NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
22
This estimate consists of an up-dating of those subjects tn1 about which significant new Information has become available, and whiche-stalcmcnt. It Includes topics under the following main headings fromThe Soviet Atomic Energy
The Soviet Nuclear ReactorNuclear
Propulsion Systems The SoTiet Nuclear Materials Production Program The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Program and Fabrication and Stockpiling
The reader should refer to NIEor information on the following portions of the Soviet atomic energy program:of the Soviet Atomic Program; The Nuclear Reactor Program-Research Reactors. Power Reactors, Nuclear Propulsion Systems for Aircraft. Missiles and Space Vehicles, Nuclear Electrical Propulsion Systems for Space Applications, and Nuclear AuxiliaryPower Supplies; and, The Soviet Nuclear WeaponWeapon Research and Development Installations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
SUMMARY AND 1
DISCUSSION
I. MARINE NUCLEAR PROPULSION SYSTEMS
Nuclear Icebreaker
Nuclear Powered
H. FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION
Soviet Ore
Uranium
Plutonium-Equivalent
Other Nuclear
IIL THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM
Weapon Test
Weapon Development
Future Soviet
Radiological Warfare
Weapon Production and Stockpiling
ANNEX A EVALUATION OF SOVIET NUCLEARebruary
TOP OCCULT
LIST OF TA8LES
Page
Table 1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Recoverable Equivalent Uranium
Metal Production2
Table 2 Estimated Soviet Fissionable Materials 8
LIST OF FIGURES
Follows page
Figure 1 Materials Production
Figure 2 Weapon Research and Test0
TOP SCCRCT-
the soviet atomic energy program
THE PROBLEM
To review significant recent developments in the USSR's atomic energy program and to estimate the probable future course of that program to
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
GENERAL
up-dating1 we have incorporatedof data from the extensive nuclear testeptemberhas improved our knowledge of Soviet weaponand reflects major improvements in SovietOur analysis of new information on Sovietmaterials production has led to estimatesthe same as given inowever,expansion of future production ofwill beomewhat slower rate than shown in
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Soviet Nuclear Test1
recent Soviet Nuclear test series,etected tests1 and 4and one additional test detectedlargest, most intensive and comprehensive everthe USSR. Although many of the tests werein nature, we believe there wereumberwhere warheads were detonated in conjunction
TOP SCCRCT
2
occurr
complete weapon system checkouts. Twenty-five tests were detected in the Novaya Zemlya area of the Western Arctic, two each in the Kapustin Yar and Sary Shagan missile lest range areas, fifteen at the Semipalatinsk Proving Ground and two underground testsewly identified test locationiles south of the Semipalatinsk Proving Ground.)
Thermonucloor Weapons
The Soviets tested al leasthermonuclear devices during1 series.f which had yields greater than one megaton. Analysis of these tests indicated that the Soviets haveighly sophisticated thermonuclear weapon technology.
We believe thatT)lean test of the muchegaton
)
ICBM Warheads
believe that the Soviets second-generationare capable ofarhead ofarhead design basedo be much more attractive and may well bein the near future. )
Missile Range Tests
tests of1 series were detected in thethe USSR missile test ranges at Kapustin Yar andJOE0 KT) wasest forat an altitude somewherenndctober,the first very high altitude tests detected in themissiles, in addition tom missilenuclear warhead, were involved in each test. Theof the test devices (lessT) plus the natureoperations suggest that the purpose of these testsacquire effects information related to components ol the
Soviet ABM system, rather than to acquire data pertaining to the kill effectsuclear burst on an incoming missile.)
