THE OUTLOOK FOR WEST GERMANY

Created: 7/25/1962

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DIRECTOR; OF CENTRAL" INJElLIGENCEr.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Outlook for West Germany

THE OUTLOOK FORERMANY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the outlook lor West Germany over the next few years, with primary emphasis on foreign policy and West Germany's role in the Western Alliance.

CONCLUSIONS

both within and outside Westthe postwar years have worked to create forcesinternal stabilityrm western orientation.probable departure during the period of thisis not likely to occasion political instability or leadbasic recasting of West German policies.

Us economic and military strength waxes,relationships within the Alliance are likelymarked by greater assertiveness, particularly inaffect West German security. The desire forwill also affect the Germans' attitude towardof nuclear weapons. They would prefer aof joint control, but failing this would wish toin any joint European system which mightEuropean unity advances. Onlyast resortWest Germans eventually seek to acquire nuclearunder their own control.)

Germany will continue to promote Europeanas well as close Bonn-Paris ties.Large European" solution, embracinglhe European Common Market states is also likely

to grow, particularly when Adenauer departs. Butform the European unity movement may take the West Germans will not wish it to carry any implication of separation from the US in matters of defense and security.)

D. West German policy is likely to remain firm against any settlement on Berlin which in effect would shut the door to reunification or affect the essential viability of Berlin, including the Western military presence there. Aoverstepping these limits would seriously damage West Germany's relations with its allies. We do not believe,thatettlement of which the Germanswould lead them to abandon their basic western orientation. The nature of the West German reaction would depend to considerable degree upon the specific terms of the settlement and the conditions existing at the time,the risksajor military action.)

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

The "Adenauer era" is clearly entering lis final stage. Since his party's setback in last fall's election, evidences of weakening in the Chancellor's authority, prestige, andhave multiplied. It Is apparent thatyear-ald Adenauer is no longer able to dominate policy as completely as he has in the past. As the Chancellor's departure from the scene approaches, competitors for the leadership of public opinion and lor political power are becoming more active.

This first Important change in theguard in West Germany9ime when "reconstruction" has become history, and when the West Germans are beginning to feel that their growingand economic power entitles themore active role in the Western Alliance. Jt also coincidesime of shifting external conditions directly affecting West Germany. The extended Berlin crisis, the acceleration of West European integration, and thenew problems emerging in NATO military policy have made West Germans more conscious of their exposed position on the periphery of the Bloc- These developments have highlighted once again the fundamental difficulties involved in reconciling Westbasic security interests and western orientation with the national objective of

II. BASIC FACTORS OF STABILITY Political Trends

these auguries of change,development of West Germanystrong factors of stability whichtoteadying influence anpolicy and politics in the years ahead.

With continued prosperity and the related trend toward political moderation, there are today no serious internal conflicts over basic domestic policies. Extremist elements have now either disappeared from political life or have takenhe ranks of theparties, tn linerendwo-party system. There is the same basicin matters of foreign policy.between the major political forces and groups have tended to diminish In recent years and the policy of close integration with the West pursued by Adenauer for moreecade now has widespread support Such issues as the degree of West Germanin NATO, commitments lo emerging European groupings, the defense buildup, and the futility of bilateral talks with Moscow, have largely disappeared from the serious political dialogue between the major parties

The cumulative effects of Westpolicies under Adenauer, accompaniedeneral rise in personal well-being and by progress toward broader European goals, have resulted in strong psychological as well as practical ties to the West, particularly the US. These bonds nowoliticalof their own. They have notreplaced narrower national concerns, but they will tend to work against sharp swings in policy, or opportunistic politicaldamaging to the West.

