Created: 6/25/1962

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Report Regarding Implementation -of Joint Study Group Rccomroendation'SNo. 18

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1. The attached report on implementation of NSC-approved Joint Study Group Recommendation No.hich is forwarded for Board consideration, was developed by the Security Committee and coordinated, pursuant to provisions of the references, with the SIGINT Committee. The latter Committee advised, subsequent to its review of the paper onune, that it had no comments or recommendations on the report.

As indicated in Mr. Bannerman's memorandum, the Army member of the Security Committee has not concurred in this report. His proposals for changes in the findings, conclusions, andtherein are set forth in Attachment II. The Navy member of the Security Committee supports those proposals.

We presently plan to place the subject report on the agenda of an early USIB meeting (probably that of IIor discussion and action on the Security Committee's recommendation that the Board approve issuance of (a) the draft Policy Statement Concerningand Security Responsibilities (Attachment I) and (b) the Guide re Practices and Procedures for Counterintelligence and Security of Overseas Personnel and Installations as contained innd B.


xcluded from automatic downgrading and declassification






of the United States Intelligence Board

Report of the Security Committee in Implementing Recommendation No.f the Joint Study Group Report re "Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government" dated0


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is herein submitted for the consideration of thereport of the Security Committee which was requested toNo.f the Joint Study Group as clarified byfor Coordination. The Army Member, with thethe Navy Member, has taken an exception to the Committeeexception is set forth below in

No.s as follows:

"The Director of Central Intelligence should focus community attention on the important area of counterintelligence and security of overseas personnel and installations, and the agencies


concerned should make periodic reports to their agency heads."

to initiating its action on this recommendation,committee sought further clarification as to the jointintent with respect to counterintelligence and security. it was determined through the assistant for coordinationtask of the security committee was, "to recommend to theor individual agencies such actions, procedures, or policies

as would improve physical and personnel security and lead to more effective counterintelligence activity overseas" and that, "the security committee has no responsibility or authority for coordinatingoperations. under nsciduch responsibility rests with the dci."

in accordance with the recommendation, the security committee confined its consideration of the problem to theand security of overseas personnel and installations of the usib member departments and agencies. it is noted that this problem does concern those departments and agencies with overseas responsibilities which are not represented on usib. accordingly, all u. s. personnel assigned overseas should recognise that theyasic responsibility to protect the security ofverseas. it is recognised that the heads of departments and agencies have the responsibility for directing the security programs of their departments and agencies.

the security committeeeview of the national security act? and of pertinent directives, such as, nscid

no.cid's. e. o.nd e. o.

s amended, governing counterintelligence and existing policy concerning the security of personnel and classified it is the finding of the security committee that existingdirectives governing the security of u. s. personnel and installations overseas are adequate. implementation, however,ontinued flow of pertinent security andinformation both among and within u. s. departments and agencies bearing overseas counterintelligence or securityand at both headquarters and subordinate levels, in



accordance with need-to-know. Equally important is the continued counterflow of such information from the field to departmentaland the central counterintelligence records described in. Development and implementation of an adequate securitydepends upon the availability of pertinent information required for accurate appraisal of the hostile threat.

The Security Committee finds tbat some field components of departments and agencies sometimes lack information which would enhance their security. In part, the unavailability of the information is unavoidable; widespread dissemination of some sensitive items would plainly engender more security problems than it would solve. However, the Security Committee considers that an increased flow of information can be achieved without unduly endangering methods and sources. It therefore suggests that all departments and agenciesanitize useful materials which they produce,iew to providing protection at the point of origin,nsure that the dissemination restrictions of the originating agency are observed.

Since the hostile clandestine threat is essentially the same in terms of goals, personnel, and tactics, regardless of the U. S. target, improvement in U. S. security defenses depends not onlyharing of needed information but also upon observance of procedures and practices which by experience arc found to be most effective in protecting U. S. interests in general and sensitive sources, methods, and activities in particular. However, it was also recognized that the differing missions and organization of U. S. agencies require that these agencies implement these practices and procedures in different ways.

It is the opinion of the Security Committeeolicy statement by the United States Intelligence Board to defineto ensure closer coordination among the counterintelligence and security components of the USIB member agencies is necessary. The Committee hasraft policy statement for the Board which is attached


a guide for the departments and agencies, theidentified certain desirable practices and procedures forand utilizing pertinent counterintelligence andaffecting personnel and installations overseas. and procedures are set forth inf the attached uide, the Committee has also identifieddesirable security practices and procedures forinstallations overseas, which are set forth innd C.

