NIE22
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
2
Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
n by iht UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai Indicated2
N?
/r
ThatinfelligtiKc argai'iiotiom parlicipaied ii me preparation at
TheInlcfligonce Agency ondmlc'hgence orgoniiotiont ol fhe Doport-menu ot Sio'e. Detente. Iho Army, the Navy.Ail Force. The Joinl Slot*.
Concurring.
etearch. Depoiimenrf ii>3fAoe-tcy
Aurpoil Chlcl ol Siorl for fnlotligence. Depart menl ot ihe Army
AtuUonl Chief of Novat Operollcmi (Intelliganca! Deportment ol lhe Novy
(HkI ol W. Wettge-ce.oroint Slot
Tho Aivironi Director, Federal Bureau ol lnveilpgcil.Ni Ohc<io> ol rhe Notional Sec.oiy Agency
Abt'amingi
Aiomic Energy CornmiMio*o ihe USIB.
iidejuriid<clion.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE
I THE SOVIET
Altitudes Toward
The Strategy of "Peaceful
The Chinese Critique of Soviet
II. SOVIET POLICIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE
Berlin and Germany
Disarmament
The
Tlie Underdeveloped
Middle East
LaUn
Asia and the Far
III. SOURCES OF POSSIBLE LONG-TERM CHANGESOVIET OUTLOOK
Internal Developments
Relations In the Communist World
Thc Course of East-West
TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable Sovicl courses of action in foreign policy over the next year or so and to examine some factors affecting the Soviet outlook on international politicsonger period
CONCLUSIONS
L Despite attacks on the general line of Soviet foreign policy by the Chinese and other Communists over the Last two years or so, and despite some disappointment with the results of that line on the part of the Soviets themselves, we believe that the general principles and tactical methods of Soviet foreign policy are likely to be continued for some time to come.
he Soviet leaders retain basic confidence in theirbelief that the Communist system isto prevail worldwide. But the aggressive quality of their policies derived from this belief will continue to be limited by their full appreciation of the dangers of general nuclear war, and their unwillingness to run serious risks ofonflict This does not mean, however, that the Soviets would always estimate such risks correctly nor that they would abandon vital Interests to avoid them. (Paras.
)
oviet tactics of struggle under the slogan ofcoexistence" rest on two basic assumptions: (a) that the USSR's economic system will demonstrate its superiority and increasingly giveower advantage; and (b) that theirst in the underdeveloped and former colonial
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but ultimately in advanced Western states also, will increasingly join the Communists in the struggle to overthrow the "system of Western)
- *ma.wu un uie peripnery
the Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself.
The greater stress placed by the Soviets In thc last year or two on wars of "naUonal liberation" is inesponse to Chinese criticism that the Soviets were magnilying the dangers of war with the West and underplaying therole of violence. Despite these Chinese pressures, the USSR has not given full political and material support or committed its prestige to all armed anti-Western movements in the underdeveloped areas. We believe that the Soviets will continue to follow an opportunistic policy in this regard.,
Although the Soviets are unlikely,atter of general policy, to use their own forces to achieve local gains, they might do so in some area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged that the political circumstances were favorable and believed that thc West would not make an effective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as
wu'icb luicca tut necessary if some Western military action on the periphery
see no prospect for acceptance by the Soviets ofstabilized situation in Germany, whichcontinue to regardey area of struggle. Whilechallenge to the Western position in Berlina separate "peace treaty" with East Germanyexcluded, it seems more likely that the Soviets willto pursue their aims by diplomatic pressure andunilateral steps designed to whittle away the Western
^position and to establish the de facto sovereignty of the East German regime. )
is unlikelyhange in Soviet leadershipany major shift in the Soviet outlook or leadcarrying increased dangers of war. However,present role testifies to thc importance of theleader in the conduct of Soviet policy, and the
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man or group which succeeds him may introduce significant changes in style and even in the weight attached to various tactics.
ver the long run, the concept of ineradicable hostility between systems may gradually come to carry less weight in determining Soviet International conduct. The chances ofong-run change depend to some extent upon the strength of certain evolutionary trends within Soviet society and,reater extent, on the Impact of divisions within the Communist movement But most of all they depend on whether fundamental Communist beliefs are sustained by successes in the East-West struggle or, over an extended period of time, arc challenged by failure to achieveprogress in that struggle. Thus US strength, maintained at an adequate deterrent level, and the effectiveness of US policy, are crucial factors bearing upon this possiblein the Soviet outlook. )
ven Ifendency should emerge, however, strong national aspirations would conUnue to sustain great East-West conflicts of interest The requirements of Sovietsecurity, prestige, and ambition, as seen by the Soviet leaders and people, would still bring the USSR into collision with the interests of other states, even if communism lost all of its fanatical character. The most that could be expected would bc that some issues would become more tractable and negotiable, particularly those which were not deeply rooted in the national interests of the Soviet state.
3
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DISCUSSION
THE SOVIET OUTLOOK
Tho mood of exuberant confidence which marked the conduct of Soviet foreign policy two or three years ago seems In the Last year or so to have sobered somewhat In the aftermath of the Sputnik success7 the Soviets appeared for some time to entertain expectations of early advances at the expense of thc West But the promising factors which spurred the Soviet mood In that period seem to have lost some of their force and new complications have arisen.
As the Soviets2 to.hoy must recognize that the significant advantage they then believed they wouldIn missiles and therefore In strategic posture has failed to materialize.ettlement of the Berlin andquestion in accord with Sovietwhich probably seemed good9 and the springere notand the attempt to resume pressure on this subject inharp rise in the pace of the arms race. Thisin tum tightened the chronic squeeze on Soviet resourcesime when someprograms, notably in agriculture. In housing, and in some branches of investment, were falling well short of expectations. Added to these concerns, there has been since at least the spring0 an ever sharpening crisis In relations wtth Communist China. This development has brought confusion and uncertainty to tlie International Communist movement, which thc Soviets see as aninstrument of their challenge to the West.
