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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Capabilities For Long Range Attack
| o< thk oWu-wnr raqmVei thai if ba handled with <
Subn-JKod fe, Mm DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred tn by Iho UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai" IndKofed2
Tht following inteffigence orgonizafiom participrjfecf in Iht prtparahon of this til'matt i
Ihe Control Intelligence Agency and the miell-jence organtiatlont of theol Stole, Defense, ihe Army, lhe Novy, ihe Air Force, AEC, ond NSA.
Director of Mel^gence end lausorch. Deportment ef Slot. Director, Oc'cnie fntcIKgence Agertqr
tart Cruet of Stoff for Intelligence, Derrartrnenl of the Army Assistant Chief of Novo) Operationsepartment of fhe Novy Assistant Chief of Sloff, InlelUgoece, USAF Director lor Intelligence. Joint Staff
The Atomic Energy CommniiM flcprese Motive lo the USiB Director of the Nertronol Secvrfty Aoency
Ihe Asttttoni Owtcior, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the iub|oct being outside
of hit jurisdiction.
vnthin tho meaning
I IH Mta
tense of tho United States ond /W, lhe Irons-
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Soviet CapabilitiesRange "
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK
APPROVED FOR RELEASE the problem CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
To estimate probable trends in thc strength andof Soviet weapon systems suitable for long rangein Soviet capabilities for such attack, projectingabout five
Major new developments are evident in Soviet programs for long range striking forces. First, as forces for attack on Eurasia are reaching planned levels, greater emphasis is being placed on forces for intercontinental attack, especially ICBMs. Second, thc Soviets are attempting lo improve their capabilities for both preemptive and retaliatory action, by measures designed to shorten reaction times and increase survivability.
The tempo of the ICBM program has quickened. The present relatively modest force level of aboutperational launchers will probably grow substantially, reaching some
'The weapon systems considered arc ground-launched missiles with rangesautical milesr more, submarine-launched missiles, heavy and medium bombers, air.lo^urtacc missiles, and advanced delivery and supporting systems such as orbital and suborbital vehicles. Emphasis Is placed on those systems designed primarily io allack land targets in North America, and in Eurasia and Its periphery.
aunchers inn3 onwards, an increasing proportion of the ICBM force will probably be deployed at launch sites having some degree of hardening.
The USSR isubmerged-launch ballistic missile submarine system, with medium or intermediate range missiles. This improved system will probably beinto some portion of ther so existing ballistic missile submarines, andew submarine class. Soviet submarines armed with cruise-type missiles are also capable of attacking land targets. Within the next few years, Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarines will probably beregular patrols within firing range of the US.
For employment against Eurasia, the Soviets have built formidable missile and bomber forces, which they willto maintain and improve. Their limited bomberagainst North America will be tailored increasingly to conduct missions supplementary to ballistic missile attack.
The weight of nuclear attack which the USSR could launch will increase with the growth of long range striking forceseneral upward trend in weapon yields. Within the next few years, limited numbers of very high yield weapons in0 megaton range will be available for delivery by bombers and probably ICBMs. Ground-launched missile units are believed to have more than one missile per launcher, toetire capability.
In thes, the principal Soviet forces for attack on North America will be increasing numbers of ICBM launchers, supplemented by increasing numbers of nuclear-powered missile submarines and decreasing numbers of bombers.reemptive attack at that time, the USSR would be able to strike at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery capability. Moreover,
Assistant Chief of SUIT (or Intelligence. Department Of the Army, believes that the number of Soviet ICBM launchers is unlikely to exceed the low side of the ranges shown lornd
'The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. estimates lhe number ol operational launchers as follows-iou;nd
it would have some prospectortion ol its own long range striking forces could survive an initial US attack and go on to retaliate.
ith the long range striking forces we estimate it will have in thcs, however, the USSR could not expect to destroy the hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fastnuclear delivery capabilities of the US.
POLICY TOWARD LONG RANGE STRIKING FORCES
The Soviets regard forces for long range attack as essential for supporting anpolitical posture, deterring the West from resort to military action, andar as effectively as possible should one occur. In our view, they are building forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives rather than attempting to achieve the very highof superiority required lo launch aattack on the West. Efforts to gear their forces better for both preemptive and retaliatory operations, along with greaterupon forces capable of attacking the US. are thc major new developments in thc Soviet programs for long range striking lorces.
