22
LBj- a , q -
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE;
Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy
Svbrihlfod by Ihm director of central intelligence CWvrrM* ui by ih*
united states intelligence board
rW
22
NT
ollowing intelligence organizations participated in Ihe preparation of this estimate-.
The Centrol lr.fsllig.nc. Agency and the intelligent, organisation, of th* Depart. menu of Stale. Defense, the Army, th.. Ai* Force, The Joint Staff, ond the est.
Concurring:
Directory LI end Kewarch. Deportmen, of Stof. Director. Defense Intelligence Agency
ont Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department ofy Atiisrorit Chief of Naval Operation.epartment of the Navy Aiiliianf Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
The Assistant Director, Federal tvreoo of Inveu potion Diettor of the Notional Seevrify Agency
oot-
Abstaining;
The Atomic Energy Commiuion Representative to the USIB, the iwb|ect being lido of hi. ioriidiction.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
I. THE SOVIET
Attitudes Toward
The Strategy of "Peaceful
The Chinese Critique of Soviet
II. SOVIET POLICIES IN THE NEAR 8
Berlin and
The United
The Underdeveloped
Middle
Latin
Asia and the Far
HI. SOURCES OF POSSIBLE LONG-TERM CHANGE IN
THE SOVIET
Internal
Relations in the Communist
The Course of East-West
TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable Soviet courses of action in foreign policy over the next year or so and to examine some factors affecting the Soviet outlook on international politicsonger period.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite attacks on the general line of Soviet foreign policy by the Chinese and other Communists over the last two years or so. and despite some disappointment with the results of that line on the part of the Soviets themselves, we believe that the general principles and tactical methods of Soviet foreign policy are likely to be continued for some time to come.
The Soviet leaders retain basic confidence in theirbelief that the Communist system isto prevail worldwide. But the aggressive quality of their policies derived from this belief will continue to be limited by their full appreciation of the dangers of general nuclear war, and their unwillingness to run serious risks ofonflict. This does not mean, however, that the Soviets would always estimate such risks correctly nor that they would abandon vital interests to avoid them. (Paras.
Soviet tactics of struggle under the slogan ofcoexistence" rest on two basic assumptions: (a) that the USSR's economic system will demonstrate its superiority and increasingly giveower advantage; and (b) that theirst-in the underdeveloped and former colonial
countries but ultimately in advanced Western states also, will Increasingly join the Communists in the struggle to overthrow the "system of Western)
he greater stress placed by the Soviets in the last year or two on wars of "national liberation" is inesponse to Chinese criticism that the Soviets were magnifying the dangers of war with the West and underplaying therole of violence. Despite these Chinese pressures, the USSR has not given full political and material support or committed its prestige to all armed anti-Western movements in the underdeveloped areas. We believe that the Soviets will continue to follow an opportunistic policy in this regard.)
the Soviets are unlikely,atter ofto use their own forces to achieve local gains,do so in some area adjacent to Bloc territory ifthat the political circumstances were favorablethat the West would not make an effectiveThey would probably employ Soviet forcesif some Western military action on thethe Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc20)
We see no prospect for acceptance by the Sovietsermanently stabilized situation in Germany, which they will continue to regardey area of struggle.irect challenge to the Western position in Berlin proceedingeparate "peace treaty" with East Germany cannot be excluded, it seems more likely that the Soviets will con* tinue to pursue their aims by diplomatic pressure and by small unilateral steps designed to whittle away the Western position and to establish the de facto sovereignty of the East German regime. )
It Is ujuikelyhange in Soviet leadership would produce any major shift in the Soviet outlook or lead to policies carrying increased dangers of war. However.present role testifies to the importance of theleader in the conduct of Soviet policy, and the
man or group which succeeds him may introduce significant changes in style and even in the weight attached to various tactics.
ver the long run, the concept of ineradicable hostility between systems may gradually come to carry less weight in determining Soviet international conduct. The chances ofong-run change depend to some extent upon the strength of certain evolutionary trends within Soviet society and.reater extent, on the impact of divisions within the Communist movement. But most of all they depend on whether fundamental Communist beliefs are sustained by successes in the East-West struggle or, over an extended period of time, are challenged by failure to achieveprogress in that struggle. Thus US strength, maintained at an adequate deterrent level, and the effectiveness of US policy, are crucial factors bearing upon this possiblein the Soviet outlook. )
ven ifendency should emerge, however, strong national aspirations would continue to sustain great East-West conflicts of interest. The requirements of Sovietsecurity, prestige, and ambition, as seen by the Soviet leaders and people, would still bring the USSR into collision with the interests of other stales, even if communism lost all of its fanatical character. The most that could be expected would be that some issues would become more tractable and negotiable, particularly those which were not deeply rooted in the national interests of the Soviet state.
