AY iy62
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT! "On the Problem, of the Tasks
of the Navy and MethodB for Accomplishingy Admiral V. Kaeatonov
Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared ln the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" X'1 Voyennayaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be bandiedeed-to-know basis vlthln your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilisation of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to tbe originating office.
Rlobard Reims Deputy Director (plans)
Original: Tha Director of Central Intelligence
cc: Military Representative of the President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Tho Director of Intelligence end Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department-of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Cbarlman, Qulded Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for. Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
AeaiBtant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research end. Reports
i-'Asaietaat Director for Scientific Intelligence
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USSR
THOUGHT: "On tbe Problem of
^the Tasfcs of tbe Navy and Methods for Accomplishingy Admiral V. Kasatonov
DATS
APPRAISAL OF
reliable source (B) .
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "On the Problem of the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for Accomplishingritten by Admiral V, Kasatonov.
This article appeared in1 Fourth Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by tho Soviets. 1 Fourth Ibsuo wont to press on
Accomplishing Then by
Admiral V. Kasatonov
In Admiral V. Platonov's article "On the Tasks of tho Navy and Methods for Accomplishingo cited several important propositions about naval operationsuture war. In our opinion, however, several of thorn are debatable, and in connection with this we want to set forth our opinion of them.
In examining the task of destroying carrier strike large units, the author expressed doubt that their combat activities would be carried out mainly on the open sea. Ve think there is no basis foroubt.
In the opinion of Won torn military specialists, besides the large units of fire ofrnuclear warheads (moreuclear bombs on each aircrafthe strength of
carrier strike large units is precisely their groat manouverability and their ability to deliver strike* with nuolear weaponsroad front. It is precisely for this reason that they consider carrier strike largeors reliable and stable means of combat in comparison with shore-basod aircraft and ground missile units.
Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militssue
It is not without reason that the NATO command thinks that ground airfields and areas of missile launch sites can be reconnoitered even bofore the beginning of combat operations and subjected to powerful strikes by nucloar missiles ln the initial hours and minutesar. Carrier strike large units, howovor, aro capable ofm in one calendar day in any direction and are less vulnerable. For the present they cannot bo destroyed by missile strlkos from the shore, and the reconnaissance of carrier strike large units on tho sea and the"correcting of submarines and aircraft against themery complicated task.
experience of numerous exercises of the carrier strike fleets of the USA and the NATO joint naval forces proves that the basic method of operations of carrier strike large units is their delivery of strikes from areas on the open sea. In particular, at tho maneuvers of the NATO Joint armed forces which were held in autumncarriers participating in the general nuclear attack dellverod their strikes against very important objectives of the "enemy"istance of up0 kmoneront of dp0 km. Hero tho carrier strike groups constantly maneuvered within the bounds of the Norwegian Sea and combined the maneuver with measures of radio silence in the networks of long-range radio communication. The American 6th Fleet operatedimilar way in the Mediterranean Sea.
It is possible for the carrier strike large units to put in to shore waters, particularly into shore bases, only in particular cases. Usually the carrier strike groups put Id to render direct support to ground troops, particularly to put ashore an amphibious landing force. For example, that was the reason why the strike aircraft carriers entered the Aegean Sea in the final stages of the concluding maneuvers of the NATO Joint armed forces) (OVS)
It should be borne in mind that by operating in shore waters with fiords, all other enemy ships can be camouflaged successfully against the background of islands ox* the shore, but aircraft carriors will be exposed when their aircraft take off. Besides that, they caudetected by intelligence agents. As an oxample of this, one can cite the constant surveillance conducted by our and the British intelligence during tho past war of the largo German ships in the Norwegian fiords. Under modern conditions, after having been discovered in areas which are too small for maneuvering, aircraft carriors can be destroyed with groat accuracy by nuclear strikes from missile troops. It is clear that the enemy will try as far as possible to avoid such areas.
One cannot quite understand tho author's ldoa that in remote areas of the ocean, "carrier strike largo units can function only as cover forces for convoys or within
tho complement of huator-killer groups of tho antisubmarine defense" . As Is well known, the carrier strike large units, like the fleet strike force, are ilntend'ed-not to cover convoys but to deliver strikes against important military, industrial, and administrative Installations and against ports and naval bases. They are also capable of delivering strikes against ships and vessels on the sea. From whom can carrier strike large units conceal convoys in remote areas of the ocean? It is obvious thatask could be given the carrier strike large units only If the probable enemy couldVexpect attacks against his convoys from largo surface vessels, for example, from aircraft carriers. Because tho probable enemy dooa not oxpect such operations from us, one con suppose that he will not charge the carrier Btrlke large units with such tasks.
