Created: 11/6/1962

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The conclusions that can be drawn from the above are:

AM sites under Soviet operational control could

hile Cubans can be trained in several months to take over some functions of the air defenseinimumonths would be required before the more complex elements of the system, such sb the SAMs, could be manned and maintained by them.



Soviet statements and actions during tbe past Beveral days strongly suggest that the USSR lsajor effort to load the missiles aboard Soviet ships and remove them from Cuba as quickly as possible before any UN verification and inspection machinery can be organized and put into effect.

Tho Soviets have indicated that "all offensive weapons" will have been sblpped out byovember. Khrushchev may then announce to the world that he has carried out bis end of the bargain and call upon President Kennedy to respond by formally guaranteeing that the US and otber Western Hemisphere countries will not attack Cuba. oviet announcement, possibly accompanied by the publication ofpurportedly establishing "proof" of tho USSR's performance, would be calculated to undercut USon UN on-site inspection and verification in Cuba and to leave the US with no alternative but to accept Moscow's "good faith" ln fulfillingpledges. The Soviets would also hope by these moves to beosition to charge the US with "bad faith" if the President should decline to give formal non-Invasion assurances on the ground that Khrushchev had reneged on UN verification. Moscow would almost certainly contend that only the opposition of tbe "sovereign and independent" government of Cubaimplementation of UN inspection in Cuba. The USSR's repudiation of earlier assertions that theould be removed along with the missiles may reflect serious difficulties in Mikoyan's talks with Castro. Unlike the missiles, which were underSoviet control, thes may have been transferred to the Cubans under military assistance agreements. It thus remains to be seen whether the USSR will risk jeopardizing its whole relationship with Castro by applying sufficient pressure to force him to consent to the removal of the bombers. Castro, ln any event, isood position to demand heavy compensation in the form of economic assistance and, possibly, more specific Soviet commitments to protect the Cuban regime in all contingencies. (An elaboration of this evidence ls contained ln Annex I)


Kuznetsov's statement that nine Soviet dry-cargo ships are loading in Cuban ports and will shortly depart for the USSR with the offensive missiles appears to be generally accurate. The ships designated by Kuznetsov have the capacity to carry on their decksRBMs with transporters and, therefore, can carry theRBMs positively identified in Cuba or theRBMs which might have been delivered by the USSR to arm the six MRBM sites identified in October. These ships also have the .capacity to carry in their hold virtually all of the associated equipment for the MRBM complexes. All of these ships have been in port long enough to load missiles and transporters tad to depart Cubaovember. The ships in question are shown in the following tableore detailed resume is contained in ANNEX II):

Missile Transporter


Port Cf




















Sovlot UN delegate Morozov told UNofficialsovember that dismantling of the missile sites will be completed and that all offensive weapons will have been shipped out of Cuba byovember. He said some Soviet ships arein Cuban ports and that the others required to complete the removal will arrive this week. He argued that, in view of this schedule, there is no reason for continuing the Red Cross inspection system (which still has not been organized) beyondovember.

About half of the.missile transporters and launching equipment previously identified at tbe MRBM sites now have appeared in Cuban ports. Preliminary analysisovember photography showsf tbeRBM missile transporters at tbe port of Mariel have been loaded on the decks of Soviet ships ln tbe harbor, and one of the ships is apparently leaving port. The USSR thus appears to be shipping missiles from Cuba without waiting for ships capable of carrying them below deck.

When this process of removal has been completed, Khrushchev may well announce to the world tbat be bas carried out his commitments to President Kennedy. Be will then call on the President to respond by issuing

a formal declaration guaranteeing Cuba against Invasion by the US and other Western Hemisphere countries. The Soviet leaders would undoubtedly hope that these moves will effectively undercut US insistence on UN on-site inspection of the missile sites and weapons beingby Soviet ships. They may believe thatoviet announcement, possibly accompanied by theof photographs purportedly establishing "proof" of Soviet performance, will deprive the issue ofand verification of its force and Immediacy and that the US will then have no choice but to accept Soviet "good faith" ln having made good on Khrushchev's commitments. The Soviet leaders probably would also believe these moves would put themtrong position to charge the US with "bad faith" if the President should decline to give formal assurances against an Invasion of Cuba on the ground that Khrushchev had failed to carry out his pledge to accept UN Moscow's reply to this probably would be that the USSR had every intention of allowing full UNbut that the adamant opposition of the "sovereign and independent" government of Cuba made it impossible to put these arrangements Into