DISCUSSION
THE SOVIET OUTLOOK
he mood of exuberant confidence which marked the conduct of Soviet foreign policy two or three years ago seems in the last year or so to have sobered somewhat. In the aftermath of the Sputnik success7 the Soviets appeared for some time to entertain expectations of early advances at the expense of the West. But the promising factors which spurred the Soviet mood in that period seem to have lost some of their force and new complications have arisen.
s the Soviets2 to,hey must recognize that the significant advantage they then believed they wouldIn missiles and therefore In strategic posture has failed to materialise ettlement of the Berlin andquestion In accord with Sovietwhich probably seemed good9 and the springere notand the attempt to resume pressure on this subject lnharp rise in the pace of the arms race. Thisin turn tightened the chronic squeeze on Soviet resourcesime when someprograms, notably in agriculture, in housing, and in some branches of investment, were falling well short of expectations. Added to these concerns, there has been since at least the spring0 an ever sharpening crisis in relations with Communist China. This development has brought confusion and uncertainty to the international Communist movement, which the Soviets see as aninstrument of their challenge to the West.
his is not to say that the last year or two has been marked only by On the contrary, there have been
significant successes also. The Soviets have doubtless viewed the Cuban developmentain. Also they evidently believe that trends generally in Latin America and in some other parts of the underdeveloped world show great promise in the long term. They probablythe "national liberation" struggles in Laos and South Vietnam as progressing on the whole favorably. Nevertheless, the more rapid general advance of Communist fortunes which the Soviets seemed to have anticipated two or three years ago has failed to Their confidence in the outlook at present, while still strong, seems to havea somewhat more dogged quality and to be keyed to an expectation of slowerThere has been no evidence, however, of any fundamental reappraisal of policy in the lightomewhat disappointing record of events. Indeed the general principles and tactical methods of Soviet foreign policy which Khrushchev had developed earlier were reaffirmed at the XXII Party Congress of
he visible growth of Soviet power and of Soviet influence abroad Is the primarysustaining the Soviets' basic confidence. Thus the Soviets feel that the presentof forces enables them to challenge the Western Powers at crisis points everywhere, although they appreciate that the risks of nuclear warfare impose caution on themselves as well as their opponents. The US,now asserts, must realize that the time has passed when it could have its own way In the world, even In an area like Latinit must recognize the USSR's claim to be its great power equal, and therefore entitled to be Involved in the settlement of all major International questions.
knowledgements of equality and. conversely, are highly sensitive to any Americanof or challenge to their prestige This factor also contributes to the recurrent Soviet impulse toward bilateralism. Moscowappears to be intrigued with the notion that the two greatest powers could somehow combine to contain or override the interests of lesser powers. But this Idea, whichout of harmony with the premise of basic conflict of systems, has noteadiness to compromise on the major issues in dispute between the US and the USSR. We believe that, in the future as well, this Idea is more likely to affect the manner In which the USSR approaches these Issues, and that only occasionally, than to alter the substance of its positions.
Attitudes Toward Wor
undamental hostility toward the non-Communist world defines one limit of Soviet foreign policy; so long as it persists, the USSR will regard international Issues asprogressively to weaken andits opponents, and not as occasions for conciliation which would guard theo! all parties. The other limit, whichheck upon this aggressiveness, is the Soviet leaders' awareness that their ownand system would face destructioneneral nuclear war. Both their statements and their actions in recent years havetheir unwillingness to run anyrisks of this eventuality. This does not mean, however, that they would always estimate the risks correctly, nor does it mean that they would abandon interests theyvital in order to avoid grave risk of nuclear war.
he Soviet leaders evidently continue to base their military and foreign policy planning on the assumption that the present overall military relationship, in which each side cantrong deterrent upon the
his estimate of Soviet views on general and local war is generally consistent with the positions laid out by Khrushchev. when he defined various types of wars and the USSR's attitude toward them. On that occasion. In addition to stating Soviet opposition to both world wars and local wars between states, Khrushchevategory ofof national liberation, or popular uprisings." Such internal wars, ranging pro-Soviet or anti-Western forces against colonial or pro-Western regimes, he declared to be "just" and deserving ofsupport. He was carefully vague,ln discussing the forms which thiswould take, and in particular he neither promised nor hinted that Soviet forces would join in the fighting It has become clear ln the past year that this wastatement of Intent to usherew phase of vigorous Soviet incitement of such conflictsor of maximum military assistance lo "national liberation" forces.
other, will continue for some time to come. They are clearly determined to maintain and Improve their strong military posture. In addition, they are vigorously pursuingol research and development inweapons to acquire whatever military advantage they can, and they would, of course, make heavy political use ol anythey achieve. It is possible that some future technological breakthrough would persuade them that they had acquired aadvantage and could therefore press the West with far more aggressive policies. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their policies upon the expectation that they will be able to achieve, withinilitary posture which would make the deliberate initiation of generalational decision; the Soviets realize that the US is determined to maintain second-strike capabilities which would visitdestruction upon them. In any case their policies rest on the conviction thatvictory can be won without resort to nuclear war.
