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MEMORANDUM EOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Question of Increasing
the Stability of Troopy Hajor-Genoral of Artillery V. Illnykh and Lleutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin
Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ^Voyennayaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Amy Contender.
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Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans)
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
ce: The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
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The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
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THO'JGRT; "The Question of Increasing he Stability of Troopy Major-General of Artillerylinykh and Lieutenant-Gene raj. of Cocanunlcatlona Troopa P. Kurochkin
OF INFO: l APFRAISAL OF
CONTENT : Documentary
reliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "The Question of Increasing the Stability of Troopritten by Major-General of Artillery V. Ilinykh and Lieutenant-Generel of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin.
This article appeared in1 Third Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This Journal is published Irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense |Lovn to the level of Army Commander. 1 Third Issue was sent to press on
Headquarters Comment: The article by Major-General M.
LJiie first sentence of the attached vas disseminated a^saaatsBBawpril
The Question of Increasing tho Stability of Troop Control
In tho article by Major-General H. Ivanov, extremely urgent questions of Increasing the effectiveness and stability of the control of troops aren analyzing thestructure of operational staffs and the requirements levied on them, the author reaches the conclusion that there mustadical reorganization of control organs, the essence of which consistshe elimination of staffs of arras of troops and certain directorates and the creation-in their place of several centers for planning and for troop control. Specifically, he proposes the creationuclear/missile center as the organ for controlling all nuclear means ofissile troops and the appropriate types of aviation.
In our opinion, lt Is impossible to agree with tbe organizational structure of operational staffs proposed by General Ivanov. He bases his thoughts mainly on the necessity for planning and only partially on control, losing sight of the other side of tbe activities of the chiefs of arms of troops and their staffs,which is training and thoroughly providing for the constant combat readiness of their subordinate units and large units. Even the control of, for example, the missile troopsront, represents an involved complexumber of measures.
In addition to this, the consolidated combined arms staff vith various centers, which is proposed by the author of the article to replace the presently existing directorates and staffs of arms of troops, is also unwieldy and still does not eliminate the division of duties, and consequently, unavoidably requires appropriate coordination among the centers.
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Collection of Articles of_ the Journal "Military oughFV^First issue,
It is perfectly correct that the element of time has assumed an extremely important significance and thatcollection of the moat complete data on theomprehensive analysis of these, adoption of declsiona and transmission of these decisions to the troops, and also control over the execution of these decisions, is required of staffs. However,,all of these tasks can be successfully accompliahed with the existing organization of the staffs if certain modifications are introduced.
Preservation of tho duties of the chiefs of arms of troops with their appropriate staffs or directorates conforms to the principle of single command and strengthens responsibility not only for planning but also for the training and education of personnel and for the support and thorough training of the appropriate arms of troops. Modern combat equipment la complex and in order to handle
In Itself, the idea of control of means of massissile troops, aviation, and chemical troops,ingle center Is not new. It wasln training exercises of the American Army,imilar center was headed by the artillery commander.
Perhaps,ystem contains certain positive aspects, but to unify the control of missile troops and atomic bomb-carrying aviation is not appropriate,ln our view, because control of the latter has its own specific characteristics and is the prerogative of the commandsr of an air army.
In the practice of combat training, fairly definite views have beon worked out for organization of the control of missile troops and atomlc-bomb-carrying aviation; they consist of the following.
The commander of the troopsront determines the target.and the procedure for the use of nuclear weapons, allocates missions among tho missile troops and aviation and establishes tho bases for coordinated action among them, and during the progreas of ths operation makes, decisions concerning the delivery of nuclear strikes.
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The stuffront jointly with the staffs of the missile troops and artillery and of the air army develops the plan for the use of nuclear weapons, organizes intelligence, determines the objectlvea for destruction, determines the yield of the nuclear warheads to be used against them and the types of bursts, and also the time for delivering the strikes.
The chief of missile troops and artillery and his staff must, on the basis of the decision made by the commander of troopa of the front, plan in detail the combat use of the missile troops to be used to carry out the oeerail 1'Gaskehe*nd ,in an army the,overall tasks-.of thellocate fire missions and assign them to those who are to execute them and must organize the tour of duty of launch batteries, the timely delivery of missiles to units and also the preparation of these for launching. During the course of an operation, they executo maneuver by trajectories and the movement of missile units and their supply bases.
In order to control missile troops, it is necessary constantly to know the situation and condition of the missile large units and units and also the availability and degree of readiness of the missiles for launching. Control of missile troops and their firo must be carried out continuously, which can be achieved by means of constant readiness forfrom presently existing forward command posts (peredovoy komandnyy punktPKP) and command posts (komandnyy punktKP) with high operational and technical training of generals andlear-cut distribution of functional responsibilities with the existence of intorchangeabillty, and also uninterrupted and reliable communications.
ule, the control of troops will be conducted from two points; these can be PKP or KP. In this, the personnel must be available at the PKP who are necessary to the commander of troops of the front in the process of workingecision and in the control of troops, namely generals and officers from the combined arms staff and chiefs of arms of troops,including the chief of missile
troops and artillery of the frontmall group of well trained officers. remaining personnel of the staff and the field control headed by the chief of staff of the front are located at the KP. onstant reciprocal exchange of information between the PKP and KP must be implemented.