In building these forces, thr Soviets put initial stress onassive capability against Eurasia and its periphery.capabilities were not neglected, bui deployment of medium range delivery systems occurred earlier and In much larger numbers. This pattern Is probably changing. Wc believe that deployment of medium range systems ts approaching the planned level, and that major emphasis is now being given to further development of forces forattack, primarily ICBMs
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
he tempo of ICBM development and deployment has quickened noticeably tn the past year or two While present force levels aie relatively modest, there is good evidence lhat the Soviets have been conducting high priority RAP on new 1CUM systems, with con-
current construction of deploymentMoreover, the Soviets are probably building new sites with some degree of
Development and Deployment. During the paslonths, activity on the Soviet ICBM lest range has intensified, wiih firings of three different types of ICBMs. The most urgent recent program aL Tyuratam has been thc development of the second generationCBM system, which is now beingTesting of theCBMlower pace. It could be available for operational useirings of the first generationCBM. which probably became operationalave beeneduced pace. We believe lhat within the nexl year or so the Soviets will begin firing new ICBMs or space vehicles which are as yet unknown to US intelligence.
The urgency apparent in theof the second generation ICBM almost certainly relatesoviet decision to deploy the first generation system in only limited numbers TheCBMery large vehicle of nearlyillion pounds gross takeoff weight, with nonstorable liquid propel-Ian Is and ladio-inertial guidance. Ground control and support facilities aielarge and Include rail service direct to launchers The second generationCnivt Is simpler and considerably less bulky, and probably employs storable liquid propcl-lants and all-inertialypicalomplex consistsail-served support area and eight or more launchers, which are
In pairs and are road-served
Hardening. All currentlySoviet launchers are deployedfixed siles, bui we believe the Soviets have
probablyrogram to construct launch sites having some degree of hardening. Considering past Soviet practices, we estimate that there will be two ICBM launchers at each site. The first of these new sites will probably be operational in3 lt is probable that such sites aie to employ either theCBM with redesigned ground supportor theCBM. Our information on the SS-fi system is inadequate to determine whether the missile employed Is even larger than thcr whether it Is smaller than the SS-7.
stimated Force Levelshe ICBM force will increase substantially above Lis present level in lhe next year or so. Our estimate of the growth of the force in this period is affected, on the one hand, by the increasing tempo of the Soviet program, and on the other hand, by the greater time and effort required to build hardened launch sites. Considering these factors, together with all the other evidence available to us, we estimate as follows the Size and composition of the ICBM force
OPERATIONAL SOV1KT ICBM LAUNCHERS.
Soft 1st Generation
'Trie Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, believesthe number of Soviet ICBM launcheri is unlikely to exceed the low side of the ranges shown for mid IMS and4
'The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. estimates0 operational ICBM launchers In mM-lM2 He would eiUmate the force levels through ipfc as follows:
Mid-IMl M1 4
Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
MRBM and IRBM sites, each with four pads, are soft, fixed, and road-served. More thanercent are deployedroad belt of Western USSR stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. within range of NATO largets in Norway, most of Western Europe, andA lesser concentration of sites In thc Soviet Far East Is capable of bringing Japan. Korea, and Okinawa underew sites in south central USSR are within range ol US and Allied military Installations in Turkey and Pakistan. IRBMs could extend the target coverage from these various areas to include all of Spain, North Africa, Taiwan, and the northern Philippines.
We estimate' that the USSR now hasperational MRBM and IRBM launch pads. We do not have evidence that all of these launch pads are manned, and it is possible that some of them representfiring positions. The site construction program has probably slowed but not ceased. The force will probably grow over the nexl year or twootal ofaunch pads (including0fter which it will probably level oil.