he overt Soviet position on limited wars is that these will grow, rapidly andInto general nuclear war and are therefore also to be avoided. In our view this formulation is primarily designed to deter the West from the local use of force and does not mean that the Soviets would themselvesexpand any local conflict intowar; rather. If at all possible they would employ political means to prevent suchIn circumstances where theyocal preponderance of power butWestern interests were at stake, they would probably use that power with restraint in order not to confront their opponent with the painful choice of enlarging the conflict oronspicuous defeat.
e believe that the Sovietsatter of general policy, lothe military and political risks involved
nstead, it seems likely thatemphasis on "national liberation" warfare,ew Idea at all. was Intended ln part to meet Chinese criticisms then being made that the USSR, by its undifferentiated stress upon the need to avoid war. was in fact ruling out altogether the use of force inthe Communist cause. This chargeajor component of the Chinese attack upon the correctness of Soviet policies and, therefore, upon the legitimacy of the USSR's traditional leadership of the Communist movement. It ls also designed to win for China the allegiance of Communists andLn the less developed countries, who are less firmly tied to Soviet leadership than their European counterparts. Despite thesepressures, the USSR has not given full political and material support or committed its prestige to all armed anti-Westernin the underdeveloped areas. Wethat the Soviets will continue to follow an opportunistic policy in this regard.
The Strategy of "Peaceful Coexistence"
n the Soviet leaders' assessment of the forces at work in the modern world, thereost of issues, trends, and sentiments which can be turned to their account. The strategy of "peacefulhich ls the fruit of this assessment, is intended to focus the attention and energies of Communistsupon the incessant exploitation of these forces. This strategy puts great stress on the virtues of flexibility and expediency, and allowside variety of contradictory frequently pursued simultaneously. Thus military intimidation goes hand ln hand with championing of the peace theme,governments are courted while their local Communist opponents receive Soviet support, and the Western Powers are treated to promises of detente while their colonies and ex-colonies are urged to turn against theand while Moscow maintains Its demands for concessions on Berlin.
ne noteworthy tactic of this strategy is the raising periodically of demands for Summit meetings. Because his success in Soviet politics has depended partly on his personal qualities, Khrushchev Is probably prone to overestimate the effect on foreign statesmen of the pressure he brings to bear in personal encounter. He also believes that, ateeting, his Western counterparts will be under greater pressure than he tofailure" and will therefore be obliged to make concessions to Soviet positions. Khrushchev clearlyersonal penchant for meetings with the President, which we believe reflects his desire that the USSR shall be acknowledged as America's great power equal and that he himself shall personify this equality. Finally, he probably alsoof Summit meetingsay of further entrenching his own leadership in the USSR and the validity of his own prescriptions for dealing with the West
entral to the "peaceful coexistence" strategy is the belief that time is on the side of tho USSR and that, without general war, the Western position can be gradually but steadily eroded. This belief in turn rests in great part upon the Soviet conviction that economic competition is the decisive factor in the struggle of the two systems. This is the meaning of the slogan emphasized soat the XXII Congress, that the Soviet Party "considers Communist construction in the Soviet Union as the fulfillment of Itsduty to the working people of all countries." The Soviet leaders expect that tangible economic successes Ln physical power and popular well-being will prove so impressive and attractive, and soto their opponents, that their ownand prospects in the international arena will be steadily enhanced.
The Chinese Crilique of Soviet Policy
ut this slogan, however closely it is linked in the Soviet outlook with the prospects ol the Communist movement, clearly implies that the claims of that movement will beto the security concerns andinterests of the USSR. And so lt is precisely at this point, where the theses on war and economic competition combine to produce the strategy of "peacefulhat the Chinese Communists haveundamental dissent. They perceive ln this Sovietustification for denyingto courses ol action which meet Chinese interests but fail to serve directly theof the USSR. The Chinese leaders see confirmation of their suspicionsost of indicators: Soviet reluctance to provide them with advanced weapon capabilities,recurrent moves toward detente and direct dealings with the Western leaders,stress on the disarmament issue, and its unwillingness to give support to all-out tactics of militancy in all areas of contention with the West. Perhaps most important, the Chinese object to the Soviet leaders' insistence upon building communism in the USSR first and their concomitant refusal to delayprogress in order to bring all members of the Bloc up to the level of their own
here Is some truth, we believe, incontentions, but it is an old truth. Ever since its founding the USSR has regularly subordinated the claims of foreignparties to national objectivesonflict arose between them. The essential difference now is that, with the growth of the international movement and especially with the accession of some parties to state power, these claims have become more diverse and urgent. In particular, China haspower and independence to defy Soviet discipline and to argue Its case with great force,
e have analyzedecent estimate the way ln which the Soviets sought at the XXII Congress, by the attacks on Stalin. Albania, and the "antipartyoPeiping's policy views.1 Then andthe USSR has reasserted itspolicies in the face of opposition within the movement and has served notice that adherence to "peaceful coexistence" is aof Communist discipline. The Chinese have nevertheless continued publicly toand criticize Soviet policies, making use of doctrinal arguments which findresponse among Communists who cling to the orthodoxy of an earlier day. Wethat there is no longer much chanceundamental resolution of Sino-Sovietand that In the continuingbetween the two the USSR, despite its vigorous rebuttal of Chinese criticisms, will find Itself unable to ignore them entirely in framing its tactics. This factor will not. ln our view, cause the Soviets to run significantly greater risks ln East-West confrontations than they are now willing to contemplate. But, depending upon the course of thisIt will exert greater or lesser pressures on the USSR to display militancy against the West and to achieve tangible successes which demonstrate the correctness of Moscow's policies.
