32
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL Trends in Soviet Science
and Technology
Svbmrilad by lhe DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE
Concurred in by lha UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD At indicated ove>leof2
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimatei
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organ iiatiora af tha Deport-mentt ol Stole. Defame, lhe Army, lhehe AirC, and NSA,
Concurring;
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of Stale Director. Defame intelligence Agency
Aniwant Chief of Staff far Intelligence, Department of the Army Attittant Chief of Naval Operalioniepariment of the Navy Auhtom Chief of Staff, ImolKgence, USAF Director for Intalliganca, Joint Staff
The Atomic Energy Cun million Representative lo the USIB Direcior af the Nalional Securily Agency
Abstaining:
The Assistant Direcior, federal Bureau af Investigation, the wbjeet beingaf hli kirbdktion.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Trends in Soviet Science and Technology
rnis document has been approved for release through tha HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligent* Agency/.
p.t.
TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
THE PROBLEM
Toeneral appraisal of the principal strengths and weaknesses of Soviet science and technology, and toin broad terms, the main trends of development over the next decade.
FOREWORD
This estimate is intended torief generalof Soviet science and technology. For extensiveanalysis relating to the subject, reference should be made to "Soviet Science and Technology" an interdepartmental research study prepared by the Scientific Intelligence Committee, the Summary and Conclusions of which were approved by USIB onpecificof Soviet science and technology will also bein the following scheduled national intelligence
Soviet Space Programs"
Soviet Atomic Energy Program"
Bloc Air Defense"
&, "Soviet Military Capabilities"
c., "Soviet Strategic Attack Capabilities"
f.Trends in the Soviet Economy"
1
THE ESTIMATE
SOVIET APPRECIATION OF SCIENCE ANO TECHNOLOGY
he Soviet leadership fosters scientific and technological progress as basic to the growth of Soviet military, economic, andpower. The Soviet stale Inherited from pre revolutionaryelatively backward lechnology.ighlythough quantitatively limited,base During, thc USSRundertook to force thc development of scientific and technical education and tbe expansion of research facilities ln order totronger foundation for futureThis farsighted program has paid off in the impressive progresss. This progress also reflects the power of the Soviet state to concentrate limited resources on the achievement ofpriority objectives. To date Soviet scientific and technological effort has been focused primarily on thc development ofweapons and the buildingtrong industrial base. We believe that these priori-lies will continue. Even so, sufficientand experience are now available to enable the USSR to make Important advancesonsiderably wider range of scientific fields.
oviet scientific progress is fostered by the high place assigned to scientists in Soviet society. Soviet scientists have longa privileged group in terms of socialand financial status. They enjoy great popular esteem derived In part fromEuropean attitudes toward learning and In part from the influence of an Ideology which exalts science. An additional attraction is that many scientific fields permit on escape from immediate political involvement which is not possible In many other professional
fields. Soviet scientistsroup appear to be dedicated to their work, politically loyal or at least apolitical, and often animatedpirit of competition with thc US. Partyof science ls now directed primarilyidentifying areas of research that offer the most promise for application, settingand achieving effectiverather than Interfering with methods of research. However, in certain fields which have acquired political implications, notably genetics, party Interference has held back significant work.
The working relationship between theleadership and the scientific community is enhanced by the fact that many party leaders have had technical training orin the management of technicalAs technological considerations have become an Important factor in Kremlinlhc participation of professionalin such deliberations has Increased and this trend will continue. In general, however, wc think il likely that the Influence ofscientists, like that of other experts, does not extend much beyond their areas of special competence.
The Soviet political leaders havepopular Interest in science and have sought to Identify themselves, andwllh Soviet scientific successes. Inyears, these achievements have enhanced the popularity of the regime. The peopleto share the regimes confidence lnscientific advancement and are proud of the ability of the USSR to achieve successes
some cases prior to more advancedof thc West. However, consumeraccruing from the regime's Interest in science and technology have been modest and there is some sentiment that the government
1
devote more of Its resources to raising living standards and less to reaching the moon
n externa) relations also, the USSR has made effective use of the prestige resulting from Soviet achievements in science andto cultivate the idea that the Soviet system is best suited for ihe achievement of rapid technological and social progress. This Idea Is projected through intensivetechnical aid to underdevelopedtrade fairs, exhibitions, visiting lecturers, and attendance al international scientific conferences.