Operational Procedures of Missile Unifs
IRBM, and MRBM units arcto have retire capabilities.evidence is not firm, we believe thatof two missiles is provided forpad. Preparation to file Initialsalvoes probably requires aol hours. Sophisticated methods ola high degree of simultaneityIn operalions are not believed toThc USSR is working lareaction and retire times Of strategicunits, but current system designsthc constant maintenance ofconditions approaching those of
he Soviets now have operational aboutong range ballistic missileiesel-powered "Z" class,lesel-powcied "G" class, anduclear-powered "H" class submarines. This forceotal ofallistic missiles with ranges up. The effectiveness of these submarines Is limited by lhe small number of missiles each carries, the short range of the missiles, and the requirement for to surface for launching. There is reliable evidence, however, that lhc Soviets are nowapability to launch ballistic missiles from submerged submarines. The range of the missiles may be. rogram to retrofit someof the existing force of aboutG" and "H" class submarines will probably begin soon. All of these submarines could be so equipped within lhe next two to four years.ewsubmarine class Is probably also under development to employ this new missile system; we estimate that the first suchcould become operational. The probable numbers of ballistic missilein Soviet operational units throughre estimated as follows:
SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILS
he Soviet Navy has also. submarine-launched cruise missiledesigned primarily for low altitude, supeisonic attack against Western surface ships, partitularly carrier task forces They are now carriedew converted dlesel-poweicd submarines and at least four nuclear-powered submarines. We believe thil theaie now extending tlteir capability to attack land targets with missiles of this type
Lomj Range Avialion
oviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of ils equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited Lo Eurasian operations than to intercontinental aitack. We estimate that as ofong Rangeeavy bomberset mediumirtually all of thebombers are BADGERs.ewBLINDERS have probably now beento units. It Is unlikelyew heavy bomber will be developedecent trends indicate little change in total aircraft strength over the next two years.
Assistant Chief of Stall, Intelligence. USAF, believes that the Heavy bomber force will have the composition Included In the following table: Bote aias
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF. believesollow-on heavy bomber will4 The continued research and de-^vclotxnent of large supersonic aircraft substantiates thc Soviets' interest In large supersonic vehicles and indicates their intent to increase their strategic attach capabilities by such means.
attempting to overcome theof Long Range Avialion (orattack, the Soviets haveemphasis to aerial refuelingtraining in BADGER and BISONof the BEARs have been modified. air-to-surface missiles. Wethat the Soviets might plan toircraft to initial attacksAmerica.ariety offactors, but excluding combatwe estimate that the Sovietsombers over North Americamissions In initial attacks; ofhalf could be heavy bombers. Theof Arctic training and basethat aircraft wouldew bases in successivea number of hours."
present Soviet stockpile consistsentirely of weapons developed fromtests conducted prior toost of the weapons allotted toAvialion are probably high-yieldfromTT.now In service could delivermaximum yields in the megatonarc probably also equippedyield warheads. Naval cruise-typeand alr-to-surface missiles arewith warheads of low or mediumuse against ships, but could deliverin the low megaton range aguinstcoastalhe general trend inof weapons allotted to long rangeprobably be upwards. ew very high-
"The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USaF. believes that the Soviets wouldumber of bases for stating and would not be restncied tn their mode of attack He further believes that the Soviets could commitircraft to initial two-way nilncKi on North America. Considering operational factors nnd allowing for noncombal at. trition.ombers could rcncri Northtargets
yield bombs ofT, orT. could now be available. It is possibleew ICBMs capable ot delivering these very high yield weapons could be available within thc next two years."
IRENDS IN IONG RANGE STRIKING
thes the USSR willto strengthen and modernize itsstriking forces, with emphasis oncapable of attacking the US.devoted to long range attack forcesaffected by the competing demands ofmilitary and nonmilitarycannot estimate with confidence thethc Soviet leaders will, make or thethey are likely to achieve In variousprograms. However, we believe lhatmixed striking capability will beICBM will be lhc dominant weapon.
