Created: 10/31/1962

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Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through

Svbmitlad bt lha


Concvr'od to b/ lha UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD At indicated otnical2



The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate!

The Central Intelligence Agency ond Ihe intelligence organtratloni of lhe Depart-menh of Stale, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force. ACC, ond NSA.


Director ol Intelligence and Research, Deportment of State Director, Defenie Intelligence Agency

Auitlcmt Chief of Staff (or InteWgance, Department of iho Army

Awlitoni Chief of Naval Operation*eportment of the Navy

AuUtont Chief o( Staff, intelligence. USAF

Director for Intelligence, Jolnl Sloff

Alomk Energy Commhiion fteprewrrfotivo to the USIB

Director of lhe National Security Agency

The AuiUanl Director, Federalf hb iursdldlon.

III! Ul)IWB"6lulw the trani-


"ti ii>i. nr. nrr-

or revelation of which in any manner to on onoulhorlied perton ii




Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through

top Gccncr
















Early Warning

Ground Controlled Intercept

Detection of Missile




Communications and




Current Capabilities and Future


ANNEX B: Maps and




To evaluate thc capabilities of Soviet Bloc air and missilesystems through


USSR has continued to devote large-scale effortsand modernizing its air defense system. Wein recent years, air defense has absorbed about one-fifthSoviet military expenditures which can be attributed tomissions. Moreover, thc Soviets consider their airsystem so important that its chief holds the position ofMinister of Defense, ranking with the chiefs ofair, naval, and rocket forces. (Paras.)

against hostile aircraft, especially againstand high altitude bombers, have been greatlyrecent years by thc widespread deployment of(SAM) systems, improved interceptorsnd advanced equipment for air defenseand control. Antiaircraft capabilities will be furtherand extended, but the major future developmentforesee is the adventapability against

n antimissile defenses has beenin the USSR for more than five years. Our evidence isto support ar estimate of the characteristics ofbeing developed. However, it does pointseveral different systems to defend against Western missiles



of various ranges. One ofystem to defend field forces against short-range ballistic missiles, could be operational now or

D. Our evidence leads us to conclude that the USSR isan antiballistlc missile (ABM) system around Leningrad and that it will probably become operationalc lack the technical data on components which would be necessaryirm estimate of the capabilities of the Leningrad system.we believe Uie system has been test-fired at Sary Shagan against ballistic missiles of short and medium ranges,autical mileissiles which are the nearest Soviet equivalent in range and velocity to the Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris. We are uncertain whether the USSR has test-fired any anti-missilcs against ICBM's. However, the SovieU have almostconducted extensive research on ICBM re-entryand wc believe that they would have concluded that the problems of intercepting LRBMs and ICBMs are not significantly different. For this reason, and considering the nature of the ballistic missUe threat to Leningrad, we believe that the system being deployed there is probably designed to intercept both IRBMs and ICBMs. We have no basis for estimating itsWe think it unlikely, however,ystem deployed at the current stage ofould be cflective againstemploying decoys." )

'The Director. Detente Intelligence Agency, iht Assistant Chief of SUff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, The Assistant Chief of Naval Open Lionsepartment of thc Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint SUff, do not concur In this paragraph.

They are concerned that the paragraph may notroper perspecUve of the operational capability of the Leningrad system. The reader may Infer that the systemapability against the ICBM. whereas this cannot be

They believe the Leningrad system was developed at Bary Shagan for static or field deployment and has been tested only against target missiles with various ranges fromm. up.

They believe also that thc system deployed around Leningrad Is toeasure of protection against the Thor. Jupiter, and Polaris. When operational, the system shouldapability to engage the threat posed by these first generation systems. Any major change In the character of the threat, such as use of salvo fire, decoys, or tankage fragmentation, shouldetrimental effect on the system's capabilities.

(Footnote conUnued next page.)


counter the more complex long-range ballisticof thes, the Soviets may seek to improvesystem, or mayifferent and moreor both. Should they follow the first course,Lhe Leningrad system at additional locations wouldin the near future if it has not already begun. If sitesconstruction now, initial operational capabilities couldat one or more locations in about two years, andimprovements would progressively increase theregard it as more likely, however, that the USSR willat locations other than Leningradewantimissile system is available. In this case, theforould probably delay the beginningfor another year or so. Initial operationalcould probably be achieved at one or more locations

technical achievements enable the Soviets toABM system which they regard as reasonablyigorous deployment program willbe undertaken. Considering the vast effort required forprogram and the relative importance of the variousareas in the USSR, we believeigorousprogram would contemplate the defense ofprincipal Sovietrogram of this scopewould require some five or six years from itsits completion. We have no basis for judging whether orSoviets would consider their ABM systems effectivewarrant the initiation ofrogram.


One Ot the more critical Judgments to be made la an assessment of the system's potential capability against an ICBM reentry vehicle. They believe that under certain favorable conditions, the system, as synthesized Irom thc Sary Shagan activity, could engage an ICBM re-entry vehicle.f_


suggests that the system probably was optimized against MRBMs.

While an anti-ICBM capability can neither be confirmed nor denied, theyon the basis ol firing activity and other evidence that the system being deployed at Leningrad is designed to counter the MRBM/IR8M. and that present evidence does not support the anti-ICBM capability Implied ln the text.

believe that the Soviet leaders almost certainlyacquire an antisatellit* capability. Although we lackthink it probableevelopment program exists. Ifare utilizing components from existing systems,be able to intercept current models of US satellitesthey would almost certainly be able to do so within theor so. )

defense against aircraft, the Soviets now relySAMs employed near important fixed targets, anddeployed to cover approach routes as well as gapslocations. We estimate that inere operational in defense of moreargetthe USSR, including principal cities and other targets ofand military importance. SAMs are also beingdefend major.installations of the theater field forces,cities in the Europeanystem whichis designed to engage aircraft at low altitudes is nowearly stages of deployment. (Paras.

the next few years, SAMs will be even more widelynew all-weather interceptors will appear, andbe equipped with better airborne intercept radar andincreasing effectiveness of interceptors and theirsystems should more than offset the probabletotal numbers. We believe thateavyanduxiliary radars are deployed in various

atites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The altitude capabilities of the most advanced air defense radars will continue to exceed the combat ceilings of Western bombers and cruise-type missiles. Early warning <EW) radar will continue to provide overlapping medium and high altitude coverage of the USSR and the European Satellites. Toward the end of the period of this estimate, the USSR will probably have in operationcapable of jamming all frequencies likely to be used by Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment.