Army Member of the Committee has taken anthe Committee report and haseparate proposalattached (Attachment II). The Army contends that Securityaction does not adequately satisfy the intentnd accordingly the Army proposes that the Securityreconstituted as the Counterintelligence and Security CommitteeU. S. foreign counterintelligence policies, programs The Navy Member supports the Army proposal. of the Security Committee is that its report to thesatisfies the intent of Recommendation No.nd that

the Army proposal should be submitted by Army to the USIBeparate matter for consideration,

specific conclusions and recommendations ofCommittee are as follows:


Executive Orders, NSCand Director of CentralDirectives governingnd security principlesabroad arc adequate.

S. security interests abroadwidest distribution ofand security information whichwith the protection ofsources. The timely exchange ofamong appropriate U. S. de-


partments and agencies and betweensecurity and counterintelligence components is essential and appropriate liaison should be maintained toward this end.

Thereeedolicy statement by usib concerning counterintelligence and security responsibilities with respect to the security of personnel and installations overseas.


The Board approve issuance of the attached draft policy statement with its attachments.


Attachments As indicated






In order for the USIB member departments and agencies to carry out effectively their responsibilities for the security of overseasand installations and without intent to infringe upon such broader authority or responsibility as any may now have under law. Executive Order or NSC directive, the United States Intelligence Board is agreed:

a. There must be as close coordination as possible

at all levels among the security and counterintelli-

gence components of those USIB departments and

agencies having overseas responsibilities in order that the hostile threat may be adequately assessed and effective countermeasures taken, b, Pertinent information concerning the efforts and



capabilities of the opposition againstnd installations overseas should be given as broad dissemination as possible among theand security components without unduly endangering methods and sources. There should


ontinual exchange of such information at the national level and in the field. It is suggested that all departments and agenciesanitize useful materials which they produce,iew to providing protection at the point of origin,nsure that the dissemination restrictions of the originating agency be observed.

ensure the availability of pertinent securityinformation to departmentsconcerned, appropriateconcerning opposition efforts andshould be submitted as soon asinclusion in the centralm accordance with.

possible and appropriate, theremeetings in the field of security andrepresentatives of those agenciesresponsibilities in areas of mutualhave established liaison.

e. USIB member departments and agencies with over-

seas responsibilities are requested toeview as they deem appropriate of their existing programs, regulations, practices, and procedures concerning counterintelligence and personnel and physical security utilizing the attached guide of desirable practices and procedures in this review. It is suggested that revision of existing programs, regulations, practices and procedures be made wherever applicable and appropriate toore effective system for the protection of installations and personnel overseas.




1. Counterintelligence and Security Policy Directives

U. S. Security and Counterintelligence personnel should be familiar with the executive anddirectives governing Security and Of key importance are EO No.. EONo.. NSCIDNo. 5, DCID... horough grasp of these orders and directives and scrupulous adherence to their provisions are essential to the coordination of U. S. defenses overseas.

Similarly, each Security and Counterintelligence Officer should be familiar with this paper and with all regulations governing Security andwithin his own department or agency.

2. Dissemination of Security and Counterintelligence Information Affecting U. S. Personnel and Installations Abroad

Counterintelligence and Security information directly relevant to the security of U. S. personnel, installations, classifiedand documents, and operations outside the U. S. should be



made available to appropriate security officers and thecomponents of others. agencies as rapidly and fully as circumstances permit. especially important is information about hostile intelligence services, as well as national and international communism. within these categories arc included currenton organizations engaged in hostile clandestine activity, all personnel within such organisations, functions, modus operandi, resources, strengths and weaknesses, and the like. modus operandi information should include known facts about the use of such techniques as provocation, penetration, subversion, blackmail, sexual or other entrapment* for security purposes, an intensive examination of the adversarypecific area, suchajor city abroad, is just as importantroader viewervice or communist organization in toto. information which becomes available to security and counterintelligence officers abroad should be promptly reported to the departmental headquarters concerned and thence, as appropriate and in conformance with, to the central counterintelligence records. within departments and agencies tho exchange of such information between counterintelligence and* security elements should be as rapid and complete asand the protection of methods and sources will permit.



a. Lateral Field Dissemination of Counterintelligence and Security Information

Lateral field dissemination of counterintelligence is frequently desirable from the viewpoint of speed and efficiency; but before undertaking lateralSecurity and Counterintelligence Officers should ensure that it does not conflict withregulations designed to preserve the security of sensitive items of counterintelligence through centralized control.

c. Meetings in Field

Security and counterintelligence personnelwithin areas of mutual concern and who have established liaison, should meet periodically as


appropriate to exchange pertinent security and counterintelligence information and to discuss mutual problems. Periodic meetings of such representatives in the field will permit more effective counteractions to be taken in matters of mutual concern.

Notifying Appropriate Officials of Counterintelligence and Security

need-to-know basts. The informed cooperation of U, S. Government employees abroad will undoubtedly further U. S. security interests.

5. Security of Communication Activities

Maximum security support should be given to

all forms of communicating and transmitting classified information including electrical means. Detailed studies should be conducted of current systems, including messengers, couriers, pouches, cables, and other forms of transmitting and communicating classified information to determine whether the security of such systems is adequate. The security of cryptographic systems of communication, however, is the responsibility of communications officials.

