SOVIET BLOC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1967

Created: 10/31/1962

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national intelligence estimate

SupersctitH)

Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Sur>erjedei)

Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through

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TABIE OP CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM

SUMMARY AND

I.

n.

ID. AIR DEFENSE

ir

Antimissile Progruri .

AntisateUtte

Nuclear

Fighter

Alr-to-Alr

Antiaircraft

AND CONTROL

Early Warning

Ground Controlled Intercept

Detection or Missile

Future

Pastes

Electronic

Communteattona and

VT_ SOVIET AIR DEFENSE

Waiitlng

Current Capabilities and Future

ANNEX A:

ANftEX B: Maps and

KCBET

SOVIET BLOC AIR ANDDEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH

THE PffOBLEM

To evaluate tbe capabilities of Soviet Bloc air and missilesystems through

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

USSR has continued to devote large-scale effortsand modernizing its air defense system. Wein recent years, air defense has absorbed about one-firthSoviet military expenditures which can be attributed tomissions. Moreover, the Soviets consider their airsystem so important that its chief holds the position ofMinister of Defense, ranking with tho chiefs ofair, naval, and rocket forces. (Paras. I, 4)

against hostile aircraft, especially againstand high altitude bombers, have been greatlyrecent years by the widespread deployment of(SAM) systems, improved interceptorsnd advanced equipment for air defenseand control. Antiaircraft capabilities will be furtherand extended, but the major future devekipmentforesee is the adventapability against

a antimissile defenses has beenin the USSR for more than Ave years. Our evidence Isto support ar estimate of the characteristics ofbeing developed. However, it does pointseveral different systems to defend against Western missiles

ecbei

ol various ranges One ofystem to defend field forces against short-range ballistic missiles, could be operational now or

D. Our evidence leads us lo conclude that the USSR isan antiballistic missile (ABM) system around Leningrad and that it will probably become operational We lack the technical data on components which would be necessaryirm estimate of the capabilities of the Leningrad system we believe the system has been test-fired at Sary Shaflnn against ballistic missiles of snort and medium rangesautical mile) rnruilri which are the nearest Sonet equivalent in range and velocity to the Thar. Jupiter, and Polaris. We are uncertain whether tbe USSR has teal tired any anti-rnissues against ICBMs However, the Soviets have almostconducted extensive research on ICBM re-entryand we believe that they would have concluded that the probierna of Intercepting IRBMs and ICBMs are not sigruficantly different For this reason, and considering the nature of the ballistic missile threat to Leningrad, we believe that the system being deployed there ts probably designed to Intercept both IRBMs and ICBMs. We have no basis for estimating Its We thins: it unlikely, however,ystem deployed at the current stage of Soviet RrtD would be effective againstemploying decoys.1 )

'tbe rxraewr. deteoaebe annul cblec of aait lot lni<ain*;ire department ot wa bay, tbea.'f of naval opernuonaepartment ot the wary. uve aaueunt cblat ol staff. inietlunoce. mar. and the director tor uteulaatwa. lout staff, do not concur in th* parasrapb.

thar are concern toarasrapo axj eolroper porspeeova ofoperatlimuu capeqliity or uin lenuifrad ajataiu. the loader may infer uut use eyrtemapabulty aarainal uve icbm. wbcreu una cannot de nea-

they dabeve tbe letunexad irnern waa developed at barytor atallc ot aeld deployment and baa bean tested only eaatnal urrni nuiauaa with eanoua raoga* trosa about loo nan. bpe

tbejlao thai tbe ayitean osatirad inm leningrad la toearare et proiaeaoe acaffial the tbor. juptter. and polaru whenliashouldapability to enaafe tbe ibreat posed by theae drat generation ayatema. any major duns* in use cbaraetar ot tbe threat, sarb ai mm et tataa ore. decoys, orraananuboo. shouldetneaeciaj effect on ibe ema" eapabuniee

(footnote continued nan pmoj

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E To counter tbe more complexar.ge beJllsfcc missile threat of the mkl-IOfiOs. the Soviets may seek lo improve the Leningrad system, or mayifferent and more advanced system, or both. Should they folio* the first course, deployment of the Leningrad system at additional locations would probably begin in the near future if It has not already begun If sites are under construction now, Initial operational capabilities could be achieved at one or more locations in about two years, andImprovements would progressively increase the capabilities We regard it as more likely, however, that the USSR will defer deployment at locations other than Leningradew and better antimissile system is available. In this case, theforould probably delay the beginning of deployment for another year or so Initial operationalcould probably be achieved at one or more locations.

F If technical achievements enable the Soviets to develop an ASM system which they regard as reasonably effective against long-rangeigorous deployment program wU3be undertaken. Considering the vast effort requiredarge program and Che relative importance of the various urban-industrial area* in the USSR, we believeigorous So-net deployment program would contemplate Ihe defense ofrincipal Sovietrogram of this scope almost Certainly would require some five or six years from Ita initiation to its completion We nave no basis for judging whether or when the Sonets would consider their ABM systems effective enough to warrant tbe Initiation ofrogram.