J- The significant improvements in the Soviet air defensewhich have been noted during recent years and which will be extended during the next few. years will progressively reduce


the chances of successful attacks by manned bombers.penetration by manned bombers will therefore requiresophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defense capability can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ, including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types,tactics, and electronic countermeasures. Even in suchthc Soviets would probably expect to destroy aof tlie attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce thc weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR is able toubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply Increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.




The Soviet leaders recognize that an effective air and missile defense is an essential element of the strong military posture which they wish to maintain, both to contribute to the security of the Bloc and to support their foreign policies. The continuing large-scale effort to improve and modernize the Soviet air defense system indicates the high priority assigned to this mission. The expenditure of resources on air defense is very large; in recent years it has amounted to about one-fifth of the military expenditures which can be attributed to broad military missions, and this share Is likely to rise, particularly ifdeployment of antimissile defenses Is begun.

Through these efforts, the Soviets have in recent years greatly improved their defenses against hostile aircraft, especially against medium and high altitude attack. Thc principal Improvements have been; (a) the extensive deployment of surface-to-air missilesb) thc Introduction of air defense control systems with semiautomatic features; and (c) the deployment of new fighters ln significant numbers to border areas. Other factors Include the advent of radars with better detection and height-finding capabilities and the Incorporation of more advanced electronic gear and armament, including alr-to-alr missilesnto interceptorew SAM system, believed to be designed to defend against aircraft attack at low altitudes, Is in the early stages of deployment in the Soviet Union.

While improvements will continue in antiaircraft systems, wethat the major future change will be the adventapability against ballistic missiles. Our evidence on Soviet accomplishments in this field is inadequate to support firm estimates, but it is clear thatn the USSR is conductedarge scale andigh priority.

Soviet forces deployed for the air defense of the USSRthc operational controlingle major headquarters, the(Air Defense of the Country) which combines ground andThe Commander In Chief of the PVO Strany Is aof Defense and is the chief adviser to the Minister andthe General Staff on air defense matters. Administratively, hethe Commanders in Chief of the ground, air, naval, and


The chief components assigned to thc PVO Strang are the Air Observation, Reporting, and Communication (VNOS) service, the Fighter Aviation of Air Defensend the Antiaircraft Artillery of Air Defensehe latter component including both antiaircraft guns and SAMs. In addition to lorces directly assigned, other Soviet forces which can contribute to thc air defense mission arc alsoavailable to this command.

There is some evidence that antimissile defense units are now being organized In the USSR. Judging by Soviet practice with other air defense organizations, we believe that antimissile units defending strategic targets willomponent of the overall defense system under PVO Strany, whereas units assigned to defend theater field forces against missile attack will probably be subordinated to those forces,

The PVO forces are organizederies of geographic divisions andimilar organization is employed by each of theSatellites, whose air defenses are in effect extensions of the Soviet system. Albania is an exception;esult of political difficulties, military cooperation between that country and the other Warsaw Pact members has ceased. The Chinese Communist air defense system Is completely independent of Soviet control, and Slno-Sovlet operational relationships ln this field have long been limited to thc exchange of information.

III. AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS Surface-to-Air Missiles

The Soviets now have operational three types of SAMwo of these,ndre designed primarily for defense against medium and high altitude attacks; thc third,s probably designed to provide improved capabilities at lowerA-l's are deployed only around Moscow, while SA-2's have been extensively deployed throughout the USSR. Thc newest system,s in the early stages of deployment at present.

heystem, consisting ofixed sites ofaunching positions each, has been operational around Moscowts chief advantages are its ability to handlearge number of targets and toigh rate of fire against them. Theystem was apparently designed lo counter the massed air raid threat of thend, The changed nature of the threat, the magnitude of effort involved In deployment, and thc limitations of the system probably argued againsteployment elsewhere. Our evidence Indicates that the defenses of Moscow have

'For performance characteristics ol SAMs, see Annex A. Tabic 1.

'For Illustrations ol typicalndites, see Annex B.nd 2.


bccn undergoing modernization in the past few years, by the installa-tion ofndites around the city and by the modification of someites, possibly to accommodate the more effectiveissile.

ystem. Sincehe USSR has beenajor operational capability with an improved SAM systemor the defense of both strategic targets and field force installations. Although thereariety of arrangement patterns, all observed sites consist of sixuidance radar and linked by service roads to facilitate loading. While the observed sites clearly represent permanent installations, allcomponents of the system are mounted on wheeled vehicles and arc capable of movement by road or rail.

Theystem appears designed to cope with the threat posed by small groups of aircraft rather than massed raids. Flexibility and mobility arc its chief advantages over then contrast to the massiveites, each of which is capable of defendingimited sector around the target area, eachite Is capable* coverage. This flexibility Is obtained at the expense of target handling capacity and rate of fire relative to the SA-1.