II. SOVIET POLICIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE
Berlin and Germany
he Issues arising from the division of Germany remain, as they have for the entire postwar period, the most critical ln the whole confrontation between East and West. The Soviets wish to bolster beyond challenge the Internal stability of the East Germanregime, always the potential weak link tn the East European system,reak-
in the USSR wd the Communistatedebruary IM3.
S^ET
More than three years of postponement, however, clearly signifies the USSR'sof the dangers inherent in unilateralencroaching upon Western rights in Berlin. The chief result of the stiff Soviet demands put forth again ln1 was to provoke from theisplay of firmnessilitary buildup;onsequence, the USSR felt obliged to undertake increasedexpenditures and demonstrations which in turn curbed Khrushchev's efforts toeconomic priorities in favor of the consumer. In this situation, he was quick to use the subsequent US initiative for bilateral talksretext lor withdrawingeadlineeparate treaty.
n the light of this record, we think lt unlikely that the Soviets are resolved to bring the Berlin issueead in some fixed period of time. The USSR, by closing the sector border, has overcome the refugee problemay whichirect infringement on essential Allied rights. Nevertheless, the building of the wall has reduced only one of the urgencies in their Berlin problem, and their basic objectives remain unsecured. In addition, Soviet prestige, and that ofpersonally has been deeply committed to demonstrable progress in this question. The Soviets must fear that continued failure to advance will not only hearten their West-em opponents, but will also lend greater weight among Communists to Chinesethat the "peaceful coexistence" strategyailure and In reality disguises the USSR's abandonment of militant struggle against the West.
hus we believe that thc USSR willits efforts to obtain at least minimal concessions through negotiation. Its tactics ln current diplomatic conversations andharassment on the access routes to West Berlin are intended to serve this end. At the same time, however, other Soviet maneuvers suggest an effort to broaden the scope of East-West discussionsashion which wouldundamental stalemate over the Berlin question These maneuvers are probably intended to preserve Soviet flexibility while diplomatic probing of the Allied position on Berlin continues. In addition, theythe USSR to explore the possibUities of making gains In related political areas, such as European security arrangements or greater recognition for East Germany, which couldime compensate for the lack of progress toward their objectives in Berlin.
e believe that, despite their hitherto essentially unyielding stand on the termserlin solution, there will be some flexibility in actual Soviet negotiating tactics. Among the various provisions associated with the "free city" proposal, probably the demandhange In the status of West Berlin has the greatest Immediate importance to the USSR. The Soviets probably do not expect to obtain Western agreement to this demand, however, and they are likely at some point to accept some "compromise" formula. It mightfor the allies to remain in West Berlin and to enjoy access to the city In exchange for undertakings which the Soviets could
senthange in the city's status and some de facto recognition of the GDR. This would have the additional advantage of allowing them subsequently, with minimum risk, to fulfill their commitment toeparate peace treaty, particularly If the newleft open to the allies thc face-saving device of treating East German controllers as Soviet agents Thc Soviets might even accept, as parterlin arrangement, some form of International supervision over access, but they would seek to Inject the GDR as fully as possible Into these procedures.
e have regularly estimated that. If the USSR reached the conclusion that the allies were unwilling to grant any significantin negotiations, it would proceed along the roadeparate peace treaty. Repeated Soviet procrastination on various pretexts, however, has demonstrated the USSR's extreme reluctance to take this step. While we believe that the USSR would not accompany the signingreaty with an immediate and absolute challenge to Allied access, the Soviets would not wishreaty to be entirely meaningless, yet Its risks would Increase Ln proportion to the meaning-fulness of its implementation. Accordingly, thereood chance that they will continue for some months to exercise their pressuresariety of local harassments.In this way to demoralize both the allies and the West Bcrllners and thus to create more favorable conditions for later But we cannot exclude the possibilityombination of circumstances might lead the USSR, sometime during the next year or so, to embarkourse of major unilateral steps of the kind threatenedeparate peace treaty.