This intimate relationship with the WcsL has also helped to encourage political andchanges In West German society which should make for stability and moderation. For example, the subordination of the military forces to civilian authority and theirwith NATO have operated to limit sharply the involvement of the military in internal politics. In the economic field, postwar liberal

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policies, wider distribution of wealth, and growing economic integration with the West have strengthened the western orientation of major economic groupings. In many ways West German society has come to resemble more closely that of other democraticcountries. These changes, coupled with the lull cooperation of West Germany in NATO anl In the development of Europeanhave also Impressed other nations.esult, the psychological gulf between West Germany and Its allies has been narrowed and the chances of serious misunderstandingthe Alliance reduced.

Security and Broader Nalionai Considerations

The West Germans also recognize that their broader security Interests are such that they must remain closely tied to the West, especially the US, for the foreseeable future. West German fear and distrust of the USSR are deep-seated and not Likely to change markedly. The West Germans are now also overwhelmingly of the opinion that the USSR will not alter its hard positions on matters affecting reunification and recovery of lost territories. Hence they are not disposed to limit their cooperation with the West In hope of obtaining Soviet concessions to German interests.

Further, the West Germans recognneey are unable toilitarystrong enough tooreign policy independent of their major alliesest Germany will probably haveen in uniform. While impressive in European terms,orce will not alter the basic fact that relative to the US and the USSR West Germany will continue tosecond level" military power. In military terms. West Germany's national territory is hardly adequate toombat zone, and the Bundeswehrs zone of communications lies almost entirely outside the country on the territory ol NATO allies. West Germany has chosen to accentuate the dependent state of its armed forces by extensive integration of its logistical support system with that of US forces in Europe. Furthermore, the West Germans could not independently develop an effective nuclear weapons capability during the next few years, and will remain totally dependent upon their allies forhus, their military strength is significant only Ln the context of NATO arrangements.

Economic Considcrolions

The basic economic conditionsto West German stability and western orientation are likely to persist for some years. Although the West German boom has tapered off, present indications arc that the gross national product (GNP) will continue tothree to four percent annually over the next several years,abor shortage and some weakening of West Germany'strade position. This rate of growth is adequate to supportontinued rise Ln general living standards and increasedand foreign aid expenditures without heavy deficit spending. Further, withthat appear to be holding steady atS7 billion, the foreign exchangewill continue strong.

The nature of West German trade will continue to strengthen West German ties with the West. Foreign trade accountsf West Germany'sigure more than double that of the prewar period. Nearlyercent of this trade Is non-Bloc

'On West German capabilities for nucleardevelopment, seeNuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other Than the US andated.

ith the Common Market nowa great Ire* trade area in Western Europe, West Germany's trade links with its Western partners will grow even stronger.

in the unlikely event thattrend toward European economicshould be checked, the basicthe West German economy, itsand Its large reserves, would makeeconomic setback improbable.interest in trade with the Eastincrease, but in view of theof the Soviet Bloc to providecommodities, it is unlikely that thewestern orientation of Westtrade would be dramatically changed

Summary

developments both withinWest Germany have workedthe postwar years to create forcesinternal stabilityirm westernIn general, the West Germansstrongly disposed to believe that thesecurity and prosperity can onlywithin the context of closethe US and lis allies. There isthe West German scene which appearsgive any ground for alarm.is also true that the last decade hasfavorable for thedemocratic stability and pro-WesternThere are,umberin view, both domestic andcould test West Germany's stabilityties with the West in the years ahead.

he breakdown of West German export trade by general areas was as follows: Western Europe.ercent: US andercent; Sino-Soviet Bloc, fi percent, ot which one-third was with East Germany; and the rest of the world, aboutercent.

III. THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION

The withdrawal of Adenauer will test West Germany's ability to conduct Its affairs without the helpominating figure in the office of Chancellor. There will be someof political power as Adenauer'sdeclines, and perhaps even more so when he retires. This will mean that policy wil] be exposed to the pressures of personal and party politicsreater degree than hitherto. In the last few months some of Adenauer's colleagues have already made bold to challenge his conduct of affairs, and anin such incidents is likely as political figures Jockey for power

However, we believe that the problem ofunlikely toserious political Instability. Given the degree of consensus within Westatters of both domestic and foreign policy, and the basic military and economic trends, it seems highly unlikely that the ascendancy of moderate and pro-Western forces will be La any real danger over the next several years. Moreover, many of the basic politicalrequired by Adenauer's departure arc already taking plact.

