INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Created: 6/25/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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iotblllb-nc* collectlob ukd

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aaanraadna rwpreaaatn aa intannt reportar reeoeflt by tneutf of station la BaigonBnltsd statea aad Oth latolllgsnca collection toa-thor with an uieament of existing intelligence

valuation procwaaow. the awwmbwwnc of tha Intelligence

collection process la South TXataaa aa aa pi aaa ad by tha COS Saigon aaa also baan eoordlaatad with appropriate aaaabers of ajr staff.

Intslligsnca

A. Coatral Intelligence Orgaalaatlon (CIO): Thla

to present aoao hoperofaaaloaaU, coordinated, evaluated approach to thogemot problenaw facing tho Baaic ooacapta of aaalyala, collation, source control* aad coordination will boin this orgaalaatloa. Tha CIO staff atari)ars laaa than

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m hopwfn1 that th* CIO will rwpreaent even to* Uy aa intelligence aauMt. but realistically SO eaaaot OSpoet profesalonal resulta

froa itoaaldoratilo period of tine.

5. Batlonal Pol lea aad security Bdrvlcn In addition to aa evert eollootioa fonaatlee, DM la expending, throogboat tbo eountrr, lta aaaelal police hraaeh for coTort Intolllgoaco oporntioao, aad ia granting-,I

Special opw ration* oorpa for TC penetration. On

too whole, atPBS roportlag aaa lacked good soorcing and eover-aga ontaldo of talgoo. and neeroat anal Of improving. Taa DBS la frequently capable of aa two ting TC lntontioaaa within Salgoa ia adraatco. partlewlaxly regarding torrorlot attacka. VTCn eoeatadlan bureau for tba correlation of Intelligence but tbe personnel are eelf-tralned aad generally sot very coapetaat.

C. isrwlosgjajfajot seelaloehis la the political lntelllgeaee era of the Preali ia engaged In both collection aad eporatlosa. consider thla asrvlcs ta be lassems, a1 aaa as god, and filled with bureancratlo petti sags. It ia set considered an effective

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tool for collaction of intelligence on too TC.

Military Intelligence Servicerrtco lo improving under tho gnlrlsmna ofbat ito Intelligence product in stilleourced and la often not disseminated with theto nake it tactically useful. Ibe Jointream*toe reluctant to eoopornte with other aerviceaCIO and these lntersorTloo disputes slow down and This organisation's aoat serious deficiency

Is exploitation of prleoners, dofeotoro and captured docuaente although there hasmall laprovaasnt in tha field. The evaluative processes employedre rudimentary and lt is seldom poaslbleo identify the ultimate aource in ersn routine reporting.

military Security Service (MSB): training of MBS officers haa boon good, andcould, but doea not,eal contribution toOTH collection and evaluation effort. Itsbeen limited by ago Din* Mhu to loyalty investigations

of Vietnamese army personnel and to tha detection of TC within army ranks. Tbe MBS haa no effective intelligence evaluation center and is still steadfaatly non-cooperative with the CIO. On the other hand, individual BBS field offloors are often

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qualified and uore interested la intelligencethan tbe Tie tar the civilian security representation.

r. Vietnamese Army SpecialService: This serviceert of tbaStaffoperatudies

bureau vnoae proficiency ia locating scaae alsadaotino TC transmitters is Inprovlng. Thla bureau aaa prepared very practical aad useful intelligence for use ia planning attacks scalnat TC transmitters. Taa studies bureau has also recently taken tha initiative la Interrogating and exploiting two TC defectors and the rapidity with union the defeotom were aade available for profesaioaal interrogationromising sign. The evaluative process of taa studies bureau is good but is sloe and limited.

3. United States latslllgence Organisations:

A. CIA: although the CIA station aaa expended very rapidly ever the seat year, taa majority of gala expenslom aaa been directed toward action projects la paramilitary sad pay" chologlcel warfare fields. Although tba latalllgeaceof the Station haa Improved in taa past year

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1*Tt>ry jood primarilyof the) dthbdcbStation Of aUUy ofticara withtorn aad a of cta avail-

able* to Station poraonnaii.