hatever their tactics in the period Immediately ahead, we think it highlythat during the next few years thewill come to regard Berlin as an issue to be settledenuine and lastingwhich stops short of Incorporating the western half of the city into EastTheir objectives in this area are deeply rooted In their view of Soviet security requirements: nor will they soon abandon the idea that the changed relation of forcesEast and West has rendered Westan anachronism which they need notforever.
he USSR intends, by demonstrating the firmness of its hold upon East Germany and its ability to threaten West Berlin, to stimulate doubts in the Federal Republic about the validity of Bonn's whole foreign policy orientation. upplement to this approach, the Soviet Government has recently stepped up Its efforts to urge upon German opinion the advantagesore neutral posture. The Soviets are encouraged in this effort by the recent political gains of the Free Democrats and the prospects of Adenauer's departure. They are likely to develop this tactic further in the coming year.
he more active policy the Soviets have lately pursued toward West Germanyreflects also their concern about theof the Common Market and theunity movement. They have already made lt clear that they regard affiliation of the European neutrals with thehreat to their interests. Theirof the European unity movement has probably never been very clear, perhaps because the phenomenon of "capitalist" states submerging national Interests ininstitutions is In flat contradiction to Marxist-Leninist teachings. But theirabout this development, which they have few means to combat, are evidently real. Most of all they would be prone to suspect that the Germans will come to dominate "Europe" and find in lt the means of power to pursue "revanchist" aims. In addition, they are bound to fear the disruptive effects
on their Inherently unstable and relatively impoverished Satellite empireurope growing in unity, strength, and prosperity.
disarmament
oviet behavior in the disarmament field in the last year or so has reinforced our earlier judgments that the USSR's primary objectives in this area are to identify itself with universal desires for peace and an end to the arms race and to inhibit and discredit Western policy. Thus agitation foris conceived by the Soviets as political action Intended to bring about alignments favorable to their interests, and also to make it difficult for their opponents to employ force against Communist advances. We believe that the Soviets do have an Interest Intheir present and particularly theirmilitary burden. The economicfor disarmament, which in the past clearly has not been compelling, may acquire increasing weight if the armaments race is not contained. As for the dangers of war. the Soviets still prefer to rely on their own armed strength, and on the control which they intend to retain over the development of crisis situations, rather than to meetrequirements for inspection and to forfeit the political advantages of their great military power.
e believe that, at least during the near future, Soviet activity in this field willto aim at political exploitation and the Imposition of restraints upon their opponents rather than at agreements on terms which the West would nnd acceptable. Along with their advocacy of general and completethey will maintain an interest ln some partial measures, especially those whichpecific political import uclear free zone, for example, tends not only loWestern nuclear deployment andbut applied to Germany has the effect ofpecial denial on the Federal
Republic and weakening its military andties with its Western partners. The Soviets will also advocate schemes in the European security field which would promote the de facto recognition of the GDR anda reduction in the American military presence Ln Europe. They will also try to make use of the disarmament negotiating process for other ends: cultivating support among participating nonallgned states,the principle of tripartltism. and achieving direct contact with Western leaders.
aving completed an extensive nuclear test series last fall, the Soviets are nowto maximize the political costs of further Western testing, coupling propaganda with repeated offers toest ban treaty based on national detection systems. Now that the US has resumed atmospheric testing, we think it certain that Soviet tests will follow. At thc same time, however, the USSR will continue to agitate the test ban Issue if only because of the general political appeal of this question. But we do not foresee anymovement towards Western terms in the Soviets' position over the next year or so. They probably consider lhat theyigh priority requirement for further testing and in any case they will almost certainly continue to resist the inspection features of Western test ban proposals
tht united nafioni
learly the admission of new member states hashift in the balance of forces In the General Assembly away from Western predominance. The Soviets believe that this process has made the UN aarena for agitating Soviet aims. They have experienced some disappointments,in soliciting Afro-Asian support forpositions which go beyond the interests of these states. Moscow's tactics will continue lo aim at developing and exploiting those Issues, particularly anticolonlalism. which
swet
marked by some disappointments. Soviet policy has contributed to the removal of Western dominance, the emergence ofin some casesand thc creation of an image of the USSRenign, though powerful, anticolonialist country. In addition, through Bloc economic and military aid programs {involvingtotaling almostillion toropaganda campaigns, and political ma-neuverings. Moscow has sown the seeds of trouble for the Western Powers in various areas of the world, reduced Western Influence In the UN, and. at least indirectly,differences between the Western allies.
the other hand, to the extentSoviet leaders hoped to achievein certain countries at anthey have had to curtail theirDespite notable gains in somehave as yet failed to achieve decisiveIn any of the states which havetheir economic and militaryperhaps Ln the case of Cuba. Asthe growth of localthe Sovieteyes on,Iraq andconsiderto date asailure.