The approaching succession problem will, however, bring lively struggles inside the Christian Democratic Uniont seems likely that the party will be able to agreeuccessor to Adenauer and prevail on the latter to give over the reins of power,in tho next year or so. Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard ls today clearly the front runner for the succession. Provided that the economic situation does notharp unexpected setback which would tarnish Er-hard's public image, the CDU and Its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Unionre likely to select him simplyhe is considered the best vote-gctter the party has. Erhard's candidacy Is further Strengthened by the fact that the strong men in the party, such as Foreign Minister

hard Schroeder. Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, and the new CDU Executive Secretary Josef Dufhucs. view Erhardtransition" Chancellor. Since each as yet lacks sufficient power to decide the outcome, all will probably be primarily concerned to keep the party in power while strengthening their personal influence in preparation for the next round. There is an outsideespecially If the changeover should be delayed, that one of these men could build sufficient power to succeed Adenauer directly.

The other parties will also play arole in determining the character of future governments. We expect that Social Democratic Party (SPD) electoral strength will continue to increase during the period of this estimate. The party's decision toMarxist dogma has won widespreadacceptance without causing seriousamong old-guard socialists. The number of voters disposed to reject the SPD simply on ideological grounds is declining. However, we do not believe that the SPD Is likely soon to enter the government except In the eventational emergency. The free Democratic Party (FDP) now holds thebetween the CDU/CSU and the SPD and will probablyignificant role lor some time Ln forming governments.because It hasractious andpartner, it may become the target of an effort to eliminate it altogether,through changes in the electoral law.

Thus the basic political alignments In West Germany will probably not undergo any significant change over the next few years. While the style of West German policy after Adenauer will certainly be different, it isthat there will be any basic recasting of West German policies. This is so mainly because no issues are in sight which seem likely toadical shift in partyor toocus for any major new party formation.

f thereerious economicor if the freedom of West Berlin were lost, the political repercussions in Westwould obviously be significant. In either of these contingencies the CDU. whichatriy wide spectrum of views ondoctrine and also bears the wholefor the foreign policyould probably lose apart of Its strength. Barringwhich would impose such extremeperhaps the main questions about West German political life have to do withThe role which West Germany will play In Western councils obviously depends greatly on whether it finds leadership ofor falls prey to the quarrels of politicians. At present the future leadership seems likely to be drawnroup of men who are essentially moderate, pro-Western, and

IV. PROBABLE ATTITUDES ON MAIN ISSUES OF FOREIGN POllCY

Berlin and Reunifieotion

he confidence of West Germans in the efficacy of the Western Alliance is sensitive to unsettling influences arising out of thesituation and the closely relatedproblem. Especially since the erection of the wall in Berlin, there is the possibilityingle dramatic incident could raise feelings sharply and bring about emotional demands for direct action. In such circumstances, the policy dilemma for the West German leaders, as well as their allies, would be obvious. Even short of dramaticontinuation of the crisis atmosphere in Berlin tends to focus the West Germans' attention on theirnational problems. In general, the West Germans are likely to continue to view the Berlin problemouchstone of the West's ability and concern to protect West German interests.

Wesi German leadership is convinced that under present circumstances changes In the Berlin situation resulting fromwith the Soviets would involvewhich would weaken West Berlin and chances for reunification. West Germanwill continue to aim at maintaining the status quo. Thus the West Germans will seek to prevent incidentsiolence and mass actions resulting from the wall, orin East Germany) which might bring the issueead in negotiation orajor threat of war. Likewise, they will be extremely wary of broad East-Weston Berlin and will favor procrastination In the hope that delay may somehowore favorable outlook for German interests later on. Currently, the West German leaders seem to feel that the East-West powerncc does not require concessions, and are therefore reluctant to consent to them.

