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UNCLASSIFIED
62
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Katanga Integration Problem
far th*ECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
in by th* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
2
flPPROVID FOR RIllASf UTLIIIIMI
Tht following inMlrgence o'goni'iol'om portiopoPed in fhe prepo/nd'on of Ihii
Tha Central Intelligence Agei-cy arid ,h" Intelligence ocgoniioNoni of tneo* Vote. Dt(-ithe Army, the Neey. the Airnd The Joint Stoft.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Reieorth, Deportment ol Stole Director, De'erne Intelligence Agency
Chief ol Staff for InMbaence. De partem of the Army AuiWorrt Chief ol Novel Operation*eportment ot the Nary Aiilttont Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USA/ Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff Dwecftxoflheecvrhy Age-!/
AMalatrsji
The Atomic Energy Cemmiwionle the OS'S, and the Aiehient federal ftwreov of Inveehgehon, th* wbjecl being ovtUde of their
rvrHcScHon.
THE KATANGA INTEGRATION PROBLEM'
the problem
To estimate the prospects for early agreement onof Katanga into the Congo and the likely conse-quencea of the failure of current efforts to secure such agreement
CONCLUSIONS
separatism is regarded by the Centralother Africans, and the neutralsuccessfulWestern, commercial interests to retain ain Katanga and thus to prevent the fullof the Congo. Adoula is under considerableshow progress toward the integration of KatangaCentral Government. Adoulaide measureover Katanga However, his minimumprobably be satisfied by recognition of theand military authority of the Central Governmentaccess to Katanga revenues,' (Paras.
Tshombe recognizes the many outsideto his maintaining Katanga as ahe is under no significant pressure from within Ka-
18NIBPowiblf DevelopmenU Inecember iBfli. remain* eaeenUalir valid.
Director of InUUlernce aad Research, Department of Bute, eould prefer that tola sentence read as follows:
In order to preserve his own polIUcal poalUon In Leopoldville, be must have, aa an absolute minimum, recognition by Tshombe or the formal dvU and mllltarr anthem? of the Central Oovernineat and assured access lo Katanga revenues.
MCfTtT
tanga to reach any accommodation with Adoula. On thethe tribal elements of southern Katanga, and Belgian and British commercial Interests and resident! in Katanga, as well as the Europeans In neighboring countries (Northern Rhodesia inupport his present position. In any agreement with Adoula, Tshombe's minimumwouldonsiderable degree ofuaranteed share of Katanga revenues. (Porta.
egotiations between Adoula and Tshombe are unlikely to achieve any early accommodation unless both sides are subjected to stepped up pressures and inducements byforces, particularly by the Belgian and UK Governments and economic interests, the UN, and the US. We do not believe that their nUnimum needs are so Inconsistent as to make agreement impossible. If some movement on the issue is not evidentelatively short time, Adoulauccessor may take more radical and intransigent initiatives, including acceptance of military aid from Afro-Asian or Bloc states. It cannot be excluded that the Central Government will attempt to subdue Katanga by force.. We do not believe that any attempt to subdue Katanga militarily, by either UN or Congolese Army forces, would be promising. Such action would be likely to bring about conditions of such disorder that the prospects for unity and an orderly political and economic development of the Congo would be further reduced,
SECRET
SEC
DISCUSSION
eration from the rest of the Congo has symbolised to Africans and to many others the power of WesternInterests and "neocoIontBllsts" to block the realization of unity and full nationalBehind the pressure forare: the desire of leaders of the Central Oovernment to establish Leopoldville'sover Katanga, the desire of all parts of the Congo to share the revenues of theenterprises of Katanga, and theto the Afro-Asian world of the principle of national unity.
ft. However, there are also strongforces. The Central Government does not exercise effective control over all thenow under Its nominal authority. Even among Central Oovernment politicians there are many whoigh degree of local autonomy. Moise Tshombe has the support of the tribal element* in southern Katanga in his effort to maintain the autonomy of the province. Even if Tshombe were 'o submit to Leopoldville, the Central Oovernment would still be facedong and difficult task of unifying the country.erious effort were made to Impose national unity, the demands of other parts of the Congo for local autonomy would become more vocal.