II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES OF THE USSR
o. Soviet scientific resources in manpower, research facilities, and funds, and thefor exploiting foreign scientific anddevelopments, are impressive and will continue to Increase and improve. Theare also supporting the expansion of the scientific base In the European Bloc countries which in turn contribute to the scientificavailable to lhe USSR. However, we believe lhat these scientific resources arc not adequate to support thc ambitious goals stated or Implied InYear Program adopted by the XXII Party Congress.
he scientific manpower base continues lo expand in numbers and improve in quality. The USSR now hasincluding all levels of technicalengaged In scientific research andand this group probably willone millionenerallySoviet planningide range ofand development activities will not be
' Comparisons between scientific manpower totals for the US and USSR are generally misleadingor wide differences In classification cnterla. training nnd experience levels, and utilizationA detailed statement on Soviet aclenljfic manpower appears in the SIC study. "Soviel Science and Technology" dateday I'M? pages
severely restricted by shortages of trained personnel.
lthough the quality of Soviel technical education varies widely, higher standards have been achieved and maintained since the end of World War II. particularly inand the physical sciences The major portion of personnel presently engaged inand development were graduatedthis period; their potential has not yet been fully realized. As this group gainsand Influence, Western pre-eminence will be increasingly challenged in many fields of science.
hile the numbers of research andpersonnel have expanded rapidly, Improvement in the quality and quantity of research facilities has not kept pace. The number of research institutions has increased aboutercent, bui many research organisations arc housed inmakeshift quarters and are further hampered by lack of equipment The high priority of research relating to militaryand heavy industry has resulted ln an unbalanced distribution of research facilities and equipment, both geographically and by field of study. The Seven-Year Plan'sgoalsarge increase in the number and marked Improvement In thc quality ot research Institutions will probably not5 as planned, but will be reached well before the end of the decade. As the network of research institutions grows, many new installations will be located outside the traditional centers of Moscow andin order lo promote the training and use of local personnel and to foster closerbetween research activities and thcwhich they support.
oviel science haa traditionallytheory. Until recently in many fields, and even today in some, experimentaland application to product development have been weak points. esult, though
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scientists have excelledumber of theoretical fields, there has been difficulty in harnessing their scientific knowledge Torpurposes. The regime lias beenajor cflorL Lo correct this Situation byreorganization, and educationalWhen Soviet capabilities forand application become moredeveloped, the USSR will be able to derive even more advantage from its excellence' in theoretical science.
Soviet concern over difficulties Inresearch results into practice hasajor reason for the successiveof the administration of scientificduring recent years.teps have been underway to associate research and development activities more closely withfaclllUcs. In the most recentinhe Academy of Sciences was relieved of its applied research responsibilities and freed to concentrate on fundamental and theoreUcal research. Al the sametate Committee for theof Scientific Research Work was established to provide centralizedfor certain key areas of research andand to strengthen scientificgenerally. Despite the manychanges that have taken place during the past few years, readjustments undoubtedly will continue, as the Soviets probably have not yet found satisfactory ways of coordinating all work and of insuring continuity between research and producUonroad front, as distinguished from selected high priority areas.