'FoeiMM' eonOMMi

On* ofmen cnucai judfnirBU to t* mad* ii anol (tierapahillirn ICBM re-entry vehicle. The* toilet* thatfavorable eendlUoni us* system. from.

a-tmtj tonK farm an ZCHUriruce djl

"^rtrsuE rriMm prot>*bt> eu optimisedsmi. While aa ann-ICrlS) capaQiiity tan nalthar beor drnhnl User eon-

elms* on Uh aaau orrteence that th* nitui Sue aapsared atnfcM to coutai tee soussr ISSst aad Umiersaene* Oocs not mspart ih* wsu.ICSM capabilitr tmpUea in Use text

G We believe that the Soviet leaders almoat certainly intend to acquire an antisateilite capability. Although we lack evidence, we think it probableevelopment program exists If the Sonets are utilizing components from existing systems, they might be able lo intercept current models of US satellites now, and they would almost certainly be able to do so within the next year or to. (Peroti

H For defense against aircraft, the Soviets now rely primarily upon SAMS employed near important fixed targets, arid upon fighters deployed to cover approach routes as well as gaps between misstte-defended locations We estimate that inAM sites were operational in defense of morearget areas in the USSR, including principal cities and other targets ofand military importance SAMs are also being deployed to defend major installations of the theater field forces, and principal cities in the Europeanystem which we believe is designed to engage aircraft at low altitudes is now in the early stages of deployment

I. In the next few years, SAMs will be even more widelynew all-weather Interceptors will appear, and interceptors will be equipped with better airborne intercept radar and AAMs The increasing effectiveness of interceptors and their ground control systems should more than offset the probable reduction in total numbers We believe thateavy prime radars anduxiliary radars are deployed in various combinations atites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The altitude capabilities of the moat advanced air defense radars will continue lo exceed the combat ceilings of Western bombers and cruise-type missiles. Early warning (EW) radar will continue to pronde overlapping medium and high altitude coverage ol the USSR and the European Satellites. Toward the end of the period of this estimate, the USSR will probably have in operationcapable of jamming all frequencies likely to be used by Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment

J. The significant improvements in the Soviet air defensewhich have been noted during recent years and which will be extended during the next few years will progressively reduce

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the chances of successful attacks by manned bombers.penetration by manned bombers will therefore requiresophisticated forms of attack. Tbe Sonet air defense capability can be degraded by tbe Increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ, including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types,tactics, and electronic counterrneasures. Even in suchhe Soviets would probably expect to destroy aof the attackers We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR Is able toubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.

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ENERAL

The Soviet leasers recognize that an effective air and missile defense is an essential element or the strong military posture which they wish to mam lain, both to contribute to the security of the Bloc and to support their foreign policies. The continuing large-scale effort to improve and modemixe the Soviet air defense system indicates the high priority assigned to this mission. The eapeodllure of resources on air defense is very targe; In recent years it has amounted to about orte-BTth of the military expenditure! which can be attributed to broad military missions, and this share is likely to rise, particularly ifdeployment of antimissileegun.

Through these efforts, the Soviets have In recent years greatly unproved their defenses against hostile aircraft, especially against medium and high altitude attack. Tbe principal improvement* have been: la) the extensive deployment of surface-to-air missilesii) the introduction of air. defense control systems with semiautomatic features; and (c) the deployment of new fighters In significant numbers to border areas. Other factors include tbe advent of radars with better detection and Cdght-flnding capabilities and the incorporation of more advanced electronic gear and armament. Including air-to-air missilesnto Interceptorew SAM system, believed to be designed to defend against aircraft attack at low altitudes, is Lo the early stages ai deployment In the Soviet Unkm.

While improvements wOl continue in antiaircraft systems, wethat the major future change will be the adventapability againstevidence on Soviet accomplishments In this field is inadequate to support firm estimates, but It Is clear thatn the USSR is conductedarge scale andigh priority.

It ORGANIZATION

4 All Soviet force* deployed for the air darense of the USSR are under the operational controlingle major headquarters, the PVO Sfrcajf, (Air Defense or the Country) which combines ground and air elements. The Commander In Chief of the PVO Straayeputy Minister of Defense and la the chiaf adviser lo the Minister and Chief of the General Staff on air dalenae matters. AdminlatraUrely. he ranks with the Command*rs in Cruel of the ground, air. naval, aad rocket lorce*.

he chief compcnenls assigned lo the PVO Strang are the Air Observation. Reporting, and CommBOjcaUon (VKOS) sernce. ihe? Fighter Aviation of Air Drfenacnd ihe AnUalrcrafl Artillery of Air Defensehe latter component Including both antiaircraft guns and SAHs In addition to forces directly asserted. Other Sc-vstrt forces which can contribute to Use air defense mission are alsoavailable to this command

& There Is sense ender.ee thai an'.imisoile defense units arc no* being organised in the USSR. Judging by Soviet practice with other air defensee believe that antimissile units defending strategic targets willomponent of the overall defense system under PVO SHany, wDereas units assigned lo defend theater field forces against missile attack will probably be subordinated to those forces.

" Tbe PVO forces are organisedens* Of geographic divisions andimilar organisation Is employed by each of theSatellites, wtsoav air defenses are in effect extensions of the Soviet system. Albania is an exception,esult ofifficulties.

military cooperation between that country and the other Warsaw Pact members has ceased The Chinese Communist air defense system U

euro parte! j- independent of Sonet control, and awso-SovMK opera UcoaJ

hu field have long been limited to the exchange of

information

IH AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS SWoca-to-A- Atbswei

I The Sonets now hare operational three types of SAM systems-Two of these.ndre designed primarily lor detense against medium and high altitude attacks; tbe third.s probably designed to pre/rid* improved capabilities at tower altitude*SA-ra are deployed only around Moscow, while'a have been extensively deployed throughout the USSR- The newest system.se early stages of dVpaCTmect at present

1 System. Theystem, consisting of flfl Died sites ofaunching positions each, has been operational around Moscow trace IBM Its chief advantages are Its ability to handlearge number of targets and toigh rate of fire against them. Tbesystem wasesigned to counter the massed air

raid threat of tbendY. The changed nature of

the threat, the magnitude of effort involved in deployment, and the

limitations of the system probably argued againsteploymeot

elsewhere Our evidence tncHeatee that the defense* of Moscow have

*fOr perfoitoinc* characterlrtici of SAMi. aaeev IflaatraUosa ot typicalndllaa. aae Aaaaa B.stf I

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been undergoing mc<Knuzatjon in trie past tew yean, by theofnd SA-3around the city and by tftc moditlcation of somaites, possibly to accommodate the more effectiveissile

Sincehe USSR has beenmajor operational capability with an improved SAM systemthe defense of both strategic targets and field forcethereariety of arrangement patterns, all observedot six launchingguidance radar and linked by service roads to facilitate loading.observed sites clearly represent permanent installations, allcomponents of the system are mounted on wheeled vehiclescapable of movement by rood or rail.

Theystem appears designed to cope with the threat posed by small groups of aircraft rather than massed raids. Flexibility and mobility arc its chief advantages over then contrast to the massiveites, each of which Is capable of defendingimited sector around the target area, eachite is capable* coverage. This flexibility is obtained at the expense of target handling capacity and rate of tire relative to the SA-l.

Considering US technical studies of theystem and informs-Uon on Soviet assessments of its performance, wo estimate the present maximum intercept range of thet somewhat more thano It probablyigh degree of effectiveness up to altitudes0 feet, with limited effectiveness up0 feet. Its capabilities would decrease rapidly at higher altitudes, but there is some evidence that It might be able to engage nonmaneu ve ring targets at altitudes as higheel The low altitude capability of tbe system probably extends down toeet. The guidance system at anite can handle only one targetime, but can direct three missilesarget simultaneously. Additional missiles could be fired against the same target after one or more missiles of the first salvo had completed their run. The Sonets apparently believe they must program three or tour missiles against each target in order to achieve acceptable kill probabilities

The foregoing figures probably do not apply to allefenses at present. An original version of the system, somewhat inferior in performance. Is probably still deployed in some areas. Further,characteristics will vary depending on the terrain and other conditions at theite, the size, speed, and approach angle ol the target, and other operational factors.

Strategic Deployment in tht OSSR. Thes the beau: missile defense system for critical urban-industrial areas in the USSR, other

A/fVOB

than Moscow.' Deployment olnsiailnlions around Moscow now Includes seven sites, and ts probably portrogram to supplement theystem. Sinceoreites tiave been confirmed in the USSR mostly in defense of population centers.complexes, and gorerocient control centers Missile defenses have been provided for most of the Soviet cities with populauorj greaternd we rjelsrvc that alluch crises wme defended. ites have im^i. empla.-cd at some smaller urban areas, presumably because they con lain government control centers or other installations of critical importance They hare also been deployed lor defense of naval and port facilities, nuclear production and weapon storage Installations, missile test ranges, and industrial faculties Other major military Inst alia Items, such as long-range missive sites andof tbe long-range air force, are also defended Dy SA-2. Several site* In border arena which we cannot relate to known targets, suggest thai Use Soviets are deploying peripheral defenses, which may eeeniually extend from the Kola Peninsula along the western and southern borders Of the USSR Into central Asia. Deployment In the Baltic coastal area is particularly dense.

dentification of additional sites and defended areas since the publication of NTEonfirms thateployment is massive in scale Considering tbe pattern of depeuiuien: observed to date. Use length of ume the program has been under war. and the extent of our intelligence onerage. we estimate that Intes were operational in defense of more than 3O0 targethe USSR In light of the accumulating evidence, we hare mcreased our estimate of the Dumber ofites to be provided and have modified ourof the timing of the program. We now estimate chat Uve Soviets willotal olites in the USSR The continuing construction of new sites and the apparently Incomplete defense in certain target areas scad os to ration if that the preggarn is still under way. We believe that the major portion Of thewill be completed within the next two years Improvements to the weapons system will continue to be introduce! and some deployment will probably continue in the period beyond IM'.

eployment to Field Forcer Some3 units have been deployed in support of Sonet field forces tn East Germany and poaslbly In Uve USSR Althoughnits assigned to Soviet field forces are normally em placed at fixed Installations, the system is transportable by road aodnits hare beeneed exercises However.nitsimited ability toast rnovtng front because of Use

detail* of SAW deplortnent at Moerow and aUewnere InK aae annua B.nilair Oefeoee CepaolUfaes Ttuoiiahateduij ivei

(top OXCStBT).

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requirement for good road) and the time required to displace to new rsesllions We beUere. therefore thatissile defenses for Arid forces will be primarily assigned to such targets as major headquarters, logistic centers, and airfields. The evidence is insufficient to determine the scale of defense planned for the Sonet field forces.

Vrdoirme-nr to Sonet AUiti Deployment of1 tee (or defense of European Satellite targets has been under way since IMO' Missile defenses have been observed in East Germany. Hungary. Bulgaria Rumania, Chechoslovakia, and Poland-' The heaviest deployment has occurred in East Perm any, where there are now Hi confirmed sites. IS of them completed, and etrobable additional tites. About half of th* confirmed site* are manned by East German troops, snd the remainder byf tbe Soviet field forces. The East German sites are located in the vicinity of Berlin and in the northern portion o! East Germany The Soviet sites appear to be deployed to defend important Soviet military Installations such as major headquarters and airfields In the other Satellites, aboutites base been ronfirmed In defense of major cities. On the basis of observed deployment, wethat aboutitae will be deployed in the European Satellites during the neat two or three years. Includrne Ole* manned by Soviet field forms