Fission Weapon Developments
tests were detected during1
series with yields ranging fromoilotons. In addition. JOE0 KT) and the two underground tests were possibly fission tests
)
Future Soviet Capabilities
Judging by past accomplishments, the Soviets could, with unrestricted testing during theoears,the practical upper limits of performance in both thermonuclear and fission designs1 In addition, in the next few years they could greatly increase their store of knowledge concerning the various effects of nuclear weapons and could opUmize designs to enhance specific effects )
We believe the Soviets are presently conducting research related to the developmenture fusion weapon; however, we are unable to judge the degree of success the Soviets may have attained-
Nuclear Weapon Fabrication and Stockpiling
have identified nuclenr weapon fabrication sitesUrals at Nizhnyaya Tura and Yuryuzan. Asuch site is located In Central Siberia nearstockpile sites are co-located with these threeInsites andT ]sites for theLong Range(LRA) Arctic staging bases have been identifiedweapon storage sitesidentified at Soviet military air
3
' Secor the view or thr AuitUnt Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF.
)
theepotsto be for nuclear weapons storage, have beenAlthough the precise function of the regionalthemselves has not been determined, theirpattern suggests storage related to militaryincluding support of ground, rocket, and airlocated within these districts. We believeL
jsites associated with these installations provide nuclear support at least to the ICBM/MRBM/IRBM launch facilities located in their specific areas.
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION
'Secor Die view ol Uie Assistant Chief of Naval Operations <ln. Wllleencel. Department of Iheee footnoteage 9.
hree gaseous diffusion isotopeplants are in operation in the USSR; one at Verkh-Ney-vinsk in the Urals, one north of Tomsk in Central Siberia, and the third at Angarsk in the Lake Baykal region. Afourth gaseous diffusion plant, still under construction, has been located north of Zaozemiy neareview of all available information leadsestimate which is generally consistent with that made in )
We estimate that the probable Sovietroduction forilograms and that it is unlikely that actualroduction is less0 kilograms or moreethat theumulative productionillilograms and we believe,air degree of confidence, that this production will not be lessilograms or moreilograms.
wo major plutonium-equiv-alent production sites have been identified in the USSR, the earlier and larger at Kyshtym in the Urals, and the second
co-located withroduction complex at the atomic energy site north of Tomsk in Central Siberia. It is probable that the large atomic energy site northeast of Krasnoyarsk includes underground facilities for plutonium production which were put into operation in the recent time period. The existence of plutonium production facilities at the Angarsk fissionable materials production siteossibility, although there is no evidence supportinghesis. )
We estimate that the value0 kilograms is the probable value foroviet cumulative plutonium-equivalentonsidering the available site data and the possible variations in reactor operation,roduction could be as larget is almost certain that actual production is not less0 kilograms.
Contrary to the estimate invailable evidence now indicates that no large increase in reactoris taking place at either Kyshtym or Tomsk. It is estimated, however, that future annual plutoniumwill increaseoderate rate through increasing power levels of existing reactors and through newThis extrapolation resultsumulative plutonium-equivalent production0 kilograms byven with an extremely high priority effort the cumulativestockpile would not exceed0 kilograms byn the other hand, the estimated minimum cumulative production byould not bo less than0 kilograms of plutonium-equivalent.
MARINE NUCLEAR PROPULSION SYSTEMS
or the view o( Ihe Assistant Chief o( Naval OpernUonsDepartment of the Navy.
is now considerable evidence that the USSRthree classes of nuclear submarines. It isthat the USSR will have up tout it is unlikely that all ol these willby that date. )
DISCUSSION
MARINE NUCLEAR PROPULSION SYSTEMS Nuclear Icebreaker LENIN
has been repeatedly reportedproblems have occurred with thesystem of the LENIN. Manyslated that the radiation levels into the reactor compartmentsignificantly above design level,inadequate shielding. The Sovietsthat the leakage from theloop system has been greaterand has necessitatedvolume of the radioactive wasteuse of uniflow steam generatorsfrequent chemical removal ofscale deposits from the tubeThe LENIN's coolant loop isoperate at high temperatures andtend to accelerate the corrosionthe system. This rapid rate ofwould lead to frequent repairs andreplacement which, in fact, haveThus, it is believed that theresorted to operating the IJININ'sat less than design pressures andat lower power levels. Theequipment and piping was observed topoor as to hamper inspection andat sea. However, the LENIN'sthe Far North duringhat many of the abovenow have been corrected, particularlyof the prolonged period0 season.
Nuclear Powered Submarines
is now considerable evidenceUSSR is constructing three classes ofsubmarines. It is estimated that the USSK will have up touclear submarinesut all may not be operational by that date. Weurrentrateubmannes per year has been achieved and we have no reason to believe that the Soviets cannot fabricate the reactors needed ia meet this construction program, or possibly even increase the rate of production slightly.*
Apparently some of the early Sovietsubmarines used essentially the same type of pressurized water reactor (PWR) as the nuclear Icebreaker. LENIN, for their power system. Additionally. It has been reported that these early Soviet nuclear submarines have encountered problems which arc believed to be similar to those experienced by LENIN. If such difficulties have ln fact beenand unless they have undergone major modifications, their operationalmay be less than designed. However, there ls no evidence to indicate that the more recently constructed nuclear submarines have suffered these difficulties.
In addition, although Soviet ofllclals have stated that they have nuclear submarines inknot category, analysis of present evidence, concerning both the power plant and the hull design, indicates that Soviet nuclear submarines are limited to speeds of aboutnots. It Is likely that an improved Soviet nuclear submarine is under development.
SC6RET
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION Soviet Ore Procurement
sparse information receivedpast year suggests that uraniumboth from the Soviet Satellites andthe USSR has proceeded much asinhe estimatedof uranium ore is sufficient tofissionable materials productionand to permit very substantialof surplus uranium. (See Table 1)
Uranium Mo'ol
metal and other feedproduced at three locations in theEleklrostal near Moscow. Glazovof the Urals, and Novosibirsk in(Sec FiguresT, there appears to bematerials plant capacity In the USSRall uranium Indicated by theestimate as well as to produce thematerials and enriched fuelfor Lhe Soviet atomic energy"
roduction
gaseous diffusion Isotopeplants are ln operation in the USSR;Verkh-Ncyvinsk In the Urals, one northIn Central Siberia, and the thirdin the Lake Bayka) region. Afourth gaseous diffusion plant, stillhas been located north ofnear Krasnoyarsk. Thisbased on both eyewitness accountsV power lines into (Sen Figure 1)
Tabic I
ESTIMATED SOVIET BLOC RECOVERABLE EQUIVALENT URANIUM METAL PRODUCTION2
(Metric Tons, Rounded) (Prom NIE ii on
of ybah
ual
out i
tocks
...
4..
more detailed description of the first three sites and of the methods by whichis estimated is included in NIEhe fourth plant at Zaowmly is described as presently consisting of two long buildings, one0eet, the other0eet. The Zaozeraiy plant thus appears quite similar to the initial stages of the plant at Angarsk as described by an eyewitness source. It Is estimated that the Zaozernly plant will begin operation
Continued study of the electric power available to the Soviet atomic energy program, as deduced from published Soviet statistics, and of the growth of electric powerand transmission faculties directly con-
a
sixncr
to the four sites mentioned above,supports the estimates otroduction made inurof total Sovietis presented inn terms of cumulative production of uranium enriched toontent. It includes theercent-equivalent of materials produced at lesser enrichments. Estimated weapon test and non-weapon usesre larger than those estimated inhese amounts have been subtracted from the values ofroduction to give our estimate of equivalentvailable for weapon uses.
roduction
ur estimate of future production at the four gaseous diffusion plants is based on gradually increasing efficiencies as older plant sections are modified, and on estimates of future power use as deduced from reports of power plant construction and publishedon Soviet plans Wethat no new gaseous diffusion plants will be installed throughither in the Urals or In the Tomsk Oblast, althoughlants In both areas will be modified loefficiencies. Soviet plans and otherindicate that production of electric power at hydroelectric and thermal power plants directly connected to the Angarsk and Zaozemiy atomic energy sites will rise rapidly3 Based on thisavailability of electric power, it is concluded that the gaseous diffusion plants at Angarsk and Zaozemiy will be constructed at speeds roughly double those observed at Verkh-Neyvinsk In the mid-igSO's.