Increasing complexity of Sovietin the politics of variousthe growing number ofin Guinea, andeavy setback asin the Congo, must also serve toa more sober view of theits policies. The tendency amongstates to concert theirand the emergence of otheron the anticolonialist scene,Yugoslavia, and even represent additionalmay, in time, reduce Sovietcontain Soviet inroads. Finally, suchas these may loom the larger as thecompeting demands on Sovietgrow.
n the whole, however. Moscow almost certainly views its policiesavorable light and believes that, over the long term, itswill be served by maintaining thethrust ol its programs in these areas lor the foreseeable future. There will probably be some adjustments in Soviet policies over the next few years keyed to specificin particular areas But we do noteneral shift of Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped areasajor change in the level of the Soviet aid programs:commitment to this aspect of itstogether with its conviction that over the long-term developments in these areas wil! work in its interests, Is too broad and too deepadical change tn the foreseeable future.
africa
he USSR's activities in Africa haverapidly over the last three years and are being pressedariety of ways Through diplomacy and propaganda, it seeks to associate itself with the anticolonlalism of the continent and to place new strains onties to the West. It is vigorouslythe African trade union movement and is beginning to give greater attention to the development of Communist cadres.however, the Soviet effort Isupon state-to-state relations. Almost one-third of Soviet aid extended1 went to sub-Saharan Africa, and the USSR not only concluded new assistance agreements with Ghana, Mali, and Somalia, but made efforts to establish some influence among thetates of the Brazzaville group with offers of aid and expanded trade relations.
he USSR's setback In the Congo, Its troubles in Guinea, and the difficulties it has encountered in offering itself as the chief sponsor of African political aspirations all suggest that the Soviets have not found any reliable means ofolid position In this turbulent area. We believe that, over the next several years, the consolidation ofand economic relations with existingwhatever their political complexion, will be the primary object of Soviet policy. Attempts to capture power in Individualstates by means of Communist parties or through the infiltration of native political movements hold less immediate promise, mainly because of the almost completeof Soviet-controlled Communist cadres. Nevertheless, the USSR win continue toassets against the day whenfor these tactics might arise.
Middle East
he complexities currently facingpolicy toward the Arab world contrast sharply with the relative simplicity of the initial phase of Soviet Intervention In Near Easternperiod when the USSR scored heavily with such measures as its arms deal with Egypt5 and Its aggressive support for Nasser's campaign against the Western Powers. The USSR's support of Qaslm's regime In Iraq has complicated the problem of staying on good terms with Qa-sim's antagonist, Nasser. Moscow's attempts to avoid offense to either of these powers during the Kuwait crisis1 illustrated this dilemma.
lthough the USSR's relations with Egypt have not gone smoothly since thein Iraq and the subsequentbid for power there, the cooling inpolitical relations has not resulted in any reduction Ln Soviet economic andsupport for the United Arab Republiche USSR welcomed the breakup of the UAR last September, and presumably hopes to resume close economic and military cooperation with Syria. The question of the future role and tactics of the SyrianParty, the strongest and best-led party in the Middle East prior to its suppression by Nasser after the formation of the UAR, will
moderate progress in the past year. With the exception of Cuba, Bloc aid offers have had limited acceptance. The Soviets, however, are not likely to be discouraged by the modest gains scored thus far for they recognize that losses to US Influence in Latin America would be especially damaging to the US world position.
oscow sees inymbol of great Importance in thc struggle for Latin America and has demonstrated its intention to provide the necessary economic and militaryto insure the survival and strengthening of the Castro regime. But there are signs of Soviet concern that the regime's self-Identification with the Communist Bloc and its belligerent and provocative attitude toward the US and the rest of Latin America will weaken the appeal of the Cuban revolution and limit the prospects for expanding the Communist movement and Soviet Influence in other countries in the hemisphere. Theapparently were both surprised and embarrassed by Castro's proclamations that Cuba has entered the "era of socialistand that he isMarxist-Leninist." Such proclamations and theof the new Marxist-Leninist party in Cuba are making it difficult for Moscow to refrain from promoting Cuba into fullin the socialist camp. We believe, however, that they will avoid the latter step so as not to acquire explicit militaryto defend the security of the regime.
oscow almost certainly looks uponIn Cuba as the forerunner ofrevolutionary successes in Latin America. In certain countries, the Soviets may urge revolutionary elements to follow the Cuban modeluerrilla struggle for power.the Cuban example may have suggested to the Soviet leaders that their long-termin Latin Americahole will not always be best served by encouraging early Communist or crypto-Communiai seizures of
power. The Soviets will be chary ofthe prestige of the world movement to be staked on regimes whose continuation in power might be uncertain. Such regimes, even if they maintained power, would be eager to pursue national interests of their own and possibly might not be fully responsive todirection. They might embark on policies which could involve the USSR in unwanted economic and even implicit military Thus the Soviet leaders maycaution In their approach to thisseeit to control the militancy of the local parties, and encourage them to work inwith non-Communist "progressive" elements, trying ln this way to eliminate US influence without substituting tn itsirect and obvious Soviet presence. They will of course attempt to turn to their advantage such promising revolutionary developments as may occur, even if they cannot fully control them.