uspension of Sonet assistance has thus far limited the extent ofeployment in China Onlyall dosen sites have been id en tided in China, three of them at Peiping. These sites are believed to contain Soviet manufactured equipment We doubtignificant number of adcUUooal sites are now deployed in China, orubstantial iniprovement in political relations, Soviet assistance for further deploymentubstantial scale will be forthcoming We also consider It impeccable that the Chin Me couldative produced copy of th*uring the period of this estimate

on* Alhtvd* Defense. We have estimated for several years thai tbe USSR would develop and deploy an acklitaora: SAM systempecifically designed to engage target* at lowesseet. Photography at Rapustln Yar in9 revealed two probable RADach of which consisted of four launch pads. Alauncher on one of the pads held two eussUr-iixe objects abouteet long We have Identified more thanites of this type tn the USSR since, usually nearrites. No pattern can be cwtermined from tbe limited deployment noted thu* far and no associated electronics mstsJlatinns have been found. While these factors cause us lo be uncertain of the characteristics of the new system, we

'Per detail! ofeoioyK-nt in ladJ the other ISrcoean SaiciXtaa. as* annex a.nd

' The Anf leite provided to Albania is new loscuee

believe thatystem designed to provide better capabilities against low altitude attack than theystem

A number ofues ideatined to datebeen tocatcd around Moscow and Leningrad at well as In coaita. regions. parUcularly ;ne Baltic* We bebev* trial the Soviets wd) deployto providecoverage tn certain areas now attended by tbendystems Those coastal areas whirr Lhe Sonet* regard at tapecuUJs vulnerable to tow altitude penetrance vC probably be provided wimerratesnoiity basis Apart from this factor, however, we have no basis for eatur.&Ur.c. how widely th* Sonets intend to deploy this system or what kind o! fined installations will be del ended w* behove that theystem in mobile configurations will be provided to held forces and that the extent ol deployment with those forces will probably considerably exceed that of Lhe SA-2.

Fultire Deiviorrrrurnts. We expect the Soviet* lo continue their efforts to develop new SAM systems and Improve existing ones foragainst more advanced aircraft and cruise-type missiles They apparently intend to Improve range capabilities and system reliability and to overcome othernetr current eyxuroa. includingil on target handling capabilities and vjrieraDLity to janumng There Is also evidence that tbe SovieU are reekingrAM rysUrau for use wttn field forces

Anfimltiiit 'rotyoi"

of Rettarch and Development. We know thai thefor more than five years beenigh priorityprogram to develop defenses against ballistic missile*.Shagan, weil of lake Ballrhash. they have created aRAO center extending overquare miles,accommodations for atX1 personnelissiles, ot various ranges up, haveinto this crater, thus providing much data on re-entryIt It almost certain that during the past two rearsbeen made to Intercept incoming missiles by defensiveFrom Sary Shagan

e belseveecond anUbalsstsc raissUe (ABM) researen facility is located on theThe facilities here are rxaassnwrabty lea* cxtassam than those at Sary Shagan This facility ha* almost certainly been engaged since at0 Inhe re-entry characteristics ot ICSMs launched from Tyuratam We

* For deUUii oteployment, seelfstre J

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uncertain, however, whether intercepts ol ICBMs have yet been attempted (torn Kamchatka.*

be mdence avalUbl* to us indicates that IE* Soviets arar.-i^ different abm nsterai ta dveaTekdbMQm a| various ran its This evidence is insufficient, however, to support an ettimatc ot tbe characteristics or effectiveness of any of these systems In general, the complex problem* involved in antl.-nnsJe defense- detec-uon, acquitiuon. discnminatinn. target tracking, andas difficult lor the USSR as lor the US We know that the Soviets are keenly aware of the coun term ensures available to an attacking force, such as tbe use of decoys, tne jamming of ABM system electronics, and the possible saturation of ABM complexes with multiple nose corses of varying characteristics,nd angles of descent. Despite the Intensity and demonstrated progress of Soviet RAD. we are not aware of any Sonet breakthrough in ARM technology

efense Acesnsf Lona-Rangt Munfes. Our evidence leads us to conclude that the USSR is deploying an ABM system around Leningrad. This system, with facilities resembling some of those first ranted at Saryas beer, under roastructaon around Leningrad since al least earlyhese installations Include three launch complexesistinctive type. Bach consists of five circular launch sites having six rsosrtxss each, and associated support areas We do not bebeve that construction of the system at Leningrad has been completed, but we estimate that It will achieve some operational capability3

e lack the technical data on components which would besaryrmof the capabilities of the Leningrad system However, we believe the system has been test-fired at Sary Shagan against ballistic missiles of short and medium ranges,rawhich are the nearest Sonet equivalent ta range aad velocity to the Trior. Jupiter, and Polaris. We are uncertain whether

Ihe USSK has IMI-Ored. any anlimisstlos against ICBMs. However, the Soviet* have almost certainly conducted extensive research on ICBM re-entry characteristics and wr believe that they would have concluded that the problems Of LtUereepting IRBMs and ICBMs are not itgrilfteanUy different For this reason, and cunsiaermg the nature of thenisstle threat U> Leningrad, we beUeve that tbe system beingere la probably designed to intercept both IRBMs and ICBMs We have no Oasis lor estimating its eflrciiveneas We in ink it unlikely, however,ystem deployed al Uie current stage olould be effective against missiles employing decoys."