Considering US technical studies of theystem andon Soviet assessments of Its performance, we estimate the present maximum intercept range of thet somewhat more thanjn. It probablyigh degree of effectiveness up to altitudes0 feet, with limited effectiveness up0 feet. Its capabilities would decrease rapidly at higher altitudes, but there Is some evidence that it might be able to engage nonmaneuvering targets at altitudes as higheet. The low altitude capability of the system probably extends down toeet. The guidance system at anite can handle only one targetime, but can direct three missilesarget simultaneously. Additional missiles could be fired against the same target after one or more missiles of the first salvo had completed their run. Thc Soviets apparently believe they must program three or four missiles against each target in order to achieve acceptable kiu probabilities.

The foregoing figures probably do not apply to allefenses at present. An original version of the system, somewhat inferior in performance, is probably still deployed in some areas. Further,characteristics will vary depending on lhe terrain and other conditions at thcite, thc size, speed, and approach angle of the target, and other operational factors.

Strategic Deployment in the USSR. Thes thc basic missile defense system for critical urban-industrial areas in the USSR, other


ihaneployment ofnstallations around Moscow now includes seven sties, and is probably partrogram lo supplement theystem. Sinceoreites have been confirmed In the USSR, mostly in defense of population centers,complexes, and government control centers. Missile defenses have been provided for most of the Soviet cities with populations greaternd we believe that alluch cities will ultimately be defended.ites have been emplaced at some smaller urban areas, presumably because they contain government control centers or other installations of critical Importance- They have also been deployed for defense of naval and port facilities, nuclear production and weapon storage Installations, missile test ranges, and Industrial facilities. Other major military Installations, such as long-range missile sites andof the long-range air force, are also defended byeveral sites in border areas, which we cannot relate to known targets, suggest that thc Soviets arc deploying peripheral defenses, which may eventually extend from the Kola Peninsula along the western and southern borders of the USSR Into central Asia. Deployment in the Baltic coastal area is particularly dense.

Identification of additional sites and defended areas since the publication ofonfirms thateployment Is massive In scale. Considering the pattern of deploymenl observed to date, the length of time the program has been under way, and the extent of our Intelligence coverage, we estimate that Inites were operational ln defense of morearget areas In the USSR. In light of the accumulating evidence, we have Increased our estimate of the number ofites to be provided and have modified ourof the timing of the program. We now estimate that thc Soviets willotal ofites tn the USSR. The continuing construction of new sites and the apparently Incomplete defense In certain target areas lead us to estimate that the program is still under way. We believe that the major portion of thewill be completed within the next two years. Improvements to the weapons system will continue to be introduced and seme deployment will probably continue in the period

Deployment to Field Forces. Somenits have been deployed in support of Soviet Acid forces in East Oermany and possibly in the USSR. Althoughnits assigned to Soviet field forces are normally emplaced at fixed installations, the system is transportable by road andnits have been observed in field exercises. However,nitsimited ability toast moving front because ol the

'For details of SAM deployment at Moscow and elsewhere In the USSR, sec Annex B,nd 4.

' "SinoSoviet Air Defense CapabUltles Throughated II1 (TOP SECRET).



requirement for good roads and thc time required to displace to new positions. Wc believe, therefore, thatissile defenses for field forces will be primarily assigned to such targets as major headquarters, logistic centers, and airfields. The evidence is insufficient to determine the scale of defense planned for thc Soviet field forces.

Deployment to Soviet Allies. Deployment ofites for defense of European Satellite targets has been under way* Missile defenses have been observed in East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, andhe heaviest deployment has occurred In East Germany, where there areonfirmed sites,f them completed, and atrobable additional sites. About half of the confirmed sites are manned by East German troops, and the remainder by units of the Soviet field forces. The East German sites are located in the vicinity of Berlin and In the northern portion of East Germany. The Soviet sites appear lo be deployed to defend important Soviet military installations such as major headquarters and airfields. In the other Satellites, aboutites have been confirmed in defense of major cities. On the basis of observed deployment, welhalites will be deployed In the European Satellites during the next two or three years, Including sites manned by Soviet Hold forces.

Suspension of Soviet assistance has thus far limited the extent ofeployment in China. Onlyalf dozen sites have been identified in China, three of them at Peiping. These sites are believed to contain Soviet manufactured equipment. We doubtignificant number of additional sites are now deployed in China, or that,ubstantial Improvement in political relations. Soviet assistance for further deploymentubstantial scale will be forthcoming. We also considermprobable that the Chinese couldative produced copy of theuring the period of this estimate.

Low Altitude Defense. We have estimated for several years that the USSR would develop and deploy an additional SAM systempecifically designed to engage targets at lowesseet. Photography at Kapustin Yar in9 revealed twoites, each of which consisted of tour launchossible launcher on one of the pads held two missile-like objects abouteet long. We have identified more thanites of this type in the USSR sincesually nearrites. No pattern can be determined from the limited deployment noted thus far and no associated electronics installations have been found. While these factors cause us to be uncertain of thc characteristics of the new syslem, we

details ofeployment In East Germany and the other European Satellites, see Annex B.nd 8.

' The singleite provided to Albania ts now Inactive.

believe that it isystem designed to provide better capabilities against low altitude attack than theystem.

A number ofites identified to date have been located around Moscow and Leningrad as well as in coastal regions, particularly, thec believe that the Soviets will deploy SA-S's to providecoverage in certain areas now defended by thendystems. Those coastal areas which the Soviets regard as especially vulnerable to low altitude penetration will probably be provided withefensesriority basis. Apart from this factor, however, we have no basis for estimating how widely the Soviets Intend to deploy this system or what kind of fixed installations will be defended. We believe that theystem in mobile configurations will be provided to field forces and that the extent of deployment with these forces will probably considerably exceed that of the SA-2.

Future Developments. We expect the Soviets to continue their efforts to develop new SAM systems and improve existing ones foragainst more advanced aircraft and cruise-type missiles. They apparently intend to Improve range capabilities and system reliability and to overcome other limitations In their current systems, including restrictions on target handling capabilities and vulnerability to jamming. There is also evidence that thc Soviets are seeking further Improvement in SAM systems for use with field forces.

