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Tbotolllcoxco organizations participated In ths preparation of thla estlaate:
The Control Iatelllcor.ee Agency and the iiitclliecr.cef tho Depcrtcenta of Stcte, Defense, the Amy, the Hovy, tha Air Forco, ond The Joint Staff.
Cor.currlnc:
Director of Intellieouce ond Eeoearoh,f State Director, Defense Ir.tolli^enco Agency Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Departoout of tho Airy
Aasistant Chief of Naval Opera ti odd (lntolHcor.ee),
Department af the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intolllccr.ee, USAF Director for Ii-.teLLi^ence, Joint Staff Director of tbo Rational Security Agency
Abstaining:
tlon, the subject beine outslae of their Jurisdiction?
WARKIKG
orey* inn h^ thoof tho eopl-
C8' , tha translation
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Excluded frcu eutcoatie dovneradinc ond declassification
T
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CENTBAL INTELLIGENCE AOEHCI
2
SUBJECT: : PTtOBADLE CCWJUHIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
IC65JXLE IBTICRS VETI RESTECT TO UOS*
THE FBQDLEM
To eotltate Ccmuirlct reactions to certain courses of action by US and allied forces ln Loos.
NOTE
The assuoptlono and courseo of action hare considered vera provided, by tho Laos Task Force far the purpose of this eotimte. Tho paper Is organized to respond directly to tha considerations raised by the clven courses of action. It will be printed In final faro after consideration has been givenariation ofo be discussed under Aflsunption Two.
Other recent estimates bearino on the situation in Laos aro:, "Cccinuniot Objeatlvce, Capabilities, and Intentions In Southeastated, "Consequences of Certain US Courseo inated, "iL-pllcntlcoa of the Fall of toend, "Tbe Current Military Situation and Cut look Inated lA
THE EBTlMJffiB
I. GENERALERATICHS
Wo bellevo that up to tho present there havo not been fundaDental differences nconc tho Ccauunlot powers concernedMoscow, Pelpinc, and Hanoi with respect to tbo Coaauniat cao-paign in Laos or in Southeast Asiahole. There any have becr. dl snareenonts as to tactics ond tlninc, with Hanoi and foipinc tending to bo oare niIItact and loss patient. The Sino-Soviet disputo ccacemina Bloc leadership and tactics has not appeared to prevent effective coordination of Cccnunist policy ln Laos. Wo balieve tbat Sino-Soviet differences are not likelyto affect the Cctziuaist responses to the courses of action discussed in thla papor. If, however, the situation threatened tooint of serious arrod conflict, dirootly Involving OS and Chinese Conuunist forces, latent differences night boccue acute
It lo ixjpartant to note that the Cotuunlstn do not consider Laos In isolation fron their othor objectives in Southoaot Asia. In fact, the Viet Cong In South Vletnan and
*be Pathet Lao lo Laos are both Integral porta of North Vietnamese Connunlst nllltary and partynd both take thoir guidance fron Hanoi. Hanoi, ln turn, is supported and counseled by both Mjsoow and Peiping vho, to sone extent, are cccpeting far Influence over Hanoi. For this reason, Moscow probably feels under certainitations in counseling patience and restraint au Hanoi, far tbe Soviets would not want to appear less willing than tbe Chinese to support the "national liberation struggles" In Laoa and South Vlctacc. The USSR has played the key diplccatic role far the Bloc and has provided extensive noterlal support, including the airlift operation. Ve do not believe tbat the Soviets are likely to abandon their Influence In Laos (and to that extent in North Vlctnao) to the Chine ae.
3* All the Connunlst powers probably suspect tho US of insincerity cr at least af procrastination In its proclaiaed effort to bring General Fhouni to serious negotiations. The Connunlst side has probably lost none of its earlier interestoalition govornoont, particularly as the Cor cueist ullitory situation In Laos has steadily inprovod at the expense of both the "neutrallat" forces and the Laotian Governoent farees. They probably share our Judgnont that the Forcea Arnees Rovales (FAR)
cannot by thcuoelves effectively defend any point renalnlne ffovorcaent hands, and that the Pathet lac, assisted by tbe North Vietnamese troops now in Laos, could quickly seize oil the nojor towns still held by the FAR forces.
