2
MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION
SUBJECT: Meetingby The Prasldent, Secretary McNamara.
Secretary Roak, Gov. Harriman. Mr McCone, Mr. Bandy and Qenerat Taylor, with Democraticepublican Leadership of the Senate and the House S an.
President opened meeting by expressing concern over deterioration ln Laos and Its possible affect on Thailandtating purpose of meeting was to explain move* decided apon In Interests of meeting our commitments to Thailand.
McNamara discussed Nam Tba military actionLG troopsLQ artillery performed well until ordered destroyed forces retired orderly with their small arms Intactilitary capability of RLG forces that were deployed to Nam Tba area now considered nil.
9. McCone reported overall Laotian military situation, pointing out that Communists held entire eastern section of the country from north to south. RLQ held weitarn portion. By reference to the map, McCone stated apparently previously deployed Viet Cong military capability could take over Thakhek or Sara vane or Actopeube VC-controlled Mekong ln tbe vicinity Pak Bang and were strengthening their position in Luang Prabang. We therefore gave VC capability of actions of Nam Tha-Intensity ln several locations with probability of success; hewwver wi did not expect an all eat military move until Communists had assessed U. S. intentions. Russell naked relative strength. Communist versus RLG; was answered that RLG forcesommunistC but the Communists ware more effectiveetter led, andreater will to fight.
4. hen reviewed the political situation, stating Geneva/Vienna agreements Incorporated International guarantee* against intrusion of foreign troop* Intohe withdrawal of foralgn troop* fromnd the maintainingeutral Lao*. Rusk atatad the RLG do not have the will nor the capacity toilitary power and, therefore. If foreign troop* are withdrawn, the area should be peaceful. Following the estabUahmentouvanna Phouma government, election* will take place and Rusk predicted substantial victory over the Pathet Leo. Ruak questioned whether Nam Tha meant the breakdown In
-
the cease-fire, ft*ting Phoumi now willing to talk It la necessary to Ond out whether negotiations wilt be fruitful end thought phoumi now mora raaaonabl* than before Rusk emphasised It Is qulta possible that nothing will come out of tha negotiation*. Rusk stated situation most volatileoaeow is committed to the Geneva/Viennabut questioned the extent of Moscow Influence in Pelping and Hanoi. Rusk expressed concern over Thailand, explaining that Sarlt strongly oriented to the West but his long border la seriously exposed.
9. McNamara reviewed his meeting with Sarlt outlined the dangers of the exposed border, aad then srxplained In detail the planned troop deployment in Thailand as covered In my memorandum on meeting of May U.
6. The President then stated that we areease-fire now aa weear ago andoalition government becauae military action by RLG seemed ineffective and furthermore the British and the French would not go along with militant action. President explained that the Geneva agreements were more favorable to us than we had hopedi that Phoumi had opposed them because he hoped U. S, would intervene militarily. President explained the British and French are violently opposed to Phoumi thats no longer valid because of the attitude of the British and the French and the military impotence of the RLG. Therefore our policy is tooalition government, otherwise thereanger that the entire country can be taken over militarily by the Communists. President stated that Khrushchev has shown no Interest ln the situation. President then stated In his opinion Phoumi had been wrong all these monthshat the chances of maintaining an Independent Laos were notut he statedthat he will not order U. S. military forces into Laos without further exhaustive study and consultation with Congressional leaders. This statement appearedirm commitment on the part of the President.
7. Rusk then discussed tha purpose of our deploying troops into Thailand, Indicating we must keep this purpose ambiguous, thusuestion mark In the minds of the other aide as to do so would provide important leverage In the forthcoming negotiations.
I. Dirks en asked McCone why there wae doubt about two Chinese Communist battalions entering the combat in Nam Tha. McCone stated, and McNamara confirmed, that all the tenable intelligence disputed the statement and that the InteiUgence Community had concluded that there were no Communist forces committed to action in northern Laos.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: