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national intelligence estimate
Consequences of Certain US Courses in Laos
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Of CENTRA! INTELUGENCE
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE w'rih rhe exception ofof Intelligence and ReMaroh,
of su,id
? ir- l indicated overleaf2
The following inlt/ltigtmct organizations purliapaled in thm prtparolion ol this. . , _.
th* central irwlkgence agency and tke intelligence orgofviatlom of theof state. defense, the army, the navy, the ak forte, and the joint
Concurringi
director, detenie intolllgonce agoncy
a.iiitanl chief of Staff for intelligence, department of the army
aiuitoni chief of navol operation!eportment of the navy
aiuitant chief of staff, intelligence, usaf
director for intelligence, joint staff
direct or ol the national security .
.'
Dittttntingi
director of intelligence onddepartment of stat* Abstaining,
ET
the atomic energy commotion representative to thend the aihlpni dkectar, federal bureau of inverfgerriori. the wbfect being owtiiae of their turkdlction.
THE ESTIMATE
members of the Royalhe armed forces, and the civil service, as well as most of the people in urban areas, are aware that Laos has become heavily dependent upon US assistance and support. Many of them have come to take continued US aid for granted. Theof US economic and logistics support would cause considerable psychological shock among these key Laotian elements. Though some of the top government leaders would realize that the US action was designed solely to bring pressure upon Phouml. mostof the government and military service would probably conclude that the US had abandoned Laos. In either case, the effect on Laotian self-confidence and morale wouldepressing one.
The financial impact of the US move would not be immediate. The government has enough foreign currency reserves InTokyo, and New York banks to meet its basic operational needs for perhaps six months or so. Moreover, the governmentillionequivalent ofillionunbackedin Savannakhet vaults which it would not be averse to issuing if the need arose. Upon announcement of the termination of US financial support, the RLG would probably take additional steps to economize foreign currency reserves and impose controls over the salaries of government and civil service employees. The reaction of these employees would no doubt be dismay and anger and there wouldhance of anti-USin urban areas, especially Vientiane. Although some might defect or return to the rural areas, the majority would probablyin the cities, hopefulenewal of US aid to the present government orew regime under Souvanna. In the countryside.
the effect of the US denial of monetary aid on the predominantly barter economy would be negligible.
If at the same time the US were toIts logistics support of the Royal Laotian Army, current stockpiles of arms, ammunition, POL, and other materiel would enable the PAR to maintain its present positions and level of operationsaximum of aboutays, though exhaustion of individual unit stockpiles and difficulties of bringing upsupplies from central supply depots would in many cases severely shorten this period. Removal of the MAAG White Star teams wouldetrimental effect on the morale of the FAR and would impair theeffectiveness of units in front line areas. Believing that Phouml's source of power was gone, the more opportunistic of the FARmight seek other arrangements, including accommodation with Souvanna Phouma's forces or with the Pathet Lao. If military assistance, to include withdrawal of MAAG. were withheld for moreew weeks, the combat capabilities of the FAR would so decline as to precludeubsequent resumption of aid.these conditions, if the Communist forces now in Laos should decide to take over the country by military means, they would meet with only token resistance. Phoumi's men In the field would almost certainly scatter and seek escape through surrender, defection,eturn to their native villages, and such Meo resistance as continued would be for the sole objective of survival.
ThePeiping,and the Pathetconsider that the US action had enhanced their chances of taking over Laos either by military action or by political means. Their choice of action
would be greatly influenced by whether they believed that the US action represented an abandonment of Laos, or an attempt to force Phoumi tooalition governmentSouvanna. Moscow would wish tothe appearance of seeking In good faith the establishmentoalition. Peiping and Hanoi would be more sympathetic to an armed takeover, since they would probably estimate that later US military Intervention would be less likely than docs the USSR. On balance, we believe that the Communists would not immediatelyilitaryof Laos.
The Communist forces In Laos would, in any event, continue their recent buildup of military strength and equipment andmilitary pressure on the government forces. They would probably increase that pressure from time to time to improve their political leverage or local military positions. The more extensive the demoralization ol the RLG and FAR proved to be. the more the Communists would use their opportunities to Induce the defection or neutralization of RLG military and governmental figures. They would expect in this fashion to insure that the "coalition" government that eventually emerged wouldore leftist complexion.
The withdrawal of US financial andaid would probably not persuade Phoumi and Boun Oum to participateouvanna coalition government. Both of them regard Souvanna with suspicion and appear to think that any coalition headed by him wouldgive wayommunut-dominated government. Phoumi may believe that US pressure on him will not be carried to the point of seriously weakening his armedincere Thai effort to persuade him toouvanna gorcrnment might be successful, but probably not. He would almost certainly not accept any role unless it gaveominant position with respect to the armed forces or police. If Phoumi were to acquiesce in oroalition government In anyit Is doubtful that he would do so with any serious intent of cooperating withRather he would seek to undercut Souvanna and his followers.
In past times of crisis the King hasto accept responsibility or to takeaction. The termination of US military and financial aid would Increase the chances that the King might undertake to form ahimself. We believe, however, that he would remain passive, seeking to avoid compromising the Crown's position of being "above politics."