More specifically. West German policy on Berlin will probably remain firm on two points: there should be no settlement which closes out the prospects fore jure recognition of Eastor which reduces the prospectsiable West Berlin. The latter point isto include the presence of Western troops in Berlin and the continuation of West German-Berlin ties. These minimumwill probably be maintained, regardless of the persons or parties in power.

A settlement in Berlin which failed to uphold the minimum requirements of the West German Government would seriously damage West Germany's relations with its allies. National self-assertiveness wouldrise, criticism of allies would increase, and West German support for NATO would decline. In particular, there wouldoss of confidence in the US, and the Westwould be disposed to move,eriod of time, toward increasing reliance onEuropean groupings for their defense. It is possible that important political forces which would be willing toolicy of accommodation with the USSR would gain Ln strength and influence. In any case, the corrosive effects on West German political life and on relations with the Western allies would be deep and long lasting

Is unlikely, however, that duringof this estimate theonsequence of suchabandon their basic westernThey recognize that Soviet policiesGermany no acceptable alternativefundamental dependence on theto the extent that thebe defended as necessary, forthe only way to avoid war. the Westdisappointment would probably beWest German dissatisfaction andembarrassment would also probablyIf the settlement includedSoviet concessions, or gave promisethe lot of the East Germans.nature ol the West Germandependonsiderable degreespecific terms of the settlement andexisting at the time,risksajor military action

Relations within the Alliance

actions by its allies whichto its Interests, West Germanyto have an overriding concern lothe solidarity of the Atlanticare, nevertheless, certainprospect which will tend to changeof West Germany'sinimum, and as aof its growing economic andWest German leaders will presslarger voice in the affairs of thetendency toward greateralso probably be accompanied by asensitivity to any indicationsGermany does not have complete

equality, particularly in malters which affect West German securityendency may also be strengthened by the factew generation of West Germans, somewhat less self-conscious about past nationalwill be rising to positions of power.

Relations with the US. Westinterest in maintaining close andrelations with the US is likely to remain the central tenet of its policy, regardless of the party or persons in power. However, on the broad political level, West Germansontinuing and basic conflict between West German interests and US policy requirements stemming from the US's roleuperpower faced with broader world responsibilities. Like some other Europeans, West Germans are somewhat uncertain as to the longer term credibility of US support for EuropeanThe West Germans will continue to be hypersensitive and quick to read into US-sponsored changes in the Alliance's political or militaryS inclination tofrom its commitments or lo deal with the Soviets at German expense. Thus West German relations with the US are likely to be marked by periodic "crises of confidence."

Securifif and Nuclear Weapons The West Germans will probably increase their efforts to influence NATO strategyay which they consider best suited to protect West Germany in its exposed geographicIn the German view, thisATO posture and strategy which places first priority on maximizing the deterrent effect of NATO power. The West Germans see clearly that for them warisaster whatever Its final outcome. While generallyonventional buildup. West Germany willtotrategic policy whichquick nuclear retaliation in the eventajor Soviet military action against NATO.

The West Germans recognize that the political, economic, and even technicalto their acquisition of nuclear weapons under national control will remainfor the next few years. Nor do wethat they have decided that evenihey will wish to have an independent capability. However, with the French move toational nuclear force and the possibility that other nations of no greater suture than West Germany may do so. the Germans are very much concerned that West Germany not fallecond-classIn particular, they wish on political grounds to avoid the implication that special disabilities are placed on West Germany or that it isully equal participant In NATO. (They see such an implication in political agreements setting up denuclearized zones or prohibiting the dissemination ofweapons) They are disposed therefore to support whatever arrangements can be madeultilateral NATO nuclear force. They probably hope that the British and French can be persuaded to subordinate their nuclear forces to such an alliance system, or it necessaryuropean system, in which the Germans would also have weapons and an equal share of control. Failing this, it seems likely that the West Germans will eventually decide, perhaps reluctantly, that they must seek to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own.