In his article. General Ivanov argued sufficiently convincingly for the advisability of having in the composition of the field controlront and army two independent elements of control, Without raising an objection against this method of resolving the problem of control, we add that, in our opinion, the chiefs of tbe basic directorates of the staff and arms of troops with small groups of subordinate officers must be located with the commander of troopsront in all cases, thus permitting rapid evaluationituation, adoptionecision, and issuance of commands.
The opinion of the author of the article concerning the elimination of parallelism in requesting dataituation is also perfectly correct. Obviously*the introduction of automation into the control of troops will eliminate such defects but even under the given conditions this system needs revision. All information received from the troops must be concentrated in one organ and represented on an overall map or map-screen.
This proposal does not exclude, of course, the necessity for Interested command echelons to receive certain special information from directly subordinate troops (for example, for the staff of the missile troops and artillery to receive data on the movement of missiles and their degree of readiness for launching).
As is known, in view of the use of nuclear/missile weapons, the significance of intelligence has increased sharply, especially the timely receipt of reliable data. And in this regard we are in full agreement with General Ivanov, that the accomplishment of all tasks facing Intelligence, primarily those on behalf of the use of nuclear/missile weapons, requires its centralization.
Does the necessity for the staff of the missile troops and artillery to have its own intelligence department no longer exist? No, it still exists. In our view, it is needed In small complement, infor the organization and execution of preliminary reconnaissance of targets prior to deliveryuclear strike, and also for the organization of control, topographic-geodetic support, and other work. But its activities must be coordinated by the chief of intelligence of the front.
hole, in our opinion, tha questions raised by General Ivanov regarding the reorganization of methods of control of troops merit further discussion.
Major-General of Artillery V. Ilinykh
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In our opinion, the article by Major-Genoral M. Ivanov reflects correctly the deficiencies in the organizational structure of tho staffs of operational formations, ln the methods of control of troops, and ln the organization of control points, and the author's practical proposals do not raise any fundamental objections.
However, ln our view, one canesolution of the problem of increasing the stability of troop control most correctly not from an examination of the organizational structure of staffs as does General Ivanov, buthorough analysis of the methods of control of troops and combat weapons, upon which ln turn will depend the structure of the control organs.
New weapons of armed combat, and the nature of conducting combat operations corresponding to them,trong influence on tha methods of control of troops and combat equipment, and the latter ln turn makes definite, perfectly specific demands on the organizational structure of the organs and means of control. Thedefense of troops, for example, requires such methods and moans of control as to ensure the timely transmission of data on current aerial targets directly to the combat weapons, the instantaneous aiming of these weapons at targets which have been discovered, putting the combat weapons into action, and effectively destroying the target. Am we see it, the main role belongs to the actual method of control*
The requirements on the organs of control which are listed ln the article amount, In essence, to control over the readiness of combat means, regulating tbe activities of the commanders of arms of troops and the chiefs of special troops, and ensuring more purposeful work by appropriate departments in the collection and processing of operational information. These requirements are correct,but they do not Include the main condition emanating from the use of modern combat weapons and from the nature of the conduct of combat and operations.
The main element, in our view, is tho fact that the control of troops, weapons, and equipment must ensure effective results fros the use of all weapons of armed combat, primarily of nuclear/mlsslley weapons,miasile weapons, and the system of antiaircraft and antimissile defensehole. On this basis, particular requirements for tha control of troops are determined. Besides those Indicated by General Ivanov in his article, we should like to bring up some new ones ln addition, such as:
-ensuring speedy reaction by the commander and staff to events (phenomena) as they occur, which depends, on the ana hand, on the use ln combat and operations of rapid-fire combat weapons and troopa possessing; high speeds of movement and, on the other hand, on the necessity for counteracting an enepy who has similar forces and weapons;
-ensuring maximum expediency ln decisions and precision ln the operations, especially of nuclear/ missile weapons, the system of antiaircraft anddefense, airborne troops and radio countermeasures moans;
-ensuring thorough control over th* timely readiness of nuclear/missile weapons, means of antiaircraft and antimissile defense, and also over the operations and situation of friendly troops and their material and technical support.
In our opinion, the requirement for control organs advanced by the author in regard to the concentration of data on the situation in one point (center) should be broadened. It Is necessary to ensure the timely collection and processing and tha reliability ofon the condition of combat weapons, troops, materiel and technical reserves, Intelligence information on the enemy (ln tha first order, on objectives for nuclearnd data on the radiation and chemical situation. Under modern conditions, the versatility and volume
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of the information which characterizes the combat situation, the increased number of directions from which it Is received, and the sharp expansion of the area within which lt Is necessary to collect this Information is noted. In addition, the collection and processing of information must be accomplished in very limited periods of time, consisting,in many cases,of minutes and even seconds.