B, mUCf: e*traoiatl inheadquarter*m iawrleaa adrtaor. la tha

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prowinCB*. It ia doubtful if adding man Dal tad Stata*lntalliganca aaraonaal would significantly lncraaaa tna capabilltiaa of tala aorrico.

Ita alaailaa la taa aaonrltytactionand coapoaanta, including taa aolloetloa ofsignificant military flgnTOO in tha QTV and tha TC oolloctloa of data an olvlllaaa ana aay havatba vlolant Balaam of powor. is Inportnnt CICtha briaflag and dabrlaflag of aalactad ailltaryam lug thalr Tiatnamaa* uaaantaraartB. CIC,taff

offflcara, coordlnataa with tha CIA Station rogardlng lialaon vlth tba gvb Intalllganca and ancarlty aarvlca*.

h Hllltary Intalllganoa Oroupalamamt of tha Daltad Stataa aray'a olaadaatlaaobargad with rognlar raportlag as political, ailltary,actlvltla* of tba GTM aad tb* TC. Tna aourcaaaf Ita information appaar to darlva froa. lialaonaarvtoo* aadav agaat aoataata.

4. CIA Station Chlaf nan lata:

A. Intalligonoa on th* PC ia atill onaatlafactory particularly with refBranca to adaanata aoaralag, avaloatlon,

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collation, and tlalac- Tao aaait laportaat fallora laate* la th* lack af ATIaraarrlca coordination aad tna bapbaaard axwloltatlaaloHaMri aadlth raapact to tala lattar point, interrogator* ara baiavIO lnt*ra*rrlo* iatarrogatloala uaoar ooaatractloa aad laprorad lntorrojatlon galaaa ia Baa;llab and Tlotnaaaa* ar* balac aroridad.

b. tba iraiai of taalntalllt-anca advlaor*

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*lda. Tala will, bownvar,low and arduoua taak. Wh*roaa Station laaataallaraarnt of proTiDciai council! including rwprwnaBtatlvaa af all local Daltadad QTRpaxatlac aadar arorlac* chiefs.

C. ootlRut tola tb* flowfroa tb*ata Salgoa. rorlnc*woo uaualL7ilitary *fflcar aaa aor*laforaatioa reportlug aaaanolt a* Bay forward blaby dlract communication to tbavoiding aayarocaaa, or aa aay aobalt It throng*oo. By taamporting will go through

aoaa* evaluation proem, bataa taa tba poaalbly

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that tat mvrlica ahimt will cobalt laaaj infomatian through ailltary ohaaaala.

D. Tba feealblc pace af leaieiantat el thin tba gth Intelligence iiiaaaualty aaaoama aa *reeleaat Biew'a wllHfujnoao to aafca obviously aaaatsd obaaaaalafc, froa bio point ofaf steadily increaaing United fltataa Influence within GTS ailltary end Internal soeaorlty oothhll canon ta. Dlaa npparaatly eoaeaxa fully la tba seedomplete overhaul-log of the OrH intelligence ccasmalty bat bo will continue to eet tbe pace of change aad tba teraa af llalaoa roletlooahlpe, la aaaapjemmuaj with hla eetlaate of tba eaglet to which Baited Statea Influence within tba internal aeourlty eetabllebmsntossible political threat ta tba stability of hla regime, nowever, bssssiitq on Mam ta laereeae tba pace of lapinlament would andeubtedly be Interpreted by hla aa evidencealted Statea dee iretrawlta influence in Internal affaire,lower andlasissan la the Gvs Intelligence capability, within politically palatableay encourage hla grechially to step up tba paaa. With the

united Stataa peraeanel mew preaeat aad the plana now la

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prociu of lMplejwntation, it can b* njectid that taa OJW latalllaaaoa atructur* aheald raaoh ita xaaaforad capability by

Original document.

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