This is not to say that the lasl year or two has been marked only by On the contrary, there have been
significant successes also. The Soviets have doubtless viewed the Cuban developmentain. Also they evidently believe that trends generally in Latin America and in some other parts of the underdeveloped world show great promise In the long term. They probablythe "naUonal liberation" struggles ln Lias and South Vietnam as progressing on Uie whole favorably. Nevertheless, the more rapid general advance of Communist fortunes which the Soviets seemed to have anticipated two or three years ago has failed toTheir confidence in the outlook at present, while still strong, seems to havea somewhat more dogged quality and to be keyed to an expectation of slowerThere has been no evidence, however, of any fundamental reappraisal of policy in the lightomewhat disappointing record of events. Indeed the general principles and tactical methods of Soviet foreign policy which Khrushchev had developed earlier were reaffirmed at the XXII Party Congress of
he visible growth of Soviel power and of Soviel influence abroad is the primarysustaining the Soviets* basic confidence. Thus the Soviets feel lhat the presentof forces enables them to challenge Uie Western Powers at crisis points everywhere, although they appreciate that Uie risks of nuclear warfare Impose caution on themselves as well as their opponents. The US,now asserts, must realize that thc tune has passed when it could have its own way in the world, even in an area like Latinit must recognize the USSR's claim to be its great power equal, and therefore cniiUed to be Involved in Uie settlement of all major international questions.
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addition to these considerations,outlook on foreign policy is alsoby thc Ideology of MarxismThis doctrine leads the Sovietsee the world movement of historicalfavorable to them, to believe that theyall sorts of popular andwith their cause, to regardsocieties of the West asdestined to give way. Such anby Itself few tacticalcan be1 used to Justify periods ofwell as the vigorous exploitation ofBut it anchors Soviet policy tothat international politics is ata clash of systems which precludeslasting accommodation with
Soviet doctrines, however, arc notKhrushchev has been resourceful in introducing reformulations whichrowing awareness of the dangers andconfronting the USSR aa It extends its operations in the world arena. He has placed great stress, often at the cost otconfusion and conflict, on the pre vent-ability of war. on the decisiveness of economic competition, on the legitimacy of cooperation with non-Communlst and even antl-Commu-nlst governments. These theses are Intended to permit the USSR to pursue its externalwith greater flexibility andAt the same time, they are designed to Justify policies which pennit carefulof military risks and accord high priority to the goal of domestic economic growth.
The USpecial place In the Soviet outlodk. The primary clement In the Soviet attitude is. of course, the concept of Washington as the stronghold of thc enemy camp. In addition, however, the Soviets have great respect and even admiration for USerlal achievements. As rulersation which has newly reached the statusuper power, they greatly value any American ac-
knowledgements of equality and, conversely, arc highly sensitive to any Americanof or challenge to their prestige. This factor also contributes to the recurrent Soviet impulse toward bilateralism. Moscowappears to be Intrigued with the notion that the two greatest powers could somehow combine to contain or override the Interests of lesser powers. But this Idea, whichout of harmony with the premise of basic conflict of systems, has noteadiness to compromise on the major issues ln dispute between the US and the USSR We believe Uiat. ln the future as well, this idea Is more likely to affect thc manner in which the USSR approaches these issues, and that only occasionally, than to alter the substance of its positions.
AH VI odes Toward War
undamental hostility toward the non-Communlst world defines one limit of Soviet foreign policy; so long as It persists, the USSR will regard international Issues asprogressively to weaken andits opponents, and not as occasions for conciliation which would guard theof all parlies. The olher limit, whichheck upon this aggressiveness, is the Soviet leaders' awareness that their ownand system would face destructioneneral nuclear war. Both their statements and their actions in recent years havetheir unwillingness to run anyrisks of this eventuality. This docs not mean, however, that they would always estimate the risks correctly, nor does it mean that Uiey would abandon interests theyvital In order to avoid grave risk of nuclear war.
he Soviet leaders evidently continue to base their military and foreign policy planning on Uie assumption that the present overall military rclaUonshlp, In which each side canstrong deterrent upon thc
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will continue for some time to come. They are clearly determined lo maintain and Improve their strong military posture. In addition, they are vigorously pursuingof research and development tnweapons to acquire whatever military advantage they can, and they would, of course, make heavy political use of anythey achieve. It Is possible that some future technological brealrthrough would persuade them that they had acquired aadvantage and could therefore press the West with far more aggressive policies. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their policies upon the expectation that they will be able to achieve, withinilitary posture which Would make the deliberate Initiation of generalational decision; the Soviets realize that the US is determined to maintain second-strike capabilities which would visitdestruction upon them. In any case their policies rest on tlie conviction thatvictory can be won without resort to nuclear war.
he overt Soviet position on limited wars Is that these will grow, rapidly andinto general nuclear war and are therefore also to be avoided. In our view this formulation Is primarily designed to deter the West from the local use of force and docs not mean lhat the Soviets would themselvesexpand any local conflict intowar; rather, if at all possible they would employ political means to prevent suchIn circumstances where theyocal preponderance of power butWestern* interests were at stake, they would probably use that power with restraint in order not lo confront their opponent with lhc painful choice of enlarging the conflict oronspicuous defeat
e believe lhat thc Soviets are un-likely,atter of general policy, tothe military and political risks Involved
in using their own forces to achieve local gains. Nevertheless, they might do so In aome area adjacent to Bloc territory If they Judged lhat the West, either because It was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or for some other reason, would not make an effective military response. They would probably employforces as necessary If some Westernaction on the periphery of the Bloc threatened the Integrity of the Bloc Itself. Even in the latter case, however, they would attempt to use their forcesayto bring hostilitiesonclusion short of general war.uch lower level, they will almost certainly encourage and support tlie use of force by pro-Communist forces when they believeocal situation ls ripe for forceful exploitation and that theto Western interests ts not great enough, and their own involvement not direct enough, to Involve risksirect encounter between US and Soviel forces.