e believe that the cost ol extensive ABM deployment,when measured against the competing demands ol other advanced weapon systems and the space program for high-quality personnel and materials,ubstantia) argument against heavy investment in systems whose effectives?si may be limited or subsequently reduced by expected advances In offensive weapons and tactic* The Soviet research, oereiopment. and testing program has already consumed use equivalent of several billiononssaeraoie part of which was expended u> develop the Leningrad system The development andcoil* Of more advanced systems will require continuing cx-

- Tin DiroiUir Detenuncy. uit Assistant Chief of Stall for Intelligence. Department of the Army Us* Aatsstaat Chief al Naral Operaoocs ilnteUleeneei. Department of the Nivy trie Awn Up: Chief of Staff. Intril! laaee. UMAF. andDirtier fee In tat licence.i Staff. So nol eoeear in this lw*ssgsr*jB>

They ara ceeearoe* mat use paiwrapri dijroper piirff

usecapafeb'-TUse tatuafra* re-sear Tbe reader may .afn

USattrmanaOCIty aaamat Use ICBM. ahtieas Uni eir.nl. De mail* ntia led.

se LeoinrrUar developed at Sary Stiaain lor italic ee nekl depMynenl and has bean traied orvlf agalnai target monies with tbHous (iiiK'i tram. upJO Dm.

They believe alio that the srstem (Mploita around Leningrad Is lo provide .

potential cspsbDIty asainsl be ICBM reentry vehicle. They believe trial under reruun favorable conditions, the system, as syoui-iiied from trie Sary Shaaan scuntv, could eivgag*CBM re-entry vehicle In this connection.have notbat tbe system ha* been fired against vehicles with velocitiesctry angle; similar to Us* ICBM Furthermoreecord of nnng to oat* rasrest* tbat tbe system probably waa optimised against MRBMs

While an aoU-ICBM capabUity can neither be oennrrned nor denied they eon-elude on the bans ofctivity aad other evidence tnat tbes deployed at Leoinarad is deaicned to counter the MRQSi IRUM. and that preterit evsdeoc* does not support thtCBM capability implied In tbe text

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pcnditures al an even greater rate. On the other hand, the USSR's traditional emphaas on the defense ol the homelandtrong Incentive lor early deployment, as does tne desiresier the Image ol Soviet military superiority and technical leadership over the US Thus sve believe that the Soviet leaders face difficult choices, some of which are probably yet to be made.

Despite the incentives for early deployment, the probableof the current system and the heavy costs involved make It difficult to explain why deployment Is occurring now. The Soviets may believe that the present system can later be improved by Introducing moreradars and missiles into it. There is some evidence that Soviet planners recognise the need tootential for improvement In their ABU systems, but we do not know whether the system athas this potential.

We are also puzzled that Moscow was not chosen (or the first antimissile defenses. Possibly tbe defense of Moscow has beendeferredore effective system is available, and deployment of the present system will be limited to Leningrad. There is no present

evidence of ABM deployment at any location other than

To counter the more complex long-range ballistic missile threat Of thes, the Soviets may seek to improve the system now being deployed at Leningrad, or mayifferent and more advanced system, or both. Should they follow the first course, deployment of lite Leningrad system at additional locations would probably begin In the near future, if It has not already begun. If sites are undernow, initial operational capabilities could be achieved at one or more locations In about two years, and subsequent improvements would progressively Increase the capabilities. We regard it as more likely, however, that the USSR will defer deployment at locations other than Leningradew and better antimissile system Is available. In tbU case, the requirement forould probably delay the beginning of deployment for another year or so. Initialcapabilities could probably be achieved at one or more locations

If technical achievements enable the Soviets to develop an ABM system which they regard as reasonably eflecuve against long-rangeigorous deployment program will probably be undertaken. Considering the vast effort requiredarge program and the relative Importance of the various urban-industrial areas in the USSR, we believeigorous Soviet deployment program would contemplate theofrincipal Sovietrogram of this scope

'Tweotv-avo Soviet ctlea have populations of SODOM or more, and arc or (oireapoodicslv (real economic snd adtamutrauve importance.

aaiuusi certainly vould require some five or six years from lis initiation lo lis completionhate no tauls for judeing whether or when the Sonets would consider thru ABM system* effective enough lo warrant Ihe LniliaUon ulrogram

efease Apmtl Short-Range Jfisstle* There are indications tr-at thr Soviets have beenodi heat ion of theirissile system for use against short-range hpmann miaaiWi soch aa Use Hones'. John. Cccporal and Sergeant We have no ersdence Of Sonet progress, but we estimate thai an unprovedystem having some effectiveness against tactical ballistic missiles could be available now or3 It tt also possible that the Soviets have ctsosen toompletely new system, il so, It could also be available in this tune period We believe that whatever system is developed will beiled petxnarUy for the protection oferes and for this use win be mobile It will probably also be deployed at fixed Sties in border areas vulnerable to short-range missile attack

AofiicoH.fe Prop'on

e believe thai the Soviet leaders almost certainly Intend to acquire an anUaatellite capability Although we hare insufficient evi-dence to determine whether the USSR is attainingapability, we think it probable thatdevelopment program exists This program might lead toe*opsnentpecific antisatellite missile system, possibly In conjunction wilh the ASM program In addition, tlir Soviets may be attempting to achieve an early capability byystem using radstr and passive tracking lacihuca. missiles, and warheads from other systems

n theslanoe. the intercept problem could be solved by determining the target satellite's orbitew passes and thenallistic missileear vertical trajectory so as tothe satellite at or near apogee of the intercepting missile Sonet medium or intermediate range missue* appear to be suitable for this purpose. Such an early capability would probably require the useuclear warhead. Ii Ihe Soviets are utilising components fromsystems, they might be ante to intercept current models of USnow. and they would almost certainlyapability to do so within the next year or to.