Margins or" Error
t is estimated that theroduction lor
Table J
ESTIMATED SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION
(Cumulative Production in Kilocrams, Rounded)
ro*
*
use
..
..
.
...
0
.
.
0
.
...
of less highly enriched uranium Is included as equivalent quantiUeiaterial.
Seeor the view of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy.
or the view of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy.
uses of plutonium are expected to be negligible during the period of this estimate.
See Tablet is unlikely that actual Sovietcould be less0 kilograms or moreilograms. It is estimated that theumulative production willilograms and we believe,air degree of confidence, that theroduction would not be lessilograms or more
yrvoleni Production *
wo major plutonium-equivalentsites have been identified in the USSR, the earlier and larger at Kyshtym in the Urals, and the second co-located with the
"The Assistant Chief of Naval OpcraUoruepartment of the Navy, doe* not concur In the U- MS production estimate. He consider* tt to be baaed upon assumptions which he cannot sup-port on Uie basis of available evidence.
His analysis of the bask gaseous dlfluslonknown to have been used by the Soviets and supported by evidence asesultsroduction estimate of0 Kg as ofllowingargin of error, this figure could be Increased as much. This analysis of the bask technology tt In accord with the avail-able lnrormaUonT_
estimate0 Kg. Is consistent with tho very Umitcd useefore5 and can account for the strong emphasis the Soviet* placed on5 economy In1 weapon test series.
roduction complex at the atomic energy site north of Tomsk in Central Siberia-It is probable that the large atomic energy site northeast of Krasnoyarsk includesfacilities lor plutonium production which were put Into operation in the recent time period. The existence of plutoniumfacilities at the Angarsk fissionable materials production siteossibilitythere is no evidence supportinghesis. (See Figure 1)
The cumulative plutonium values arc estimated to have an error of plus or minusercent. The error on annual values is much larger, making It difficult to establish In all caseshealid differences In annual production
We estimate0 kilograms is the probable value foroviet cumulative plutonium-equivalentonsidering the available site data and the possible variations in reactoractual production could be as large0 kilograms. It is almost certain that actual production is not less0
Contrary to the estimate made invailable evidence now indicates that no large Increase in reactor capacity is taking place at either Kyshtym or Tomsk. It Is estimated, however, that future annualproduction will increaseoderate rate consistent with performance during82 period through new construction, increasing the power levels of existingandy-product of the nuclear power
" The Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUons. Department of the Navy, does not concur Id this cumulaUve Soviet plutonium producUon csu-mate. Healue ofKg. Is in accord with the Soviet expanded reactor program, and that the figure lorhould beollowed by an extrapolation ofaterially lower rate than that given ln the majority eiumiile.
and propulsion programs of the USSR This extrapolation resultsumulativeplutonium production0 kg byven with an extremelyeffort, the cumulative plutoniumstockpile would not exceed0 kg byn the other hand, theminimum cumulative production byould not be less than0 kilograms of plutonium-equivalent.
Olhnr Nucloarthtum.[
In
Is probable that the USSR has been producing enriched Lithium since at4 although the location and capacity of Soviet lithium isotope separation plants are uncertain.increases in the production andof lithium ores for the Soviet atomic energy program ineriodwith the large-scale production of thermonuclear weapons in the USSR.
eavy Water. Wc estimate that the production capacity of the nine known Soviet heavy water plants Isetric tons per year. (Seeor planthis capacity is believed lo be ample for the needs of the Soviet atomic energy program.