Anlimhiih Program

Scope of Research and Development, We know that the Soviets have for more than five years beenigh priority and extensive program to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. At Sary Shagan, west of Lake Balkhash, they haveenter extending overquare miles, with housing accommodations for at0 personnel.7 moreissiles, of various ranges upave been launched into this center, thus providing much data on re-entryIt is almost certain that during the past two years attempts have been made to intercept incoming missiles by defensive missUes launched from Sary Shagan.

Wc believeecond antiballistic missile (ABM) research facility is located on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The facilities here arc considerably less extensive than those at Sary Shagan. This facility has almost certainly been engaged since, at0 in determining the re-entry characteristics of ICBMs launched from Tyuratam. We

For details oleployment, sec Annex B, Figure 3.


ate uncertain, however, whether intercepts of ICBMs have yet been attempted from Kamchatka.0

The evidence available to us indicates that thc Soviets arcseveral different ABM systems to defend against missiles of various ranges. This evidence is insufficient, however, to support an estimate of the characteristics or effectiveness of any of these systems. In general, the complex problems Involved tn antimissileacquisition, discrimination, target tracking, andas difficult for the USSR as for the US. We know that thc Soviets are keenly aware of the countermeasurcs available to an attacking force, such as the use of decoys, the Jamming of ABM system electronics, and thc possible saturation of ABM complexes with multiple nose cones of varying characteristics, directions, and angles of descent. Despite the intensity and demonstrated progress of, wc are not aware of any Soviet breakthrough in ABM technology.

Defense Against Long-Range Missiles. Our evidence leads us to conclude that the USSR is deploying an ABM system around Leningrad. This system, with facilities resembling some of those first noted at Sary Shaganas been under construction around Leningrad since at leasthese installations include three launch complexesistinctive lype. Each consists of five circular launch sites having six positions each, and associated support areas- Wc do not believe that constiuctton of the system at Leningrad has been completed, but we estimate that it will achieve some operational capability

Wc lack the technical dala on components which wouldirm estimate of the capabilities of the Leningrad system. However, wc believe thc system has been test-fired at Sary Shagan against ballistic missiles of short and medium ranges.. missiles which are the nearest Soviet equivalent in range and velocity to the Thor. Jupiter, and Polaris. We are uncertain whether

'The Assistant Chief af Staff, Intelligence, USAF. dots not believe Uiatagainst ICBMs have been attempted from




lhe USSR has test-fired any anttmlssllcs against ICBMs However, the Soviets have almost certainly conducted extensive research on ICBM re-entry characteristics and we believe lhat they would have concluded that the problems of intercepting IRBMs and ICBMs are not significantly different. For this reason, and considering the nature of the ballistic missile threat to Leningrad, we believe that the system being deployed there is probably designed to intercept both IRBMs and ICBMs. We have no basis for estimating its effectiveness. We think it unlikely, however,ystem deployed at the current stage ofould be effective against missiles employing decoys.1*

c believe that the cost of extensive ABM deployment,when measured against the competing demands of other advanced weapon systems and the space program for high-quality personnel and materials,ubstantial argument against heavy investment In systems whose effectiveness may be limited or subsequently reduced by expected advances in offensive weapons and tactics. The Soviet research, development, and testing program has already consumed the equivalent of several billiononsiderable part of which was expended to develop the Leningrad system. Thc development andcosts of more advanced systems will require continuing ex-

-The Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff tor Intelligence. Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of USAF. and the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff, do not concur In this paragraph.

They are concerned that the paragraph may notroper perspective of the operational capability of lhe Leningrad system. The reader may Infer lhal the syslemapability against the ICBM, whereas this cannot be substantiated.

They believe the Leningrad system was developed at Sary Shagan for static or field deployment and has been tested only against target missiles with various ranges from about MO nm. upm.

They believe alao thai the system deployed around Leningrad Is Voeasure of protecUon against the Thor. Jupiter, and Polaris. When operaUonal. the system shouldapability to engage the threat posed by these first generation systems. Any major change In the character of the threat, such as use of salvo fire, decoys, or tankage frugmentaUon, shouldetrimental effect on tho system's capabilities.

One of tlie more critical Judgments to be made Is an assessment of the system's potenUal capability against an ICHM re-entry vehicle. They believe lhat under certain favorable conditions, the system, as synthesized from the Sary Shagan activity, could engage an ICDM re-entry vehicle. Li this connecUon. we have no evidence lhat the system has been fired against vehicles with velocIUes and re-entry angles similar to the ICBM. Furthermore, the record of firing to dale suggest* that the system probably was optimised againsi MRBMs.

While an antl-ICilM capability can neither be confirmed nor denied, theyon Ihe basis of firing activity and other evidence that Uie aystein being deployed Bt Leningrad Is designed to counter the MRBM/IRBM. and that present evidence docs not support the antl-ICUM capability Implied In the text.

penditurcs at an even greater rate. On the other hand, the USSR's traditional emphasis on the defense of the homelandtrong incentive for early deployment, as does the desire to foster the image of Soviet military superiority and technical leadership over the US. Thus we believe that the Soviet leaders face difficult choices, some of which arc probably yet to be made.

evidence of ABM deployment at any location other than Leningrad

Despite thc incentives for early deployment,'the probableof the current system and the heavy cosls Involved make It difficult to explain why deployment is occurring now. The Soviets may believe that the present system can later be improved by introducing moreradars and missiles into it. There is some evidence that Soviet planners recognize thc need tootential for Improvement In their ABM systems, but we do not know whether the system at lenin-grad has this potential*-'

We are also nuzzled that Moscow was not chosen for the first antimissile defenses. Possibly the defense of Moscow has beendeferredore effective system is available, and deployment of the present system' will be limited to Leningrad. There is no present

To counter the more complex long-range ballistic missile threat of thes, the Soviets may seek to improve the system now being deployed at Leningrad, or mayifferent and more advanced system, or both. Should they follow the first course, deployment of the Leningrad system at additional locations would probably begin In the near future, li It has not already begun. Tf sites arc undernow, initial operational capabilities could be achieved at one or more locations in about two years, and subsequent improvements would progressively increase the capabilities. We regard it as more likely, however, that the USSR will defer deployment at locations other than Leningradew and better antimissile system is available. In this case, the requirement forould probably delay the beginning of deployment for another,year or so. Initialcapabilities could probably be achieved at one or more locations.