The Ccnauniots probably interpret the current US troop ooveeent to Thailand as an atteopt to deter thee froa further nilitcry action in Laos. They recognize that the dovo puts tho US in an irjprovod position to Intervene if fiGhtlnc io reoiced, but they probably believe that tho US has net yetim decision on the particular clrcucstocces which would require it to Intervene. Thoy probably have revised upward, however, their ootiaato of tho chances that sona najor violation of tha eeaoo-flro in tho future would produce such an intervention.
5. In these clr-cunstanceo, we believe that the Concunista will not alter substantially their ourrent tactic of suspending oojor ulLitary action while waiting for the Roynl Laotian Governcent (RLG) to accept their ternsolitical settle-cent. They are unlikely at thio point to nove any Chinese coabat forces or additional North Vletnaaooe troops Into Laos. If the RLO does not cake sone substantial cove cent toward Ooanuolst toroo, the Coanunlsts will probably renew their atlitary pressures
Hovovor, the CcoaunlBt Bide will probably seek to keep tho level and incidence of its nllltary operations below what lt believes would procpt US intervention, particularly since it probablythat US intervention night,ne Juncture, Involve air operations against the highly inportant Ccanuniot baoos of supply ond LOG "safe-havana" of Heath Laos and North Vletnan.
H. ASSUMPTION ONE
Neither side bos openly repudiated the ceanc-flro or tho principleegotiated settlement, but continuing Coccuniet nllltary activity constricts the territory undor RIG control. US policy renolns toegotiated settlecent basedeutralist coalition govemnent.
COURSE Al Tho UShe RLG and the FAR
with assistance af the type and up to
the level of that provided to South
Viatnan.
6. If tbe US initiated this course of action, lt is possible that the Cocounist side would see this as no acreSto strengthen the RIG negotiating position. We believe it
nore Uiely, however, that they would suspect that tho US had decided, whatever It ndebt say publicly, to abandon tho effortoalition Government. They would probably believe that the US Intendedabh effective noa-Cocnuclst centralubotantlal part of Laotian territory. They nlGht even believe tbat thislrot stopS plan to buttress the FAB, if necessary, with US coobot forces. Tbe Coccunist side would olnoot certainly increase its cdlitary investment In Laos, perhaps acltnowlodclnc openly tbe presence of North Viatnaneoo troops and increasing their nunber, providlns then and the Pathet Lao with Increased localities support, nore artillery, and,reatly exparxiQd airlift. Tho CCanunists probably would not hesitate to respond to FAR encroachnents on oreao under their control in Laos with counteraction up to the scale of theha operation. They would also probably increase sharply their infiltration and oubversion efforts ln areas under RLG control but would alnost certainly not attenpt to oelzo the najor towns alone the Kekonc renoinins ln RLO bands.
COURSE D: In addition to the actiona aBsuaed In Course A, the US carries out abuildup of Its ccobat forces ia Thailand to0 troops.
7. Although this additional course of action vould notany greater iucediate threat to Concunlot interests ln Laos, tbo CcnoanlBts vould probablyore serious view of the situation because af the nearness of US farces capable afin Lace. The Horth Vietnaceso vould probably reinforce their troops in Laos and the Chinese night novo forces to their border vith northern Laos. At the sane tine, the Concunists vould probably novooBunptlon of negotiations.
COURSE C: Troops fron the US and Thailand, and fron those SEATO nenbors willing to participate, are stationed in RIG-he Id areas to preservo the cease-fire and to prevent further Pathet Lao/Worth Viatnacese nllltary advances. The US and allied troope vould initiate no offenaive action against Cctxwcist-beld positions. The
United" US till tary Intentions would bo conveyed to the Ccrnunlet aide both privately and publicly.*
8. under the assunption given, tho cease-fire would still have been Generally in force when tho US took tha Qivon action, although United Ccnnunist ailitory oncroachnent continued. In theeo circucatances, the Coanunist aide would probably suopect that the US intent went farther than tbe atated purposeof the cease-fire. Their Judgnont of tbe real US intention would rest to acne extant an the size and disposition of tho allied forces ooving into Laos and tbe size ond eonposition af the forces backing thea up In Thailand. In any aaco, they would probably be-Uevo that the US, though still prepared toatisfactory political settlonent, was willing and ready to participate directly in the event of subsequent Ccnnunist nllltary activity in Laos.