Tha Currant Naeohotiora
remier Adoula of the Congo Central Oovernment and President Tshombe ofhave been negotiating off and on in Leopoldville sincedoula has continued to insist that Katanga accept the Lot Tomdarnentalc as evidence of Itsto the Central Oovernment. although he has acknowledged that the Lol needs to be modified to provide Increased provincialTshombe has shown some willingness to make concessions on minor functional details of the Katanga-Central Oovernmentbut has refused to give up anyauthority he now has in Katanga pending adoptionew constitution.
here is little chance that either of the two principals will offer concessions sufficient to gain agreement unless pressures andare stepped up considerably. Meanwhile Adoula Is telling representatives of the US Oovernment that political pressures on him are building up to the point where be must seek other means than the currentand reliance on the UN, or riskHe has talked several times of asking the UN to withdraw and of seeking the aid of sympathetic Afro-Asian and Bloc stales. More recently he has told US representatives that he will not go to the Communists for help and that his approaches to Afro-Asian states are for help within the context ufole as UN members,
e cannot estimate with any certainfy the future of present negotiations under UN sponsorship. Adoula Is unquestionably under strong pressure frnrn his supporters as well as his opponents in Leopoldvltle to show progress on Integration, but he can, If he wishes,to negotiate for some lime. Tshombe, for his part, has every reason to employtactics and keep the talks going,he might be forced to break them off by pressures from Elisabethvllle. We areto believe, however, that thewill break down only If and when Adoula feels compelled to resort to other means to obtain the reintegration of Katanga.
Adoula's Situation ond likely Cowries ofprepentlon for forceful selxure of Katanga,
mute up ol MBtdc WW ol t,, *
up for action against Katanga
Sooner or later Adoula is going to have toIf Adoula goes to the UN for ain solving the Katanga Issue orend Katanga's secession, by force Ifan Increasingly tough approach todifferences among the Interestedbe forced to step aside forstatea would Inevitably beelse to have aoppositionunlty-by-force"Adoula's frustrations may havey mmyoverstate the Immediacy of the danger
his position. Lesshird of theAll along the line Adoula would beof the Chamber of Deputiesolution to his basic problem,removing him. However, thatessentially political. What he willgrow as time passes without evidencefor is some means of providingtoward the integration ofevidence that his government Isany time some unforeseen Incidentby the whole Congo as theopposition forces that might leadreplacementadical ind lessleader. It Is equally likelySituation and Likely Courses ofwould himselfore. If necessary to preserveahoinbes purpose to maintainIn Katanga and to retain for Katanga
as much of Its present autonomy as possible.
e believe that the chances are lne varlou, pressures upon him
than even that. In the absence ofmtegrtte hu provlnce with lhe rest of the
evidence of progress toward the Integration of ,
Katanga. Adoula will, before many weeks0 has
passed, try new Initiatives. He is unlikelyhUn he,musl
beginudden attack on the UN andconcessions. He recognizes that the
US and the efforts they have been making*"h representatives and military
behalfettlement, but will rather stepin the Congo, the US Oovernment. the
his attempts to persuade the US and thefro-Asians in the UN and elsewhere are all
to bring increased pressures to bearhis maintaining Katangaear-
Tihombe. Before long he would probablystate. On the other hand,
to the UN for help In bringing about thefeels that he has the direct backing
tegraUon of Katanga by force. In theBelgians and other Europeans In Katanga
of failure, he would then turn to thethe support of Important Influences in
Asian states, and possibly even to the Blocand America. Also Important IsIn the buildup of hla military forces fact that the Acting UN Secretary General
ha* publicly Indicated his belief that financial problem! willignificant reduction of the UN presence In the Congo, probablyaboutlthough two UN attempts to force Congo Integration have been abortive, we believe Tshombeakeeflort tohird round ofwith Its attendant dlso. 1er andWe expect Tshombe to continue toaiting game, and to make no concess lens to the Central Oovernment which he does not feel compelled to make.
Other Parties to the Situation
elgium's Interest in the Congo tend to be dominated by Its large economica significant part of which Is In the Katanga. It has also been powerfullyby the blame and opprobrium which were heaped on it as the "Imperialist" power responsible for the chaotic International messhe Congo becameigei. The powerful mining Interests, while showing some awareness of the needatangaessentially support Tshombe against both the Central Oovernment and thein his own regime. They lend to "scount the problems of the Centraland the dangers in the situation which might follow the downfall of Adoula. The government in Brussels, however. Isdisposed to think of the problem in terms of the future of the Congohole, though It is frequently unable to influence the Union Miniere du Haut Kalanga or the UMHK's representative* in Katanga. When lt Is able to carry the UMHK people in Brussels, they are not always able to persuade theiron the spot to carry out
he UK is another Interested parly, not only because of Its large financial stake In Katanga, but further by reason of itsIn the Rhodesias. The latter are now going through an extremely delicate and highly Important phase of decolonisation which would almost certainly belee ted by another upheaval in the Congo, particularly by another round of fighting In Katanga. The UK Oovernment wouldaccept and cooperate with any measures toesolution of present problems in the Congo so long as they did not involve use of force In Katanga.
of the Afro-Asian stalesIntegrationoralon the Western world andWere integration efforts lo fall,states would considerlong wilh the UK, Belgium,Soviet Bloc states areno significant role In the Congo,will be alert to exploit for theirany change which turns AdoulaAfro-Asians against the Wesl on theIntegration.
