to admit that It could not make good Its promises of raising the standard of living, but must instead stiffen labor discipline, restrict wage increases, raise prices, and extend food rationing.
The failure of Ulbricht's Inflated plans for economic growth not only has contributed to popular dissatisfaction, but also hasimpugned his leadersliip in the SED and in Moscow. Industrial growth has been far slower than planned. Agriculturalhas declined, in large part because of the effects of forced colleclivisalionlbricht, who had disregarded the advice of economic experts in framing his plans, must now bear the responsibility for their failure. It is clear that there have been importantwithin the parly over economic issues. These disagreements have madeeven more dependent than he was before on Soviet support.
Because oftubbornness, and to protect their economic Interests, the Soviets had to Intervene to set aside his extravagant plans for economic growth.esult of this Intervention and Soviet materialthe immediate difficulties are being overcomeransition to more realistic planning ls being undertaken. The closeof the Soviet Union In East German economic policies and planning, however, has further impaired the prestige of Ulbricht in Moscow and the picture of East Germany as an increasingly strong and self-sustainingthat had been promoted by the regime.
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR RESISTANCE
closing of the Berlin sectora major psychological Impact on Uiepeople. The immediate shock atof their escape route and their tiesBerlin and West Germany wasby further disillusionment withover lU failure to react. This hasrise to an increased feeling ofas demonstrated by an increase Inrate. At the same time, it hasa substantial increase in popularthe regime, manifested by passiverestlessness and grumbling, and Inacts of sabotage, especially inThis attitude has sharpened thealready brought about byharsh economic policies, byand the disappointment ofthat living standards wouldthe erection of the Berlin wall Inrespect had an effect oppositeby the SED leaders,onsequence of the action ofthe population would be moreto Its will.
Workers. Since the events ofthe industrial workers have been sub-
jected to heightened pressure for greaterefforts without wage increases, and at the same time have encountered privations in day-to-day life. Nevertheless, the regime has had little trouble from the workers, who have the German's traditional respect forand obligatory attitude toward work. There Is some evidence of passive resistance, strikes, and even occasional sabotage, but no sign of organized opposition. In any case, mindful of the key role played by the workers In3 uprising, the regime isattentive to their mood, and would be likely to take some action to alleviateamong the workers before seriousdeveloped.
The Professional Classes. Among the professional classes, whose ranks were already severely thinned by emigration prior tougust, resentment is particularly strongof the severance of ties with theirand fields of specialization in the West. Isolated instances of open butopposition have been reported among teachers and university professors Thecontinues to offer inducements to the professionals to cooperate, but we believe that it will be no more successful in the near future than In the past in enlisting significantfrom this group.
The Youth. AnUregime sentiment is more virulent among youth and students than any other segment of the populace with the exception of the farmers. It was apparent even beforeugust, but lt has beenby the curtailment of the refugee flow, which had regularly included aproportion of youth, and by the harsh measures taken to tighten control over the population since that time. Nevertheless, the regime has encountered only minor andresistance from youth to thelaw. and no major campaign to boycott it has materialized. Moreover, the government has moved speedily and ruthlessly against youthful leaders of antiregime manifestations and thus far has been able effectively toany organized activity ln this group. In the absence of conditions more propitious for organized or widespread opposition, we believe that the youth will be unable in the next few years to coalesceignificant challenge to the regime.
he Peasants. Discontent has been strong in the countryside ln the wake of the forced collectivization0 and thepressure on the peasants since that time. The uncooperativeness of the peasants has been an Important factor In the decline of agricultural production. In addition, sinceugust. Incidents of open defiance, though sporadic and unorganized, have been frequent ln the ruralsuch acts as the burning of farm buildings, and thefeeding and illicit slaughter ofThe regime has been so concerned about the attitude of the peasantry that lt has sent hundreds of agricultural specialists and party and government functionaries to the collective farms to exhort the peasants to greater efforts, though this measure is likely, if anything, to increase peasantThe countryside, however. Is notfor organizing active oppositionarge scale, and we believe that the regime should have little trouble, with Its security forces, in keeping the rural populace under control.
HE UKEUHOOD OF AN UPRISING
espite the resentments of thesustained by the oppressive measures of the regime, we believeeneral uprising occurring spontaneously is unlikely. It is always possible that local Incidents' could spread Into an outbreak of considerablebut such developments are not possible to predict with precision. The condition most conducive toevelopment would be the popular Impression that the authority of the
SEG/ET
was faltering or breaking down. This could occur If the regime's behavior wasor contradictory, as was the caseprior to3 uprising. We also believe that certain outside events, suchower struggle ln the USSR, an Intense crisis In relations between the Communist states, or greatly sharpened East-West tensions over Berlin would considerably Increaseeneral uprising in East Germany. On balance, we believe that the presence of Soviet forces and the' memory of3 in East Germany6 in Hungary will continue to act asass uprising. In the absence of unusual external developments, as outlined above, the people of East Germany are not likely to engage in rash actionarge scale unless they believe that decisive aid from the West will be forthcoming.
IV. THE EFfECT OF CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES
Greatly sharpened tensions over Berlin would arouse the regime's apprehension with respect lo popular unrest. In such an event, wc believe that the Soviets and the Eastregime would considerably Increasesecurity measuresrecaution. Such measures would be likely, in turn, to cause the populace to be more cautious in taking actions which might provoke ruthless repression.
If. in response to Soviet actions threat-ing the Western presence in Berlin, the West launched limited military operations toaccess, the East German populace would probably not rise against the CommunistBut hopes of liberation would be aroused and in the confusion the purpose of Western action might be misconstrued. There probably would be local demonstrations of defiance, and it is possible that these would expand Into an uprisingonsiderable scale, especially if the military operations and were enlarged In any case.
ground operations in the vicinity of thewould probably be regarded by many East Germans as an opportunity for escape, and attempts to do so would probably occurass scale. In such an event, efforts by security forces to prevent breakouts couldln open outbreaks of resistance which might become widespread.
believe that Western attemptsor stimulate an uprising inwould not be successfulin conjunction with Westernoperations. Even In the absence ofmilitary operations, some elements ofwould probably respond toactive resistance by undertakingother local acts of defiance. As longacts remained localized, however,that the regime would have littlein suppressing them. On thethereood chance that appealsresistance wouldideparticularly under conditions oftension in which the West wasa strong Soviet challenge to itsin Berlin.
The Effect of Ulbrkhft
inherent weaknesses of theIts heavy dependence upon thewill make the successiondifficult In East Germany.or Incapacitation would almostbring into question, not only Inbut also within the party,of the hard-line policies withIs so thoroughly Identified andthe stability of the regime itself.at this juncture would be greatlyto headrisis of authority.aretrong position to do this,of Ulbricht would faceevere lest, and it isovert manifestations of unrest
he USSR, in addition to Issuing pointed rexnindcTS tliat the regime is guaranteed by Soviet force, would almost certainly Intervene actively to head off any dangerous factional struggles among Ulbrtcht's lieutenants. Some form of collective leadership would be likely, at least as an Initial measure. Thereafter, if stability still seemed to be threatened, the Soviets might bring to theuccessor whose capabilities, like those of Ulbricht. lay primarily ln the area of mtlmldatlon. They would probably prefer, however, toore moderate East German leadership better equipped to pursue conciliatory domesticand to make theore acceptable partner for the confederation schemes which the USSR regularly urges upon West Ger-amny.
f the Soviets decided to removethe problems of the succession would be far more complicated because of theconfusions that would appear in the party and the population. This would be an operation of such political delicacy that the Soviets would be unlikely to attempt ita prolonged period of careful preparation.
Original document.
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