asia and the far eam
oviet policy in the Far East Isby the large and sometimesrole which Communist China plays in thc area and its challenge to Moscow's traditional authority over the Communist parties of the region. Soviet policy ln recent years has nevertheless hewed fairly consistently to the line of cultivating good relations with nation -allst, neutralist governments, even when this brought them into conflict with Chinese The Soviets refrained conspicuously from supporting China ln the Sino-Indian border dispute and in the Slno-Indonestan quarrel over Indonesia's Chinese Community. Even though Moscow's friendly attitude these "bourgeois" governments has facilitated Peiping's efforts to form Its own factions within the Communist parties the Soviets have not been deterred. We think it likely that, over the next year or so. thewill not alter their line for the sake of
composing their relations with the Chinese or helping Moscow-oriented Communists in factional conflicts within the national parties.
ndonesia has become the targetigorous Soviet drive to establish aposition, with important implications for the contest for influence with Peiping. There hasarked increase in Sovietto Djakarta since the fall appears to regard its vigorous program of political, economic, and military support for Indonesia asompellingof the correctness and effectiveness of Its policy of backing nationalist, neutralist governments, as opposed to the more radical prescriptions of Peiping. As part of this policy the Soviets are encouraging theto take West New Guinea by force. However. Stno-Sovtet differences already have resultedeightened struggle forover the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and have accentuated factionalwithin the party. In the event of an open Sino-Soviet break, the Soviets would probably encourage the PKI to purge itsfaction and would seek to retain influencelegitimate" party which would support the Soviet policy of cooperation with Sukarno.
oscow evidently continues to viewthe results of its policy towards India, where the Soviet commitment In economic aid and other support to Nehru is deepening with time. Moscow's desire to establishcontrol in India has not diminished, but the Soviets continue to regard thisong-term process and areheto build up good will and enhance Soviet prestige ln India against the time whenfor Communist acquisition of power are considerably Improved. We believe thatpolicy toward India willone of Sino-Soviet contention for some time to come. The Indian Communist Party is seriously split on
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Issue of the correct Internal strategy to fallow,trong faction has close ties with Peiping. An open Sino-Sovlet split wouldcertainly resultplit of the party. Although this would weaken the Indianmovement considerably, it would notignificant effect on Soviet policyIndia.
he USSR's political relations withremain at an impasse. Soviet hopeseftward turn in Japanese policies following the mass demonstrations against the pro-US Government0 have been largelyin part because of Soviet over-eagerness to capitalize upon this trend during subsequent elections and Mikoyan's visit. On the governmental level. Moscow continues to reject Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles and to insist upon abrogation of the defense treaty with the USrecondition for normalizing Soviet-Japanese relationseace treaty. The USSR would probably relax somewhat its present unyieldinghowever, if it detected in Tokyo signsillingness to loosen lies with the US. The USSR would probably also modify itsif an open Sino-Sovlet break were to occur, sincereak would almostlead to competition between Moscow and Peipingloser association with Japan.
he Soviets of course desire to seecontrol established at an early date in Laos and South Vietnam, and would regard this development as opening up newin the area of Southeast Asiahole. Soviet involvement in these conflicts has been Influenced heavily by the Sino-Sovlet quarrel, and we believe that the Soviets will continue to feel that Chinese arguments oblige them tohow of firm support for theforces there. At the same time, they will prefer lo advance the Communist cause primarily by political means and to avoid sub-
III. SOURCES OF POSSIBLE LONG-TERM CHANGE IN THE SOVIETn the opening section of this estimate, we have set forth certain broad considerations underlying Soviet foreign policy which are likely to remain generally valid for some time to come. We recognize, however, that the environment In which Soviet policy is made is changing. It may therefore be useful tothree majorcourse ofwithin the USSR, changingInside the Bloc and the Communist movement, and the movement of events in the East-Westto consider how they might ln the long run aflect the Soviet outlook on international politics.