. The Soviets showed moderate Interest In the procurement ofminerals6utand effort appear to have declined/
3
riffum. Analysis of weapons teststhat there has been an increasingfor tritium In the Soviet
III. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM
Weapon fetf Program
Nuctear Testeptember1
uclear tests in the Soviet Unionnlest,, was conducted. (Sec Figurewenty-five tests were held in the Novaya Zemlya area of the Western Arctic, two each In the Kapustin Ynr and Sary Shagan missile test range areas, fifteen at the Semipalatinsk Proving Ground, and two underground testsewlytest locationiles south of theProving Ground. Although many of the tests were developmental in nature, we believe there wereumber of instances where warheads were detonated Lnwith complete weapon system checkouts. This series, by far tbe largest, most intensive and comprehensive ever conducted by the USSR, involved tests conducted underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, and at very high altitudes. The locations, environment yields, and characteristics ofoviet
tsatsf
]from9re summarized in Annex A.
Sovietsigorousweapon development program duringof the moratorium. This conclusionby photographic evidence of:evel of activity at the Sarovaresearch and developmentinb) the operationsimilar facility at Kasli beginning inand (c) continued research andactivity8 at theProving Grounds. Details ofnuclear weapon research andfacilities at Sarova.Kerch/Bagerovo. Nizhnyaya Tura and
the probable research and developmentat Krasnoyarsk were discussed in1
Novaya Zemlya Tests
s In the past, testing in the Novaya Zemlya area was preceded by anthat the area would be closed to foreign and domestic ships and to aircraft whileexercises with the actual use of various types of modern weapons" took place. This was the first such announcement in which rocket troops, in addition to the Soviet Air Force, and the Northern Fleet, wereas participants. As In the8 test series, three different locations within tho closed Novaya Zemlya area were used. (See Figurehe majority of the high-yield detonations tookew miles Inland from Mys Sukhoy Nos on the west coast of the island; four small-yield tests were held near the southern coast; and on three occasions two devices were detonatedery few minutes of one anothor over the east coast of the island north of Malochkin Shar.
ukhoy Nos Tests. Wc believe that the majority of the Mys Sukhoy Nos tests were air drops delivered by bombers. These werend Included most of thedevelopmentalowever, we also believe that some of the tests in therange7) were missile-delivered from land-based or seaborne missile launchers locatedadius of several hundred miles of ground zero, and as such, were probably tests of weapon systems using stockpiled warheads.
East Coast Tests.1 east coast tests) were unique In Soviet test history because they occurred In pairs,ery short limebetween the detonations of each pair. The yields ranged from "low KT"T, and there was no apparent consistency to the order In which the yields were employed.8 tests on this side of the islandimilar range of yields but were single rather than double shots. We believe that1 east coast tests involved weaponized devices probably delivered by aircraft.
outhern Area Tests. Four small-yield tests. JOEsere located in or near the traditional naval test area off thecoast of Novaya Zemlya. Two of these tests were clearly naval-associated.n underwater lest inthe same location as the underwater tests of earlier seriesnd. was probablyto study underwater effects and may also haveestaval weapon system.T) was detonated on or near the surface of the water and may haveaval weapon system or effects test. Two air bursts in this area, JOEs0 KT) andere probably systems tests of tactical weapons.^
Semipalatinsk Proving Ground Tosts
1 Soviet lest series opened at the Semipalatinsk proving groundeptember. Of theests in the Semipalatinsk2wo were underground andere atmosphericTwo of the atmospheric tests wereT devices, and the remainder wereT and below.
J It has beenthat the instrumented ground zero, which was under construction wheninad been used at least once by the end of this series, but we cannot specifically identify this test among those detected.
nique features ofests were the first underground tests detected in the USSR,5 KT) onctober andT)hese tests apparently were not held within the proving ground itself, butugged hill area aboutiles to theUse ot this location suggests that they were conductedunnel or tunnelsfor the
_
tests probably permitted the Soviets tounderground instrumentation techniques for obtaining diagnostic weapons data and to study seismic data obtained from the tests in connection with underground testproblems.
Missile Range Tests
our tests of1 series werein the vicinity of two of the USSRtest ranges. Two of them took place near the Kapustin Yar rangehead, and two were detonated downrange from Kapustin Yar, not far from the Sary Shagan ABM test complex.