If technical achievements enable the Soviets to develop an ABM system which they regard as reasonably effective against long-rangeigorous deployment program will prpbably be undertaken. Considering the vast effort requiredarge program and the relative importance of the various urban-industrial areas in the USSR, wc believeigorous Soviet deployment program would contemplate theofrincipal Soviet cities.11rogram of this scope

"Twenty-five Soviel clUes have populationsr more, and ate of correspondingly ereat economic and administrate Importance.

almost certainly would require some five or six years from lis Initiation lo its completion. We have no basis for Judging whether or when the Soviet would consider their ABM systems effective enough to warrant the initiation ofrogram.

Against Short-Range Missiles. There are indicationsSoviets have beenodification of theirissile system for use against short-range ballisticas the Honest John, Corporal, and Sergeant. We have noSoviet progress, but we estimate that an Improvedystemeffectiveness against tactical ballistic missiles could beort is also possible that the Soviets have chosena completely new system; if so. it could also be available inperiod. We believe that whatever system Is developed will beprimarily for the protection of field forces and for this usemobile. It will probably also be deployed at fixed sites Invulnerable to short-range missile attack.

Antiialellile Pi eg: am

believe that the Soviet leaders almosi certainly Intendan antisatellite capability. Although we have InsulTlclentlo determine whether the USSR is attainingapability,It probableevelopment program exists. Thislead lo lhc developmentpecific antisatellite mlsslloIn conjunction with the ABM program In addition, thebe attempting to achieve an early capability by assembling aradar and passive tracking facilities, missiles, and warheadssystems.

n Ihe latler instance, the intercept problem could be solved by determining the target satellite's orbitew passes and Ihenallistic missileear verticnl trajectory so as tothe satellite at or near apogee of the intercepting missile Soviet medium or Intermediate range missiles appear to be suitable for this purpose. Such an early capability would probably require the useuclear warhead. If the Soviets are utilizing components fromng systems, they might be able to Intercept current models of USnow, and they would almost certainlyapability to do so within the next year or so.

Nuclear Warheads

nalysis of debris from1 nuclear lest series Indicates that the USSR Is continuing its efforts to reduce the diameters and weights of low-yield fission weapons. We believe that these tests almost certainly Included development of warheads for air defense purposes. Nuclear weapons handling facilities have been identified at the SAM lest com-


plex ai,Kapustin Yar and at thc Sary Shagan ABM research center.nuclear warheads arc not widely deployed at theseWe believe that the Soviets are interested in developingfor using nuclear weapons to intercept ballistic missiles bothand outside the atmosphere. The larger payload capabilities ofAAMs under development are compatible- with existingand we estimate that these missiles will be available inyear or so.

fighter Airctait

As ofe estimate that there were0 fighters in operational units throughout thc Bloc, withf these In Soviet units.f the Soviet fighters are directly subordinate to IA-PVO with air defense as their exclusive mission. Thc remainder, which are in Tactical Aviation, are trained in air defense as well as ground support operations.

With thc widespread deployment of thehe Soviets haveombination of fighter and missile defenses. They now rely primarily upon missiles for point defense of important fixed targets, and upon fighters for area defense to cover approach routes as well as gaps between missile-defended areas. The arming of fighters with AAMs and the increased useata link intercept control system has significantly increased the effectiveness of fighter aircraft.

These developmentsonsiderable reduction In Soviet fighter strength. Reductions in Soviet fightertactical andwill continue over the next five years. We estimate that the number of operational Soviet fighters will be reduced on the order ofercent during this period. The more advanced performance characteristics of new model fighters and improvements in their weapons and control systems should more than offset reductions In numbers.

Although the Soviets have been working to improve the all-weather capability of their fighter force sincehis force still consists largely of day fighters. The FLASHLIGHT A, introducedthe first Soviet attempt to develop an all-weather Interceptor. Airborne intercept (AI) equipment has been added to some models of FRESCO, FARMER, and FISUBED. Under nonvisual conditions, the effectiveness of most of these Al-equipped models ls seriously reduced by the limited range of the radar, the continued reliance on gunand the restrictionursuit attack. Some of these models are equipped with AAMs, and their capability is less seriously limited by nonvisual conditions."

" For characteristics of Interceptors and airborne intercept radars, see Annex A,nd 3.

ew intcrceptois now entering service are the FITTER. FISHPOT and. We estimate that production ol these newinterceptors begannd thatave been produced since that time. Although we have identified onlyn units wc estimate that atave actually been deployed.

. Vkerformance Interceptor prototypes were displayed in1 Aviation Day show, thc FIREBAR B, the FLIPPER and thc FIDDLER. We have limited evidence that FIDDLER and possibly FLIPPER may be in production now. We estimate that all three of the new fighters will be produced and that they could start entering units. Ali three of these new fighters are equipped with improved AI radar and AAMs. The appearance of thcew long-range fighter, mayoviet intent loapability to intercept aur-to-surface missile (ASM) carriers. We estimate that this aircraft will be able tooiter. or more from base. However, its potential for such missions is currently limited by the shorter ranges of Soviet Ground Control Intercept (GCI), and by the amount of warning lime available.