Soviet ICBM program willariety of factors: Sovietconcepts, technical improvements,weapons programs, the nature andWestern forces, and the internationalThese factors place broad limitsfuture Soviet ICBM force but doarticular program. For thiscan only estimate the Soviet forcea broad range. All thingsbeiievo the Soviet force level Inbe within the rangeTne majority ofegree of hardening,some fully hardened To achieveside of the range, the USSR wouldcommit resources throughout thisrates al least as high as those nowIn thc ICBM program. Many ofwill probably have more than one
^etailed discussion of Soviet nuclear weapon charnctcrisUcs. sec, "The Soviet Atomic ErtercyatedOP SECRET (Limited Distribution)
missile available, loetire capability. Our estimate, reflecting the considerable range of uncertainty in any figures for this period, is as follows:
OPERATIONAL SOVIET ICBM "
Fully Hard ew a
he smaller force would give thc Soviets high assurance in an initial attack otUS soft fixed nuclear bases, scmihardened ICBM sites, communication and controland the principal US metropolitan areas. The larger force would provide an additional attack capability against some hardenedcontrol centers, and other elementsto US striking and defensive strength, and would increase the Soviet retaliatory capability. We believe that thc programmed buildup in US intercontinental attack forces makes It increasingly unlikely that the Soviets would judge that they could launch an attack on US nuclear forces and inflict sufficient damage to assure thatdamage to the USSR was acceptable.
he accuracy, reliability, and reacUon time of thc ICBM force will Improve. Better command, communications, and otherwill Increase its flexibility and capability for simultaneous attack. The bulk of thc force will probably be equipped with warheads
"The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. De-partment of the Army, believes that the force level Is likely lo be towards the low Side of the estimalc presented in thcabove.
"The Assistant Chlet of Staff. Intelligence. USAF, believes thc operational Soviet ICBM launchers for lhcill be as follows:
ardened Piilly Hard
in therange,umber of L
missilesmissiles will prob-
ably be available To Improve theof the force, the Soviets will probablyto deploy ICBMs al launchers which are dispersed and have some degree of hardening. They will also probablyully hardened system which we believe couldoperational5
MRBM end IRBM Forces
strength In these systemshave been stabilisedperationalTo improve the survivability offorce, the Sovicls may alsomobile or hardened systems.
Submarine-La unified Forces
planners will probably look uponmissile forces as an Importantlo their ICBM strength becauserelative invulneiablllty and theirfor varying the direction and natureon the US. We believe that theof nuclear-powered submarines capableballistic missiles will benhe Soviclsalso have about two dozenequipped wiih cruise-typeaddition, dleselpowered missileremain In operation. The ranges ofmissiles may be extendedmuch. for bulllstlc. for cruise missiles. By thesome Soviet nuclear-poweredwill probably be conductingpatrols within missile range of US coasts.
ith the growth and improvement of missile capabilities, tlie Soviets would probably plan Io employ bomber forces in follow-onafter initial missile strikes had been delivered or Lo supplement the retaliatory blow ii the USSR were attacked first. Aircraft
with improved penetration aids and nuclear weapons would probably be used for increasingly specialized missions, such as aimed reconnaissance and atlacks on hard targets. Byong Range Avi.ition will probably includeedium bombers, about one-third ol them supersonic BLINDERs. Heavy bomber strength will probably have been reduced toWc estimate as follows the strength of Long Range Aviation in thes:
e have no evidence ol Soviet plans or programs for Lhe military use of space. Wc think it highly unlikely, however, that the USSR would omit this field in its vigorous search for qualitative improvements in itsposlure and foi achievements with which to support claims of superiority. We believe that the Soviets could launch reconnaissance, communications, meteorological, navigation, or geodetic satellites at any lime There is
"The Assistant chief of Staff. Intelligence. USaF. believes that the heavy bomber force will have the composition included In the following table iscendom sirs
no evidence thai lhe Soviets are working to develop offensive space weapon systems, bul the course uf the Soviet space program to date suggests lhal any efiort in Ihls field would be directed toward an orbital bombardmentIt would be technically feasible for the Soviets to launchans of limited capability into orbit in thc, but we do not believe they could achieve an effectivecapability by the end of Lhc decade."
IMPLICATIONS OF CAPABILITIES
The capabilities of Soviet long range striking forces will be only Inunction of Lhe numbers of weapons available, their performance, and Lhe adequacy o( supporting elements Equally critical will be the way in which the Soviets employ thetr striking forces, their ability to maximize the effects of these forces under the various circumstances in which war could begin, and theirof Western capabilities and plans.