Covering convoys and carrier strlko large units from submarine strikes is carried out by carrierroups which are especially assigned for this purpose, and at the basis of these groups are not strike aircraft carriers but aircraft carriers of tbe antisubmarine defense.
By using the carrier hunter-killer groups, tbe enemy, as was correctly noted by Admiral V. Platonov, of course will strive to clear our submarines from the areas where carrier strike largo units are maneuvering. However, one
must not overestimate his capabilities for accomplishing this task. The areas where tho carrier strike large units are maneuvering are quite large and occupy hundreds of thousands of square kilometers. Moreover, one must inspect not only the areas of combat maneuvering but also the areas where tho strike fleet is formed, where ships are refueled, waiting areas for servicing, and aroas with the routes of the carrier strike large units and other operational groups of the strike fleet. Even the successive execution of preliminary searches in those areas to clear them of submarines would require bringing in tens of carrier hunter-killer groups of the antisubmarine defonse, and this exceeds the bounds of the real capabilities of the probable enemy, particularly if one considers that such operations must be carried out simultaneously In several zones of thecean.
For reliable, direct protection of carrier strike large units and convoys operating in antiatomic combat formations, one also mustarge number of antisubmarine forcos and weapons.
Despite tho fact that our probable enemies have at theireveloped shipbuilding industry, their capabilities for building the noodod number of ships and planes of the antisubmarine defense to fight our submarines are not limitless. These capabilities can be limited even moreesult of strikes by missile troops and by missile submarines against the centers of tho shipbuilding industry and the bases of the enemy's antisubmarine forces.
We are completely, aware that the operations of diesol-electric submarines, particularly against carrier strike large units and fast, strongly protected convoys, will be conducted with great difficulties. However,those submarines will be able to operate successfully against less fast-moving targets.
The operations of atomic submarines will undoubtedly bo more effective. The great maneuvering capabilities and the enormous range of these boats make it possible for them to be used to deliver strikes against carrier strike large units not only in aroas of combat maneuvering of the latter and in tho approaches to them but also on the lanes used by the carrier strike large units in crossing the ocean and on the approaches to distant bases across the ocean.
Without being inferior in speod to aircraftexceeding the speod of the fastest convoystimes, the atomic submarines can attack them fromand avoid encountors with theof the antisubmarine dofense which usuallypositions in forwardf the movement ofstrike largo units or tho
The use of atomic torpodoos increases even more tho combat capabilities of the submarines. Incidentally, we cannot agree in any way with Admiral V. Platonov in his negative evaluation of atomic torpedoes, much less
the long range ones The advantages of atomic torpedoes are obvious. Thus, tohip of any class, it is sufficient to strike it with one atomic torpedoemicircleadius equal to the radius of destruction of the given target. We note that to destroy any ship suchtrike aircraft carrier, we must hit it with no lessoorpedoes with conventional filling. esult of the fact that tohip with an atomic torpedo, it is sufficient not to guarantee striking the ship directly butemicircleizable radius, ; tho probability of destroying tho target with this torpedo increases greatly and in several Instances approaches one.
Finally, one must keep in mind that ln using torpedoes with conventional charges, becauseheir small radius of destruction, the firing is usually done by four-torpedo salvos, but in using atomic torpodoes the firing is done with single torpedoes. Therefore,ubmarine replaces conventional torpedoes with atomic onos, then with tho uso of the same number of torpedoes, the number of possible effective attacks Increases by fourhe self-sufficiencyubmarine ln ammunition Increases by four times.
Considering the great self-sufficiencyarrier strike large units, which is reinforced by the mobile system for supplying and servicing them on the sea, the basic efforts by our Navy must be directed at fighting them on the open sea and ocean: at tho approaches to probable areas of combat operations, directly in those areas, and also on the ocoan lanes used by tho enrrier strike large units from remote roar bases and at exits from those bases.
We think that by using and clearlyufficient amount of forces and moans of reconnaissance, the successful operations of our forcessubmarines and aircraftcan and must be organized against the carrier strike large units on the open sea.
s it is also difficult to agree with the author of the article on the evaluation which ho givos of the long-range possibilities of atomic aircraft (Pago) . In our opinion
tho Insufficient range at low altitudes and the low self-sufficiency of modern aircraft, even the largest jet aircraft,erious hindrance impeding their use in distant areas of the ocean in coordination with submarines. The impossibility of long flights at low altitudesonsiderable degree causes the great vulnerability of modern aircraft toweapons.
Apparently, aircraft using atomic energy will be able to fly forong time at low altitudes and at any distance from their airfields, and they will be shot down much less frequently by antiaircraft weapons than were their piston and jet predecessors.
According to he atomic airplane can become an almost:invulnerablo and quite effoctlve weapon of armed combat on the soa in conducting combat operationsarrlor strike large unit, convoys, and missile-carrying submarines.