The first of the missile range tests. JOET)eptember, was probablyinto the stratosphereissile fired from the SAM test complex at the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Rangehree previous tests had occurred in thisJOEs73T) and9 KT) in Novemberthat JOEas the latest step in the Soviet development programAMEffects data from this test may well have been of interest to both Soviet air defense and ABM systems.
The second of the KYMTR tests, JOE0asest for effects data at an altitude somewhereeet. Although there arc serious difficulties with any interpretations of the available data, it is possible that this wasest of an ABM warhead. (sec
, onnique in Soviet test history. Notthey the first very high altitudehave been detected in the USSR, butin addition to0 nmcarried the nuclear warhead, werein these tests. Informationthe two operations suggests that theyidentical except for the heightsthe nuclear devices were detonated.estimated thatas detonated atofautical miles andat an altitude of aboutauticalfar from the Sary Shagan ABMsmall yield of the test devices (lessKT) plus tho nature of the operations,involved, and the height of thesuggest that the purpose of theto acquire effects information relatedof the Soviet ABM system,to acquire data pertaining touclear burst on an
Weapon Development Program
Developments. thedevices during1 series,!
the spectrum of tested yields ranged fromilotons toegatons,reponderance of tests inegaton region and an absence of tests betweenndegatons.^
jthc Soviets haveighly sophisticated thermonuclear weapon technology.^
1
top occner
Soviet thermonuclear devices tested1 arc discussedew hand-made versions of the very high-yield weapons could be available now or in the near future, but production of significant numbers of weapons based on new or improved designs exhibited in1 test scriesear or more.
Sub-megaton Tests. Four of the Soviet tests,) fall in this category with yields betweenTT. ifth. JOE0 KT) J*
egatons. Most of the Soviettestssall IntoT yield range.
Wc believe thatT)lean test of theT weapon.rj been systems tests of weapons8 designs.
nm BaUUttc Missile. Wewarhead now associated with this classwhich may be either land-basedcan achieve yields inmegaton range.
fission Developments
Twenty-four fission tests were detected during1 series with yields ranging fromoilotons. In addition, tho high-altitude test over the Kapustln YarTest Rangend the twotests south of Semipalatinsk werefission tests.
Marshal Mallnovsky stated1 that the Soviets hare nuclearof as low as "several tens of tons ofj
Possible Fflocf of1 TNn Soviet 5'ro'egicelivery Sytleim
A new Soviet ICBM Is now underNo re-entry body weight has been assigned, as yet. to this missile; however, we believe that the Soviets should have noinuitable warhead. Some of the ICBMs tested during the past year may be designed to carry large payloads. although this hypothesis Is not substantiated by the available evidence.
MRBM/IRBM. The warhead weight for the several Soviet MRDM's and IRDM's Is believed to beounds. Several of1 tests are believed to have
OE0he high-altitude test over the KYMTR. presents difficulties in^
J Since it would have been desirable toevicenown yield ina high altitude test it is likely that the debris or the yield Is not representative and JOEas the detonationreviously tested device for effects purposes.
rrr-nr-w ci
Future Soviet Capabilities
Judging by past accomplishments, the Soviets could, with continued unrestricted testing during theoears,the practical upper Limits ofin both thermonuclear and fissionIn addition, in the next lev years they could greatly increase their store of knowledge concerning the various effects of nuclearand could optimize designs to enhance specific eflccts,"
We believe that with continuedtesting the Soviets could increase the yield-to-mass ratio to values approaching the practical upper limits within the nextyears for those thermonuclear weight classes to which they accord development priority."
Pure Fusion Devices. Wc believe the Soviets are presently conducting researchthis
Radiological Warfare Munitions
vailable evidence Indicates the Soviets have conducted research applicable to radio-logical warfare. There is published Soviet research on the biological effects of radiation, on immunization against radiation, and on the synergistic effects obtained by utilisingof radiation and biological On balance, we believe the Sovietsimited capability to produce and employ RW agents. However, In view of the complex processing and logistical problems inherent in an RW program, we do not believe they have stockpiled more than token quantities of HW munitions.