Production. Soviet production of interceptordropped sharply in recent years. Annual production reachedn thes. Production declined tond tohis decline was partly due toand production difficulties caused by the increased complexityfighters. However, thc primary cause was probably thedeployment of SAM sites. The USSR produced on thenterceptors annually0enterceptors will be produced

Air-to-Air Missiles

have firm evidence on the deployment of AAMs in theforce and In several of the Satellite forces as well. Wethree types are nowadar beamrlderoming missileissile which may beInfrared homing missile or an all-weather semiactivewo versionsrototype AAM, designated Aobserved on FIDDLER and FLIPPER al1 Tushlno airwe estimate that one of these versions willt is probable that these missiles haveradar homing systems and that they can carrywarheads, some of which may be nuclear. Sovietimproved AAMs over the nexl few years will depend primarilydevelopment of interceptors equipped with suitable AI radarcontrol system.11

" For performance characteristicsNCs. sec Annex A. Table 4.



Antiairciaft Guns

Soviets continue to employ large numbers orfor defense of field forces and fixed targets, primarily forlow altitudes where fighter and missUe effectiveness Is poor.range in size frommarge percentagecontrol radars. Proximity fuses probably are used in someEuropean SatcUite forces haveand there aren Communist China, NorthNorth Vietnam. The number of antiaircraft guns in thenowas declined over the past few years andIs continuing. Because of the widespread deployment ofbelieve that most of the remaining medium and heavy guns useddefense of fixed targets in the USSR wiU be phased out overfew years.arge number of these probably wiil bereserve status near major target areas, and some wUl bedefend field forces. Transfer of some of this equipment tocountries is probable.M


believe thateavy prime radars and aboutradars are deployed in various combinations at somein thc Sino-Soviet Bloc. Overlapping radar coverage extendsentire USSR and European Satellite area, with thc heaviestwest of the Urals and in peripheral areas. In the Faxcoverage extends from the Soviet-North Koreanthe coastal zone of Communist China, into North VietnamChina along the borders of Laos, ThaUand, andcoverage in China is sparse; radars are generally locatedtarget complexes. In some coastal areas of the USSR,radar is used occasionaUy to extend early warning (EW)to enhance low altitude detection capabilities."

Early Warning Radars

Soviet aircraft warning system is based upon largeEW radars closely spaced throughout the USSR. Underthis system can detect and track aircraft at mediumaltitudes more. from Bloc territory; underconditions the system can detect and track aircraft at. Maximum altitude capabilities of theEW radars will continue to exceed the operational altitudesaircraft during the period of this estimate. Low altitude de-

" For characteristics ol antiaircraft guns, see Annex A. Tableor characlerlsUcs of Soviet radars, see Annex A, Table S.


and tracking capabilities are limited, but thc density of coverage makes detection and Intermittent tracking likely.

Ground Controlled Intercept Radari

eavy EW radars are also usedCI role. To obtain the requisite accuracy for height determination In GCI operations, the EW radar is used in conjunction with height-finder radars, the limits of which reduce thc maximum effective range toypes of radars employ moving target indicators or other antlclutter techniques, but the low altitude capabilities of most GCI radars remain quite limited.

Detection ofounchingi

Soviets have no operaUonal radar system for early warningmissilehe development of high frequencyradars for detection of long-range missile launchlngswithin Soviet capabilities for at least six years. The Sovietsa high degree of competence in backscatter research andSoviet work in thc latter field lias related lo development oftechniques, but the Soviets have probably alsomethod for detecting US nuclear detonations and possibly USlaunchings. Its use against missiles mightimitedEW time for alerting defenses.

future Development


Pal live Defection

Soviet ground radar development has stressed reliability, mobility, and ease of maintenance, and this emphasis continues. The Soviets have also Incorporated Increased power and greater designin their newer radars. Recent trends in Soviet radar development appear directed toward countering the Western ASM threat.

The very large number of radars employed In the Soviet syslemigh redundancy of coverage. Moreover, in deploying successive generations of radars the Soviets have tended lo retain much of the older equipment In service, resultingteady growth In the operational inventory. However, in the past year or so. thc deployment of new and better radars and the Introduction of automated control systems appear to have lededuction in the number of radar sitesew areas. This trend will probably continue, leading eventuallyignificant reduction in the operational inventory.

he Soviet air warning system is supplemented by passivewhich can extend EW range beyond most known radarariety of specialized equipment, used for detection and dlrcction-


finding, can cover most of the frequencies used by Westernand radar. This equipment-has been extensively deployed at sites in forward areas of the Soviet Bloc and has also been observed on Soviet ships and aircraft. Thc extent to which passive detection has beeninto the air defense system is not clear. Thc large number of sitesair potential for target location, but the elaborate data handling facilities required to exploit this potential effectively may not be available.

Electronic Warfare

At present, the USSR has an appreciable capability for Jamming Western long-range radio communications and bombing andradars, including frequencies up0 megacycles and possibly higher. The Soviets are also known to have employed electronicincluding simulation of Western navigational aids, againstaircraft. Present capabilities probably will be Increased by the use of Improved techniques and higher power. Toward thc end of the period of this estimate, the USSR will probably have In operation equipment capable of Jamming at all frequencies likely to be used by Westernradar, and navigation equipment.

Thc Soviets have long sought to strengthen their air warning system against enemy countermeasures.

These trends

will probably continue, butoviet electronic systemswill still be subject to disruption by properly employed techniques.

