CABLE TO (DELETED) FROM DIRECTOR RE SOVIET UNION POLITICAL ADVANTAGES

Created: 9/19/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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1. herewith conclusions op special national intelligence estimate approved by us ib oneptember.

a. we believe that soviet union values its position dm cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup jn cuba is to strengthen the communist regime there against what the cubans and the soviets conceive toanger that the us may attempt by one means or another to oyerthrow.it. the. soviets evidently hope to deter any such ttempt by enhancing castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening soviet military retaliation. at the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in cuba might provoke us military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.

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TERMS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, THEDELIVERIES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVING AIR DEFENSEDEFENSE CAPABXUTIES IN CUBA THEIR POLITICALTHAT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF IIARE LIKELY TO BE REGARDED AS ENSURING THE CONTINUATIONCASTRO REGIME IN POWER, WITH CONSEQUENT DISCOURAGEMENTOPPOSITION AT HOME AND TN EXILE. THE THREAT INHERENT INIS THAT. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEENSE OF SECURITY AT HOME, IT WILL BE EMBOLDENED

' TO BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE IN FOMENTING REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY EN LATIN AMERICA.

THE BUILDUP CONTINUES, THE SOVIET UNION MAYTO ESTABLISH IN CUBA, OTHER WEAPONS REPRESENTED TOIN PURPOSE, BUTORE 'OFFENSIVE" CHARACTER:BOMBERS, SUBMARINES. AND ADDITIONAL TYPES OF SHORT-RANGE

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WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE SOVIET ESTIMATE AS TO WHETHER THEY COULD BE INTRODUCED WITHOUTS MILITARY REACTION.

D. THE SOVIET UNION COULD DERIVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY ADVANTAGE FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN CUBA, OR FROM THE +* ' ESTABLISHMENTOVIET SUBMARINE BASE THERE. AS BETWEEN

THESE TWO, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUB BASE COULD BE MORE LIKELY. EITHER DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH SOVIET PRACTICE-TO DATE AND WITH SOVIET POLICY AS WE PRESENTLY ESTIMATE IT. IT WOULDAR GREATER WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF RISK IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS THAN THE SOVIET UNION HAS DISPLAYED THUS FAR. AND CONSEQUENTLY WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT POLICY IMPUCATT0N5 WITH RESPECT TO OTHER AREAS AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

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THE LATIN AMERICAN REACTION WILL BE TOOF AN INCREASED SOVIET COMMITMENT TOO THE TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARYLATIN AMERICANS WILL FEAR ANDOVIETINTO THE HEMISPHERE, BUT WILL REGARD THE PROBLEMTO BE MET BY THE US AND NOT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY- THE CHANCES ARE BETTER NOW THAN THEY WERE AT PUNTESTE TOAS MAJORITY FOR SANCTIONS ANDSHORT OF MILITARY ACTION AIMED AT CUBA. IT BECAMETHAT THE SOYIEI UNION WAS ESTABLISHINGASE IN

CUBA, MOST LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD EXPECT THEO;EijMJl&TE IT, BY WHATEVER MEANS WERE NECESSARY, BUT MANY OF THEM WOULD STILL SEEK TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT.

2. SITUATION IN ARGENTIAjN IS EXTREMELY TENSE. MILITARY REMAINS DIVIDED INTO TWO MAJOR CAMPS: A) SO-CALLEDWHO TEND TO FAVOR OUTRIGHT MJ iTO NULLEFI

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AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE; B) SO-CALLED LEGALISTS WHO ARE WILLING TO RIDE ALONG WITH GUTDO GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. PRESENT CRISIS PRECIPITATED BY HARD-LINERS WHO SAW IN GUTDO'S ACTIONS OF DISSOLVING CONGRESS AND POSTPONING ELECTIONS3 AN OPPORTUNITY TO CRACK DOWN ON LEGALISTS. HARD-LINERS TRIED TO OUST KEY GARRISON COMMANDERS WITH LEGALIST TIES AND <^ LATTER DEFIED ORDERS. WE DO NOT CONSIDER CIVIL WAR LIKELY, BUT

ARMED VIOLENCE COULD OCCUR WHICH BY INCREASING INSTABILITY WOULD OPEN DOOR FOR PERON1ST AND COMMUNIST ACTION AGAINST GUTDO ON THE . ONE HAND AND COULD MOVE HARD-LINERS TOWARD OPEN TAKEOVER ONOTHER HAND.

ADOULA'6 MOVES TO REINFORCE CENTRAL

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'j; CONGO. PRELIMINARY TALKS ARE UNDERWAY IN EJJSABETHVILLE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING UNITED NATIONS PLAN TO INTEGRATE COUNTRY. PROGRESS TOWARD THIS GOAL WILL BE ' SLOW AT BEST AND TSHOMBE IS MAKING GREAT HUE AND CRY ABOUT

)VERNMENT MILITARY POSITION

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IN KATANGA AND KASAI PROVINCES. THERE HAVE BEEN -MINOR CLASHES, BUT NOTHINGCALE EVEN REMOTELY APPROACHING ALLEGATIONS BY SPOKESMEN ON BOTH SIDES.

4. DEATH OF IMAM OF YEMEN, EVIDENTLY FROM NATURAL CAUSES. SETS SCENE FOR DISPUTE OVER SUCCESSION BETWEEN CROWN PRINCE BADR AND PRINCE HASAN. BADR HAS DECLARED HIMSELF NEW IMAM AND HAS CALLED ON TRIBAL LEADERS FOR SUPPORT. BADR IS OPPOSEDOWERFUL NORTHERN TRIBES WHO LEAN TOWARD HASAN WHO IS NOW IN NEW YORK AS HEAD OF YEMEN UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION. THERE. ARE SOME PROt-NASIR ELEMENTS IN THE COUNTRY WHO MAY SEEK TO EXPLOIT INSTABILITY.

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ANOTHER NUCLEAR TEST AT NOEMLTAEPT ESTIMATED TXELD FIFTEEN MT.

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