The Sovief Test Detection System
he existenceoviet test detection system comprising seismic, acoustic,and debris collection components was confirmed at8 Experts' Conference In Geneva In addition, the Soviets probably have added to their detection system facilities for measuring telluric currents resulting from high-altitude detonations, We estimate that Soviet capabilities in geophysical detection are reasonably good but not comparable to those of the US. However, it should be noted that their detection capabilities against US tests have been greatly enhanced by theopenness of US testing and through
Weapon Production and Stockpiling Sites
he USSR hasarefulbetween the introduction or modification of delivery systemsuclear weapon logistic system including (a) weaponcapacity with associated national reserve stockpile facilities at Interior locations; (b) national stockpile and assembly sites situated near major order-of-battle concentrations; and (c) storage sites at military bases within the service area of national stockpile andsites, which provide the necessaryto the operational sites. Changes in Uie design of stockpile facilities occurred6hich appear to have been responsive to major nuclear weaponand to the introduction of new strategic delivery systems.
Notional Fabrication and Stockpile Sites "
AMmanl Cniettaff, Intelligence, usaf. believes that some of the capabilities listed could be achieved in significantly lessoears if the Soviets accord sufficient priorityarticular class of weapon.
"Details of fabrication and stockpile sites are given in NiEhanges in Information over the pa.it year are hlghllshted in the current text.
"T
j
on modification and retrofit capability but do notasic fabrication function.
The Nizhnyaya Tura nuclear weapon complex contains facilities for the fabrication, assembly, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. It is likely that the earliest series-produced weapons ln the Soviet program were fabricated and stored at Nizhnyaya Turahis was probably the first stockpile facility In the USSR The complex was expanded9 with construction of what is believed toew fabrication area.
The second Soviet nuclear weaponassembly, and stockpile complex isaboutm south of Nizhnyaya Tura in the vicinity ot Yuryuzan. We believe that the Yuryuzan complex became operational by the end5 or
j expansion was under wayecond stockpile area was under construction. It Is estimated thiswas available for use by the end
atomic energy site,of Krasnoyarsk in Centraluclear stockpile facility whichbegun operationstherin the complex probably arenuclear weapon- fabrication.
National Assembly and Stockpile Sites
addition to the three nationalsites co-located with fabrics-'ionassembly stockpile sites havej"
Storage Sites at Arctic Staging Bases
facilities
are believed to be located in the vicinity of major Long Range Aviation staging airfields in the Arctic.^
]
Airbase Storage Sites
uclear weapon storage sites utilizing three standard designs have been identified at Soviet military air bases, f
national assembly-stockpile sites probably contain reserve weapons to support regional and operational storage sites. It is believed that these installationseap-
J
SECRET
L
J
r
t
^Those located near the western border may provide support to Soviet forces deployed In the Satellites.
Regional1 Deport
uring theeriod, military regional storage depots hare been identified
r.
"JAlthough the preciseof the regional storage depotsnot been determined, theirsuggests storage related topossibly including support ofand air defense forces locateddistricts. We
sites associated with these Installationsnuclear support at least to the ICBM/ MHBM/IRBM launch facilities located ln their specific areas.and training, and nuclear testing specifically oriented to ground, naval, and air defenseIndicate that nuclear weaponsites are probably also available to units of the Soviet ground forces and to certain naval surface and submarine forces. Whether these requirements are met by the storage sites listed previously, or by additional undetected faculties is not known.
Soriof Nuclear Weapon Storage in the European Satellite!
We have no firm evidence that Soviet forces stationed ln the European satellites have acquired nuclear weapons. However, annumber of reports suggest that the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) are acquiring short-range rockets and missiles (FROG and SCUD) and that the GSFGhas simulated nuclear weaponduring maneuvers
No nuclear warhead storage facilities have been Identified in East Germany, nor Is there definitive information that nuclear weapons have been deployed to the GSFG. Those rocket and missile-equipped units which have beenuclear delivery role probably would be supplied from storage sites
ie suppl
tes near the western
border of the USSR.