Communicorfons ond Control

he Soviets continue to use the very high frequency (VHF) band for air-to-air and air-to-ground communications; there Is no Indication that the Soviets will employ ultra high frequency (UHF) systems.


or point-to-point ground communications in support ol airoperations, the Soviets will continue to Improve and expand land-line and microwave links. The use of high frequency radio will decrease, but will continue for special purposes and backup. The microwavethe Soviets plan to have operating5 will be capable ofa signal over long distances without serious degradation, and willow degree of vulnerability to jamming and interception. Doth operational and experimental tropospheric scatter links are ln existence, and at least two ionospheric scatter links are being tested In the far northern areas of the USSR. These links would be Important to air defenses in those northern areas, where more conventional radio communications are subject to climatic interference and landlincs are nonexistent,

he most important advance In Soviet air defense communications over the last few years has been the development and deployment of an air defense control system with some semiautomatic features. These features include data handling equipment for rapid processing of air defense information and data link equipment for controllingBeginning Inoviet system, similar In concept to the US SAGE system but less complex, was widely deployed In the western USSR. Wc believe that the ground element of this system has been replacedecond generation system, and that an improved semiautomatic fighter control system Is being introduced. These new systems will probably be widely deployed in the USSR and possibly Eastern Europe within the next few years.

video data link system has been introduced which Is usedthe radar display from the radar site lo the filter controlvisual presentation. It is widely deployed throughout theespecially on the periphery


he responsibility for Soviet civil defensetransferred from thc Ministry of Internal Affairs to theDefense. Developments since then have appeared to reflectof the difficulty of building deep shelters able toyield nuclear weapons. Relatively more emphasis has beenuse of emergency shelters such as basements and coveredon evacuation, especially preatlack evacuation oflikely target areas and their resettlement elsewhere for thethe war. Indoctrination of the populace in civil defensecontinued and has come to include radio lectures and televisedfilms. Information on the possibility of widespreadhas been published, and manuals on civil defense for ruralbeen issued.

ivil defense training has been, at least in theory, both obligatory and universal. We believe thatillion Soviet citizens have received some Instruction in civil defense. Of these, someillion have probably received good basic training in elementary civil defense techniques such as use of shelters and gas masks, and have probably been familiarized with protective clothing and radiationequipment. On Lhc other hand, thc training program hasin many areas from poor instruction, shortage of training aids, and public apathy.

Although the USSRubstantial lead over any of the Western Powers, it still lacks adequate shelter for the bulk of Lhc population. Basement shelters are probably capable of providing some protection to perhapsillion city dwellers against radiation and fire.illion persons in Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, Tbilisi, and Kiev can take refuge in subways, which are probably capable of resisting some overpressure. We presume that the USSR has prepared for theand protection of key party and government personnel, but we have no evidence on relocation centers. We estimate that detached and tunnel type shelters and underground bunkers are available toillion key personnel. Thus, some kind of shelter is available for about one-fifth of the urban population. Virtually nothing has been done to provide shelter for the rural population, who would presumably have to prepare their own shelter In the form of dugouts or earth-covered trenches.

In terms of shelters built and personnel trained the USSR has made greater progress than any other major power. Even with limited warning. Soviet civil defense measures would probably reduce casualties considerably, especially among key personnel. Nonetheless, wc believe that Soviet civil defense is not prepared to cope with large-scale nuclear attack, especially under conditions of short warning time.


defense weapons and equipment are most heavilythat portion of the USSR westine drawn from the Kolathe Caspian Sea; in East Germany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia;thc southern portion of the Soviet Far East. Concentrations areat some specific locations outside these areas, especially Inand in eastern China. The approaches to Moscow are by farheavily defended area of the Bloc.

Warning Time

radar could now give Moscow and many other targets inmore than one hour's warning of medium and high altitude


attacks made with Western bombers of2 type. Soviet assurance of such detection would be reduced by low level penetrations. Thebombers and ASMs now being added to Western Inventories could reduce this warning time by as much asercent. Moreover, the more limited EW time available in Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of the defenses of even heavily defended targets ln such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles Increase, and as Western ballistic missilesreater part of the threat, the problem of warning time will become more critical.

Currenf Capabilines and Fufvrt TVcndi

he extensive deployment of SAMs over the past four years has significantly improved Soviet air defense capabilities. These capabilities are greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers In daylight and clear weather at altitudes betweennd0 feet. Under such conditions, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to00 feet; tho FLIPPER will probably be able to execute attacks at0he capabilities of the fighter force would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poor visibility. In the Increasingly widespread areas defended by SAMs. air defense capabilities would be virtuallyby weather conditions and would extend to altitudes of0 feet.

espite its recent and considerable improvements, however, the Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty In copingarge-scale air attack employing varied and sophisticated tactics, even In daylight and within the foregoing altitudes. In addition, the Soviet defense problem would bo complicated by the variety of delivery systems which might be employed, including air and surface-launched cruise missiles and, fighter-bombers. At altitudes beloweet, the capabilities of the system would be progressively reduced; beloweet, the system would lose most of Its effectiveness. The Soviets will attempt to correct these deficiencies during the next few years by further deployment of low altitudeites and by Improving the capabilities of fighter aircraft ln low altitude operations. Total system effectiveness will be increased by the further application of automated command and control.

"Current operationalnterceptors (PISHBKD, VTTTKR. FISHPOT) an capable ofynamic climb and reaching alUtudca ofeet. Inlimb, the aircraft would be al these altitudesbort period of time (perhaps one to threeuring which It would have little mancuverablUty. The precision with which the climb must be planned aad executed limits IU effectl rents* as an Intercept lacue.

The Soviets now have no operational capability against long-range ballistic miss lies However, they may now have some capability Infield forces against short-range ballistic missiles. TheABM system will probably become operationaln about two or three years, the USSR may achieve some capability toimited number of additional targets against long-range missiles.over this same time period, the Soviets will have little capability against complex forms of missile attack. Wo believeoreABM system will almost certainly not become operaUonalnd that Its deploymentubstantial scale will require several years.