NexJeor Worheodi

nalyse of debris from1 nuclear test serve* indicates thai tbeontinuing its efforts to reduce trie diameters and weights of low-yield fission weapons We btUeve that these tests almost certainly included development ot warheads for air defense purpose* Nuclear weapons handling facilities have beer, identified at the SAM lest

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fries at Kapostir. Var and at tne Satv Shagan ACM research centerafxaWsTsTsxTsxfgxaw

rota that nuclear warheads are net widely deployed atutaila-noes We believe that th* Soviet* are interested In der-opingtor using nuclear weapons to intercept ballistic missiles bothand outside the atmosphere The larger pavload capabilities of the new AAMi under development are compatible with existing nuclearnd we estimate that these missiles will be available in the next year or so

vcroff

s ofe estimate that there were0perational units throughout the Bloc, withl these in Soriei unitsf the Soviet fighters are directly subordinate to IA-PVO with air defense as their exclusive mission The remainder, which are In Tactical Avlatwn. are trained in air defense a* trail as ground support operation*

Tf With the widespread deployrnent of thehe Soviet* havecmbmatton of fighter and missile defense* They now rely primarily upon missiles for point defense of important fixed targets, and upon fighters for area defense to cover approach routes as well as gaps between mlerlle defended areas. The arming of fighters with AAMs and the increased useata link intercept control system has stsmincanuy increased the eSccuvenea* of fighter aircraft

heee deteiopmenUonsiderahle reduction in Soviet fighter strength. Reductions in Soviet flgbtertactical andwul continue over th* neit five years. We estimate that the number of operational Soviet lighters wul be reduced on the order ofercent during this period. The more advanced performance characteristics of new model fighters and Improvements in their weapons and control systems should rnore than offset reductions In numbers

lthough the Sonet* have ceen woraang to improve the all-weather capabtuty of their fighter force sincehis force still consists largely of dayhe FLASHLIGHT A, Introducedtho first Soviet attempt to develop en all-weather Interceptor. Airborne Intercept (All equipment has been added to some models of FRESCO. PARMER- and FI5HBED Under nonvisual conditions, the eflecUveneas of most of these Al^qmpped models is seriously reduced by the limited range of the radar, the conUnued reliance on gunand the restrictionursuit attack. Some of these models are equipped with AAMs. and their capability is less seriously limited by nonvisual conditions."

roe ehartsrxenrOcs of inlereepton and airborne intercepteei.

aervrtt 1X1 TT1HP01

ande estimate thai production ol these new genera, lion interceptors begannd thatuve been produced since that time. Although we have identified onlyn units, we estimate that atave actually Been deployed

Three new nigh performance mierceptor prototypes were displayed fli1 Aviation Day show, the FIREBAR B. the FLIPPER and tlic FIDDLER We have limited evMerice that FIDDLER aad rsoaainiy FLIPPER may be in production now We estimate mat ali three of the new fighters wilt be produced and that they could Start entering units4 Ail three Ol these new tighten are equipped with unproved AI radar and AAMs The appearance of theew long-range fighter mayoviet intent toapability to intercept air-to-surface missile (ASM) earners We estimate that this aircraft will be able tooiterm or more from base However. Its potential for such missions Is currently limited by the shorter ranges of Soviet Ground Control Intercept (OCI). and by the amount Of warning time available.

iBlererplcr Production. Soviet production of Interceptor aircraft has Cropped sharply in recent years. Annual productioneak ofi theroduction declined to07 and to9 This decline was partly due to rising cosxs and production difficulties caused by the increased complexity of modem fighters However the primary cause was probably tnedeployment of SAM sites. The USSR produced on the orderierceptor* annually0e esumate thatnterceptors will be produced2

Arf-fo-Air.

have firm evidence on the deployment of AAMs in theforce and in several Of the Satellite force* as well Wethree types are nowadar beamruler (AA-lf.horning missileissile which may beinfrared horning missile or as ail-weather semiscuvewo versionsrototype AAM. designatedobserved on FIDDLES and FLIPPER at1 Tushino sirwe estimate that one of these versions willrobable that these missilei haveradar homing systems and that they can canywarheads, some of which may be nuclear SovietImproved AAMs over Ihe next few years will depend primarilydevelopment of interceptor- equipped with suitable AI radarcontrol system "

-For prrfonnir.ee eKirictcrUUes ef AAMs. see Annex A. Tattle I

vns

Sonets continue tc employ large lumbers ollor defense of field forces and fixed urxrti primarily forlow altitude* wtiere Qjniar aad missile effectiveness ts prior.range in stse fromunrge percentagecontrol radars. Proximity fuses probably are used in someEuropean Satellite forces haveand there areIM in Communist China. NorthNorth Vietnam. The number of antiaircraft guns In thenow0 has declined over the post few years andIs continuing. Because of the widespread deployment olraukv* that most ol the remaining medium and heavy guns useddefense of fixed target* In the USSR wiU be phased out overfew years.arge number of these probably will bereserve status near mayor targetnd some will bedefend held forces Tranaler of some of thu equipmentrobable "