One must koop in mindissile-carrying aircraftery valuable featurein launching its missiles it itself observes the objective of the strikend directs the missile to thet operates without any intermediate means, and because ofrrors in determining the location of the target by reconnaissance means are excluded, as well as any influence on the accuracy of the firing by the movement of the target during the missile's flight. .
We basically agree with tho opinion of Admiral V. Platonov about the degree of throat from enemy missile-carrying submarines and on the ways of combating them at the modern stage of the development of our antisubmarine defense forces and weapons. It is true that at the present time the real strength in the fight against missile-carrying submarines can be fast submarines of tho anti-Hubmarine defense which are specially equipped to accomplish thishere is also no doubt about the methods of combat operations of antisubmarine submarines proposed in the article.
However, one cannot completely agree with the author of tho article when he says that there is no other way to
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combat missile-carrying submarines. In our opinion, the useingle weapon (thef the antisubmarine defense) in the struggle againstormidable enemy as missile-carrying submarines Is an emergency measure caused by the status and capabilities of the antisubmarine forces and weapons at the given moment.
Although possessing several Indisputable advantages ln comparison with other forces of the antisubmarine defense, the submarines of the antisubmarine defense also have their shortcomings. The, chief shortcoming is that even with the sharp Increase in theetection of submarines by hyoVoaoduattcrmeana of surveillance, detailing submarines of the antlsubmarino defense for the reliable accomplishment of this task must be excessively large and must amount to not tens but hundreds of atomic submarines. This, obviously, cannot be guaranteedomparatively long time. Moreover, having predominance in the worldocean in surface and air forces, the probable enemy can use, ln his fight against our submarines, bosldus his own .submarines of the antisubmarine defense, surface ships, dirigibles, and aircraft-of the antisubmarine defense from land bases and from aircraft carriers. This will place our submarines of the antisubmarine defense ln an unequal position with the enemy submarines, and this even further decreases the reliability of accomplishing the task of combating them.
On the basis of these considerations, lt is extremely desirablo to bring ln other forces besidesubmarines of the antisubmarine fiefense for the struggle against missile-carrying submarines. These should be forces which would be able as much as possible to compensate for the shortcomings inherent ln antisubmarine submarines.
In this plan we do not share the very pessimistic evaluation expressed by Admiral V. Platonov regarding naval aviation. It is obvious that, provided the means of detecting submarines by aircraft are Improved, and the flight range of aircraft at low altitudes Is incroased, aircraft will bo able to increase the effectiveness of the struggle against missile-carrying submarinos in coordination with submarines of the antisubmarine defense
Apparently, the new possibilities in accomplishing
important task may take into account orbital means of combat which are based on the use of artificial earth satellites.
In our opinion, the essence of the problem Is to create effective means for the distant detection of submarines from the air which will make it possible to employ for their destruction the most effective modern means of destructionmissiles with nuclear charges launched from submarines or aircraft and possibly also from shore launching mounts.
It would be incorrect to rule out the possibility of creating other means of detection. Considering the great seriousness of the threat of missile-carrying submarines for our country and the other countries of the Socialist Camp in thear breaks out, we must setask before Soviet scientists.
Thus, as the bases for accomplishing the task of combating missile-carrying submarines, we must place not just one means of combat,et of means, the main ones of which are submarines, aircraft, and possibly, orbital means of combat.
In examining the task of combating onemy ocean transportation, the author of the article maintains that under*modern conditions the need arises to choose, as the main objective for strikes by our forces, not transports, but aircraft carriers We cannot agree with that statement. In our opinion, it is caused by an obvious overestimation of the capabilities of our probable enemy to cover and defend his convoys. For this purpose the enemy may use aircraft carriers only within the complement of carrier hunter-killer groups or for direct safeguarding to protectelatively small number of the most valuable convoys/ onsiderable number of convoys and transports will follow the ocean lanes without cover by aircraft carriers. (We have already mentioned that carrier strike large unitsery small bearing on the direct protection of convoys.)
Moreover, it ia quite difficult to guarantee
selective destruction of aircraft carriers among all the ships and transportsonvoy, evenurely tactical viewpoint. It is obvious that submarines armed with torpedoes will launch their torpedoes against tho nearest large ship or transport during an attack, and strikes by missiles with nuclear warheads from submarines and aircraft must bo delivered against the main body of thegainst the transports, calculating on destroying as many of them as possible. Any other solution oftask is scarcely admissible.
Of course, when one has the opportunity to choose between attackingransport or an aircraft carrier, preference should be given to tho latter. However, in principle, the main objectives for strikes by naval forces in combat with enemy ocean shipping, just as previously, remaintransports with troops and cargo, and the task of disrupting shipping can be accomplished only byefinite proportion of the enemy's transport tonnage.
Original document.
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