The current Sovirt targeting concept reflects the view thateneral nuclear war Is likely lo be piolracted and that victory requires the reduction ol al) elements of the western warmaking potential TheseInclude: the bases ol strategic delivery systems, nuclear weapons facilities;and governmental centers; military and war supporting industry. We have no evidence that avoidance of heavy civilian casualties is among the objectives underlying Soviet targeting.
"The Assistant Chief ol SUIT. Intel licence. USAF. believesoviet orbtUI bombardmentcould be achieved prior to thc end of the decade Based on technical conn derationsooster and techniques known to exist today or to Be within Soviet capability, he believes thatystem could be developed as early3 Thu system could be composed of orbital vehicles0 pounds giosi weight, which couldery High yield weaponEPun, initially and Inter lo
Should lhe Soviets conclude th.it thc West was inevocabiy commillexl to annuclear attack on thc USSR, they would launch their available ready forces in aattack designed to Dlunl the expected Western blow The mixed force which they have available for such operations would permit flexibility of tactics and complicate Western defensive problems, but would pose seveie difficulties of coordination. Initial missile and bomber attacks against lhe US would probably extenderiod of many hours', and those against Eurasia over atew hours. We believe thai at present the Soviets would plan to employ few if anysubmarines in Initial attacks against the US; initiation of routine submarine patrols within missile range of the US could change this situation.
y thes, lhc USSR will haveubstantial missile capability tonuclear weapons against the US, intu its already (oi midable forces for strikes in Eurasia. Significant portions of Ihls force will be relatively Invulnerable to attack. The Soviets will beosition to strikeat the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and ihey will have some prospeelortion of their own force could survive an initial US attack and retaliate with high yield nuclear weapons. With the long range striking forces we estimate that they will have in thes. however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing numbers of US hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fastnuclear delivery vehicles.
SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK
Glossary of Missile Terms TableBallistic Missiles TableMissiles TableMissUes
Tableand Heavy Bomber Weapon Systems
CLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS
OperaUonal Capabilityale lhe hrttt operationalew missiles and launchers.
Circular Error ProbableIhe radiusircle in which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur, inherent missile accuracies arc somewhat better tlian thc accuraciesin the tables, which take Into consideration average operational (actors. Thc accuracies specified for naval systems include die error in thc location of rhe launching ship.
Warheadlie weight of the explosive device and Its' associated fuzing and firing mechanism.
Nosecone/ Re-Entry Vehicle-Thehousingofthe warhead plus the warhead.
Heady Missileeady missile is an ln-conimlssion missile with warhead mated,on anin-commissionlauncberinatrainedunlt which is considered ready to be committed to launch. Ready missile rate is the percentage of missiles on launcher which arc "ready missiles".
Reliability, onhe percentage oi ready missiles which wMsucceesfullycomplete countdowns and leave their launchers attimes orinutes thereafter.
Reliability. Inhe percentage of mlaailea launched which detonate as planned in the target area. within three CEPs of the aiming point).
Maximum Operational Rangeaximum range under operational conditions with warhead weight indicated. For long range ballistic missiles, the maximum range figures disregard the effect of the earth's rotation. The maximum effective range ofsuchmlssilesflrcdoncasterly trajectories would be greater than that indicated; those on wesierly trajectories would be less. In general, ballistic missiles can be fired to ranges of as shortf maximum figures listed widiout degradation in accuracy.
Condition Launch crews not on alert Nosecone and missile not checked out and not mated. Missile guidance system not adjusted for particular target. Missile not erected or fueled.
Conditionaunch crews in launch area and on alert. Missile and nosecone mpre-launch storage building, mated and checked out.
Conditionaunchcrewsonstatlon. MLsslle with nosecone erected on launch pad. Propellant facilities in position, anached, and ready to start propellant loading. Guidance system set.
Conditionfssile propellant loadingGuidance system checked.
Reactionime required to proceedeadiness condition to firing.
Retireime required to refire from die same pad.