There wouldumber of other courses of action open to Phoumi and Boun Oum, but it is difficult to estimate with confidence the odds on any one of them. The most likely would seem to be for Phoumi and Boun Oum to preserve the existing government andthe loyalty and level of effectiveness of its armed forces as long as possible, hoping that the US would In time renew Its support and aid. Recent Indications are that theattitude of Phoumi has gainedsupport among the more vocalof the RLO and probably encouraged him to oppose any compromise with
Another possibility would be for Phoumi and Boun Oum to leave Laos for Thailand or Europe In self-imposed exile. If either or both were to retire from theewand military figures with strong anti-Sou van ns sentiments would be likely to follow suit. However, most of the RLO wouldstay behind and seek accommodation with Souvanna. The FAR commander in chief would seek to assert control over and maintain discipline In the army, but units in the field would become Increasinglyand Ineffective. The King, in spite of his distrust of Souvanna, would probablyin Laos and In due course accept agovernment.
t is also possible that Phoumi and Boun Oum might decide upon some form of drastic military action as the only way to dramatize their position and shock the USenewal of support. For example, Phoumi might seek to gather his forces at Savannakhet andthe partition of the country. Phoumi might also move whatever forces he could muster to the Sayaboury and Pakse regions on the west side of the Mekong River and seek to create safe havens from which to launch some later military action. In the caseartition attempt, thereharp military reaction byforces, and Phouml's forces would almost certainly be defeated and scattered or captured. The enemy's reactionove across the Mekong to the Sayaboury and Pakse regions would probably be lessbut eventual action against these and any other "rebel pockets" would be almost certain.ast resort, Phoumi and Boun Oum might go to the hills and try to carryuerrilla war against any Laotianwhich might be set up, but we believe this to be quite unlikely.
1 The following is the dissent of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State:
The Director of intelligence and Research,of State, believes mat the statement of the problem has resulted in an overly-simplifiedof the effects on General Phoumi and Premier Boun Oum of cessation of US financial and military aid. lie does not believe that tbe actual complexities of the total context In which Phoumi and Boun Oum must act permit us to have anyIn the sort of net Judgment expressed inf this estimate where It is stated that theof US financial and military aid would probably not persuade Phoumi and Boun Oum to partlplcat*ouvanna coalition gov. eminent."
The estimate apparently addresses Itself only to an abrupt and total termination of US economic and military support (without notingf US financial aid has been withheld since
February or assessing the impacthe timing, sequence, and correlator, of various moves the US nught make In the course of withdrawing support, as well aa the bearing of pressures from other sources, should be taken Into account
The estimate fails to assess Phouml's IntenUons, but implies that he la governed solely by the view that the coahUon government as presentlywould necessarily mean an earlytakeover. However, it is entirely possible that he has deliberately overstatedouvanna Oovernment In order to affect US policy. Thus his stubbornness to date might be attributedonviction that If heto hold out, the US would not dare tomilitary assistance. On this point it hasIncreasingly evident that the degree ofdetermination may be an Important If not critical factor. Phoumi himself apparently believes that If he can hold out until Souvanna retires from the field, he can then force the US to support him. (King Vatthana said as much to former President Aurlol; Phoumi himself has made clear to USthat his obJecUve Is to get rid of Souvanna.)
Other factors might also weigh onerious Thai effort to persuademost likely if the Thais believe the US iswould have considerable Influence on Phoumi. If the Pathet Lao remain relatively quiet for the next few months (as the Soviets have Implied that they will. In private conversationsigh level) Phouml's hopes for renewal of large-scale hostilities and for consequent US support of him would beIf on the other hand hostilities shouldat the insugauon either of Phoumi or the Pathet Lao. the probability of further militaryfor the PAR must alsoactor for Phoumi to weigh. This is particularly true since thehas personally warned Phoumi through the Lao Ambassador that the Lao must not labor under tbe delusion that the US would send in forces to help the far if hostilities break out.
Phouml's stubbornness might also be eroded by the cumulaUve effect of gradually worseningconditions In the cities, and by concern that an alternate to him acceptable to both the US and the RLO might step forward.
The Director of Intelligence and Research,of State, believes that the complexities of the Laotian situation similarly militate against the confident Judgment expressed Inf the estimate: "if military assistance, to Include withdrawal of MAAG, were withheld for more than few weeks, the combat capabilities of the FAR
would so decline as to preclude their restorationubsequent resumption ofhis conclusionossibility which must be weighed In tbe light of another possibility: that Phouml'sIntransigence may ItselfL-Kong Le attack. The President has already warned Phouml. through the Lao Ambassador, that the PL are stronger than the RLO forces and if hostilities are resumed Laos will be finished.
In summary, the Director of Intelligence andDepartment of State, feels that an estimate of Phouml's poslUon, to be useful, sbould take fully into account not merely the fact of withdrawing financial and military aid, but the variousof collateral pressures, tuning, and sequence, tbe correlation of moves which the US might make; as well as the realistic and diminishing range of choices which Phoumi actually faces.
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Whit* Hows*
National Security Council
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Original document.
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