a further effort to "document" thefaith in Implementing its pledges, Moscowpublic the alternative plan which KuznetsovtocCloyovember, under whichwould provide the US with photographs ofmissile sites, give the US the Sovietmoving the missiles to Cuban ports, togetherschedules, and allow US ships to comeships lnay as to enable US inspectors

to see and count the missiles. If the present New York negotiations fail to produce agreement onand verification procedures, Moscow would claim that US insistence on full UN on-siteln Cuba wasevice for delaying aand evading implementation of the President's offer of assurances against an invasion of Cuba.

It ls not clear at this point whether there is collusion between the USSR and Cuba ln rejecting full UN verification or whether the Soviets are simply taking advantage of Castro's opposition to avoida precedent which would pose serious problems for the USSR In the future, particularly on questions of disarmament and nuclear test ban controls. It seems clear, however, that in view of President Kennedy'sfor UN verification, Khrushchev felt he had no choice but to accept this in his backdown letter ofctober. The Soviet Foreign Ministry Instructed the Soviet ambassador In Cuba on 31 October tohant, who was ln Havana at that time for talks with Castro, that the UN would be permitted "to look at whatever they want toin Cuba." hant's military adviser, Brigadier Rlkbye, later confirmed to USin New York that the Soviets had told the UN party that,as far as the USSR was concerned, the UN could inspect the missile sites and all incoming shipments.

While the Soviet leaders thus apparently felt obliged at the height of the crisis to agree to UN verification in Cuba, they later came to believe that after Khrushchev'sctober letter removed the immediate danger of US military action they could safely maneuver

to extricate themselves from Khrushchev's embarrassing commitment by hiding behind Castro's opposition to any UN presence in Cuba.

similar ambiguity surrounds the motivesunderlying the shift in the USSR's positionthes from Cuba. Prior to his arrival

ln Havana, Mikoyan assured Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloyovember that thes would be included in the list of offensive weapons to be withdrawn in an estimatedoays. According to Brigadier Rikhye, Soviet representatives In Havanahant's party "many times" tbat they were determined to remove all the equipment which President Kennedy regarded asincluding thes.

5 November, however, Kuznetsovthat the US regards these bombers as He contended they are basically Obsolete

in view of their low ceiling and speed, that they are good for only "coastalnd that they cannot be used in combat over enemy territory. Heegative replyirect question whether the USSR would Include thes in the weapons to be removed from Cuba.

view of the very marginalto the USSR of deploying these bomberswe believe this shift in the Sovietwell be evidence of the seriousIs encountering in his talks with the Castro has made it clear that he wason Khrushchev's decision to withdrawand that, in any event, they were nevercoutrol. Thes, however, may be andifferent matter in that they may havetransferred to Cuban control underof military assistance agreements. If thistrue state of affairs, it remains to bethe USSR will risk jeopardizing itswith Castro by applyingto force him to consent to the removal

of the bombers. Castro, ln any event, Isood position to use this question in demanding heavy compensation in the form of economic assistance and, possibTurther and more specific Sovietto protect the Cuban regime in all contingencies.


Tbe Lablnsk which Kuznetsov Indicated would depart Cuba on the 6th of November should be able to do so. She is known to have been ln Marlelovember and to have returned to Havanaovember. She probably tookoad at Marlel and returned to Havana to take on fuel and bunkers prior to herfor the USSR.

Photographic intelligence taken onovember shows the Bratsk leaving the port with three missiles on deck. This may mean that she is now en route the USSR. Or, as ln the case of the Lablnsk, tbe Bratsk may be proceeding to Havana to take on bunkers prior to ber final departure.

of the loading apparently was completed. She carried no missiles on deck.

Metallurg Anasov, which ls also Inof Marlel,ovember had on her decks 6and transporters, with an additional twoprocess of being loaded. This combined with

the deck cargo on the Bratsk accounts fornd transporters sighted earlier at the Marlel docks.

two ships known to be at the portthe Fizik Kurchatov and the Lenlnskyadeauate capacity to carryissiles withon their decks. This tie more.thanthe 'IB mlasllee. and transportersnear'One of the two ships wasphotographyovember to have twoloaded on deck,'

v. int- small amounts of observed IRBM equipment could probably also be carried on these ships.

Original document.

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