his estimate of Soviet views on general and local war Is generally consistent with the positions laid out by Khrushchev, when he defined various types of wars and thc USSR's attitude toward them. On that occasion. In addition to stating Soviet opposition to both world, wars and local wars between stales, Khrushchevategory of "wars of naUonal liberation, or popular uprisings." Such Internal wars, ranging pro-Soviet or anti-Western forces against colonial or pro-Western regimes, he declared to bc "Just" and deserving ofsupport He was carefully vague,ln discussing thc forms which thiswould take, and In particular he neither promised nor hinted Uiat Soviet forces would jojn In Uie fighting. It has become dear In the past year that this wastatement of Intent to usherew phase of vigorous Soviet incitement of such conflictsor of maximum miliiary assistance to "national liberation" forces.
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Instead, it seems likely thatemphasis on "national liberation" warfare,ew idea at all. was intended in part to meet Chinese criticisms then being made that the USSR, by Its undifferentiated stress upon the need to avoid war, was In fact ruling out altogether thc use of force lnthe Coromunist cause. This chargeajor component of the Chinese attack upon the correctness of Soviet policies and, therefore, upon the legitimacy of the USSR's traditional leadership of the Communist movement. It is also designed to win for China the allegiance of Communists andIn the less developed countries, who are less firmly tied to Soviet leadership than their European counterparts. Despite thesepressures, the USSR has not given full political and material support or committed its prestige to all armed anti-Westernin the underdeveloped areas. Wcthat the Soviets will continue to follow an opportunistic policy In this regard.
The Strategy of "Peaceful Coexiileoce"
n the Soviet leaders' assessment of the forces at work in the modern world, thereost of Issues, trends, and sentiments which can be turned to their account. The strategy of "peacefulhich is the fruit of this assessment, is Intended to focus the attention and energies of Communistsupon the incessant exploitation ol these forces. This strategy puts great stress on the virtues ol flexibility and expediency, and allowside variety of contradictoryfrequently pursued simultaneously. Thus military intimidation goes hand ln hand with championing of the peace theme,governments are courted while their local Communist opponents receiveupport, and the Western Powers are treated to promises of detente while their colonies and cx-colonles arc urged to turn againsi the "Im-
perialists" and while Moscow maintains Its demands for concessions on Berlin.
One noteworthy tactic of this strategy is the raising periodically of demands for Summit meetings. Because his success In Soviet politics has depended partly on his personal qualities. Khrushchev Is probably prone to overestimate the effect on foreign statesmen of the pressure he brings to bear ln personal encounter. He also believes that, ateeting, his Western counterparts will be under greater pressure than he tofailure" and will therefore be obliged to make concessions to Soviet positions. Khrushchev clearlyersonal penchant for meetings with thc President, which we beheve reflects his desire that the USSR shall be acknowledged as America's great power equal and that hc himself shall personify this equality. Finally, he probably alsoof Summit meetingsay of further entrenching his own leadership In the USSR and the validity of his own prescriptions for dealing with the West.
Central to the "peaceful coexistence" strategy ls the belief that time Is on the side of the USSR and that, without general war. thc Western position can be gradually but steadily eroded This belief in turn rests in great part upon the Soviet conviction that economic competition is the decisive factor in the struggle of the two systems. This ls the meaning of the slogan emphasized soat the XXII Congress, that the Soviet Party "considers Communist construction In the Soviel Union as the fulfillment of Itsduty to the working people of allhe Soviet leaders expect that tangible economic successes In physical power and popular well-being will prove so
' impressive and attractive, and solo their opponents, that their ownand prospects in the international arena will be steadily enhanced.