IV. lAOAf. AND CONIROt1

believe thateavy prime radars and aboutradars are deployed in various combinations at someIn Uve Slno-Sovvei Bloc. Overlapping radar coverage extendsentire USSR and European Satellite area with the heaviestwets of the Ural* and in peripheral areas In the Parcoverage extend, from the Smart-North Koranihe coastal rone of Communal Cnina. into North VietnamChina along the borders of Laos Thailand, andcoverage in China l* sparse: radars are generally locatedtarget complexes In some coastal areas of the USSR,radar Is usedto extend early warning (EW)to vlow altitude detection capabilities "

fortyadon

he Soviet aircraft warning system is baaed upon large numbers Of EW radarl clooely spaced throughout the USSR. Under optimum condition* this system can detect and track aircraft at medium and high alUtudea morerom Bloc territory; under virtually all conditions the system can detect and track aircraft at these altitudes wuatnm Maximum altitude capabilities of the most common EW radars will continue to exceed th* operauonaj altitudes of Western aircraft during Use period of this estimate. Low altitude de-

- For (harv^tertstsos ot antiaircraft gum, see Annex A. Tablefat eharscteriaUc* ol Soviet radars, see Annex A. Table s

TOP^fcRET

lection md tracking capabilities are limited, but tbe density of coverage make* detection and intermittent tracking likely

groundfnrercepr "odors

eavy ew radars are also usedc1 rote to obtain use reqiunu accuracy for heightgc1 operations, the ew radar it used ir. cceii hesght-emder radari. the limm of wtaen reduce the macro urn effective range totypes of radars employ mo-mg target indicators or other antatlauer techniques, but the low altitude capabilities of most go radars remain quit* limited

oarect.oo of missile launching!

he sonetso operational radar system for early warning of ballistic missile attack the development of high frequency wnosphene backacatur radars for detection of long-range missile launching! has been within soviet capabilities for at least six years. the soviet* haveigh degree of competence in backscatter research and theory. much soviet work in the latter field has related lo development of new communications techniques, but the soviets have probably also used thi* method lor detecting us nuclear detonations and possiblyt* use against missiles mightimited amount of ew time for alerting defenses.

of radars

of coverage. moreover, inf radar* the sonet* have tended to retain much of th* older equipment in semce resultingteady growth in th* optratirioal inventory however, in the past year or so. tha deployment ot new and better radars and the introduction of automated control systems appear to have lededuction in the number of radar site*ew areas. that trend will probably continue, leading eventuallyignificant reduction in the operational inventory

pon.v. derecfioit

si the sonet air warning system is supplemented by passivewhich can extend bw range beyond most known radarariety of specialized equipment, used for detection and direction-

toyelecret

rinding, can cow moil of the irequenc.es used by Western coram unsca-tions and radar. This equipment has been estensively deployed at sttei in forward areas Of the Soviet Bloc and has also been Observed on Soviet ihlps and aircraft. The extent to which passive detection has beenUito the air defense system is not clear. The large number Ofair potential for Ur|et location, but the elaborate data haraaing facilities required to exploit this potential effectively may not be available.

oWore

t present, the USSR has an appreciable capability tor jamming Western lone-range radio communication! and bombing andradars. Including frequencies up0 megacycles and possibly higher. The Sovieti are also known to have employed electronicIncluding wmulalion of Western navigalional aids, against West-em aircraft- Present capabilities probably will be increased by the use of unproved techniques and higher power Toward the end of the period Of this estimate, the USSR will probably have in operation equipment capable of punming at all frequences likely to be used by Westernuncancels, radar, aad navigabcc equipment

l.Sic,

ond Ce-nfol

TOP^&RET

or poinl-lopoint ground communications in support ol bitoperations. Hie Soviets wJi continue to improve and expand land-line and microwave Unas. Trie use ol high frequency radio will decrease, but wui continue for specialnd backup The rritcrawav* tVs-tem me Soviets plan to bars operating0 will be capable of re-iayincaignaJ over long fltsunce* without serious degradation ano willow degree of vulnerability to jamming and interception. Both operational and experimental iropospherlc scatter links are ui existence, and at least two ionnsprKilc settler links are being tested in the far northern arras Of the USSR These link) would be important to air defertses In Usee* northern areas, where more coo*entiorial radio rranmunieaUons are subject to climatic interference andre noncxistant.

he most Importantoviet air defense communications over the last few years has been the development and deployment of an air defense control system witn some semiautomatic features These features include data handling equipment lor rapid procesnnc of air defense information and data link equipment for controllingBeginning inoviet system, similar in conorpt to th* US SAOE system but less complex, was widely Deployed In the western ussr We believe that th* ground element Of this system has been replacedecond gerieraUon system, and that an improved semiautomatic fighter control rystern IS being introduced These new systems will probably be widely deployed in the USSR and possibly Eastern Europe within the neat few years.

ideo data link system has been Introduced which is used to transmit the radar display from tha radar site to th* filter control center for visual presentation.idely deployed throughout the Soviet Bloc, especially on Use periphery

V. CIVIL DEFENSE

he responsibility for Soviet Civil defense preparations was transferred from the Ministry of internal Affairs to the Ministry of Defense Development* since then hare appeared to reflect increased recngniuon of the difficulty of bulkling deep shelter* able to withstand high yield nuclear weapons. Relatively more emphasis has been placed on use of emergency shelters such as basements and covered trenches, and on evacuation, especially preattafc evacuation of "noneffectives" from likely target areas and their resettlement elsewhere for tbe duration of the war uadOctruuuioc of trie populace in civil nefemc measures has continued and haa come to mclud* radio lectures and televisedRims. Information on the possibility of widespread radio-active fallout has been published, and manuals on civil defense for rural areaseen issued

TOP

TO?

tnl defense ImTmng has been, at least in theory, both obligatory and universal We be b* re thatallllor So net crusens bare received some instruction in civil defense Ot these, someillion bare probably received rood basse training in eiernentary crvil defease techniques such as use of stutters and gas masks, and have probably been iamOlamed with ptotecUvv clothing and radiation moru-tonng equirxment On the other hand, the training rxcernsrn has auf-tered In many areas from poor instruction shortage ot training aids, and public apathy.