Other Operational Storage facilities
We have no firm evidence of theof other types or operational storagespecifically designed for nuclearHowever, it is considered likely that the Soviet Naval Aviation would require nuclear storage at bases where it has deployedKIPPER) missiles. Soviet tactical doctrine
Operational Implication* erf Storage Site Design Changes
he national stockpile sites and the airfield storage installations were characterized by numerous handling facilities and storage bunkers. On the other hand, the new nuclear weapon storage installationswith the regional military storage depots and with airfields have simplified and more efficient weapon handling and servicing facilities. We believe that many of thewhich were accomplishedariety of structures ln the older installations, may now
have been eliminated or may be completed within the storage bunker. Theseclearly suggest the development ofweapons which require less servicing, thus resultingeduction of response times.
The widespread dispersal of nuclear weapon storage facilities in the USSR and the hardness accorded to the nuclear weapon storageindicate that the Soviets areigh degree of protection to their nuclear stockpile.
Nuclear Sforoge Site Hardness
he hardest nuclear storage sites appear lo be the national stockpile facilities which contain several burled bunkers with above-ground entrances. In many cases' advantage has been taken ol natural terrain features such as valleys and hill-sides to further decreasethe vulnerability of these bunkers. Similarly^
]are of heavy concreteearth covered and areto minimize the blast effectsnuclear detonation. No apparentafforded to structures other thanal these sites,
sites were not hardened Initially, although the new bunkers estimated to have beenat these sites probably are hardened.
Logistic*
he national fabrication stockpileall of which are located within the Interior of the USSR, can operate as self-sufficient complexes, but they do not appear to be intended topecific grouping of forces because of transportation andlimitations on an Immediate operational basis. Thus, we believe that the stockpile of weapons at these sitesational reserve. The national assembly and stockpilehough incapable of very rapidof weapons, unless airlift of weapons by helicopter Ls employed, are believed to provide direct support to. and strategic reserve for. the operational sites. The nuclear weapons initially required for nuclear warfare areto be immediately available atsites located at oriles of deployed delivery systems.
Table 1
EVALUATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTSS)
r
No.
(ll)'
-
Aug (9
Sep SI
Oct 51
A af S3
Aug 53
Sep 53
Sap 53
Sap 64
Oct 54
44
Oc! 51
Oct 54
Oel 54
Oct D4
Jul 15
Aug 55
Sep Si
Nov SB
Nov 55
Feb M
Sea
Mar 64
Mar 50
Aug 50
Aug So
Sep 56
Sep 64
Nov 64
lOOUutlrm(ltd ul 'rmKr 2
CMftnted)
r
JOE
1
(ft)
Dec 16
17
Yar
E
Mir 17
Apr 57
Apr 17
Apr 67
Apr 57
Apr 57
Aug 57
Sep 67
Sep 57
Sep 57
Sep 57
57
B
Oct 17
Dec 57
Jan 88
Jan 68
Fob 18
Feb 58
Feb 58
Mu 58
Mm 68
Mar 58
18
oMnotHil al1
TOP GCCIiQ
3
PRELIMINARY EVALUATION' OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS (IMI
i end al
Continued)
No. (ft) (KT)
Oct 61 Semi
Tropopause
Oct 61
(6)
Oct 61
(8)
Oct 61
ct 61
ct 61
ct 61
ct
Oct 61
Semit.gemipalatirok; KY=Kapustin Yar;ovayaalues of burst befght and yield are beet values,
1ange ol valuta have been reported they arc written as turn mum/maximum.reater than:ess tbaii:
1 Alternate value. Analysis based oo this assumed ykld.
et61 .
ct 61 SN, 0
112
Oct 61
Oct 61
Nov 61
Nov 61
a AAA
Nov 61
Nov 61
GE
KT
Nov 61
Feb 62
,E
Original document.
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