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Chinese Oitique of Soviet Policy
But this slogan, however closely It is linked In thc Soviet outlook with the prospects Of the Communist movement, clearly Implies that tho claims of that movement will beto the security concerns andInterests of the USSR. And so It is precisely at this point, where thc theses on war and economic competition combine to produce the strategy of "peacefulhat the Chinese Communists haveundamental dissent. They perceive in this Sovietustification for denyingto courses of action which meet Chinese Interests but fail to serve directly thcof the USSR. The Chinese leaders see confirmation of their suspicionsost of Indicators; Soviet reluctance to provide them with advanced weapon capabilities,recurrent moves toward detente and direct dealings with the Western leaders,stress on the disarmament issue, and Its unwillingness to give support to all out tactics of militancy in all areas of contention with the West. Perhaps most important, the Chinese object to the Soviet leaders' insistence upon building communism in thc USSR first and their concomitant refusal to delayprogress In order to bring all members of thc Bloc up to the level of their own
There is some truth, we believe. Incontentions, but it is an old truth. Ever since Its founding the USSR has regularly subordinated the claims of foreignparties to national objectivesonflict arose between them. The essential difference now is that, with thc growth of thc in lernatlonarv movement and especially with the uccesslon of some parlies to state power, these claims have become more diverse and urgent. In particular. China haspower and independence to defy Soviet discipline and to argue its case with great force
have analyzedecentway in which the Soviets sought atCongress, by tbe attacks onand the "antlpartyoPciping's policyhen andlhe USSR has reasserted Itspolicies in the face of oppositionmovement and has served noticeto "peaceful coexistence" Is aof Communist discipline. Thenevertheless continued publicly toand criticize Soviet policies, makingdoctrinal arguments which findresponse among Communists whothe orthodoxy of an earlier day. Wcthat there Is no longer much chancefundamental resolution of Sino-Sovietand tliat In the continuingbetween thc two the USSR, despiterebuttal of Chinese criticisms,Itself unable to Ignore them entirelyIts tactics. This factor will not,view, cause the Soviets to run significant!risks ln East-West confrontationsare now willing to contemplate.upon the course of thisit will exert greater or lesserthe USSR lo display militancy againstand to achieve tangible successesIhe correctness of
IL SOVIET POUCIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE
Berlin ond Germany
Issues arising from the divisionremain, as they have for theperiod, the most critical in thebetween East and Westwish lo bolster beyond challengestability of the East Germanregime, always the potential weakthe East European system,rcak-
'NTEh-relopmenuiIn Ul* USSR and Uie Communistated II2
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of Communist power could place ln hazard all the regimes under Soviet hegemony in that area. The concurrent Soviet offensive aim ls to limit the West German contribution to the strength of NATO and ultimately to separate the Federal Republic from Itspartners. Both of these objectives have inspired the three year old Soviet effort to erode thc Western position in Berlin andtoithdrawal of the allies from the city. Khrushchev believes that, if he Is successful, this wouldong stepestablishing the permanence andof the GDR and would at the same timeody blow to West Germany'sIn Its allies and. indeed, to thcand cohesion of the entire "NATO
More than three years of postponement, however, clearly signifies the USSR'sof the dangers Inherent in unilateralencroaching upon Western rights in Berlin. The chief result of the stiff Soviet demands put forth again In1 was to provoke from theisplay of firmnessilitary buildup;onsequence, the USSR fell obliged to undertake Increasedexpenditures and demonstrations which in turn curbed Khrushchev's efforts loeconomic priorities In favor of thc consumer. In this situation, he was quick to use thc subsequent US initiative for bilateral talksretext for withdrawingeadlineeparate treaty.
In the light of this record, we think it unlikely that the Soviels are resolved to bring the Berlin issueead in some fixed period of time. The*USSR, by closing the sector border, has overcome thc refugee problemay whichirect Infringement on essential Allied rights. Nevertheless, the building of the wall has reduced only one of the urgencies In their Berlin problem, and their basic objectives remain unsecured. In addition. Soviet prestige, and that of Khru-
shchev personally has been deeply committed to demonstrable progress In this question. The Soviets must fear that continued failure to advance will not only hearten theiropponents, but will also lend greater weight among Communists to Chineselhat the "peaceful coexistence" strategyailure and In reality disguises the USSR's abandonment of militant struggle against the West
hus we believe that the USSR willIts efforts to obtain at least minimal concessions through negotiation. Its tactics in current diplomatic conversations andharassment on the access routes to West Berlin are intended to serve this end. At the same lime, however, other Soviet maneuvers suggest an effort to broaden the scope of East-West discussionsashion which wouldundamental stalemate over the Berlin question. These maneuvers are probably Intended to preserve Soviet flexibility while diplomatic probing of the Allied position on Berlin continues. In addition, theythe USSR to explore the possibilities of making gains in related political areas, such as European security arrangements or greater recognition for East Germany, which couldme compensate for the lack of progress toward their objecUves in Berlin.
e believe that, despite their hitherto essentially unyielding stand on the termserlin solution, there will be some flexibility in actual Soviet negotiating tactics. Among Uie various provisions associated with lhe "free city" proposal, probably the demandhange in Uie status of West Berlin has Uie greatest Immediate Importance to Uie USSR. The Soviets probably do not expect to obtain Western agreement to this demand, however, and they are likely at some point to accept some "compromLte" formula. It mightfor Uie allies to remain in West Berlin and to enjoy access to Uie city in exchange for undertakings which the Soviets could rcpre-
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hange ln the city's status and some de facto recognition of the ODR. This would have the additional advantage of allowing them subsequenUy. with minimum risk, to fulfill their commitment toeparate peace treaty, particularly If the newleft open to the allies the face-saving device of treating East German controllers as Soviet agents. The Soviets might even accept, as parterlin arrangement, some form of international supervision over access, but they would seek to Inject the ODR as fully as possible Into these procedures.
We have regularly estimated that, If the USSR reached the conclusion that the allies were unwilling to grant any significantIn negotiations. It would proceed along the roadeparate peace treaty. Repeated Soviet procrastination on various pretexts, however, has demonstrated thc USSR's extreme reluctance to take this step. While we believe that the USSR would not accompany the signingreaty with an immediate and absolute challenge to Allied access, the Soviets would not wishreaty to be entirely meaningless, yet Its risks would Increase In proportion to the meaning-fulness of its implementation. Accordingly, thereood chance that they will continue for some months lo exercise their pressuresariety of local harassments,in this way to demoralize both thc allies and the West Berllncrs and thus to create more favorable conditions for laterBut we cannot exclude thc possibilityombination of circumstances might lead Uie USSR, sometime during thc next year or so. to embarkourse of major unilateral steps of Uie kind threatenedeparate peace Ueaty.
Whatever their tactics in the period immediately ahead, we think It highlythat during the next few years Uiewill come to regard Berlin as an Issue
to be settledenuine and lastingwhich stops short of Incorporating Uie western half of the city Into EastTheir objectives in this area are deeply rooted ln their view of Soviet security requirements: nor will they soon abandon Uie idea Uiat the changed relation of forcesEast and West has rendered Westan anachronism which Uiey need notforever.