We fully agree with the opinion of General Ivanov concerning the necessity for stricter centralization of troop controlhole, including centralization of planning, control of fire weapons, and collection and processing of operational information, but we do not share his point of view on tbe composition of the fiold controlront (army).
In our view, th* creation of two separateain command-planning center and an operational center, is contrary to the concept of centralization of the control of troops. In ossence, one center plans, and another concerns itself with the collection of data and directs combat operations. This can lead to parallelism and to the necessity for coordinating the work of these two centers and.in the final analysis, to loss of time. Vould it not be better to have one center, an operational directoratehose functions have been broadened In the sphere of unified planning, and the collection and analysis of allon the situation of friendly troops and on tha results of the use of nuclear weapons,and in theof all instructions based on the plan for the operation,and on the progress of combat operations? In this situation, the concept of centralization of control will be effected more fully and the necessity for coordinating tho work of both centers will no longer exist.
The designation "nuclear/missile center" also warrants comment. In propoalng the formation ofenter, Goneral Ivanov indicates that "the nuclear/ missile center willnified organ for controlling the weapons of destruction of the front. All weapons
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of nuck-ar attack nust be concentrated ln the hands of the chief of this center,issiles of all types, bombor aviation and others, which will undoubtedly improve and expedite their use". It appears to us that it would be more correct to callenter the "fire and chemical center" which will more fully reflect the content of its work.
In tho composition of the field controlront (army) proposed by the author of theighly Important organ Is omitted, the communications directorate (department). Without this organ, none of the indicated centers can operate. To assign tha organization of communications to each or to any one of them aeparately is impossible and moreover it is perhaps harmful.
The organization and support of communicationsompletely Independent branch of military affairs directly involving the use of numerous communications troops and various technical means. Therefore, it appears to us that one of fchepmost Important organsront's system of field control should be the communications directorate.
Without dwelling on the organization of the communications systemront, let us examine the problems which, ln our opinion, are of fundamental significance ln determining the organizational structure of the field controlront, and which were not touched upon ln General Ivanov's article.
First of all, lt is advisable to dwell on tbe designation of the organs that aro ln charge of the organization of communications. Taking into account the future development of technical means of control, it is advisable to have in the fieldochanism (apparat) for the chief of communications troops and an automated system of control for the front. All the forces and means of communications, the automation of troop control processes and provision for secret communications,
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including cryptographic organs and means for making electrical signal communications channels socure should be concentrated ln the hands of th* chief of communlca-tiona troops and automated control systems.
The chief of communications troops and automated control systems mustingle systom of communications for ensuring the control of the front's troopshole. All means, available at the present time to the chiefs of missile troops and artillery and to the PVO troops, and dealgnated for the organization of an autonomoua communications system, must be employed for tho creationingle system of communicationsront. It is also necessary to avoid using the independent high frequency (vvsokaya chastotaVCh) government communications units. The VCh government communications organs must have only station secrecy devices, operating on solected channels assigned from the overall front system of communications.
The above listed meaaures permit, in ourigher quality and more economical communications system for operational formations especially if one considers the development of multi-channel radio relay, radio, and wire communications systems and also the introduction of means of automating processes of control and means of communications.
At the presentharp increase is evident in the requirement for communications channels for ensuring troop control and direction of tbe operational rear area. It appears to us that the basic direction in tho development of means of communications, which permits most effectively provision for the increaalng requirements la the creationingle centralized system of communications with wido-scale use of multi-channel radio relay and wire means.
The effectiveness of this approach can be demonstrated by the following examples. The existing equipment for the multiple use of heavy field cable llnoa will permit receipt on one lineelophone and one telegraph
channel. Prospective moans offer the possibility of havingelephone channels onine and the adoption of prospective voice-frequency telegraph equipment will enable us to replace each telephone channel withelegraph channels. esult, by the adoption of multi-channel equipment, tbeof the communications system on telephone channels can be Increasedimes, and on telegraph channels by several dozen times. imilar result will be achieved by the adoption of multi-channel radio relay and radio means.
Consequently, the widespread introduction ofcommunications systems permit provision forJ the increasing requirements for communications channels in operational control elements without an Increase in the number of communications troops.
And now the last of the questions touched upon by Major-General M. Ivanov in his article. We fully subscribe to his proposal concerning control points. Actually, tho existence of forward command posts along with command posts does not promote the assurance of stable control under present conditions, on the contrary, it leadsissipation of forces and means, weakens the capabilities of the main command post, decreases its role in the control of troops and gives rise toin the organization of the communications supportront. The creation of two independent control points, one of whicheserve point, can in many respects further ensure the stability of troop control under the conditionsuclear/missile war.
Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin
Original document.
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