GROUKD-LAUNCHED HALLtSTIC MS51LE5 totimetod Character, etic* end
Takeoff Weight <lbs)
ft tor. liquid
or non-ator. liquid
Time i; ProTD eadineas Condi lion Is
0 bra. We.
tRTO SURFACE MISSILES Esii rattednd PorfortfJinc4
Maximum Range) Utitdejicc
clLdefiaed turjjAl* on land:
Accuracytithlpft Agfljurit land targeu
R'actoid Wt. (lbs)
iding with semi-active
E or nm clear
UioWarae inertialactive radar terminal homing
KITCHEN AS 4
A ne* ftir-io-lurfaca ni^sile carriedLINDER *B* medium eotnlw, was dtaptayvd in tho iaet Soviet air stow We believe (Let tKi* OXype of a
coild become operational in
Kaliabihty on launcher
Primarily ontiohiji,sedIoaH (arcetJ
Altitude n; LftUQOh
Mfc'DIUM AND It RAW BOMUKR RIlWW SYSTEMS Gntimnttidyliaivra1 PreM*
[Cakulawd jr. accordance with USQUA Spochatroaftrv**reduced Co pumkl oitor Atlevel, aod aircraft operate at altitudo* prmittwradiWrai-
Radium/ranfe (nm) 1
one rrfuel d. Wit*xAS-1
ono refoetn? refuel
OC IP MM
allitede. IC.OCC tb
Combat Coiling (ft)lb bombload or
Syateai Accuracy (GBP) a. Boeabiae aecerao.0 ft ii.C ft t- ASW tcct*&e>1
av. Aircraft reaching taxM nteava in US
AMS retiabiUty onlauacber/inflight I.L AS-2
iv. AS t
150 vi. *hipi;
n. va. coailet
L vn.. vs. coaxial
it. land target*
footnote* Cop of followjna mm
FootAotan lot Table* 4
!i in- iven in 'Ji- table
era *uImbey ar* applicable io lb*of lieae aircraft,ptiaaaai
*iqa profile* oa direct Mn. Th* ana of olderaircraft, standard mm ion profiles, indirect
le*el oc other tactic* deaicnad, 0>
evade datactioa and interception aoold reduce UiaU'< ranno. Tho calculation of degradation In rango and and radius msulUni; from aaphinticsied penetration iat. lie*omplex process which can host be actomplUMI to* Individualule-of-Uiuob foilaid operatic* of heavy lumbers, the ladle* ai optimaa alii*Ht be decreasedales tot everyI* fine at Ma la-cl.
'BADGER* bv. been observedisi.OMKT, orissile.IPPRR.
BEAR* now carry one.ANGAROO, ra literombload. Th* AS-1ataiad to -eigh aboutlb-.
*ombr. *kk4 BNMwllbcat raCeeliag proa a; rang* aad.efaeliaa capa-
bitity could ho co.etoped fort any Uai*.
a* annul refueling equipment aad carries oneITCHEN; range and radtu* miaaion* incled*. dash. Radiusfor bothaiclata aad eat of large*aagas iadeoV darea oejy.
1 flonDIng accuracies Indicates are for visualot radar bccibiag againat well-defined largata with (tea-fallhese figures are not applioablo to drogue retarded bomb*,would be mueh la**
' ladaea* tbe follo-ia* operabocal ati/iUea rata*.
eacladlag coahel eunltoe t eit'aft el
base*be la coaaiiuioaance *tanddown prior lo initialb) HX ot aircraft in ecaacalnsion alrw would be launched from tUgingf aircraft launchedging baae* or directly frome* on unrefueled tni*-ftiona would arrive in Urgetdj 7a% of airetaf: laureled on refceled aueuoa* would imi ir largnt area*. CalcalaOou lor BEAR ara baaed aa arUaaTli
Arctic staging a'd aircraft. Il ahould be
noted that arllfcout pnor nalnlaaancetba in-uurnmiaaioa rateombers al hamo baiaa would br abouland for median bomber? aboal iOX.
Missile Capabilities against Northern
surface Ballistic Missiles
Missile Capabilities against Continental
Bomber Capabilities against Northernof
Bomber Capabilities against Northernof
Soviet Bomber Capabilities against Continentalof BISON
Soviet Bomber Capabilities against Continentalof BEAR
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