Internal Developments
ithin the USSR. KhrushcheVsfrom the scene might be followedrolonged power struggle which could produce confusion and uncertainty in foreign policy or considerable fluctuations in tactics. Apart from this possibility. Khrushchev's present role testifies to the importance of theleader in the conduct of Soviet policy, and the man or group which succeeds him may Introduce significant changes in style and even in the weight attached to various tactics. We think It certain, however, that such awould appreciate, as fully as does the present one, thc consequences of nuclear war. Further, this leadership would be unlikely toubstantially different view either of the interests of the USSR or of the risks justified by these Interests. We do not believe, therefore,hange of Soviet leadership would in Itself produce any major shift in the Soviet outlook or lead to policies carryingdangers of war.
resent trends suggest that, over the long run, popular aspirations are likely toa larger influence In Soviet domestic politics.1 We believe that such awould have some effect on the conduct of foreign policy, but this process wouldcertainly be gradual and subject to Even now the Soviet people are not enthusiastically committed to at) aspects of Communist Ideology. In particular, they are not obsessed with the idea of ineradicable and total conflict, on ideological grounds, between themselves and the non-Communist world. Their desire for peace and for more rapid gains In material welfare is pronounced. To the extent that these attitudes become more important in formulating Soviet foreign policy, the USSR's reluctance to enter upon risky confrontations with thefor the sake of advancing thecause In remotebe
t the same time, thc Russian people possess strong nationalist feeling. Theyandigorous assertion ofpower on the world scene in furtherance of Soviet national Interest. Accordingly, we believe that, even if Soviet politics come to represent popular opinionreater degree than at present there would not necessarily be any substantial lessening of international conflict. But the nature of such conflict, and the atmosphere in which it took place, would change, becoming less ideological and more traditional. While East-West disputes would persist, there wouldetter chance of the occasional recognition of areas of commonbetween Lhe contending powers.
Relations in the Communiit World
oviet control over the international Communist movement Is likely to be further diminished in the face of pressures forautonomy. This process, insofar as It
'olitical Developments In the USSR and the Communistated2 formore completeof thu mntwr.
enables Individual parties toorecast to their policies, may increase the effectiveness of Communist political appeals in some areas. This result, however, is likely to be more than offset by the spectacle ol policy conflicts and doctrinal argumentthe movement. These consequences will tend to rob Soviet policy of the specialwhich lt has derived from the conceptholly united movement basedingle agreed interpretation of human society. In addition, some of the Soviet energies nowagainst the West may be diverted to combating Chinese policies in various areas.
ehind these difficulties for theof Soviet policy, however, lies theof an important change in the Soviet outlook Itself. If the Chinese challengea definitive and open Sino-Soviet break, and if China subsequently progresses toward great power status and develops an effective rivalry to the USSRlaimant toof the Communist movement, the Soviet view of world politics asipolar struggle would be increasingly difficult to In these circumstances, the Soviet leaders might come to feel that in sometheir interests paralleled those of the West rather than those of their enormous and uncontrollable neighbor.
The Coune ofCompetition
erhaps the most significant factor which will affect the Soviet outlook, however, is the success or failure which the USSR's foreign policy encounters in the years to come. Successes in expanding Soviet influence,weakenings in Western positions, and in particular any further advances of directrule will act to confirm the Soviet leaders in their analysisundamental conflict of systems destined to end ln their triumph. However, they have alreadydifficulty in translating real gains in military power into concrete politicalunder conditions of nuclear stalemate. And in the underdeveloped areas, it has proven far more difficult to move the newer nationsull association with Soviet policies and thence along the path toward Communistthan the Soviets thought it would be when, in an earlier phase, these countries were emerging from Western rule. If Soviet objectives should be continually frustrated, the Soviet leaders would have to reappraise the validity of some of their key doctrines. They might in this case gradually relax their effort to extend communismlternatively, they might become far more aggressive in order to make good on thecommitment to makeorld system; but, assuming that the West retained its deterrent power, this seems less likely because of the greater risksourse would involve. Thus US strength, maintained at an adequate deterrent level, and the effectiveness of US policy are crucialbearing upon this possible evolution in the Soviet outlook.
n sum. none of the factors discussed above portends any early or sharp change in the basic Soviet outlook upon the external world. Still less do they suggest that any deliberate renunciation of Marxism-Leninism, or of the international movement built upon it. is likely. They do point, however, to the possibility thatongspecial intensity whichhostility imparts to world politics may diminish. evelopment would not mean that International conflicts of Interest ceased to exist, or even that the danger of general war was appreciably reduced. On the
'Tbe FBI representaUve to the USDS doei not concur with paragraph SS, feeling that:
If Soviet ob|ecUves should be continuallythe Sonet leaders would have to reappraise their tactics In applying some of their key docUlnes. They might, In this case, Sad It necessary to delay their efforts to extend communism everywhere.
S^ET
the requirements of Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition, as seen by the Soviet leaders and people, would still bring the USSR into collision with the interests of other states, even if communism lost all of its fanatical character. The most that could be expected would be that some issues would become more tractable and negotiable,those which were not deeply rooted ln the national interests of the Soviet state, and that the occasional recognition of aof common interest between the USSR and its adversaries would not be Invariably stifled by ideological hostility.
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