The significant Improvements in Die Soviet air defense system which have been noted during recent years and which will be extended during the next few years will progressively reduce the chances ofattacks by manned bombers. Successful penetration by manned bombers will therefore require Increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. Thc Soviet air defense capability can be degraded by the Increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be. able to employ,air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetration tactics, and electronic countemeasures. Even in suchthe Soviets would probably expect toumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to thc USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR is able loubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.





TAJ3LErobable Soviet Development I'togram for Surfacc-lc-Alr MU-

sile Systems

TABLEstimated Performance of Soviet Interceptor Aircraft

TABLEstimated Performance of Soviet Airborne Intercept Radars

TABLErobable Soviet Development Program for Alr-to-Air Missile Systems .

TABLEstimated Characteristics and Performance of Soviet Early Warning and Ground Ccritrolted Iiu-Jcept Radars

TABLEstimated Characteristics or BIqc Antiaircraft Guns

TABLEstimated Strength and Deployment of Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense2

TABLEstimated Sino-Soviet Bloc Fighter Strength,

-top sccaef.



probable soviet development program fur surface-to-air

missile systems

IiilUal Op

Mil Up Horn Range

Man KIT Altitude

Mdi Efl Altitude


Accuracy (CEP in

Warheadion(ragmen taUon

it ba-od on oeljlnalnUriie. For thoseiter modified for thoUIDELINE misalle, characteristic, will approach thoseystem.

Maximum altitude It not uoceaaorily achieved alrange. Range will vary with tba lias, diieelion of approach, and altitude of thr allaelmi aircraft.

hava tome effectiveness upCO0 (Mtif equippeduclear warhead.

' That system probaUriajk degree ofp lo slniodas0 United etTrctivencaa up0 feet tu canabdiiies would deereoae rapidly at hither altitudes, butome evidence lhal it might be able lo engage tatgcU al altitudes aa highee*.

in mob faelora na oiling condition! and largei speed*flmmw low-altilude capabilities. Soviel doctrine suggests olloeallon of targetseel lo AAA Are.

' We have insufficient evidenre lo estimate characlrriitica. This ayitrm is probably being deployed for low-altUude defense,

Although lhe origina] lystent was equippedaad FRU1TSETand FRUITS ET radars appearedhese or. radars have improved aonMwaat theaad lov-allitud* capability of iKe tritcrc.

1 Nuclear warhead* are possible, although specific rridroee of theiracking.





Year Mt0





Tim?limb0 fl fmln) fiom brake re-kaHa


Maiimum potter

Combil rvlivs .'





Air-to-airN'o miuiles






in ni


externaliih no external fuel.

or radar characteritticj.

0 feel.

Duty the more probable missile* are lialed for each specific aircraft; FRESCO and FARM iA, B, and C, eould be modified to carry mirrilca, buthave noi beenoneircruft. MiiMlesoefccU cannot be carried al Iho same lime.

KISHBEDan employrnw




Fan hit *








A A- 3




i i* Target


Range . (inn)

Range (nm)


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nm b


cm *

Evidence indicates tliat most ranges used ope ration ally maximum capability alimstcd

" Theoo values are based on Uie lite of itmemini.

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2 3




Ground Co* trailedri Targei;

Aliunde Coverage

Target Targat 7 Sim (Nom-m) Tartf


Eari* War* tagFl Target DtlwUoa Range (nm)


OOS.ic ovaregeTrvcotXT Target Target Target 7 Star Target Target Target (Vc/i) (Nen-ea) Te/Mt fNoat^a) (Koae-aa) (Xeaa-M

















awmaliMdfunied Theeeawyercent ande* aomegal bet. *c Theee ehangea depmd ape* *Uag. weather, altitude, iliiiniw at im

aad aaf otter (aetenten IM Individual rwlar and ItaIn delermhilna tlnaa. Isp/Sen ratiu atio ta behoved Iu irprewitdel* ruo< range Tracking, hvwvcr,piifeUUp/aWiok Ihu orderercentachieved at

aboul focMUU*hirda or Um luted rang*.

eprenet out beat eeunaw of radara Uauted by toeep-UUoa freabeaey (PRFl Ato parceat BkpAean ratM raid be aeket-ed.

perlaewa-ea e* tkate radaie ia eeUneled to be ewca that tbeir rung* -oUd be United by radar bortaoa line a* atgaHn. iq,


I 5

p *

C, E



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3 i1



P v. <


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1 I



T a,

a x 9k- x>



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i B






Late Other

odel * Other

Radar Sites

Primary Secondary

Oun Llahl Mrd/Heavy





Europr Solcllitc Fore**.




Air De'eota '

(Ind. in For Emi)

operational units, secluding trainers, FIREBAR, and FLASHLIGHTISHPOT.




' FlgSUts anti E* aad CCIra of Moscow. SAM svlee withinm. and AA (una withtam, all of which are included above i* tha tgcre* (orrsrthwcaura. and "eat centra) USSR

' Figares ire forndn'.r Suftelent evidence Is not now available to permit an estimale on

best copy







near important militaryConfirmed SA-2ConlWmadit*

O Procainee underProbableir


Canal w 1

. ii




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e. Assistant Chid of Sio* for Infetl.flence. Departmoni of the Army, for tho Department of the Army

d Assisto.-rt Chief o' Navol Q|ior tho Deportment of th* fkrry

Chief of Staff, tnteftgence.for the De^rrmer* of the Ai


for IrdeWraeocc. Jointor thoio"

cy. Director of Intelligence,for the Atomic Energy Cernrrnsion h. AsMsonl Director. FSI. for the fedorol Bureau of Investigation i. Dheetor of NSA> for the Noltonol Security Agency

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Original document.

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