The USSR intends, by demonstrating the firmness of Its hold upon East Gennany and Its ability to threaten West Berlin, to stimulate doubts in Uie Federal Republic about Uie validity of Bonn's whole foreign policy orientation.upplement to Uus approach, the Soviet Government has recenUy stepped up Its efforts to urge upon German opinion Uie advantagesore neutral posture. The Soviets are encouraged ln Uus effort by the recent political gains of the Free Democrats and Uie prospects of Adenauer's departure. They arc likely to develop this tactic further In the coming year.
The more active policy thc Soviets have lately pursued toward West Germanyreflects also their concern about theof Uie Common Market and Uieunity movement. They have already made it clear that they regard affiliation of Uie European neutrals with thehreat to their interests. Theirof Uie European unity movement has probably never been very clear, perhaps because Uie phenomenon of "capitalist" states submerging naUonal interests in suprana-Uonal institutions is ln flat contradiction to Marxist-Leninist teachings. But theirabout this development, which they have few means to combat, are evidently real. Most of all Uiey would be prone to suspecte Germans will come to dominate "Europe" and find ln It the means of power to pursue "rcvanchlsl" alms. In addition, they are bound to fear the disruptive effects
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their inherently unstable and relatively impoverished Satellite empireurope growing in unity, strength, and prosperity.
Disarmament
Soviet behavior in the disarmament Held in the last year or so has reinforced our earlier Judgments that the USSR's primary objectives in this area are to Identify itself with universal desires for peace and an end to the arms race and to inhibit and discredit Western policy. Thus agitation forls conceived by the Soviets as political action Intended to bring about alignments favorable to their interests, and also to make It difficuli for their opponents to employ force against Communist advances. We believe that the Soviets do have an Interest Intheir present and particularly theirmilitary burden. The economicfor disarmament, which in the past clearly has not been compelling, may acquire Increasing weight If the armaments race is not contained. As for the dangers of war, the Soviets still prefer to rely on their own armed strength, and on the control'which they intend to retain over the development of crisis situations, rather than to meetrequirements for inspection and to forfeit the political advantages of their great military power.
We believe that, at least during thc near future, Soviet activity in this field willto aim at political exploitation and the imposition of restraints upon their opponents rather than at agreements on terms which the West would find acceptable. Along with their advocacy of general and completethey will maintain an Interest in some partial measures, especially those whichpecific politicaluclear free zone, for example, tends not only toWestern nuclear deployment andbut applied to Germany has thc effect ofpecial denial on the Federal
Republic and weakening its military andtics with its Western partners. Thc Soviets will also advocate schemes in the European security field which would promote the de facto recognition of the GDR anda reduction ln the American military presence ln Europe. They will also try to make use of the disarmament negotiating process for other ends: cultivating support among participating nonaligned states,the principle of tripartltlsm, and achieving 'direct contact with Western leaders.
completed an extensive'series last fall, the Soviets are nowto maximize the political costs oftesting, coupling propagandaoffers toest ban treatynational detection systems. Now thathas resumed atmospheric testing,it certain that Soviet tests willthe same tune, however, the USSRto agitate the test ban issue ifof the general political appeal ofBut we do not foresee anymovement towards Westernthe Soviets' position over the next yearThey probably consider that theypriority requirement for furtherin any case they will almostto resist the inspection featurestest ban proposals.
Tho United Notions
the admission ot newhashift In. the balancein the General Assembly awaypredominance. The Sovietsthis process has made the UN aarena for agitating Soviet aims.experienced some disappointments,in soliciting Afro-Asian support forpositions which go beyond thethese states. Moscow's tactics willaim at developing and exploitingparticularly antlcoloniallsm, which
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effective demonstrations of Soviet sympathy and support for thecountries. At the same time, the USSR will continue toecord, ln the UN and elsewhere, on the troika principle. This device Is Intended ln the first Instance to prevent International authorities,the Secretary General, from takingactions against Soviet interests; it also serveseans of asserting the USSR's claimositron In thc UN and the world at large which fully acknowledges'Its power. When the question of the Secretaryrole comes upl3 the Soviets will again press vigorously the case they made for reorganization upon Hammarskjold's death, but we believe lhat In the end they willompromise solution.
The Underdeveloped Areav
Moscow inaugurated its offensive against the West in the underdeveloped areas of the world some seven years ago. it did so in the first instance In order to counter and complicate Western policy and to remove dominant Western Influence from these areas. Secondly, It sought toattern of economic and military dependence on the USSR and. in this way, toasting and Influential Soviet presence. It also sought to become the poUtical sponsor of anticolonialist regimes ond to magnify their radical anti-Western tendencies. At the same time it hoped lo establish or strengthen thc local Communist parties and to prepare conditions for their eventual revolutionary role.'lt is unlikely that thc Soviets hadimetable for the advance of the Communist movement tn theareas, they probably anticipated fairly constant and fairly rapid progress toward these various goals.
In reviewing successes and failures over the years, the Soviet leaders roust now count their efforts as generally successful, though
12
marked by some disappointments. Soviet policy has contributed to the removal of Western dominar.ee. the emergence ofIn some casesand thc creation of an image of the USSRenign, though powerful, anUcolonlallst country. In addition, through Bloc economic and military aid programs (Involvingtotaling almostillion toropaganda campaigns, and poUtical ma-neuverlngs, Moscow has sown the seeds of trouble for the Western Powers In various areas of the world, reduced Western Influence in the UK, and, at least Indirectly,differences between the Western alUes.
On the other hand, to the extent lhat thc Soviet leaders hoped to achieve dominant influence In certain countries at an early date, they have had to curtail theirDespite notable gains in some areas they have as yet failed to achieve decisiveIn any of thc states which havetlieir economic and military assistance, except perhaps in the case of Cuba. As for promoting thc growth of local Communist parties, the Sovieteyes on. for example. Iraq andconsider their efforts to date asailure.