The Soviet scientific research effort is supported by intensive programs to collect and disseminate scientific and technicalThe All-Union Institute ofand Technical InformaUon, with astaffnd an0 part-time abstractors, is the largest technical information center In the world. Iton translating, abstracting, and editing
foreign scientific literature, but also processes technical inloimatlon published In lhc USSR. Nevertheless, the Soviets slill have difficully in making technical InformaUon available promptly and in usable form to researchers who need It. In this connection thc Soviets are conducting Intensive research on use of computers for translating and Information processing. They are alio seeking toeneral shortage of up-to-dale reference books and high quality periodical literature on the latest technological practices
improvement in SovietcapabiliUes and technology liasfrom the acquisition of plants,Instruments, and technologyBy this means, the USSR hasmany years of Independent researchin such fields as advancedrare metals, and plastics.Union continues an intensivepurchase Weslern industrialindustrial technology, primarily fromUK. West Oermany. and Japan andof advance in certain fieldsonsiderable measure on thethese efforts. We believe that afor the Soviets' recent interestpatents wllh the US is Uieof acquiring lechnology from USintelligence services also contributeexploitation of foreignajor part of their operaUonalto the collection of scientific andintelligence, primarily in military fields
III. CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND FUIURE PROSPECTS
science and technology as ainferior lo that In thc West,best Soviet scientists arearleading Western counterparts.have made noteworthy progressengineering fields and In theaspects of certain basic sciences, parUcu-
SEfRET
larly physics, mathematics, und lhe geophysi-cal sciences Progress has twen slower ui sc Jen tine Acids less directly related todevelopment and military power, such as biology and medicine. The Soviet policy ol concentrating resources has led to significant achievements In military technology andsegments of industry; in some specific areas, they now equal or surpass the West. In many other fields, they are intent uponor erasing the present Western lead during the coming decade.
We believe lhat the development of new weapons systemstrong technology in defense-supporting industries will continue to receive first priority in Soviet scientific efforts.year economic program recently adopted indicates, at the same time, thatemphasis will be given to theof science and technology to strengthen lhe civil economy and thus the Sovielfor nonmilitary competition with thc West.
The Soviet regime apparently intends to applyelect list of scientific-technological tasks certain managerial techniques derived from successful high priority militarysuch as nuclear weapons and guided missile systems. These techniquesigh degree of control and coordination of the scientific and technical, theoretical andaspects of an entire program, as wel] as more effective provisions for advance planning and financing. These tasks include such research problems as controlledreactions, efficient direct conversion of heat into electrical energy, and automatic control of industrial processes. Analogous approaches are being applied also In areas of research and development of lesser priority. The current policy of the regime Is to plan and coordinate the work of Institutions at alllevels so as to focus theiron the key tasks in their areas. In the fundamental sciences, scientists are directed
to select and concentrate on the mostresearch topics.
Military Program*
oncentration of scientific andeffort is producing impressive weapons systems for Soviet air, ground, and naval forces. Major allocations of facilities, funds, and equipment are given to priority areas of military research, and numerous researchproving grounds, and test facilities are devotedumber of specificonsiderable amount of basic research in the Academy of Sciences and higher educational institutions ls probably supported because of promise in military fields.
he USSR's military forces have been modernised extensively during the last decade, most significantly in thc development ofweapons and their means of delivery. Analysis of1 test series indicates that major advances have taken place in Sovietweapons designs. The Soviets havea highly sophisticatedweapons technology, and theyigh potential for continuing such advances in the future. With respect to missiles,present Soviet technologyrobable continued high priority, we believeide range of Improved characteristics will bein future systems.
hc productionuccession ofjet interceptors continues, but wcthat Soviet air frame and enginehave been hampered by reliance upon theoretical design to the neglect of empirical testing. Soviet air forces are beingequippedariety of air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles, and the USSRto develop an effective semiautomatic control system for air defense fighter forces. Impressive advances In missiles, rockets, and artillery and an extensive vehicularprogram have already improved the fire power and mobility of ground forces. Thc
SEfWET
has an extensive chemical warfare (CW) program; we believe that troops are well equipped with munitions and protectiveand are well trained in their use. Naval forces continue to be strengthened by thcof missiles on warships; new classes of missi If-equipped ships include destroyers, submarines, and patrol craft.
We believe that the USSR will continue to devote substantial scientific effort to strengthening its armed forces by Improving the performance characteristics of weapons and equipments already developed. InUie Soviets probably will emphasize the development of new systems, such as Improved detection equipment and underwater weapons for Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, although Lhc USSR will haveimited ASW capability in areas beyond coastal waters during the next few years. The USSR lags behind the US in marine nuclearsystems, but the Soviets will probably continue to develop nuclear propulsion for ships. They may develop nuclear propulsion for aircraft as well. The USSR will alsoemphasize research ln magnetohydro-dynamlcs, because of specific applications to controlled thermonuclear reactions and theproblem. We believe that the USSRrogram for the military use of space,their accomplishments to date have not disclosed the specific manner ln which they intend to use space for the projection ofpower.