UN itself isarty to There are differences ofUN objectives and courses of actionvarious responsible UN officials inand In the Congo. UN officialsare acutely conscious of the extentthe world organization's future isthe success of its operations in IheUN officials and commanders ofunits In the United Nationsin the Congo (UNOC) are disposedthe UN's Influence and authorityfor Integration and some even favorof UNOC troops to force Tshombe lo Past experiences In the use offorce for political objectives in thehowever, made some of them Acting Secretary General. hares lhe Interest of hisintegration of the Congo, but he iaabout financial problems, andthe use of force by the UN. He alsoconsiders that the UN lacks thethe mandate to impose lntegra'Jon
Proipecti
espite their Inability to reachyet and the lack of promise that they will be able to do so on their own. Adoula's and Tshombe's minimal politicalare not necessarily Irreconcilable. We believe that each Is capable of making the concessions which would satisfy theproblems of the other without himself losing his own political position. Adoula's minimum needs would probably be satisfied by recognition of the formal civil andauthority of the Central Oovernment and assured access to Katangashomberant of partial autonomy to the government ofwhich all tbe provinces probably willa guarantee ofEach la afraid to offer concessions before the other has come forth withconcessions and each distrust* the other's good faith In the implementation of anThe UN can certainly continue to play an Important role as mediator, butis unlikely unless further pressures are brought to bear on both parties at the same lime.
e believe that such pressures, to be effective, would havee imposed upon both Tshombe and Adoula, and that they would have to be agreed to and Jointlyprimarily by the UN, the US. the UK. and Belgium, Including Belgian economicin the Congo. We also believe that they would be most effective if developed in supportaster plan to develop and unify the Congo, politically and militarily as well as economically, but which would
'Tha Director ol IntelUgenee end Research,or Bute, would prtfei that this sentence read ai follows:
In order to preserve his own pollUcal position tn LeopoldvlUe. he must have, as an Absolute mini-mum. reeognlUon by Tshombe of the formal elvtl and mlltury authority of the Central OovernmentasauiTd accesi to Katanga revenues.
onsiderable degree of provincial autonomy.
The threat to use UN military force against him might, in certain circumstances, influence Tshombe to enter into agreements Integrating Katanga Into ihCentralTshombe himself, as well as the economic Interests in Katanga, would wish to avoid the physical damages inescapable in the case of hostilities.
However, the actual use of UN military force to bring concessions from Katanga would raise many difficulties. The UN forces as presently constituted In Katangacould not successfully expand operations beyond securing and holding areas presently occupied.rth and central Katanga, they are few in number and do not possess offensive capabilities. In southern Katanga, theyt strong resistance If they attempted to occupy areas outsideparticularly the Katangan military strongholds at Jadotvllle and Kolwezl.If provided with additional logistical support and freedom of military actionair operations, present UN forces probably could secure and hold all the main centers In Katanga. In this last case,Katanga forces would be likely toto guemlla-iype operations and could severely harass UN forces for some time. In any event, we believe that once hostilities were actually in train between UN forces and Katanga, the prospect* foreaceful unified Congo would not be bright.
ny extensive use of UN forces against Katanga would be strongly opposed by our Western Allies. In particular, the UK would be apprehensive that any violence in Katanga would upset the politicalnow under way in Northern Rhodesia Hostilities In southern Katanga would almost certainly Involve physical damage to the economy and place foreign investment in
Jeopardy and thui be opposed by all having economic Interest* there.
IS. Unless tangible progress is made toward Integration of Katanga, the CentralAdoula or awill be tempted to resort to radical courses of action outside the UN framework. One of these will probably be to eenu the Congolese Army (ANC) against Tshombe. The ANC. however. Is almost certainlyof Imposing Leopold nile's authority on southern Katanga. External help from
Afro-Asian and Bloc sources could Inood manythe ANC, but we anticipate that at the sameuildup of Katangan forces would take place. In an>ilitarywould not resolve the problems of Congo unity but rather would result Inreminiscent of the summerikewise, efforts to rebuild purJcin the Congo are likely to beas would be attempts to organize and develop the economy of the countryhole.
i
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Mmm
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rho Nory
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