Thc increasing complexity of Sovietin the politics of various countries and the growing number of embarrassments, as in Guinea, andeavy setback asIn the Congo, must also serve to giveore sober view of the prospects for Its policies. Thc tendency amongstates to concert their independent policy and the emergence of other Influential voices on the anticolonialist scene, chiefly Egypt. Yugoslavia, and even Communist China, represent additional complications which may. in time, reduce Soviet influence and contain Soviet Inroads. Finally, suchas these may loom the larger as thccompeting demands on Soviet economic resources grow.
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Uie whole, however, Moscowviews its policiesavorablebelieves Uiat, over the long term, itswill be served by maintaining Uiethrust of Its programs in these areasforeseeable future. There willsome adjustments In Soviet policiesnext few years keyed to specificIn particular areas. But wc doa general shift of Soviet policyunderdeveloped areasajorthe level of Uie Soviet aid programs;commitment to this aspect of itstogether with its conviction Uiat overdevelopments ln these areasIn its Interests, Is too broad and tooa radical change ln Uie foreseeable future.
Africa
The USSR's activities In Africa haverapidly over Uie last three years and are being pressedariety of ways Through diplomacy and propaganda. It seeks to associate Itself with the anUcolonlalism of Uie continent and lo place new strains onUcs to the West. It Is vigorously cul-Uvating thc African trade union movement and ls beginning to give greater attention to the development of Communist cadres.however. Uie Soviet effort Isupon state-to-state relations. Almost one-third of Soviet aid extended1 went to sub-Saharan Africa, and the USSR not only concluded new assistance agreements with Ghana. Mall, and Somalia, but made efforts to establish some influence among Uietales of the Brazzaville group with ofTers of aid and expanded trade relations.
TheMISSR's setback in thc Congo, ils troubles ln Guinea, and the difficulties it has encountered in offering itself as Uie chief sponsor of African political aspirations allsuggest Uiat Uie Soviets have not found any reliable means ofolid position In this turbulent area. We believe that, over the
next several years, Uie consolidaUon oland economic relaUons with cxisUngwhatever their political complexion, will be Uie primary object of Soviet policy. Attempts to capture power in individualstates by means of Communist parties or through the Infiltration of native political movements bold less immediate promise, mainly because of Uie almost completeof Soviet-controlled Communist cadres. Nevertheless. Uie USSR will conUnue toassets against thc day whenfor these tactics might arise.
Middle East
The complexities currently facingpolicy toward Uie Arab world contrast sharply with thc relaUve simplicity of Uie Initial phase ot Soviet Intervention in Near Easternperiod when thc USSR scored heavily with such measures as Its arms deal with Egypt5 and its aggressive support for Nasser's campaign against the Western Powers. The USSR's support of Qasim's regime in Iraq has complicated the problem of staying on good terms withantagonist. Nasser. Moscow's attempts to avoid offense to either of these powers during Uie Kuwait crisis1 illustrated this dilemma.
Although the USSR's relations with Egypt have not gone smoothly since thcIn Iraq and the subsequentbid for [lower there. Uie cooling Inpolitical relations has not resulted in any reduction In Soviet economic andsupport for Uie United Arab Republichc USSR welcomed Uie breakup of the UAR last September, and presumably hopes to resume close economic and military cooperation with Syria. The question of Uie fuiure role and tactics of the SyrianParty, tbe strongest and besl-lcd parly In the Middle East prior to its suppression by Nasser after the formation of thc UAR, will
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iihcull problem for Moscow. Itlikely, however, that the Soviets will seek to prevent overly militant Communist tactics, of thc sort unsuccessfully employed by the Iraqi Communistsethere will be no significant change In Soviet policy toward Iraq, Syria, and the UAR over the next year; Moscow will seek to avoid Involvement in controversy among these three states and to maintain goodwith all of them.
Soviet leaders view Iran aspromising and vulnerableappear confident that events area revolutionary explosion whichLn the overthrow of thc Shah'snationalist. anti-Western forcessever Iran's tics with the West.has endeavored to hastenby seeking to discredit thchis government as Americanbelieve that the Soviet policy towardCENTO, will continue along thelines; we do not foresee anymoves ln Iran over the next year ora domestic upheaval which offerednew opportunities for sub-versionof their political influence.continue to press for aand restrictions against foreign
Latin America
Soviets view latin America asin the opening stage of an "activeimperialism" and they expectopportunities for the expansioninfluence will develop. TheyBrazil as the most significanttarget for economic andand will make considerablebroaden the opening won In thediplomatic relations last November.however, the USSR's effort towith Latin American states has made only
moderate progress in the past year. With thc exception of Cuba. Bloc aid offers have had limited acceptance. The Soviets, however, are not likely to be discouraged by the modest gains scored thus far for they recognize that losses to US Influence Ln Latin America would be especially damaging to the US world position.
Moscow sees Lnymbol of great importance Ln thc struggle for Latin America and has demonstrated its intention to provide the necessary economic and militaryto insure the survival and strengthening of thc Castro regime. But there are signs of Soviet concern that thc regime's self-Identification with the Communist Bloc and its belligerent and provocative attitude toward the US and the rest of Latin America will weaken the appeal of the Cuban revolution and limit the prospects for expanding the Communist movement and Soviet Influence in other countries in the hemisphere. Theapparently were both surprised and embarrassed by Castro's proclamations that Cuba has entered the "era of socialistand that he isuch proclamations and theof the new Marxist-Leninist party in Cuba are making it difficult for Moscow to refrain from promoting Cuba into fullIn the socialist camp. We believe, however, that they will avoid the latter step so as not to acquire explicit militaryto defend the security of the regime.