lthough the USSRubstantial lead orer any of the Western Posjers. it still lacks adequate shelter for the bulk of the pcepoiatlon. Basement she Iters are probably capable of providing some protection to perhapsillion city dwe.lers against radiation and Ore.illion persons in Moscow. leningrad. Baku. Tbilisi, and Kiev can take refuge In subways, which are probably capable o( resisting some overpressure We presume that the USSR has prepared 'or theand protection of key party and government personnel, but weo evidence on relocation centers We estimate that detached and tunnel type shelters and underground bunkers are available toillion key personnel Thus, some kind ol shelter Is available for about one fifth of the urban population. Virtually nothing has been don* to provide shelter for the rural population, who would presumably have to prepare their own shelter in lite form of dugouts or earth-covered trenches.

n terms of shelters buill snd personnel trained the USSR has made greater progress than any other mayor power. Even with inrntnH warning. Soviet Civil defense measure* would probably reduce casualties considerably, especially among key personnel Nonetheless, we believe that Soviet civil defense is not prepared to cope with large-scale nuclear attack, especially under conditions of short warning time

VI. SOVIET AME*S* CAP

SZ. Air defense weapons and eq uprnent are most heavily concentrated in that portion of the USSR westo* drawn from the Kola Peninsula to the Caspian Sea: la East Germany Poland, and Cxecnceicvatoa;he southern portion of th* Soviet Far East Crxscentrstfson* are also found at some specific Iocs tieutside these areas, especially ia the Uralsastern China. Th* approaches to Moacow are by far the rnoet heavily defended area of the Bloc

Winning Time

W radar could now give Moscow and many other targets in the Interior more than one hour's warning of medium and high altitude

TOP^KRET

f

attacks rr.nde with Western Uimt^ti of thetype Snict assurance of such detection would be reduced by low level penetrations. Thebombers and ASMS now being added to Western inventories could reduce this warning time by as much asercent. Moreover, the more limited EW time available in Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of the defenses of even heavily defended targets in such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles increase, and as Western ballistic missilesreater part of the threat, the problem of warning time will become more critical.

Current Capabilities ond future frendr

be extensive deployment of SAMs over the past four years has stgrjincantiy Improved Soviet air defense capabilities. These inabilities are greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers In daylight and clear weather at altitudes betweennd0 feet. Under such conditions, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to00 feet; the FLIPPER will probably be able to execute attacks at0he capabilities of the fighter force would be reduced considerably during periods ofor poor visibility. In the increasingly widespread areas defended by SAMs, air defense capabilities would be virtuallyby weather conditions and would extend to altitudes of0 feet.

espite its recent and considerable improvements, however, the Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in copingarge-scale air attack employing varied and sophisticated tactics, even in daylight and within the foregoing altitudes. In addition, the Soviet defense problem would be complicated by the variety of delivery systems which might be employed. Including air and surface-launched cruise missile* and. fighter-bombers At altitudes beloweet, the capabilities of tbe system would be progressively reduced; beloweet, the system would lose most of its effectiveness. The Soviets wDl attempt to correct these deficiencies during the next few years by further deployment of low altitudeites and by improving the capabilities of fighter aircraft in low altitude operations. Total system effectiveness will be Increased by th* further application of automated command and control.

"Current operationalnterceptors ITS Kit ED. Ki'l'l'EK. nSHPOT) air

capable orynamic dlrab and reacting aiUtude* Ofeet Inlimb. Use aircraft vrould be al these altitudeshort pericd ot tune (perhaps on* to three minnteai, dttriniit "ouJd bare tittle ctaaeuTVTabtlity. Tile precision vrith walcb Uift climb must be planned and executed limits Us edecUveows as an Intercept tactic.

it-

rOP JKRfcT

be Soviet* now have no operational ca pa bullyowever, they may now haw some capability inneld forces against short-range ballistic missiles TheABM system will probably become3 Inor three yvara, the USSR may achieve soene capability to defendnumber of additionalmissiles How-

ever, over this same time period, the Scrvteta will haw Utile capability againompter teems of missile attack. We believeoreABM system will almost certainly not become operationalnd that its deploymentubstantial teal* wul require several yean

he significant Improvements in the Soviet air defense system which have been noted during recent years and which will be extended during the next few years will progressively reduce the chances ofattacks by manned bombers. Successful penetration by bombers will therefore require increasingly sophtaUcated forms of attack. The Soviet air defense capability can be degraded by the increasingly com pier forms of attack which tbe West will be able to employ.air launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetrationnd electronic counterraeasure* Even in stickthe Soviets would probably expect toumber cd the attsckera W* doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage lo the USSR would be accrptanie Unless and unQI tbe USSR is able toubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air snd miorlle defense deficiencies and uncertain ties wul sharply increase as ballisticarger proportion of ths West's total nuclear delivery capability

TOPXECBET

ABLES

TABLErobable Sonet Development Program lor Surface-lo-Air Mis-rale Systems

TABLEstimated Performance of Soviet Interceptor Aircraft

TABLEstimated Pi^ormance of Soviet Airborne Intercept Radars

TABLErobable Soviet Development Program for Air-to-Air Mice If Systems

TABLEstimated Characteristics and Performance of Soviet Early Warning and Ground Controlled Intercept Radars

TABLEstimated Characteristics of Bloc Antiaircraft Guns

TABLEstimated Strength and Deployment of Smo-Soviet Bloc Air Defense2

TABLEEstimated Slno-Sowri Bloc Fighter Strength,

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