A lesser variant of this course vould involve stationing allied forces only in tbe Mekong valley towns to free FAR troops fron garrison duty for active operations against tho insurgents (SEATO
9- North Vletnan vould alaoet certainly introduceforces Into Laos. The Chine so Coanunists night take this opportunity to novo "volunteero" Into tho northern provinces, and the North Vietnamese and Soviets, although they night not voleone this developnent, vould probably accede. Sovlot lcgis-tieal support vould be stopped up. Tbe Pathet Lao, vith North Vietcacooe partielpatlon, vould probably step up the scale of their Dili tary actions throughout Laos vith the Intent ofUS-aHied control of tbe specific areas occupied. Thay vould probably barasa OS lines of cccziunlcatlons, outposts, and patrols. Connunist agents vould probably undertake terrorist and sobotage aetivitieo vithin tbe US-occupied towns.
10. We do not baliuva, however, that tho Ccanunist forces would attenpt to drive the US troops fron the areas thoy occupied. Tba Coonunlstn probably vould consider that over the lone run, confineuent of US and allied forces to these areas would placo tho US in an awkward dlltory-political position, and night cause tho US to withdraw. Meanwhile, they vould probably revert to preoDure3egotiated settlonent with the withdrawal of US troops as the initial objective of any agreeaect.
TH. ASSUMPTION TWO
Tbo Cotrjunlet aide resums nllitary activity vith of fo nol vootho cajar towns reoalnlna in RIO hacdo. US policy shifts froaeutralist coalition cover-nornt too facto partition of Laos.
CCURES D: Troops froa tho US and Thailand, and frca those SEATO oenbers willinc to portieipato, enter Laos too facto partition of the country which would leavo in RIG hands only that part of Laos south of approxi-natelyh parallel. The allied forces would take offensive action to clear and secure southern Laos to tho border with South Vletnan.
H- The assured Cctnunlst nllitary operations acalnot the najar teams remaining in Laotian Governuent bonds would coan that the Coccwnlsts had abandoned tho ideaeutral Laosoalition cavernsent and hod deterained to end the Laotian conflict by allltary coo no. Their Intent would bo to
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brlnu Laos under direct Ccaaunlst control byuick and ccoplete viotory over the RIG.
12. The Cccouniet decision to conducteneralwouldajor now stop In Caanuniot policy recording Laos. We believe thatecision,ubstantial shift in Bloc policy, would have been basedelter theould not respond by intervening and would have been preceded by considerable donate aeons the. Cooauniat partners. When tho US Intervened, the Cconunlsts would be eoccemed to prevent thefrca Bpreodina beyond Laos, nevertheless, they would toko such steps as thoy deeaed necessary to protect thensolvco ond thoir positions in Laos aoninot further US deployaentoS counterattack. They wculd resistS effort to clear the area to tho South Vietnamese border. Ihey would aluoet certainlyapid Logistical buildup, further strengthen North Vietnanose forces, and possibly Introduce Chinese Ccrxiunlst "volunteers." They would probably assuce that the US would not be willing torolonged and unpopular war, and that tho US would lc duo course be prepared toettleoent.
COURSS E: In addition to the areco occupied
under Course d, allied forces occupy
Saycboury Province and, with tbe ex-
ception of the city cf Luang Frabang,
tho najar tcwna along the Mokeng.
13* Kovecent into those additional areas would increase the apprehension of tho Conounists about US intentions, Thoy would offer vigorous resistance at points thoy bad already occupied, olDost certainly with North Vietnaceso roinf orcecents. Furthor, the Chinese Coariunists would be nore likely in this circumstance than undorbove to cctriit their own forces, probably under the fiction that tbey are "volunteers."
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Original document.
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