At present, certain systems of communicating and transmitting classified information among and between components of the various departments and agencies are not under the control of any particular department or agency. esult, the responsibility for security protection of such systems has not been clearly assigned to any specific agency or department. Security Officers should bewith all means of communicating and transmitting classified



9- Establishment of Training Programs

To ensure that Counterintelligence and Security-personnel are kept abreast of counterintelligence and security programs,techniques and methods of reporting, training programs and facilities should be established and maintained where practicableegular basis. It would be advantageous if those agencies and departments which have established training programs could offer their training facilities to personnel of other agencies which may not have similar facilities. Thia should resultore uniform implementation of security and counterintelligence programs.






submit complete biographic data on the intended spouse to his parent agency for appropriate checks,etermination should be made regarding retention if marriage is concluded.

7. Employee Conduct

Supervisory and command officials should be seriously and continually concerned with the well-


being of their employees. They should observe the behavior of employees and should report promptly any unusual actions which may indicate seriousmedical or psychiatric problems. There shouldlose liaison maintained between security and medical representatives both at headquarters and in the field, to ensure that both components are kept apprised of pertinent information affecting the health and security of employees. Appropriate security officials should be advised of any behavior which involves security factors or jeopardizes U. S. interest in order that appropriate measures may be. Employment of Foreign Nationals

Foreign nationals employed by the United Statesontinuing basis in or around U. S. installationsshould be thoroughly investigated and theirwithin the installation appropriately restricted and controlled.

The basic loyalty of such personnel is to their country of origin, which requires that their manner of use be severely limited.

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the direct supervision and observation of U. S. personnel. Such

personnel should be thoroughly investigated prior to employment

in every case where possible.

9. Clearance Procedures

The positions of all persons engaged in intelligence activities or having access toshould be designated as sensitive under the criteria established by Executive. Investigative coverage for such positions shouldield investigation to include interviews with neighbors as appropriate, supervisors and co-workers. Investigation shouldheck of the subject's spouse and any close relatives who are aliens or U. S. citizens residingoreign country. Lengthy satisfactory Government service should not be the sole criterion for clearance if only minimum security checks have been conducted.

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1. Control of Classified Information

Adequate physical security safeguards should be established and maintained in overseas installations to ensure that unauthorized persons are denied

access to classified information.

2. Storage of Classified Material

It is desirable that Secret material should be stored in accordance with storage requirements for Top Secret as set forth in Executive Order

as amended.


of the. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

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of the Security Committee in

Implementing Recommendation No.f the Joint Study Group Report re "Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government" dated0

1. (S) The Army Member of the Security Committee takes exception to the report of the Security Committee in this matter and does not concur in its submission to USIB in its present form. the following changes in the report to USIB are recommended:

in second sentence,f there adequate; however, it was noted in the fieldthat national intelligence directives could beto lead to increased focus of attention on that function.

following paragraph just before "Conclusions"report: "In reviewing present USIB level coordinationto U. S. foreign counterintelligence programs andSecurity Committee found that there is no organizational bodyUSIB structure which is now responsible for 'focussingon the important area of counterintelligenceCIDan adequate mechanism for the coordination ofcounterintelligence operations, but this procedurethe requirements of Recommendation Under

"Conclusions" subparagraphs follows:

re adequate, but they do not result in accomplishment of the intent of Recommendation"

the following subparagraph topositive organizational step within the USIB structurein order to insure accomplishment of the"

a. Add the following subparagraphs to) The Board redesignate the Security Committee theand Security Committee and approve the revisedof its Mission and Functions as shown in inclosure. (Revisions of. That the new Counterintelligence and Security Committee be assigned the task of compiling and submitting to theeport on member agencies implementation"

Zi (C) The changes recommended above are believed necessary in order for the DCI and USIB toositive atep to Implement Recommendation It is believed that thereport as it is now written does nothing more than continue the status quo.


MERRILL T. KELLY Army Representative

1 Incl aa (SECRET)



Pursuant to . . tanding Counterintelligence and Security Committee . . isclosure: and to review and report to the Board on overall US foreign counterintelligence policies, programs, and problems; and as concerns. thereunder:

The mission of tho Committee shall be to assist the Board and the DCI in focussing intelligence community attention on the important area of foreign counterintelligence as it supportsand to promote . . . methods.

ontinuing review of USprograms, policies, plans, and major problems.

report annually to the Board on the adequacy

of US foreign counterintelligence programs, policies, plans and major problems.




recommend foreign counterintelligence policy

make recommendations to theconcerning Security.

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3. Organization and Functions -

a. The Counterintelligence and Security Committee shall be composed of counterintelligence and security representative! Board.

Original document.