elations with Europe. West German relationships within the Alliance will also be strongly influenced by European moves toward integration. Like other Europeans, the West Germans would like to be parttrong political and economic grouping which could deal with the US on more equal terms, and which could reduce, to some extent.present overwhelming dependence on US military support This is,ong-term objective. Meanwhile, provided that NATO's efficacyeterrent to Soviet aggression against Western Europe remains, it is highly unlikely that West Germany will support the creationuropean "third"

defter-

to stand between the US and the USSR, or will make commitments to any European country or grouping which could causecomplications between itself and lhe US. In general, West Germany will endeavor to influence West European developments Ln the direction ofseful supplement to NATO.

A high priority will continue to be given the Bonn-Paris link; most West Germansthis link as critical to the creation of any viable larger European grouping. Inthe Bonn-Paris tic may also continue to be strengthened by French support onHowever, Bonn will avoid makingto Paris which could hinderintegration or damage West Germany's relations with Washington.

West Germany will continue to be strongly attractedLarge European"thattructure of unity embracing more that the six European Commonstates. Theretrong Westdisposition, stemming both fromand political considerations, to include the UK and other Western Europeanin European groupings. This type of thinking will probably be strengthened when Adenauer departs, particularly if Erhardor if the SPDtronger voice In government. The departure of both de Gaulle and Adenauer, on whose personal relations the Bonn-Paris link has been forged, would tend to strengthen the forcesLarge European" solution.

Relations wiih the Bloc

Germany. Basic Westtoward East Germany will bea determination to avoid steps whichany change in the presentpolicy. At the same time, movedfeelings of kinship for the Eastand partlyesire loleverage, the West Germans will favor trade with the GDR and maintain the "technical" level contacts deemed necessary to keep these economic relations going. They will not, however, be willing to enlarge these contacts or raise their level, In part because they do not wish to give other slates afor moving toward recognition of the GDR.

The replacement of Ulbrlcht in East Germany would be an encouraging sign to West Germans. However, it Is unlikely thathange, of itself, would be Interpreted by West Germanshift Ln Soviet policy sufficiently significant to warrantof present West German policies. Anin the GDR, forcibly repressed by the Soviets, wouldtrong emotional response in West Germany. Nevertheless, the West Germans would probably limit theirto nonmilltary activities, whilepressing the West lo take strong diplomatic and economic countermeasures.

East European Satellites. TheGerman concern with Eastern Europe will probably continue to stimulate WestInterestore flexible and pragmatic policy toward the other Satellites, particularly Poland. This interest will probably beprimarily in terms ol enlargedcontacts wheneverarise. Further, the West Germans are likely to urge that the Common Marketto East European efforts to preserve trade ties with the West. The West Germans probably feelore active Eastern policy, while not of great immediate benefit, could be helpful in tho longer term. If this policy showed some promise, the West Germans might become increasingly disposed to relax the Hailsteinrecognition of any country, except the USSR, which recognizes Easteven to recognize the Oder-Nelsse line.

he USSR. Increasing West German interest ln normalizing Its relations withEurope could provide the USSR with some opportunities for influencing West German policies, and sowing disruption in thecamp. But this is likely to be of marginal significance so long as the West Germansto be persuaded that they areound footing with their Western partners and that the latter are fully committed to the security of the Federal Republic. The Germans know, of course, that their hopesestoration of national unity are heldby Moscow. But the belief which was once held in some quarters in Germany that there was some price which could be paid the Soviets for conceding reunification is nowextinguished. The Germans recognize that the Soviets, out of concern for theof Communist power in all of Eastern Europe, are not really free to dismantle the East German regime. They also know that the Soviets will not cease what amountsolicy of calumny toward the FederalLn the hope of breaking down European unity and the Western military alliance. Thus the subjects of discourse between Bonn and Moscow are likely to remain extremely limitedong time to come.

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