Moscow almost certainly looks uponln Cuba as the forerunner ofrevolutionary successes In Latin America. In certain countries, the Soviets may urge revolutionary elements to follow the Cuban modeluerrilla struggle for power.thc Cuban example may have suggested to the Soviet leaders that their long-termIn Latin Americahole will not always be best served by encouraging early Communist or crypto-Communlsl seizures of
SEorer
The SovieU will be chary ofthe prestige of the world movement to be staked on regimes whose continuation in power might be uncertain. Such regimes, even If they maintained power, would be eager to pursue national Interests of their own and possibly might not be fully responsive todirection. They might embark on policies which could Involve the USSR In unwanted economic and even Implicit militaryThus the Soviet leaders maycaution ln their approach to thisseek to control thc militancy of the local parties, and encourage them to work Inwith non-Communist "progressive" elements, trying in this way to eliminate US influence without substituting In Itsirect and obvious Soviet presence. They will of course attempt to turn to their advantage such promising revolutionary developments as may occur, even if they cannot fully control them.
Asia and the Far East
oviet policy in the Far East isby the large and sometimesrole which Communist China plays In thc area and its challenge lo Moscow's traditional authority over thc Communist parties of the region. Soviet policy in recent years has nevertheless hewed fairly consistently to the line of cultivating good relations withneutralist governments, even when this brought them into conflict with Chinese The Soviets refrained conspicuously from supporting China in thc Sino-lndian border dispute and in the Slno-lndoneslan quarrelndonesia's Chinese Community. Even though Moscow's friendly attitudethese "bourgeois" governments has facilitated Pciping's efforts to form Its own factions within the Communist parties the Soviets have not been deterred. We think it likely lhat. over the next year or so, thcwill not alter their line for the sake of
composing their relations with the Chinese or helping Moscow-oriented Communists in factional connicts within the naUonal parUes.
ndonesia has become the targetigorous Soviet drive to establish aposiUon. with important implication', for the contest for influence with Peiping. There liasarked Increase in Sovietto Djakarta since Uie fall appears lo regard Its vigorous program of poUUcal, economic, and military support for Indonesia asompellingof Uie correctness and effecUveness of Its policy of backing nationalist, neutralist governments, as opposed to Uie more radical prescriptions of Peiping. As part of this policy the Soviets are encouraging Uieto take West New Guinea by force. However, Sino-Soviet diflerences already have resultedeightened struggle forover thc Indonesian Communist Partynd have accentuated factionalwithin the party. In the event of an open Sino-Soviet break, the Soviets would probably encourage the PKI to purge itsfaction and would seek to retain influencelegitimate" party which would support the Soviet policy of cooperaUon with Sukarno.
oscow evidently continues to viewthe results of ils policy towards India, where llie Soviel commitment in economic aid and other support to Nehru is deepening with time. Moscow's desire to establishcontrol In India has not diminished, but Uie Soviets continue to regard Ihisong-term process and are prepared In theto build up good will and enhance Soviet prestige in India against the time whenfor Communist acquisition of power are considerably Improved. We believe thatpolicy toward India willone of Sino Soviet contention for some time to come. Thc Indian Communist Party is seriously split on
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Issue of the correct Internal strategy to follow,trong faction has close lies wiih Peiping. An open Sino-Soviet spilt wouldcertainly resultplit of the parly. Although this would weaken the Indianmovement considerably, it would notignificant effect on Soviet policyIndia
The USSR's political relations withremain at an Impasse. Soviet hopeseftward turn in Japanese policies following the mass demonstrations against tlie pro-US Government0 have been largelyUi part because of Soviet over-eagerness to capitalize upon this trend during subsequent elections and Mlkoyan's visit On the governmental level. Moscow continues to reject Japanese claims to the southern Kuril es and lo Insist upon abrogation of thc defense treaty with thc USrecondition for normalising Soviet-Japanese relationseace treaty. The USSR would probably relax somewhat its present unyieldinghowever, if it detected In Tokyo signsUlingness to loosen ties with tlie US. Thc USSR would probably also modify itsif an open Sino-Soviet break were to occur, sincereak would almostlead to competition between Moscow and Peiphigloser association with Japan.
Thc Soviets ol course desire to seecontrol established at on early date in Laos and South Vietnam, and would regard this development as opening up newin the area of Southeast Asiahole. Soviet involvement ln these conflicts has been influenced heavjly by the Sino-Soviet quarrel, and we believe that the Soviets will continue to feel that Chinese arguments oblige them tohow of firm support for theforces there. At the same time, they will prefer lo advance the Communist cause primarily by political means and to avoid sub-
stantial risks of direct US mUitary
attitude Is likely to governreaction to the intensification,support, of operations against thoMoscow will share the concern ofand Peiping toecisivethe local Communist forces in Southand the USSR may come underto support the more aggressiveand miliiary policy favored by thesestates. But the Sovietcertainly realize that the USraises the stakes ln SouthUSSR Is not disposed to make heavyor Jeopardize other objectivesWest In order to make immediatean area which Is of more direct concernand Peiping. They are likely,toradualist strategy and losome temporary setbacks Inthe risks of substantial Involvement tothc Viet Cong.
their differences, thcthe Chinese do not appear to becross purposes in these two countries.an open split between the twogreat strains upon theirplit would produce anradical shift in Communist conductand South Vietnam.egree of independenceChina and the USSR In both LaosVietnam it Is the interests ofwhich are most Immediately atthe tactics being followed are thoseby Hanoi and ImplementedHanoi controlled assets. In the wakeSino-Soviet split, both Moscow andbe concerned with increasing theirwith thc North Vietnamese, anddisposed therefore to supportas to policies in Laos and
SEGRET
SOURCES OF POSSIBLE LONG-TERM CHANGE IN THE SOVIETn lhe opening section of this estimate, we have set forth certain broad considerations underlying Soviet foreign policy which are likely to remain generally valid for some time to come. We recognize, however, that the environment in which Soviet policy Is made Is changing. It may therefore be useful tothree majorcourse ofwithin the USSR, changinginside the Bloc and the Communist movemeni. and thc movement of events In the East-Westto consider how they might in the long run affect the Soviet outlook on International politics.