The USSR will continue Its large andprogram to develop miHslle systems for defense against ballistic missiles. We believe that this program is directed toward defense against all types of ballistic missiles, and even against satellites, although most of theand testing to date has Involvedterminal intercept techniques against short and medium-range missiles. The USSR is also conducting basic research which might
eventually lead to methods of employing highly concentrated beams of energy orIn defense against aircraft, missiles, and space vehicles, although we have notpecific weapon program in this area.
Space Program
uring the next decade, wc believe that the USSR will direct an increasingly strong scientific effort toward its space program. To date thc program has resulted incries of spectacular firsts. While this Soviet program has been Impressive, there has been an apparent lack of systematic and comprehensive in-flight measurement of the space environment necessary to continued progress In the future. The recentlyseries of "Cosmos" satellites, which may represent the beginningroader space research program, suggests that thc Soviets are now taking steps to remedy this weakness.
enerally, the Soviet ICBM and space programs are mutually supporting. Until the "Cosmos" series, all major space events have Involved the first generation ICBM booster and their successes have been largely attributable to its payload capacity. This booster could be used to achieve additional successes now, such as placing two men into earth orbit, soft-landing an Instrumented package on the moon, orunar satellite. However, more advanced space missions, such as manned lunar flight, will require far more powerful boosters than those now in use, as well as comparable advances Incommunications, guidance, electric power supply, tracking, and other related fields. The USSR may also be working on nuclear or ionic propulsion systems for spaceIn short, the Soviets mustore advanced technological foundation than that gained In their early days of military rocketry.
seJTet
Programs
oviet Industry is characterized by marked qualitative unt-vrnncss inpractices between industrial sectors, and even within certain sectors which arcwell developed. In heavy industry, such as steel-making, techniques andoften compare favorably with those used in the West. However, industrial practices generally are inferior and sometimes even crude by Western standards, especially Inoriented industries. Despite thelikely to be made, the magnitude of this problem is so great Uiat the average level of Soviet Industrial technology willwell behind that of the West through the nextears. Soviet agricultural technology has advanced very unevenly, and In mostlags far behind that of Uie West.
he continuing Soviet stress ongrowth has caused the leadership to place Increasingly heavy emphasis upon more efficient uUlizatkm of resources. Significant advances in this respect could be achieved by the wider use of existing technology. ForInvestment In materials handlingand the development of plantwould yield large increases in labor productivity. The unrealized potential oftechnology is particularly evident in the key problem area of agriculture, wheregains could be achieved through broader investment In already developedand equipment. Improved seed and animal strains, fertilizers, and the use offarming techniques.
utomation will probably contributelo the attainment of Soviet long-
range industrial objectives. The current Seven-Year Plan for automaUon is essentially experimental, as Indicated by Uie designation of somendustrial installations as model experimental plants. An extensive research and development program Is underway0 loears probably will produce radical innovations in computer design and In self-learning machines capable of Improvingplanning and the control ot complex industrial processes. Wc believe that0 the Soviets will attempt to introduce these developmentside variety ofbut major investment programs will be required and difficulties in adaptingdevelopments to practical purposes will be encountered.
Summary
e believe that during the presentthe Soviets will move forwardroad scientific front, although not at Uie rates they anticipate in all areas. ManpowerIn many disciplines will advance much more modestly than predicted publicly byleaders. Organizational difficultiesrobably continue, particularly in translating thc results of research Into practice.by continuing to concentrate efforts and resources, the USSR probably will achieve during the next fewumber of notable accomplishments in priority fields. The more spectacular Soviet achievements, particularly those ln space, missiles, and nuclear weapons will continue to be used to foster an Image of advanced scientific and technologicalIn all fields and to bolster Soviet claimslhe superiority of thc socialist society.
SEWET
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