Internal Development
ilhin the USSR, Khrushchev'sfrom the scene might be followedrolonged power struggle which could produce confusion and uncertainty In foreign policy or considerable fluctuations In tactics. Apart from this possibility. Khrushchev's present role testifies to the importance of theleader in the conduct of Soviet policy, and the man or group which succeeds him may introduce significant changes in style and even in the weight attached to various tactics. We think it certain, however, that such awould appreciate, as fully as docs the present one. the consequences of nuclear war. Further, this leadership would be unlikely toubstantially different view either of the Interests of the USSR or of the risks justified by these interests. We do not believe, therefore,hange ol Soviet leadership would In itself produce any major shift in the Soviet outlook or lead lo policies carryingdangers of war.
resent trends suggest that, over the long run, popular aspirations arc likely toa larger influence in Soviet domestic
politics.1 We believe tliat such awould have some effect on the conduct of foreign policy, but this process wouldcertainly be gradual and subject to Even now the Soviet people are not enthusiastically committed to all aspects of Communist ideology. In particular, they are not obsessed with the idea of ineradicable and total conflict, on Ideological grounds, between themselves and the non-Communlst world. Their desire for peace and for more rapid gains ln material welfarepronounced. To the extent that these attitudes become more Important in formulating Soviet foreign policy, thc USSR's reluctance to enter upon risky confrontations with thefor the sake of advancing thecause In remotebe
t the same time, the Russian people possess strong nationalist feeling. Theyandigorous assertion ofpower on the world scene in furtherance
of Soviet national interest. Accordingly, we believe that, even If Soviet politics come to represent popular opinionreater degree than at present there would not necessarily be any substantial lessening of international conflict. But the nature of such conflict, and the atmosphere in which it took place, would change, becoming less ideological and more traditional. While East-West disputes would persist, there wouldetter chance o( the occasional recognition of areas of commonbetween tlie contending powers.
Relations in the Communist World
oviet control over the international Communist movement is likely to be further diminished in the face of pressures forautonomy. This process, insofar as it
oliUcal Development* In Ul* USSR end the Communistuledebruary 1M2ore completeof this matter.
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Individual parlies toorecast to their policies, may Increase the effectiveness of Communist political appeals ln some areas. This result, however. Is likely to be more than offset by the spectacle of policy conflicts and doctrinal argumentthe movement. These consequences will tend to rob Soviet policy of the specialwhich it has derived from the conceptholly united movement basedingle agreed interpretation of human society. In addition, some of the Soviet energies nowagainst the West may be diverted to combating Chinese policies In various areas.
ehind these difficulties for theof Soviet policy, however, lies theof an important change in thc Soviet outlook Itself. If the Chinese challengea definitive and open Slno-Sovlet break, and If China subsequently progresses toward great power status and develops an effective rivalry to the USSRlaimant toof the Communist movement, the Soviet view of world politics asipolar struggle would be Increasingly difficult toIn these circumstances, tlie Soviet leaders might come to feel that in sometheir interests paralleled those of the West rather than those of their enormous and uncontrollable neighbor.
The Course of Eosl-WoK Competition
erhaps thc most significant factor which will affect the Soviet outlook, however, is the success or failure which thc USSR's foreign policy encounters In the years to come. Successes in expanding Soviet influence,weakentngs*ln Western positions, and in particular any further advances of directrule will act to confirm the Soviet leaders in their analysisundamental conflict of systems destined to end In their triumph. However, they have alreadydifficulty In translating real gains in military power inlo concrete political suc-
cesses under conditions of nuclear stalemate. And In the underdeveloped areas. It has proven far more difficult to move the newer nationsull association with Soviet policies and thence along the path toward Communistthan the Soviets thought It would be when, ln an earlier phase, these countries were emerging from Western rule. If Soviet objectives should be continually frustrated, the Soviet leaders would have to reappraise the validity of some of their key doctrines. They might, ln this case gradually relax their effort to extend communismlternatively, they might become far more aggressive in order to make good on thecommitment to makeorld system; but. assuming that the Wesl retained Its deterrent power, this seems less likely because of the greater risksourse would involve. Thus US strength, maintained at an adequate deterrent level, and the effectiveness of US policy are crucialbearing upon this possible evolution in the Soviet outlook.
n sum. none of the factors discussed above portends any early or sharp change in the basic Soviet outlook upon the external world Still less do they suggest that any deliberate renunciation of Marxism-Leninism, or of the international movement built upon it. Is likely. They do point, however, to the possibility lhatongspecial Intensity whichhostility imparts to world politics may diminish.evelopment would not mean that international conflicts of interest ceased to exist, or even that the danger of general war was appreciably reduced On the
mi reprcscnlaUvc to thc USUI does not concur with paracraph BO, teclmg that:
If Soviet objectives should be conUnuallythe Soviet leaders would have lo reappraise their tactics In applying some ol thetr key doctrines They might, in this case, find it necessary to delay efforu to extend communism everywhere.
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thc requirements of Soviet naUonal security, presUgc, and amblUon. as seen by the Soviet leaders and people, would sUU bring the USSR Into collision with the Interests of other states, even if communism lost all of Its fanatical character. The most that could be expected would be that some Issues would
become more tractable and negotiablethose which were not deeply rooted in tbe naUonal interests of the Soviet state, and that the occasional recogniUon of aof common Interest between the USSR and Its adversaries would not be Invariably stifled by Ideological hostility.
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